

Chad

The Minority Rights Group

Report No. 80



THE MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP

is an international research and information unit registered in Britain as an educational charity under the Charities Act of 1960. Its principal aims are —

- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world.
- To help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised, are very difficult to resolve; and
- To foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.

The Minority Rights Group urgently needs further funds for its work. Please contribute what you can. MRG is eligible to receive a covenant from UK taxpayers.

SPONSORS

Lady Butler
Milovan Djilas
Dr Rober Gardiner
Lord Goodman, CH
Rt Hon Lord Grimond, PC
Dr Joseph Needham

COUNCIL

Professor Roland Oliver — **Chairman**
Hugo Brunner
George W. Cadbury
Ben Hooberman
Richard Kershaw
David Kessler
Keith Kyle
Scilla Elworthy
Dr Claire Palley
Professor Terence Ranger
Walter Schwarz

STAFF

Alan Phillips — Executive Director
Becky Che Abas — Education
Danny Hearty — Education
James MacSweeney — Administration
Marcia Roulston — Office Secretary
Kaye Stearman — Deputy Director

OFFICE

29 Craven Street London WC1N 5NT
01-930 6659

Chad

By Kaye Whiteman

Kaye Whiteman is a journalist, writer and broadcaster on African affairs, notably on francophone Africa. He has contributed numerous articles to newspapers, magazines and learned publications as well as chapters to several books and is presently Editor-in-Chief and General Manager of *West Africa*. He has travelled widely in West Africa and visited Chad several times.

The cover photograph shows Chadian refugees in Kousseri refugee camp, Cameroon (L. Davico, UNHCR).

Printed by Expedite Graphic Limited, Murray House, 3 Vandon Street, London SW1H 0AG.

ISBN No 0 946690 60 X

This report was first published in September 1988.

MRG gratefully acknowledges financial help towards the cost of this report from the *European Human Rights Foundation*.

The report that follows has been commissioned, and is published, by the Minority Rights Group as a contribution to public understanding of the problem which forms its subject. It does not necessarily represent, in every detail and in all its aspects, the collective view of the Group.

To receive the reports of the Minority Rights Group on a regular basis please take out a subscription. 5 reports annually for £7.50/US\$15.

For details of the other reports published by the Minority Rights Group, please see the inside back cover.

Other publications available from MRG include:

Minorities: a question of human rights?

edited by *Ben Whitaker* with an introduction by *Professor Roland Oliver*. This is a collection of the MRG Annual Lectures, together in book form for the first time. Contributors are *Conor Cruise O'Brien, Sir Edmund Leach, Marie Jahoda, Sean McBride, Lord Grimond, Lord Scarman, Sir James Fawcett, Ralf Dahrendorf, Shirley Williams, Shridath Ramphal and Sadruddin Aga Khan*. Published by Pergamon Press in association with MRG.

ISBN 0 08 0308317

Price £9.50/US\$16 post free from MRG.

Please subscribe to MRG's Reports: this will help you to receive them regularly, at a lower cost; and help MRG, enabling it to commission further urgently needed future Reports.

Chad

By Kaye Whiteman

CONTENTS

<i>Map</i>	3
Introduction	4
Geography, ethnicity and national unity	5
The French intervention of 1969	7
The decline and fall of Tombalbaye	8
Disintegration and civil war	10
Habré takes power	12
Operation Manta	13
The final push north	15
<i>Footnotes</i>	16
<i>Bibliography</i>	16

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BET	Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti
CAR	Central African Republic
CCFAN	Conseil de Commande des Forces Armées du Nord
CDR	Conseil Démocratique Revolutionnaire
CDS	Comité Défence et Sécurité
CSM	Conseil Supérieur Militaire
FACP	Front d'Action Commun Provisoire
FAN	Forces Armées du Nord
FANT	Forces Armées Nationales du Tchad
FAO	Forces Armées de l'Occident
FAP	Forces Armées Populaires
FAT	Forces Armées Tchadiennes
FDT	Front Démocratique du Tchad
FLT	Front de Libération Tchadienne
FROLINAT	Front de Libération Nationale
GUNT	Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition
MNLT	Mouvement National de Libération du Tchad
MNRCS	Mouvement National pour la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale
MPLT	Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad
MRA	Mission pour la Reforme Administrative
MRP	Mouvement Révolutionnaire du Peuple
MSA	Mouvement Socialiste Africain
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PPT	Parti du Peuple Tchadien
UNT	Union Nationale Tchadienne
UNIR	Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution

THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from any fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge.

Now, Therefore,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interest.

Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.



KEY

National boundaries

Prefecture boundaries

Parallels and disputed territory

Main roads

INTRODUCTION

At first sight it may appear strange for the Minority Rights Group to produce a report which has as its subject not a minority group but a whole country. Like many other nations in Africa and elsewhere Chad is a nation of minorities which is essentially the creation of the arbitrary European colonial practice of drawing lines across a map rather than creating an integrated unit. Yet there are many such nations which are the subject of MRG's concerns — Lebanon in the Middle East, Uganda and Burundi in Africa, to name only a few. What they and Chad have in common is not only that they are to a large extent artificial states, but that they have been subject to degrees of internal conflict which in Lebanon, Uganda and Burundi have resulted in large scale death and devastation and almost destroyed their economic base. For a state such Chad, already desperately poor, the disaster has only been compounded.

Not only has Chad been subject to almost incessant internal rebellions and civil wars since its independence in 1960 but it has also suffered periodic intervention by outside forces, whether at the invitation of whatever government currently ruled in the capital or of strategically placed rebel forces outside, or without any discernible invitation at all. The ex-colonial power France has had forces almost continually stationed in Chad since independence and has sent reinforcements on at least 3 occasions, most notably in 1969 but also in 1983-4 and 1986. Chad's northern neighbour Libya has maintained that it has a claim to an area of northern Chad, as a result of a treaty of dubious legality between the colonial powers France and Italy. Libyan troops and weapons have played their role in Chad since independence and on several occasions Libya has engaged in battle. The US, because of its opposition to Libya has on occasion given overt and covert support to the current Chadian government.

Chad's African neighbours have all played a part in attempting to create, fuel or resolve its continuing ethnic, religious and political conflicts. Neighbouring countries have frequently acted as refuges for dissidents and armed rebels from Chad, whether as policy or passively. Nigeria, disturbed at the prospect of continued conflict along part of her north-west border and knowing from her own history the traumas of such protracted conflict, attempted to build a peace process within the country in 1979. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has also attempted on several occasions to bring about a peaceful settlement, but as with the Western Sahara question, there are too many conflicting interests within the organization and the problem of peace in Chad has proved to be intractable.

Within Chad itself there have been many attempts to create 'reconciliation' between different groups and communities but it cannot be claimed that at any time did this process show much chance of success, probably because the structure of political life was so oriented towards rule by political and military strongmen and later by competing warlords. A series of regimes have created and imposed various forms of authoritarian rule — Tombalbaye from 1960 to 1975, Malloum from 1975 to 1979, the GUNT government from 1979 to 1982 and under Habré from 1982 until the time of writing. For much of this period various, often substantial, areas of the country have been held under the changing fortunes of 'warlords', disaffected military commanders, opposition groups, guerrilla bands and foreign backed forces. Under the cover of single party rule and military conflict, human rights abuses — such as torture, detention without trial, extra-legal killings of political opponents and massacres of unarmed civilians — have been continuing on a large scale, both by the recognized government and opposition groups.

This report by MRG is primarily about the process of ethnic and religious conflict, political disintegration and foreign intervention in Chad since independence. The ordinary people of Chad hardly feature in this report, just as they have not featured largely in the priorities of their rulers or those who seek to protect political and

strategic interests in what is, for all practical purposes, one of the least important countries, in wealth, power or prestige, in the world. For the people of Chad these conflicts have been a tragedy, just as they have been for those in Lebanon or Uganda or many of the other situations which MRG Reports cover. Ironically, just as the people of Chad appear to be deriving some precarious stability from a cessation of large scale internal hostilities, the price they must pay is that of the apparent exclusion of the majority of the population — notably the Sara peoples from the south — from holding real power. This report does not offer solutions to the crisis in Chad but it does try to explain the background to the complex and tragic conflict in the hope that it will increase knowledge and understanding of it.

The colonial background

The key symbolical event in the birth of the territory which became the modern state of Chad was the battle of Kousséri on 21 April, 1900. Although Kousséri lies in what is now Cameroon, the battle saw the death of two prominent opposing figures in the history of Chad — the Khartoum-based Islamic warlord Rabeh, and the commander of a French expeditionary force, Colonel Lamy. Although both leaders died in the conflict, the battle saw the rout of Rabeh's forces, and opened the way to the French conquest of what is now northern Chad. Symbolically, Lamy's name was given to the fort on the banks of the Chari river which became the territory's capital, and is now Ndjamena.

It was in fact one of the last parts of the African continent to be carved up between European powers in the 'scramble for Africa'. France had developed a grand design of a continuous mass of territory from Algiers in the north to Dakar in the west to the Congo river in the south, and eventually extending to the Red Sea in the east. Frustrated in this last ambition by the defeat at Fashoda on the Upper Nile in 1898, France set about taking over as much as remained of unconquered territory, which happened to be mainly in the Sahara Desert.

This meant cracking open one of the last surviving bastions of power in the area, Rabeh's recently established domain in the Kanem-Borno locality, extending into Baguirmi. Chad's colonial borders were drawn more hastily than most, and, as elsewhere, were contingent more on the power play between Europe's national States than on local considerations, and in the case of Chad extremely disparate peoples were lumped together by political chance and for administrative convenience.

Moreover, mastery over the northern part of Chad, the area later known as the BET (Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti) was only achieved by 1914 after Italy's conquest of Libya diverted expansionist Turkish power from the area even if World War I, which saw a revolt in Cyrenaica, prolonged regional insecurity. Cyrenaica was the home of the Sanusiya brotherhood, a proselytising Islamic fraternity who expanded into much of what is now northern Chad in the 19th century. It had been the crushing of Sanusiya power in the vicinity of Tibesti in 1913-14, that had helped to consolidate France's hold on the BET area.

The northern frontier continued to be in doubt because of Italian unhappiness after the carve-up of German territories at the end of World War I. In 1935 an agreement was made between the Italian dictator Mussolini and the then French Premier Pierre Laval pushing the Libyan frontier southwards to include the Aozou oasis. Although this agreement was never ratified, it was never formally denounced by the French after the defeat of Italy in World War II and it formed the basis of Libya's continued claim to the Aozou strip, asserted by King Idris after Libya became independent in 1952 (when his troops temporarily occupied Aozou), and from 1969 by the revolutionary regime of Colonel Gaddafi.

The BET was more or less 'pacified' by the early 1920s, but the local population was always extremely hostile to colonization, and the area remained under French military administration until Chad's independence in 1960. The formal handing over of administrative power from the French military to the Chadians in the BET took

place only at the beginning of 1965. By 1968, French troops had returned there at the invitation of the government of independent Chad.

GEOGRAPHY, ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL UNITY

Thus in its beginnings, Chad made unpromising material for an independent state. This can be seen especially in its geography, both physical and human. With 1,284,000 sq. kms., it is the fifth largest country in Africa, with over 4000 kms. of land frontiers with six countries. It is also notable as the largest landlocked country in the world without rail access to the ocean, and it is over 1500 km. as the crow flies to the nearest port at Douala in Cameroon, and a lot longer by road. Routes through Nigeria, or through the Central African Republic to the railway in Congo-Brazzaville are equally awkward and unsatisfactory.

For part of the year, rains render many of the country's roads impassable, and even without rebellion and civil war it would count as one of the world's most under-developed and least-favoured countries, with little in the way of natural resources beyond cotton and cattle. Although, for reasons of administrative disruption due to civil war, Chad's GNP per capita does not figure in World Bank statistics, it used to be among those at the very bottom of the world table. It has a certain geological unity as part of the Chad Basin, around the lake which gives the country its name, but ecologically it moves from the desert over much of the north through Sahelian conditions in the centre to the savannah in the south.

Chad has never had a proper population census and the last reliable survey of population was in 1964 when the total population was 3.3 million. Today it is projected at nearly 5 million. However this is very unevenly distributed. The northern area (the BET) holds only about 6% of the population, and well over one third of the total territory, while the five prefectures of the far south, about one tenth of the area of Chad, contain about 46% of the total population. This region, sometimes known as *Le Tchad utile* (useful Chad) also contains much of the fertile agricultural land.

The other significant statistics to do with the population are of religious affiliations, with just over 50% Muslims, and the rest divided between Christians (the majority of whom are Catholics) and animists, in equal proportions. Again, all but 0.6% of the Christians and all but 3.5% of the animists are in the far south, mainly from the Sara ethnic group. For most of the first twenty years of independence, until the 1979 watershed, politics, the civil service and the armed forces (although not business) were dominated by people from the five prefectures, often referred to collectively if inaccurately as Sara because of the prevalence of Sara language and culture. This domination was based above all on the advantage given by the ascendancy in that area of Western-style education. According to one authority there were in 1975 81.4% illiterates in the north against 72.5% in the southern prefectures, with 0.9% of northerners reading and writing French compared to 26.8% in the south and 17.7% reading and writing Arabic in the north as against 0.7% in the south.¹

It is, even so, misleading to talk of Chad suffering from a straight north-south divide, as Chad really breaks down into three parts — the sparsely populated desert north (including the inaccessible and barren Tibesti mountains); the more highly populous sahelian zone of scrub and arid lands in the centre of the country, dominated by Islamic sultanates such as Kanem, Baguirmi and Ouaddai; and the non-Muslim, agriculturally-endowed, far south, merging from grasslands into forest. It is also unhelpful to see Chad's so-called north-south problem in purely racial terms comparable to, say, Mauritania or even neighbouring Sudan, even if there is some similarity in population patterns with the Sudanese neighbour. Chad does have an important group that are usually classified as Arab, maybe as much as 25% to 30% of the total population. Some are nomads or semi-nomads, others are in settlements as in the Salamat area in the south-east, or settled and assimilated as an elite in most of the central prefectures.

Chad's Arabs are more identifiable by their use of Arab customs and language, than from race, due to centuries of inter-marriage with African peoples (unlike in Sudan, light-skinned Chadians are rare). A similar phenomenon exists on a smaller scale in the Nigerian state of Borno, which borders Lake Chad, where the Arabs are called Shuwa, an appellation also given (as Shoa or Sua) in Western Chad. Thus the Arabs coexist and merge with the Kanembu, Maba, Hadda and a multitude of other Western Sahelian groups. They are absent, however, from the far north, which is populated mainly by two groups, the Teda and Daza peoples, who inhabit the northern and southern sides of the Tibesti mountains respectively. They are supposed to be descended from the original inhabitants of the Sahara, and are more ethnically affiliated to the Kanembu than to the Arabs. They are also known as Goranes (in Arabic) or, more generally, as Toubou (in Kanembu) and have fiercely resisted all penetration, whether by Arabs (Sanusi or Sudanese), French, or the central government in Ndjamen, which eventually, despite their small numbers, they sought to control.

Chad's dilemma since independence has thus been how peoples as unlike as the Sara and the Toubou, or even the Sara and the peoples of the central zone, can live together in a national entity, given the strong cultural and religious differences. Power in 28 years of independence has passed from the far south to the far north. From the period of the rise of nationalism onwards, secession, partition, confederation and federation have been variously suggested, but curiously, in spite of all the conflict, or perhaps because of it, a Chadian identity, although fragile and embryonic, appears to have been forged. As in neighbouring Nigeria (although less so in Sudan) the shared experience of civil war and adversity have had the effect of forging a Chadian identity among protagonists. Some observers see a parallel in the pre-colonial empire of Kanem, which survived in the approximate area of what is now Chad for nine centuries, and achieved a kind of equilibrium between desert, sahelian and savannah zones.

Paradoxically, the sentimental 'idea of Chad' was something that was given a boost by the French colonialists, well beyond the physical fact of their having delineated the borders. Apart from its desert allure, and the stamping ground it offered with the other Sahara territories for the Foreign Legion, Chad's particular mystique evolved during World War II, when under the French Guianese Governor Felix Eboué it became the first overseas territory to respond to General de Gaulle's 1940 appeal from London. Thus for all Gaullists Chad became a major rallying point as it was also the base from which General Leclerc staged his famous march across the Sahara which ended at Berchtesgaden. Of more than 3000 men who went with Leclerc only 55 were actually French, and the vast majority of the rest were Sara, who were the great military reservoir of French Equatorial Africa.

Leclerc's old regiment even now bears the name 'Chad regiment' (there are of course no Sara in it now) and it is possible that Gaullist sentiment about Chad helped to condition the French into accepting de Gaulle's post independence decision to intervene in 1968 and 1969, and that Frenchmen should be prepared to be *mort pour le Tchad* ('dead for Chad'). It was a feeling that waned and in the 1970s President Pompidou rapidly wound down the intervention (see below). All subsequent interventions (under President Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand) have been of limited duration; but the strong French and Gaullist mythology around Chad may have helped point the way to a Chadian identity. It is still a potent myth that can be drawn on.

Independence and the seeds of revolt

The manner in which France granted independence to its black African territories was not conducive to the preparation for the responsibility of nationhood in an area as loosely knit as Chad. Although World War II had led to some political awakening, the basis for a mass national movement such as the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) became in countries such as Guinea

and Ivory Coast, was not immediately present despite the efforts of the talented leader of its local branch in Chad, Gabriel Lisette. He was a former administrator of Guadeloupian origin, who was elected to represent Chad at the National Assembly in Paris from 1946 to 1951 and again from 1957 to 1959, and later, after the 1958 referendum, in which period he became Chief Minister/Prime Minister. However, his presence aroused antagonisms, especially among Muslim politicians.

The local version of the RDA, the *Parti du Peuple Tchadien* (PPT) did not have an overall majority in the territorial assembly, and had to form alliances with other groups. This unstable situation eventually led to the fall of Lisette's government in January 1959. There followed a period in which governments succeeded each other in quick succession. The first was headed by Gontchomé Sahoulba, traditional ruler of Léré (in Mayo-Kebbi in the non-Sara south), but he was succeeded in March by Ahmed Koulamallah, the head of the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain* (MSA), who achieved power for twelve days in March. It was the Muslims' chance for power and it was lost by factional intrigue in their own ranks, perhaps with assistance from the colonial French, who with few grounds suspected Koulamallah's 'Nasserist' connections.

This was the moment at which Lisette was replaced as both Premier and as PPT leader by the Sara politician François Tombalbaye, who had made political capital of Lisette's expatriate origins, and used the by now strong Arab power-base of the PPT to make his bid for power. Tombalbaye went on to hold fresh elections in which the PPT consolidated its southern power base and made inroads elsewhere in the country, so that it now had a convincing majority. Tombalbaye went on to become President of independent Chad in 1960.

Thus did the basically Sara far south inherit the political kingdom. In view of their dominant position in national life it was difficult to see how it could have been otherwise, but the country which became a republic in August 1960 was not happy or united. Tombalbaye, a man of limited experience and political imagination, constantly cast around to find a broader national base, but was pushed by circumstance into authoritarian actions. He, like Lisette, tried to divide and rule the Muslim politicians, but as a Sara, his problems were almost greater than those of Lisette.

The Muslims knew that in March 1959 he had petitioned the French to divide the north from the rest of Chad, and he stood as a symbol of the south's relative educational advance, which meant that as French colonial personnel were withdrawn they were more likely to be replaced with southerners than from other regions of Chad.

In March 1962, Tombalbaye dissolved all parties other than the PPT, and imposed a single-party state. Since the Muslim politicians now had no vehicle for political expression, this increased their frustration, and in March 1963 Djibrine Kerallah, the Foreign Minister, who was one of the leading Muslims in the government, resigned following a reshuffle which reduced the number of Muslim ministers. Tombalbaye then dissolved the National Assembly, arrested its President and a number of prominent political figures, both Christian and Muslim, and tried them for plotting against the state. Tension remained high, and in September, after the arrest of more leading politicians, including Kerallah and Jean Baptiste, the popular Mayor of Fort Lamy, serious rioting between Muslims and non-Muslims broke out in the capital. Officially more than 100 people were killed, but unofficial estimates put the figure higher. Koulamallah was also detained, having been returned by the government of Cameroon, whence he had fled.²

This was the great rupture — the end of the attempt to find a valid political consensus, and it was from the events of 1969 that the present conflict was born. Many future rebel leaders were either jailed or fled the country at that time. There followed a period in which Tombalbaye organised 'controlled' elections at the end of 1963, in which he was returned with 97% support, and brought a few token Muslims into his government. Though the opposition appeared to have been suppressed, it eventually resulted in a disastrous reaction. Exactions such as the 1964 'development loan',

devised by Tombalbaye to meet mounting deficits, and the older cattle tax, both abusively administered by southern bureaucrats, created a tinderbox atmosphere outside the south, especially after the government tax drive of 1965. In November 1965 riots against tax collectors broke out at Mangalmé³ then in Batha prefecture. This is usually described as the birth of the Chad rebellion. According to Tombalbaye it was a 'misunderstanding about taxes', but all reports indicated that the forced collection of taxes at up to more than three times the prescribed rate pushed the local population into spontaneous violence which left about 500 dead, including the local deputy, and the *Directeur de Cabinet* of the Interior Minister. It created a spate of simmering revolts in central and eastern Chad, over several prefectures, occasionally erupting into violence and jacqueries, made worse by the brutal government repression that followed Mangalmé.

In this atmosphere of dissent and revolt *Front de Libération Nationale* (FROLINAT) was formed at a meeting on 22 June 1966 at Nyala in western Sudan, just over the border from Salamat, one of the strongest dissident areas with a high population of Chadian Arabs. FROLINAT was ostensibly a merger between the *Union Nationale Tchadienne* (UNT) of Ibrahim Abatcha a militant trade unionist originally from Borno in Nigeria, exiled to Egypt and Sudan in 1963, and the *Mouvement National de Libération du Tchad* (MNLT) of Ahmed Moussa. Although both groups could trace their origins to the MSA of Ahmed Koulamallah, the UNT was more a group of intellectuals, some of whom achieved later prominence, while the MNLT, according to some sources, had more conservative Islamic connections particularly in Ouaddai prefecture. Moussa, in any case, was not at the meeting, and attacked it soon after, withdrawing his own supporters to form the *Front de Libération Tchadienne* (FLT).

It was Abatcha, however, who emerged as the first leader thrown up by the Chad rebellion. With material help from Ghana and Algeria, and assisted by seven 'Koreans', North Korean-trained graduates of Arabic universities, and incorporating some FLT supporters, he set about capitalising on the discontent in the prefectures of the centre and east recruiting supporters, and organising guerrilla operations against Tombalbaye's forces in these areas. Early in 1968 he was apprehended and killed during an operation.⁴

Although Abatcha's death was a setback for organised revolt in the centre and east, a new factor emerged soon after in the shape of a rebellion in the hitherto quiescent BET, the vast sparsely populated far north, traditionally lightly governed, and considered as almost separate from the rest of the country. It is one of the ironies of independent Chad that a small minority should come from a position of virtually total exclusion from power at independence, to completely dominate its government. The whole of the BET's population, the vast majority of which are Teda-Daza, or Toubou, was projected in 1979 at 96,000, or just over 6% of the total population of Chad, and the same projection put the Teda-Daza ethnic group at 6.2% of the total.

The causes of the outbreak seem to have been similar to those which triggered the rebellion in the centre and east in 1965, notably the lack of consideration on the part of southerners for local sensitivities. If the reaction came a few years later than in the centre and east, it was because the BET had been in the protective cocoon of French military administration. It was the replacement in 1965 of the French by members of the Chad army (the Toubou actually referred to them as Chadians) that led to a deterioration in relations between the far north and the south. Especially provocative, it is said, was the behaviour of the second *sous-préfet* sent to Tibesti, Lieutenant Allafi whose brutal activities were even recorded in the report⁵ of the French officer Major Galopin, who reported on the causes of the Tibesti uprising. The attempt by the BET Prefect appointed in 1966, the then Lt. Col. Negue Djogo, to compel the cultivation of land, and worse, to 'sedentarise' people who were traditionally nomads, also caused outrage, as did the disregard for the *dia*, the blood price that plays a key role in Toubou culture. At the end of 1966 the traditional ruler of the Teda, the *Derde*, Kichidimi Weddeye, partly because of these oppressive acts, but

also because of the refusal to appoint his son, Goukouni Weddeye, to a post in the administration, went into exile in Libya with about a thousand followers.

Into this turbulence came one of Abatcha's lieutenants in FROLINAT, Mahamat Ali Taher, said to be instrumental in provoking a mutiny of Nomad Guards at the Aozou outpost on 8 March 1968. They massacred the garrison held by southern troops and succeeded in holding it until August when French and Chadian troops recaptured the garrison, in the first direct intervention of French troops since they had withdrawn from the BET. The government in Fort Lamy claimed that it had been a simple mutiny, but it was in fact the signal for a more general insurrection; after the French withdrew in November, Aozou, and other garrisons such as Bardai and Zouar continued to be harassed by dissident Toubou.

At the same time, the revolt in the centre and east was taking on an increased dimension, in spite of Abatcha's death. The main rebel leader at this stage was El Hadj Issaka, a strongly Islamic former *chef de canton* from Batha, who had been in exile in Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan, and who now showed talent as a guerrilla fighter. Although Toubou attacks in the far north continued into 1969, it was the threat to the capital from the more numerous rebel fighters — estimates are between two and four thousand — that led to President Tombalbaye's mission to Paris in March 1969 to request a comprehensive French military intervention.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION OF 1969

French troops based in Chad were normally numbered around 1500, after the substantial reductions of 1964-5. There were also perhaps as many as 300 advisers serving with the Chad armed forces, but what Tombalbaye's mission requested were troops that would provide logistic support in the field, and, if necessary, in combat.

The French decision in mid-April 1969 to send an expeditionary force of 900 troops was one of the last made by General de Gaulle before he resigned as President at the end of April, and was the most significant military intervention in black Africa in the whole of his presidency. It aroused misgivings amongst some French political observers not just on the left but among former colleagues of de Gaulle such as Giscard d'Estaing and Chaban-Delmas, because of fears that Chad might become another Indo-China. De Gaulle's main motive was the fear of a domino effect in Africa should the Tombalbaye government fall as a result of a rural uprising. The influence of President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, working closely with de Gaulle's own African affairs adviser Jacques Foccart was always said to have been conclusive in persuading the General to intervene.

There was also discussion at the time of the strategic position of Chad. Although exceptionally poor, landlocked, with no real evidence of buried mineral wealth (despite claims concerning the disputed Aozou strip) Chad's central position in Africa, in the vicinity of several countries of considerably greater significance, makes it appear important to military strategists. Even when, later, Libya became directly involved, and the US started showing interest, doubts persisted on the arguments being put forward on Chad's strategic importance. Once President Pompidou came to power in Paris in 1969, he sought ways to disengage as quickly as possible, once the situation was apparently contained.

The major condition of the intervention was that it should be accompanied by a *Mission pour la Réforme Administrative* Administrative Reform Mission (MRA), headed by a former Governor of Chad, Pierre Lami, to revitalise and reorientate the administration, an admission by Tombalbaye that administrative shortcomings were one of the principal causes of the rebellion. The most important immediate effect of the military intervention was to push back the advance being made in the centre and east, but it also had a powerful stimulating effect on the disparate groups involved in the revolt to come together under the banner of FROLINAT.

With the death of Abatcha early in 1968, FROLINAT had been left leaderless, and a succession struggle broke out, after which the movement went through a difficult time. Of the triumvirate established in 1968 (Djalabo, Abba Siddick⁶ and El Baghalani) Djalabo disappeared in 1969, while Baghalani defected to the FLT and operated out of Sudan. El Hadj Issaka, the first commander of the First Liberation Army established in 1969 was dismissed in 1970, and later died, probably in 1972, also in mysterious circumstances. Likewise Mahamat Ali Taher, who had been active in promoting the BET revolt, and in 1969 helped to organise all the autonomous FROLINAT leaders in the BET into the Second Liberation Army, later better known as the *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN), was killed in action by French troops in September 1969.

This high leadership turnover helped consolidate the position of Abba Siddick, but as he chose not to go into the field, the way was open for others to prove themselves on the battlefield, notably Goukouni Weddeye, who succeeded Taher in charge of the FAN in 1969. This was a period in which pressures for unity in FROLINAT were high, and Siddick, having established the First Liberation Army at a first Congress of Consolidation in 1969, called the two armies to a second congress in June 1970. In August, the third congress was held, from which Siddick emerged as Secretary-General.

It was not long before latent tensions between the two armies emerged. The Toubou had always felt that more arms were being channelled to the First Army, and Goukouni feared that in an eventually united command, the FAN would lose out. There was also much distrust of Siddick as a diplomat and politician rather than a military man. Tensions broke out at a meeting of FROLINAT military commanders convened by Siddick at Kufra, Libya in August 1971, although the FAN had been urging him to hold a proper congress, a legitimate successor to the founding meeting at Nyala in 1966. The Kufra meeting, which led to a split in FROLINAT, was also important because of the clear importance of two elements in the shape of individuals who progressively came to dominate the whole Chadian drama — the new Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and the eventual President of Chad, Hissen Habré.

It was arguably Tombalbaye himself who, in summoning the French military intervention, opened the door for all the other outside involvements in Chad, the most conspicuous of which has been that of Libya. It was pure coincidence that, five months after the French sent their expeditionary force, the aged King Idris should be overthrown in a military coup by the militant Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamist Colonel Gaddafi. In fact the Idris regime had been showing a growing sympathy for the Tibesti revolt, partly because of the long connection of the Sanusiya of Cyrenaica (whom Idris headed) with the northern part of Chad. There was also the fact that the Toubou peoples extend to southern Libya, which was why the *Derde* went into exile there in 1966. Idris' bodyguards also happened to be Toubou: one ironic effect of Gaddafi's 1 September coup was that these guards were expelled, and returned to reinforce the fighting force of the FAN.

Gaddafi himself, sympathetic to both the anti-colonial and Islamic aspirations of FROLINAT, rapidly moved to step up the discreet aid which the Idris government had already been giving the movement, particularly in arms and funds. And it was Siddick who, as Secretary-General, seemed the automatic conduit. Hence, after the Kufra meeting, Gaddafi sided with Siddick, and even helped him by putting the dissident Goukouni under house arrest. Again, coincidentally, Tombalbaye chose this moment to break diplomatic relations with Libya, accusing Gaddafi of fomenting a plot against his government, in response to which Gaddafi, rising to the challenge, not only broke off relations but announced that he was recognising FROLINAT as the only legitimate representative of the Chadian people, and offering Abba Siddick an office and radio time.

By early next year, the climate seemed to have changed. Already in mid-1971 the decision to withdraw the French expeditionary force had been taken, the threat from FROLINAT, itself torn by its

internal dissensions, seemed to have receded and Tombalbaye was at the height of a period of domestic reconciliation and pursuit of friends in the Arab world, partly with a view to staunching the flow of external support for the rebellion. The French were also beginning to covet military contracts from the increasingly oil-rich Libyans. Thus the assiduous efforts of President Hamani Diori, leader of Chad's western neighbour, the Niger Republic, bore fruit, and again Gaddafi changed course. In April a joint Libyan-Chadian communique announced the resumption of relations. At the same time Abba Siddick moved his base from Tripoli to Algiers and Goukouni was released.

These were difficult times for FROLINAT. Although resources had increased, the 1971 split had led to serious tension between the First and Second Armies, to the point that FAN obstructed the use of the 'Ho Chi Minh trail' that supplied the First Army from Libya, and serious fighting broke out on several occasions between the two armies when supplies became scarce. It was in this period that the second new personality obtruded increasingly on the scene of the rebellion. Hissen Habré was an Anakaza (a fringe Daza group from near Fada) who had been brought up in Faya Largeau. This ethnogeographical origin made him more southward-looking than Goukouni, who was from the northern Tibesti — the Teda, it is said, look more towards Libya. Habré became one of the first Toubou to obtain a university education in France, from which he returned to a post in the Chad administration in 1971, only to disappear, and show up later that year in Tripoli, Libya. This was the origins of rumours that he was a French secret agent. From the beginning many observers noted that Habré combined extreme ambition and acute opportunism.

The rapidity of Habré's rise to influence was seen in October 1972, when the FAN reconstituted itself as the *Conseil de Commande des Forces Armées du Nord* (CCFAN) with Habré as its head, Goukouni as his deputy, and Adoum Togoï, a former career officer in the Chad army, as its commander-in-chief. It is said that Goukouni conceded the leadership to Habré because of his superior education, a move he came to regret.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TOMBALBAYE

The year 1972 marked the beginning of the last phase of the rule of President Tombalbaye. The apparent success of his campaign in Arab states in diminishing rebel activity, and the French decision to withdraw its expeditionary force — completed when its commander General Cortadellas left in September 1972 — caused a relaxation in the pressures on him, even though the basic presence of about 1500 troops with 400 technical assistants in the education and medical corps remained. Thus, although the MRA continued to function, French pressure to reform the administration became less vocal, and the mission turned its attention increasingly to development works like sinking wells.

Pressures for reconciliation also relaxed. President Pompidou's visit in January 1972 had been an occasion to acclaim Tombalbaye's efforts in that direction, which had involved the release of a large number of political prisoners in 1971, and the incorporation of prominent Moslem politicians in the government. But in June, there were many arrests after an armed attack on Fort Lamy airport, including prominent southern politicians as well as Moslems. This was a warning sign that the President's credibility with his own people was beginning to wear thin. As more and more southern graduates returned, and began to question his capacity to govern, he became increasingly paranoid. This was notably seen in 1973, when Dr. Outel Bono, a popular southern radical who had been jailed in 1963 and amnestied in 1971, was assassinated in Paris just after he had formally launched the manifesto for a new party in exile. It was generally believed that his death was the work of paid agents of the Chad president.

What really alienated his own Sara people was the 'cultural revolution'. This had notionally begun as far back as 1968, but it was when Tombalbaye transformed the PPT into the *Mouvement*

National pour la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale (MNRCSS)⁷ on 30 August, 1973 that the concept took definite shape. The Mobutu-style 'authenticity' of name-changes (Francois into Ngarta Tombalbaye; Fort Lamy into Ndjamena; Fort Archambault into Sarh, etc.) was acceptable to most people, but there were many misgivings when, reportedly under the influence of a Haitian adviser by the name of Vixamar, he revived and encouraged the practice of *yondo*, the male youth initiation ceremonies among many Sara clans. It is hard to think of anything more calculated to alienate the southern Sara elite, whatever approval there may have been among traditionalists. It appears Tombalbaye felt it was a way of disciplining youths, who were increasingly protesting against his rule through school strikes, etc., which in turn brought more twists to the screws of repression. Making *yondo* compulsory for all Sara candidates for public employment offended a large cross-section of Sara society, not just civil servants but the predominantly Sara army. When it was extended to include Muslim Sara (to whom it was anathema), and then all civil service candidates, considerable discontent was provoked.

Meanwhile, the President seemed to have found comfort in the controversial accord with Colonel Gaddafi at the end of 1972, which ceded the Aozou strip to Libya. Although signed during Tombalbaye's official visit to Libya on 23 December, all its terms were never made public. In return for this prize, Gaddafi agreed to stop supporting FROLINAT, and offered a credit of up to 23 billion francs. Some reports also suggested that Tombalbaye also received a personal gift. Apart from the establishment of a Chad-Libya bank, little evidence was seen of the large credit, and Tombalbaye refused to make statements on the Libyan occupation of Aozou early in 1973. Nonetheless, there seems to have been little criticism at the time of the treaty, in spite of the fact that it surrendered national territory. The main political importance of the Libya flirtation was that it gave President Tombalbaye a false security.

Even more illustrative of Tombalbaye's headlong and apparently almost conscious descent towards nemesis was his increasingly acrimonious relationship with France, following Lami's negative 1971 report on the possibility of reform. President Pompidou, visiting in January 1972, stressed that French military aid was both 'exceptional and temporary', but the clearest indication that France was beginning to see Tombalbaye as expendable was the statement by General Cortadellas, commander of the French expeditionary force, on his departure in September 1972. He said that further military intervention by France would not be 'automatic', and even more suggestively, that such interventions would not be considered in the case of 'palace revolutions'. Tombalbaye must also have had reason to be concerned about the increasingly critical tone of articles about him in the French press, as his reconciliation programmes collapsed, and his regime turned increasingly to force in order to survive. The Chad President put the blame squarely on Pompidou's adviser Foccart, who ironically, had argued for saving the regime in 1969. Foccart became the subject of vitriolic attacks. In June 1973, Tombalbaye denounced Foccart⁸ as an enemy of Chad before a crowd of 100,000 in the capital, accusing him of mounting fourteen plots against Tombalbaye's rule.

Tombalbaye's suspicions were understandably particularly intense towards the army which eventually overthrew and killed him in a coup d'état on 13 April, 1975. The insecurity was shown late in 1971, after a student demonstration protesting about the police cried 'Vive Général Doumro', the army Chief of Staff who was known to advocate the professionalisation of the military. This led Tombalbaye to sack Doumro and place him under house arrest. He replaced him with General Félix Malloum, who in turn was arrested and accused of 'political sorcery' in June 1973, principally because Tombalbaye feared his reputation as army strong man. General Ngué Djogo, another prominent army figure, was arrested at the same time. Increasingly obsessed by his fear of a coup d'état, Tombalbaye helped create the very situation he sought to avoid by a series of humiliations and slights against those he feared, culminating in arrests of senior officers early in April 1975.

accompanied by a violent denunciation of the 'inefficient' army and its leader, together with a threatened 'metamorphosis' beginning at the top. The rebellion was initiated by the little-known Lt. Dimtoloum from the Bokoro barracks, but it was widely supported, and, allegedly, facilitated by Tombalbaye's Eurasian security adviser Major Camille Gourvennec, till then generally reputed to have been Tombalbaye's *éminence grise*. This role of Gourvennec, a former French army officer, gave rise to the suspicion that the French may have backed to move to remove Tombalbaye. But since it came from a Sara-dominated army, it was basically designed to preserve the status quo more effectively, rather than facilitate change.

The Malloum regime 1975-79

In the euphoria after the fall of Tombalbaye, whose ineffective, corrupt and increasingly eccentric regime had become extremely unpopular it seemed as if a new start might be possible. The *Conseil Supérieur Militaire* (CSM), set up under General Malloum as head of state, preached reconciliation: the *Derde* returned from Libya, as well as members of the FLT of Ahmed Moussa (although their rebel activity in eastern Chad had, by 1975, become largely quiescent). The CSM's initial posture towards FROLINAT was to cease prosecuting an unnecessary war. Abba Siddick, from Algiers, first welcomed the coup, but later put out a statement denouncing it as a military version of the Tombalbaye government. The CSM, being composed of top military men, was inevitably southern-dominated, but there was little effort to seek an opening towards political reconciliation. Nor was there any attempt to investigate or punish some of the abuses of the Tombalbaye regime. Although Vixamar had fled, Gourvennec retained a position of key influence heading both the gendarmerie and intelligence services, and other prominent figures from the old regime retained important positions.

For the first two years of the Malloum regime, Chad's international relations and indeed domestic posture, came to revolve to an extraordinary extent around the 'Claustre affair': it seemed almost as if political life including the rebellion, hung fire while this two and a half year saga was being played out in the remote Tibesti plateau.

On 21 April, 1974, a CCFAN commando kidnapped and held hostage three Europeans staying in Bardai. Most accounts say that the original target was Dr. Stauwens, a West Germany missionary whom the Toubou reproached for refusing to treat rebels in his hospital and for letting his vehicles be used for military purposes. The purpose was to seek a ransom, which the West German government⁹ duly paid after two months and Stauwens was released. But the other two Europeans were French: one, Marc Combes was a technical assistant with the MRA; but the other was Madame Françoise Claustre, an archaeologist doing research in the area, and who was also the wife of Pierre Claustre, who at the time was the head of the MRA. This was a much bigger catch, but where the Germans had handled the Stauwens' ransom with efficient realism, the French reaction was a mixture of bungling and duplicity, partly rooted in the complexity of Franco-Chadian relations.

One of the French negotiators, Major Galopin, sent to Tibesti by Tombalbaye, was arrested by CCFAN in August 1974 under suspicion that he had been sent to 'sow dissension', was tried by 'popular tribunal' and executed on 4 April, 1975. The other major problem was that Habré found that the West German ransom money was useless for purchasing arms and remained in suitcases in Tibesti. Therefore his demands concentrated on the actual provision of weapons. In the summer of 1975 an attempt at a deal was struck with Pierre Claustre, by now no longer MRA head, and despairing of official attempts to free his wife. In August 1975 Claustre, with apparent covert support from the French government, flew an aircraft loaded with arms into Tibesti, violating the airspace of six African countries. The arms were not those Habré required, so Claustre in turn was held hostage. But the

mission was also accompanied by a TV team, and when French television showed film of Mme Claustre on 10 September, 1975, the Claustre affair became a French domestic political matter, thus forcing President Giscard to meet Habré's calculated threat to kill Mme Claustre by sending the Prefect of the Vosges (in whose office Habré had done a training course) with a suitcase full of money to the Tibesti.

This in turn caused the mounting irritation and anger in Ndjamená at France's direct negotiations with the rebels, and on 27 September Malloum demanded the departure of all French troops from Chad. This was completed by the end of 1975. In spite of the payment of the ransom the hostages were still not freed, mainly because Habré felt that he could increase his demands, having been till then successful in obtaining ransoms. This attitude came up against understandable official French reluctance to proceed, but it took another year to break the stalemate, when tensions between Habré and his deputy Goukouni finally surfaced, and Goukouni deposed Habré from the leadership in October 1976. Goukouni took charge of negotiations over the release of the Claustres, which using Libya's own network of connections with the French, was effected successfully in January 1977 in Tripoli.

Thus, by early 1977, considerable change had occurred in the personnel and situation of the rebels. The constant international publicity that the Claustre affair had brought to both Goukouni and Habré had the effect of sidelining Abba Siddick's somewhat nugatory leadership even more than previously. The period had seen a series of verbal clashes between Siddick and Habré, which became very much a personal vendetta that some attributed to their comparable educations, and Siddick's armchair jealousy of Habré's reputation as a guerrilla fighter. It had the effect of publicly parading FROLINAT disunity. Moreover, although there had been a revival of rebel activity in the east, under El Baghalani — the First Army had now more or less metamorphosed into the 'Volcan' force — he did not acknowledge the authority of Siddick who had expelled him in 1970. The lack of major combat between Ndjamená and the rebels came mainly from Malloum's reluctance to become militarily involved: for long period he operated a de facto ceasefire, and late in 1975 he bravely toured rebel areas. His policy had the effect of leaving the government in control of main centres, while rebel groups had a free hand in large areas of north, central and eastern Chad, to some extent setting the scene for what happened later. The split in the FAN at the Yebbi-Bou war council of 18 October, 1976, which led to Habré leaving with some 300 men to establish himself in Biltine, meant there were now effectively three separate rebel armies, presaging the era of competing warlords that was to come.

The year 1977 marked a series of setbacks for Malloum. The loss of prestige that came from the marginalisation of his government in the release of the Claustres was followed by a serious coup attempt on 1 April, in which the presidential palace in the capital was attacked by dissident members of the Nomad Guard. At the end of June, Malloum's position worsened with the breakdown of discussions with Libya because of Gaddafi's refusal to discuss Libyan occupation of the Aozou strip. The first discussion of Chad at the Organisation of African Unity came at the summit in Libreville in Gabon in July at which a committee was set up under President Bongo to mediate in the Chad-Libya dispute.

Libya, indeed, following its role in the Claustres' release, was now favouring direct support for Goukouni, and also provisionally for the maverick Baghalani who actually appeared publicly in Tripoli during the Claustre release. Baghalani died in a mysterious car crash near Benghazi in March. Although his succession at the 'Volcan' army was confused, the Libyans supported as his successor an Arab from Batha prefecture called Ahmat Acyl, who had been a member of the National Assembly until 1975 when he went into exile in Tripoli. He seems for a time to have shared command with the pro-Sudanese Adoum Dana.

Libyan material support for Goukouni was partly responsible for the latter's successes in July 1977, when, after hard fighting, Malloum's forces surrendered three centres in the far north —

Bardai, Zouar and Ouri. Libyan food aid in eastern Chad permitted the 'Volcan' army to absorb some troops formerly allied to Abba Siddick. Goukouni's FAN and the 'Volcan' moved closer together, having already established a provisional military committee, which met and projected a Provisional Council to renovate FROLINAT at Karanga in August 1977, the first step towards which was the expulsion of Abba Siddick. Goukouni and Acyl went on to merge their forces in the *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP) in March 1978, leaving Habré to use the title of FAN (which he had in fact claimed when the split occurred).

Habré had indeed not been idle, having built his strength in eastern Chad to more than 1000 men, controlling much of Biltine and the area around Abéché. He obtained support from Sudan and Egypt, developing contacts in Islamic circles which proved useful later. In the kaleidoscope of groups, fragmenting and allying, disappearing and re-forming, it now seemed logical for Malloum to move closer to Habré, especially as they both shared hostility to Libya's occupation of Aozou, and Malloum was now increasingly disturbed at the threat from the north. There was also reportedly strong French pressure for this new coalition of forces. Earlier French hostility to Habré because of the killing of Galopin, and the Claustre kidnap, was not shared in military and intelligence circles, where his military and political skill and ruthlessness were admired. First contacts were made in Khartoum in September 1977, and the outline of an accord was announced in February 1978, but the residue of south-north suspicion was such that it took more dramatic events to finally push Malloum and his increasingly demoralised *Forces Armées Tchadiennes* (FAT) into what proved to be the deadly embrace of Habré at the end of August that year.

In January 1978, in a military operation that suggested a Libyan hand, a FROLINAT offensive began, and by the end of February had led to the abandoning by Malloum of Ounianga-Kébir, Fada, and the pivotal oasis of Faya Largeau, giving the rebels effective control of most of the BET. Even as this happened, President Gaddafi convened a peace conference in Sebha in late February, with support from Niger and Sudan, at which Malloum agreed to a ceasefire, and to withdraw a complaint he had made against Libya at the UN over the Aozou strip. This led to another conference at Benghazi on 27 March, which Goukouni reluctantly attended, and at which Malloum and Goukouni agreed to sign the ceasefire. Malloum agreed to recognise FROLINAT as 'a revolutionary movement that represents the legitimate aspirations of the Chadian people', not without reservations from his military colleagues in Ndjamená.

The ceasefire, due for 10 April, foundered on Malloum's refusal of Goukouni's condition that the Franco-Chadian cooperation agreements be ended, and on 15 April a new offensive was launched, apparently by Acyl's forces (Goukouni having stopped his advance at Arada) that compelled Malloum to call on French assistance to save his regime. From the middle of April there began a secret build-up of a new French expeditionary force that at its height probably totalled some 2500 men, with eight Jaguar fighter-bombers stationed at Ndjamená airport, as well as refuelling aircraft, troop transporters and electronic surveillance planes. With this ground and especially air support, it was possible for Malloum's flagging¹⁰ forces to hold back the FROLINAT advance in battles at Ati, which Acyl's forces had taken, on 18-19 May, and at nearby Djedaa, Acyl's home village, in June. This setback had repercussions on the unity of the FAP, which collapsed amid recriminations, in which Acyl's men pillaged Goukouni's offices in Tripoli and Sebha and, after abortive attempts to seize Faya from Goukouni in July and September, broke up in disorder. At the same time the appearance of a Third Army, in the Lake Chad area, led by Aboubakar Abdelrahmane, added further to Goukouni's discomfiture.

This confusion on the FROLINAT side gave a breathing-space in which the negotiations between Habré and Malloum came to fruition in the signing of the Fundamental Charter on 29 August, 1978. Pressure from the French was undoubtedly the strongest force behind the accord. President Giscard — who, in the year of a major

military intervention in Shaba province in Zaire, was experiencing a flush of African adventurism — was optimistic it would create a new accord in Chad that would permit him to disengage. For Malloum, desperately aware of his crumbling military position, and unable to reach any permanent agreement either with Libya or with the various FROLINAT factions, it was his last card. And it proved fatal.

The Fundamental Charter kept Malloum as head of state and appointed Habré as Prime Minister, replacing the CSM with a Committee of Defence and Security (CDS) with eight members for the CSM and eight for the CCFAN. The Prime Minister was to form a government and organise elections for a constituent assembly. A major concession to Habré was the adoption of Arabic as an official language with equal status to French, a situation that still pertains. Although equality was supposedly maintained in the allocation of jobs, it soon became clear that Habré had the upper hand. Apart from immediately dismissing Gourvenec¹¹, Habré secured the removal from minor posts of two of his main opponents, Colonel Abdelkader Kamougué and General Negué Djogo, and only included three southerners in his government.

Relations within the CDS rapidly deteriorated, partly because of hostility on the part of the Sara who felt that they had lost too much in the accord. Habré's often intransigent behaviour¹² caused further friction, and no progress was made in the provisions of the Khartoum agreement for integration into the FAT of the FAN forces, which remained concentrated along the Ndjamená-Abéché road, while increasingly being brought closer to the capital. CDS meetings became rare, and it looked as if Habré's entry into the government had been part of a calculated manoeuvre to provoke a crisis.

The year 1979 began badly, despite the lack of rebel activity, because of the continuing friction between Goukouni's and Acyl's troops. There was also tension between Goukouni and Gaddafi, who, for a second time placed the FAP leader under house arrest in Sebha, from which he managed to escape to the BET, where he waited upon developments in Ndjamená. There, another bomb attack occurred, together with the distribution of literature calling for partition. There was also further evidence of activity from the Nigerian-backed Third Army.

DISINTEGRATION AND CIVIL WAR

From 1979 began the most frightening and period in Chad's post-independence history, in which central authority all but collapsed, and the country appeared to be ruled by competing groups of largely ethnically-based warlords while, with the help of external forces, attempts were made to piece together new coalitions to save the country from disintegrating. The external forces, as the situation became more anarchic, inevitably became drawn in deeper and deeper to protect their own perceived positions.

The spark which lit the flame came on 12 February, 1979, in the form of a FAN-inspired strike of Moslem pupils at the *Lycée Félix Eboué* in Ndjamená following a wave of strikes the previous day in Abéché and Biltine. A policeman fired in the air to separate Muslim and non-Muslim pupils, and hostilities began between the FAN and southern troops — mainly gendarmes of Colonel Kamougué. Each side blamed the other, but the violence was most probably spontaneous even if Habré seems to have been planning for such a confrontation.¹³

Fighting spread rapidly, and after two days Habré's forces numbering under 400 captured the radio station and strategic parts of the 'African quarter', with the help of a reported 1200 defectors from the FAT¹⁴, which was in disarray, despite holding parts of the capital. Malloum, who took refuge in the French base, seems to have given up the struggle, and took no part in the ceasefire negotiations, organised jointly by the French commander General Forest, the Imam of Ndjamená (who was an ally of Habré) and Sudanese diplomats. Southern strongman Kamougué also took no part in the negotiations. After the ceasefire on 19 February, General

Forest signed an agreement on 22 February with Goukouni, who had already moved his FAP troops — probably 800 strong — up from the BET into Kanem, which brought them into positions in and around Ndjamen, where initially they joined forces with the FAN. This, ostensibly, was the decisive moment at which central power slipped out of the hands of the southerners and into those of the northerners. The balance of numbers had decisively changed, and both the FAT and the southern-dominated administration began to disintegrate, and a mass refugee exodus began southwards.

Although the fighting had been short, the results of the first Battle of Ndjamen had been disastrous in that it triggered appalling communal violence and a separation of communities, sowing deep hatred and hostility between southerners and the other Chadians, especially between Muslim and non-Muslim, not merely in the capital but across a wide swathe of the country. Most commentators treat the extent of the actual massacres with caution, but it seems that there were killings of southerners in Ndjamen by the FAN as well as at Abéché and Biltine, where officials were said to have been executed by firing squads. As in Nigeria in 1966, it was reports like these that set off the killings in March of Muslims, mainly Arabs from the centre-east, in the five southern prefectures. Some estimates put the number of Muslim dead in the south at between 5000 and 10,000.¹⁵

Although Habré had consolidated his positions in the Battle of Ndjamen, he was in a position of only partial control, and the new presence in the capital of Goukouni's FAP introduced a further complication into the situation. Just as the FAN had taken control of Abéché and a part of the centre-east in mid-February, so the FAP now controlled the BET and part of Kanem. The Third Army (also called the *Movement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad*, the MPLT) also moved to control positions around Lake Chad.

At this stage, amid disintegration, and a deserted capital, the Nigerian government convened a first peace conference in Kano on 11 March (known as Kano 1). Other neighbours, notably Sudan, Cameroon and Niger, and also Libya, supported and participated in the conference, while France was conspicuous by its absence. It was remarkable as the first peace conference on Chad to have been attended by all parties, including Habré, Goukouni and Malloum, as well as the Nigerian-supported Abdelrahmane of the MPLT. Abba Siddick and Ahmat Acyl were personally absent, but represented by others. Although the provisions of the agreement at Kano 1 for setting up a control commission and a provisional government never materialised — instead a State Council under the Chairmanship of Goukouni, with two representatives each of FAP, FAN, FAT and MPLT, was set up — the Nigerian troops who were to guarantee the agreement arrived before the end of March.

By the time of Kano 2 was convened on 3 April, Nigeria's position was becoming increasingly problematic because of the presence of its troops alongside the 'unauthorised State Council'. Other groups also sought recognition, including Siddick and Acyl, as well as Adoum Dana of the First Army, and the People's Liberation Army of Mohammed Abba Said, an autonomous guerrilla leader. Their claims for membership of the Council of State were to be considered by a commission set up during Kano 2. A member of the MPLT, Lol Mohammed Choa, a civil servant, was sponsored by Nigeria as head of the Council.¹⁶ Although the composition of his government was to be a subject of a further meeting, Kano 3, scheduled for 19 May, the latter never took place.

Lol's position was reinforced by the curious disappearance of Abdelrahmane shortly after Kano 2, and once the various leaders had returned to Chad, further negotiations took place involving particularly Lol, Goukouni and Habré; a 21-member provisional government was formed on 29 April, with Lol as President. This contained eleven northern Muslims (including Habré as Defence Minister and Goukouni as Interior Minister), and ten southerners, notably General Djogo as Vice-President and head of the armed forces. Malloum in the interim had gone into exile in Lagos.

The new government displeased Nigeria, in spite of Lol's presence as compromise President, because it had developed independently

of its control. Nigerian troops (whose position had become increasingly precarious) were thus withdrawn, and Nigerian oil exports to Chad were banned. At the end of May, a meeting of Chad's neighbours in Lagos protested at the formation of the Lol government. Libya was especially incensed because of the exclusion of Acyl. Thus on 2 June, a *Front d'Action Commun Provisoire* (FACP) was formed in Tripoli, composed of the participants of Kano 2 who had not been included in the Lol government. Gaddafi also appeared to be wooing Kamougué, who had also not been included in the government, and whose prestige had been reinforced by successfully blocking on 31 May an attempt by Habré to send FAN troops to Mayo-Kebbi in the south, where they had vainly hoped to capitalise on anti-Sara sentiment. Meanwhile, Goukouni had moved to eliminate the forces of the MPLT around Lake Chad in June, and create a new Third Army, the *Forces Armées de l'Occident* (FAO), under his own nominee, Moussa Medela, although a rump of the MPLT still survived as part of the FACP.

Undeterred by the extremely poor relations between Lagos and Ndjamen, Nigeria having successfully engineered the exclusion of any Chad delegation from the Franco-African summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in May 1979 and the OAU summit in Monrovia in July 1979, persuaded the OAU to support a further conciliation conference, to which Sudan sent the invitations, although Nigeria took the chair. It was convened in Lagos in 21 August, and had the prestige of an OAU resolution behind it. Although the balance of forces within the Lol government had altered slightly, its members were still disunited, and Lol himself, with any power base he might have had gone, increasingly appeared to be little more than a temporary figurehead.

Nigeria's persistence paid off with the Lagos agreement, to which all 12 factions agreed. The main points were as follows; the establishment of a *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* — Transitional Government of National Unity (the GUNT), prior to a democratic election; a ceasefire; the integration of the armed forces into a national army; the demilitarisation of the capital; the formation of a control commission, under the OAU Secretary-General; and the sending of an OAU peace-keeping force following a withdrawal of French troops. Although it was agreed that Goukouni was to be President and Kamougué Vice-President, allocation of portfolios to all the factions who signed the communique was a lengthy process, and it was only on 10 November, 1979 that the GUNT was formally established at Douguia, with Habré as Defence Minister, Acyl as Foreign Minister, and posts for Mohammed Abba Said, Adoum Dana and Abba Siddick, although not for the largely dismembered MPLT.

The tasks facing the GUNT were awesome — a shattered capital, a dispersed administration, an empty treasury, and no programme to speak of. In Lagos there had been optimism that this agreement was possible, but the chronic instability of the factions proved too strong for any cohesion, and by the end of 1979 none of the key Lagos provisions had been carried out, the cabinet had met only once, no start had been made on integrating the armed forces and the OAU peace-keeping force — from Guinea, Benin and Congo because of Chadian insistence that no neighbouring countries should be involved — had not even arrived.

1980 thus began as ominously as 1979, as the complex coalition of Douguia began to unravel. Habré's FAN, which had seen the joint promotion of Goukouni and Kamougué as a setback, captured Am Dam in Ouaddai from FACP units, and despite the arrival of 600 Congolese troops fighting spread to Ndjamen. After two months of tension and intermittent combat in a city that was frequently without electricity or water, the Congolese left. In March there was more FAN-FACP fighting, at Bokoro and Mongo, and the scene was set for the second battle of Ndjamen, one of the cruellest phases of the Chad civil war, which led to a build-up of refugees at the camp at Kousséri, in north Cameroon, and Maiduguri in Nigeria. It began with an attempt by Kamougué to enter Ndjamen from the south, which was repelled by the FAN after heavy fighting which later embroiled both Goukouni and Acyl's supporters and

left the capital devastated. Truces arranged by President Eyadema of Togo and OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo in the second week of April collapsed almost immediately, and a GUNT cabinet meeting of 26 April relieved Habré of his post, along with two others. The next day, President Giscard D'Estaing ordered the evacuation of the remaining 1100 French troops, stating this was at the invitation of the GUNT, although this actually referred to the original intention of the Lagos accord that French troops be removed. A discreet presence was in fact retained to protect essential installations, but the psychological impact of withdrawal was considerable. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that if Giscard was understandably seeking to disengage from a hornet's nest, he was also expressing disapproval at Habré's removal from the GUNT.

A military stalemate followed in the ravaged capital, now split between GUNT and FAN, while Habré, who still had a foothold there, tried to consolidate his hold on east and central Chad. In June, he captured the key centre of Faya Largeau from Goukouni's FAP, as well as Ounianga-Kébir further north. This incensed the Libyans, who had started providing the GUNT — both Goukouni and Acyl factions, as well as, it was reported, Kamougué — with considerable military equipment after the French withdrawal, and ensured a reaction from Gaddafi. On 15 June, Gaddafi announced that a treaty had been signed between Libya and Chad for mutual support, which, it later emerged, was to serve as a cover for intervention by Libyan troops.

The Libyan intervention 1980-1981

Continuing anarchy in the capital, as well as the north and the centre — indeed everywhere except Kamougué's enclave in the south — combined with the impotence of the OAU, despite resolutions at its July summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from which all Chadian delegations were excluded from sitting, as they had been at Monrovia the year before. The possibility of sending an OAU force was discussed but the costs were too high. Little could now stop a Libyan intervention, in view of France's apparent disinterest. It must also be said that at this point no one else but Libya was ready to assist the GUNT.

The Libyan advance south began in October, accompanied by aerial bombardments of FAN positions in the capital (with aircraft apparently operating from Maiduguri in Nigeria, although this was denied by an embarrassed federal government)¹⁷. By early November the Libyans had restored all the BET to the GUNT which was still denying Libyan involvement. FAT troops also moved north to Ndjamena to join the FAO in November, and in December Habré and his troops withdrew to Cameroon, ready to sign a ceasefire that Goukouni had already signed at the end of November. The Libyans, who had established effective control over Ndjamena but did not flaunt their presence, provided such support that GUNT troops could collectively reinforce their positions. The price which Libya extracted for its intervention was seen in early January 1980, when it was announced, during a visit by Goukouni to Tripoli that Libya and Chad had formed a union. Exactly what this meant was never spelt out, except that it recognised a Libyan military presence through all of Chad except for Kamougué's preserve in the far south. Goukouni, aware of criticism from within the GUNT, not least from his own Vice-President Kamougué, also faced criticism from the OAU Chad committee meeting in Lomé, Togo, as well as some international concern. The major surprise was the passivity of the French government, which, in spite of conclusive evidence of the Libyan advance southwards, made only a token reaction. Some observers attributed this to President Giscard's desire not to be militarily involved on the eve of a presidential election, others to his disillusionment with Africa following the fall of the Emperor Bokassa in the CAR, but there was some foundation for a more pragmatic theory — that there was an understanding between France and Libya as far back as 1978 based on their own solid economic cooperation.

The OAU Force 1981-1982

When Giscard lost the presidential election in May, 1981, and the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand took power, pressures from France on Goukouni to detach himself from Libya multiplied. The non-appearance of the promised Libyan aid reinforced Goukouni's own disillusionment. But where was the elusive OAU force to replace the Libyans that had been presaged in so many resolutions, again at the OAU summit in Nairobi, Kenya, in July? Behind the scenes there appeared assurances that funds could be found and both the French and Americans were apparently ready to provide financial support, alongside the known Nigerian willingness. Further attempts were made during the World Economic Summit in Cancun, and during the Franco-African summit in Paris at the beginning of November it was announced by Goukouni in person that he was inviting the Libyans to leave. An OAU peace-keeping force of 1500 Nigerians, 600 Senegalese and 900 Zaireans was to replace them. Although there was some scepticism that the Libyans would in fact abandon such a bridgehead southwards, they withdrew with orderly rapidity, and the OAU force was somewhat tenuously in place by the end of 1981.

The only snag in what appeared to be an unexpectedly beneficial turn of events was the familiar but temporarily eclipsed figure of Hissen Habré, who had gone back to his former patron, President Nimeiry of Sudan for aid in trying to build up a guerrilla movement in the east again. The new Reagan administration in the US, which took office formally in January 1981, was keen to assist actions against Gaddafi, who had been identified as a prime enemy of the US, so a steady supply of funds and equipment from the CIA and other sources was ensured. By the time the Libyans withdrew, Habré had already built up support in the east, helped by the nebulous mandate of the OAU force. By December, Goukouni was complaining that the OAU force, which he thought had been sent to guarantee the security of the GUNT, was so tied by its mandate that it could not intervene to stop Habré. It was clear in retrospect that the OAU should have insisted on a ceasefire before sending its troops in, and that over-rapid Libyan withdrawal gave Habré his opening, but when the enlarged OAU Chad Commission met in February 1982 and called on Goukouni to negotiate with Habré, which Goukouni refused to do, it was apparently too late for constructive developments. By the end of February the OAU itself was paralysed by the conflict over Western Sahara.

HABRE TAKES POWER

May 1982 saw Habré advancing from his base at Abéché to recapture the whole of the BET, and key points along the road westwards to Ndjamena, from Oum Hadjer to Ati, taken while the impotent OAU troops stood by. Efforts by the Mitterrand government to militarily supply the GUNT failed because of GUNT's lack of a unified command: arms simply went to one or other of its component parts, if not actually to the other side. Goukouni reshuffled his government in mid-May in an attempt to reinforce his position, but it was already clear that leading GUNT figures, such as Kamougué and Acyl had begun to distance themselves from President Goukouni. The consensus-minded Goukouni had always tended to be outmanoeuvred by the more ruthless Habré, in spite of Goukouni's victory of October 1976. Even though aided by the Egyptians, the Sudanese and the Americans, Habré appeared to have made the most of his opportunities, and shown his ability as a military tactician. Thus his entry into Ndjamena on 7 June met with almost no resistance: the GUNT had virtually disintegrated before the news of his advance, and Goukouni fled, to reappear later in Algiers.

All that was left was Kamougué's fief in the south which had often been presented as a haven of order amid anarchy, although in fact it was becoming increasingly corrupt and dictatorial.¹⁸ Through clever use of dissident Sara, Habré succeeded at the end of August in mounting a surprise attack capturing Kamougué's headquarters at Moundou. Although Kamougué was slightly wounded, he fled

through Cameroon to Gabon, and likewise turned up later in Algiers. Late in October 1982 a government-in-exile composed of eight different factions was set up in Bardai in northern Chad — Goukouni's old headquarters in the northern Tibesti which he still controlled. Most of the groups that made up the old GUNT remained there, notably FAT and FAP, and the CDR, although its leader Aycl had been killed in an accident in southern Chad in July to be replaced by his subordinate, Acheikh Ibn Oumar.

During the abortive OAU summit in Tripoli in November, the second that year, Gaddafi did his best to promote Goukouni as Chadian representative but the issue proved as divisive as the Western Sahara at the earlier abortive summit. Many of the francophone leaders such as Presidents Mobutu, Bongo and Eyadema, who had welcomed Habré as President at the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa in October, contested the Libyan position. At the end of the year there were reports of GUNT military activity in the north, and of Libyan troop movements near the border, but Habré now seemed solidly in power in Ndjamen, enjoying considerable Western backing, especially from the Americans, and more reluctantly from the French, as well as growing, if often resigned, acceptance in Africa. Bearing in mind the terrible plight into which the country had been plunged, most of the Chadian population seemed prepared to accept any strong ruler provided he brought peace. Habré often compared himself with Mobutu, and there was some comparison with the way the younger Mobutu pacified the turbulent Congo (Zaire) of the 1960s. An international donors conference on Chad held in Geneva at the end of November 1982 assembled a reconstruction package of over \$300m.

The only major doubts remained about Habré related to his ability to be a truly national leader. There were many dubious episodes in his past, and the violence of his supporters in the battles of Ndjamen made the FAN particularly feared. Southerners in particular attributed the original massacres to his followers and the behaviour of the larger northern FAN troops in the former enclave of the south after Habré came to power in Ndjamen did nothing to reassure southerners. The setting up of the national army, the FANT, in January 1983, was a step in the right direction. But reconciliation takes time and patience. In the meantime, there was an ever-present threat from the south.

The early part of 1983 was quiet: apart from the loss of the oasis of Gouro in February, friction was confined to verbal abuse. 'Radio Bardai', with its powerful transmitter, claimed to be broadcasting from a far northern oasis said to be in the hands of GUNT troops, but some reports indicated it may have been from southern Libya. A curious distraction from the main confrontation occurred in May 1983 when fighting occurred between FANT and Nigerian troops in a territorial dispute concerned with islands in Lake Chad that had only recently appeared, due to the low level of the drought-depleted lake.

The key which unlocked the launching of the expected serious military action was the snub delivered to Colonel Gaddafi, and hence to the GUNT, by the successful holding of the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in June. It was the growing resistance to the extent to which Gaddafi seemed prepared to sacrifice the very existence of the OAU to his own purposes that caused a growing African solidarity. This resulted in diplomatic containment of the contentious Western Sahara issue, and a denying to Gaddafi to the right to host a summit and thus become OAU Chairman. At the same time, the Chad delegation from Ndjamen led by Foreign Minister Idriss Miskine was seated without any objections, the Libyan delegation having already withdrawn. A GUNT delegation in Addis Ababa kept an extremely low profile.

There had been a fruitless diplomatic contact between the Habré regime and Libya in March 1983 which foundered because of Libyan insistence on Chad's Islamic character, and on retaining the Aozou strip, so further negotiations appeared impossible. On 24 June, Goukouni's troops, heavily equipped and supported by the Libyans, captured Faya Largeau, and advanced rapidly out of the BET to take Abéché in the east on 8 July, thus giving the GUNT

strategic control of much of northern and eastern Chad and presenting a serious threat to the Ndjamen government. Both the French and the Americans responded by sending increased amounts of weaponry to the Chad government. The French also sent technicians and advisers to bolster Habré's flagging army. Egypt and Sudan also supplied assistance, and Zaire sent a paratroop contingent, to guard installations in the capital as a morale-boosting exercise. With this backing, Habré's troops recaptured Abéché in July, as Goukouni had over-extended his supply-lines.

Habré then moved immediately on Faya Largeau, recapturing it on 30 July and immediately suffered from a similar supply problem, which Goukouni and his Libyan backers exploited by moving back to the key oasis, this time with Libyan air support. This new element alarmed both Paris and Washington, although there were important differences of approach not to mention competitive jealousies. The Reagan administration favoured a more vigorous approach and announced the sending of an extra \$15m dollars military aid (on top of the \$10m announced on 10 July) and also the despatch of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes to be based in Sudan.

OPERATION MANTA

France was much more inclined to be cautious. For one thing Mitterrand and the Socialist Party had been highly critical of earlier Gaullist and Giscardian interventionism in Africa. Ellysée spokesmen said: 'There are no French soldiers in Chad and there will be none'. But pressures from Washington were clearly increasing, and a special envoy, General Walters, visited President Mitterrand on 6 August. Although the President refused at that meeting to accept the US suggestion of a French military strike, the Libyan escalation increased pressure within the French government, and on 9 August the Habré government was informed that President Mitterrand had agreed to send in paratroops and other assistance. This was the beginning of 'Operation Manta' (sting-ray), the largest of the French military interventions involving the sending of 3000 troops with air support from Jaguar fighter-bombers. But it was too late to save Faya Largeau, from which Habré's army withdrew on 10 August.

Habré's troops had been obliged to withdraw over 300 kms to the south, where French troops joined them, along the line of the 15th parallel, from Abéché in the east to Salal and Moussoro in the west. For the next four years, Chad was effectively partitioned between the increasingly Libyan-dominated GUNT in the north, and the Habré government, with its variety of international backers, notably the French and the Americans, in the south. It was the period of maximum internationalisation of the conflict, with major powers involved, often working through proxies, but in which the African states, not to mention the Chadian people, were largely spectators.

Faced with the virtual partitioning of Chad there were disagreements among concerned parties as to how to handle the situation. Habré, with known US backing (largely for anti-Libyan motives), and probably some sympathy among the French military, often spoke of the reconquest of the north, although certainly under restraint. The French took the lead in encouraging talk of reconciliation of Chadian groups, which found an echo among some, though not all, African states. Two major attempts were made to convene OAU talks to promote Chadian political reconciliation: in Addis Ababa in early January 1983 and in Brazzaville in July 1983. Both failed, because of Habré's increasing unwillingness to be considered merely another faction leader, but the French government was still keen to promote the idea because French public opinion, as always, was unhappy about any open-ended commitment of troops.

That Mitterrand acted decisively when he chose was seen after Goukouni's troops, again with Libyan backing, attacked the post of Ziguey in northern Kanem on 24 January, 1984. As they

withdrew after having been rebuffed, they were attacked by French aircraft. One aircraft was shot down, which led the French to extend the limit of the *de facto* exclusion zone to the 16th parallel (the Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba line), said to be more defensible militarily.

Part of the strategy of Gaddafi and the GUNT in this period was to hope that a period of stalemate would lead to the emergence of contradictions within the Habré camp, causing yet another government in Ndjamenà to collapse. They pinned their hopes on the 'southern' factor, encouraged no doubt by the prominent southern exiles in their midst, notably Kamougué and Djogo. The continuing distrust of Habré's troops in the south, which was still under the abrasive control of the FAN, provided fertile ground for dissidence. There were violent clashes in May and August 1983 following Ndjamenà's attempts to impose taxation, and calm only returned with the intervention of one of Habré's southern ministers, Noé Djindingar. In the meantime, the activity of rebel bands (known as *commandos rouges* or 'codos') was increasing, with assistance from the GUNT and the Libyans who for a time were permitted to operate from inside the CAR.

Faced with the prospect of the opening of a southern front, Habré moved to try and consolidate his political position, first by holding a conference of *préfets* (April 1984) at which FAN's arbitrary rule was criticised, following this by making a decisive move to project himself as a truly national figure. This was the Congress of FROLINAT-CCFAN, both of which were detested names in the south. Thus Habré's move to dissolve the movement and replace it with an official national party, the *Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution* (UNIR), was well received, especially as it happened in spite of strong opposition from FAN loyalists. Six of the fifteen members of UNIR's executive bureau were southerners, although Habré loyalists were still in a dominant position, and real power lay with northerners. A new government set up in July was half southern, and a former 'codo' leader was named as Defence Minister.

In the south the theory of 'national reconciliation' did not work in practice. At the end of August negotiations which had been continuing with the 'codos' was broken off by their leader Colonel Kotiga, with a serious new outbreak of fighting in four of the five southern prefectures with the exception of Mayo-Kebbi, home of the Foreign Minister, Gouara Lassou. For the southerners, this was a disaster and the true effects of their 1979 loss of power at the centre was brought home to them: from having been the majority, they had become the new minority. Government repression was brutal, and the 'codos' were forced back into inaccessible areas, although their activities continued. There were widespread arrests and summary executions, with villages being razed to the ground, and a reported death-toll running possibly into thousands.¹⁹ By the beginning of 1985 the back of the 'codos' had been broken, with as many as 3000 surrendering to government forces. At the same time Habré and the French persuaded the government of President Kolingba in CAR to take more decisive steps against the use of border refugees, partly because the 'codos' had been taking advantage of support from ethnic groups within CAR hostile to the Kolingba government. In a new bid to promote reconciliation, Habré toured the south himself in March 1985, preaching a message of peace and reconciliation after the period of violence and revenge. He did, however, explicitly praise the forces of the national army, the FANT.²⁰

From stalemate to Operation Epervier

In the second half of 1984 the international aspects of the Chad crisis entered a new and unexpected phase. There had been times in the past where both the French and the Libyans pulled back from direct confrontation with each other, principally because of their mutual economic interests. After mediation by Austria and Greece, an agreement was signed between France and Libya providing for a simultaneous withdrawal of French troops and what were euphemistically described as Libyan 'support elements'. This was the first official admission by Libya of direct involvement — the

fiction had hitherto been maintained that all the fighting was being done by GUNT troops. While the French observed their part of the agreement and pulled out Operation Manta troops by 10 November, the Libyans remained.

President Mitterrand met Colonel Gaddafi at Elounda in Crete on 15 November, but the French leader later admitted that he had been misled into withdrawing while the Libyans remained. Even so, there was still a tacit understanding of the maintenance of the *de facto* partition, so the Crete meeting may not have been a complete failure. Mitterrand later said that France would not use force to drive the Libyans from northern Chad, but would intervene if they came south of the 16th parallel; many of the French troops had withdrawn only to the nearby base of Bouar in the CAR. In short if it was possible to maintain the status quo without actually having troops in situ, this was the way forward. This was a formula that, perhaps unintentionally, maintained an uneasy peace for at least another year.

In the meantime, the emphasis continued to be on reconciliation of all Chadian political groups. With the repression of the 'codos' rebellion in the south, disaffected southerners began to return. In March 1985, for example, Negué Djogo formed the *Front Démocratique du Tchad* (FDT), opposed to both Habré and Goukouni, and a 'third force' of dissident GUNT members emerged in both Lagos and Ouagadougou. The CDR of Acheikh Ibn Oumar, an important part of GUNT's fighting force, was also undergoing strains, having split in late 1984 into two factions, one of which, under Rakhis Mannani, was said to be closer to Tripoli. These same tensions led to Acheikh's detention in Tripoli in the second half of 1985. This was a period in which Acheikh was reportedly under heavy French pressure to go over to Habré. Meanwhile, Goukouni had been trying to consolidate the GUNT by setting up in August 1985 a Supreme Council of the Revolution, uniting a number of groups that had splintered from the old FROLINAT, and its three armies, with Kamougué's *Mouvement Révolutionnaire du Peuple* (MRP). A further abortive reconciliation conference was held in Brazzaville in October, Congo President Sassou Nguesso having taken the leading role in the process, with backing from the OAU.

Having rebuffed an earlier offer of negotiations from Habré, Colonel Gaddafi while on a visit to Senegal ostensibly supported a peace process involving another OAU peace-keeping force — received very unenthusiastically by the OAU — while preparing a new attack. Perhaps the precedent of Giscard's lack of response to Libya's military take-over and virtual annexation of Chad during the 1981 French presidential election campaign led the Libyan leader to permit the GUNT to take a new initiative in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections of March 1986. The reaction, however, was very different. In February, Libyan-backed GUNT troops possibly including members of the shadowy 'Islamic Legion' launched an offensive south of the 16th parallel, attacking the towns of Oum Chalouba, Ziguey and Kouba Olanga, although Habré's troops beat them back. Against the background of the first francophone summit in Versailles and Paris, the French sent Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft to bomb the Libyan-built airstrip of Ouadi Doum near Faya, which in turn led to a raid by a Libyan Tupolev on Ndjamenà airport. Although the raid only caused minor damage, the fact that it could take place and successfully penetrate government defences, triggered a new return of French troops to Chad. This time it was called Operation Epervier (sparrowhawk)²¹ and involved fewer men (1200) than Manta, as well as returning Jaguars to be based at Ndjamenà. The decision was made by Mitterrand and his Prime Minister Fabius, but after the victory of the right in the French elections, the new government, with Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister, endorsed it, an indication of the largely bi-partisan policy towards Chad obtained under the new Mitterrand-Chirac regime of 'co-habitation'.

Operation Epervier was designed to have a mainly deterrent effect and, despite a few skirmishes, succeeded until the end 1986, when a

number of changed circumstances finally ushered in Habré's much promised push north. The advocates of political reconciliation were pressing for still further meetings, although the drift back to Ndjamena of opponents continued, with Djogo early in 1986 and 'codo' commander Kotiga later in the year, as well as Mahamat Senoussi of one wing of the CDR. A major turning point came at the much heralded reconciliation meeting in Loubomo in the Congo, fruit of Congolese President Sassou Nguesso's patient efforts, but sabotaged by the non-appearance of Goukouni. This led to the then OAU President Abdou Diouf losing interest in the reconciliation process, and to the resignation of the Vice-President of the GUNT, Col Kamougué, although he did not give support to Habré until February 1987. A last attempt by Sassou Nguesso to continue the reconciliation committee was utterly rejected by Habré, who by now had sensed that the GUNT was disintegrating.

THE FINAL PUSH NORTH

In August 1986 Acheikh's CDR suspended collaboration with Goukouni, whose troops were subsequently skirmishing with CDR troops in Tibesti, and in October Goukouni called for reconciliation in a French radio interview, followed by reports that Gaddafi had once more put Goukouni under house arrest (some reports said that he had been seriously wounded). In November there was conclusive evidence that Libya had switched its support to the formerly uncertain Acheikh who, at a meeting in Cotonou, became President of the neo-GUNT, composed of seven groups formerly supportive of Goukouni. It was the rallying of Goukouni's troops, who still had most of the Tibesti, to Habré's side that gave the Chadian leader his opportunity, and in December he struck, possibly with the approval of the French. President Mitterrand, at the Franco-African summit in Lomé in November, had been particularly sphinx-like, saying, on the one hand that France wanted to help Chad 'recover its dignity', while ruling out actual French intervention north of the 16th parallel. In the meanwhile Operation Epervier was reinforced by 1200 men. M. Giraud, Defence Minister in the Chirac government, had earlier supported the recovery of the lost Chadian territory, although it was denied in Paris that this was French government policy. The US, which was still supplying military aid, was reported to be keen for Habré to commence military operations because of the discomfiture that it would bring to Gaddafi.

Unannounced, Habré's troops moved north in mid-December, infiltrating men to assist the FAP troops in the Tibesti in resisting Libyan attempts to capture Bardai, and, in the north-west, sending a column to take Fada at the beginning of January 1987. This was followed by the capture of Zouar, which effectively cut the supply-line to the major base at Faya. It was only when, after consolidating positions and receiving further French and US aid, FANT troops in mid-March moved in on Ouadi Doum that the Libyans and the rump of the GUNT forces abandoned Faya, leaving behind much military equipment, and retreated north.

Thus Habré had recovered in a short campaign all the lost territory of northern Chad bar the disputed Aozou strip. In May the Libyans announced officially they were withdrawing to Aozou, and were handing over their positions to Goukouni's forces (though these were now mainly with Habré). Although political reconciliation was still not complete, and Goukouni, who had been released in January and was half-reconciled with Gaddafi, produced

conditions for peace that Habré as head of state *in situ* found himself unable to accept, the Chad conflict ceased for most practical purposes to be a question of internal politics. From April 1987 onwards, it was about the dispute between Chad and Libya over Aozou.

This was seen at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in July, when the Sassou Nguesso mediation was formally abandoned and the 1977 Bongo committee to reconcile Chad and Libya was revived. It was followed almost immediately by a bold attempt by Habré to take Aozou town, which he held for three weeks, before Gaddafi retook it with a substantial force at the end of August demonstrating once again Habré's tendency to overextend his supply lines. It was no secret that the French government was critical of Habré's push to Aozou, and temporarily may have denied him air cover and possibly logistical support. Habré reacted to this unexpected setback by raiding the base of Maaten es Sarra, well inside Libya, reportedly inflicting serious damage (ironically the French may have given him discreet assistance here).

Both parties, having both lost and recovered face, accepted the intervention of OAU Chairman Kaunda calling for a ceasefire. This was agreed on 12 September and to the surprise of many, held well into 1988 despite some skirmishing on the north-west Sudan border. There was an initial meeting in September 1987 of the Bongo committee, which itself agreed to set up a committee to review the cartographical and other evidence, and which duly met after some delays, but a further full committee meeting scheduled to take place in Dakar was three times postponed, despite increasing suggestions that a Habré-Gaddafi meeting was in the offing. This 'summit', which appeared to have been definitively scheduled for Addis Ababa in May 1988 also did not take place due to the Libyan leader's absence, although he did use the OAU's 25th anniversary to announce his willingness to recognise the Habré government and invited Habré to go to Tripoli to meet with Goukouni who was still also claiming to lead the GUNT.

Chad had thus recovered its territorial integrity and had found a sort of civil peace, after twenty-three years of fighting, under a strong leader who, if he remained controversial in Chadian political terms, had grown in authority, and was exercising total control.²² Although many problems remained unsolved, and a country that had started off among the poorest had compounded its disadvantages, through all the period of fighting and fragmentation,²³ it was at least enjoying a spell of relative peace in which some sort of economic reconstruction could begin, provided all the forces could somehow be contained.

The whole Chadian imbroglio had also been a serious setback for Africa. The acute dependency it illustrated, and the incapacity of Chad's neighbours or the OAU to resolve its problems gave much thought for those considering the limits of African independence. It was also in the words of Robert Buijtenhuijs, the 'suicide of an African revolution'. Whatever ideological content FROLINAT may once have had became eclipsed soon after independence by the conflicts of local warlords and factions, indeed, by the very decomposition of an all too fragile state. FROLINAT never succeeded in becoming a properly national movement, and the use of the name itself fell out of favour after 1979.

The only real change has proved to be the decisive shift in the centre of power from far south to far north. This end product, a sort of *pax Habrénsis* that has at least preserved national unity, was even so, imposed with substantial assistance from both French and Americans. But the future still depends on Habré's capacity to win the peace.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Christian Bouquet, *Tchad: Genèse d'un Conflit*, Harmattan, 1982. The figures are based on the 1964 survey and may not have been accurate even then but are still used by most authorities as a guide.
- ² Kherallah was jailed until 1969, and resumed a ministerial career in 1971 until Tombalbaye's fall in 1975. Koulamallah was released only in 1971, and jailed again in 1972, to be released only after the 1975 coup. He played no further part in politics. Jean-Baptiste died in jail: his supporters claim he was liquidated as early as 1964.
- ³ Mangalmé is home of the Moubi, one of the components of the Hadjeray group, later to become prominent in the rebellion. Although a Moubi delegation had an official 'reconciliation' with Tombalbaye in 1971, the area remained a seat of disaffection. The Hadjeray became one of the main pillars of support for Habré in his rise to power, but after 1982 became increasingly disaffected and in 1987 went into open revolt (see *Africa Confidential*, Vol 29, no 2 of January 22, 1988). After the 1965 riots Mangalmé was moved from Batha to Guera prefecture.
- ⁴ The best account of the career of Abatcha and the formation of FROLINAT can be found in Vol 1 of the comprehensive study by Robert Buijtenhuijs, whose two volumes are probably the definitive works on Chad's rebellion and civil wars (see bibliography).
- ⁵ Galopin's report is reproduced in *extenso* in *Tchad: une Néo-colonie*.
- ⁶ Abba Siddick was a former Tombalbaye minister, part Chadian Arab, part Centrafrican, who was in exile, studying abroad from the early sixties.
- ⁷ The MNRCS was actually launched the day after Dr Bono was assassinated.
- ⁸ Foccart was also regularly pilloried in a satirical paper in Ndjamena called *Le Canard Libéré*, in which he appeared as 'dopele', a vulture in the Sara spirit world.
- ⁹ He was said to have been related to the then President Scheel of West Germany.
- ¹⁰ Buijtenhuijs says in his second volume that in 6 months in 1978 the FAT lost about 2000 men out of 11,500, of which 5000 were in the army and the rest in the Nomad Guard. (page 48)
- ¹¹ According to *Africa Confidential*, Vol 19, no 19, of 22 September, 1978, Gourvennec was SDECE station chief in Ndjamena. He died almost as soon as he returned to France.
- ¹² Buijtenhuijs gives an example of how Habré made a major scene over the fact that a speech he made at the end of September was broadcast in Sara before having been broadcast in Arabic, now with French one of the two official languages. This happened, it appears, because the Arabic translator was late.
- ¹³ Buijtenhuijs says that southerners saw the event as a Habré coup, but he supports the spontaneous violence thesis.
- ¹⁴ See Buijtenhuijs pp 73-4 for details of defections from FAT at this time.
- ¹⁵ French 'neutrality' in fact aided Habré. *Africa Confidential*, Vol 20, no 6, of 14 March, 1979, reports that 'when the fighting finally broke out, Forest prevented the Chadian army from exploiting its superior armaments and numbers. The Chadian Air Force planes are manned by 20 French mercenary pilots, but French troops blocked the runways and obliged them to leave the country.'
- ¹⁶ Nigeria at one point in the Kano 2 conference held Goukouni and Habré under house arrest, which immediately united them against Nigeria, causing them to call for the withdrawal of Nigerian forces, and determined them to act in defiance of Nigeria.
- ¹⁷ According to Bernard Lanne in the chapter on Chad in *Africa South of the Sahara* (see bibliography) the Habré forces committed such atrocities at Pala and Léré that the population rose up against them. This was the point at which Kamougué set up a *Comité Permanent* at Moundou, which ruled the five southern prefectures as a *de facto* separate state.
- ¹⁸ See Buijtenhuijs, *op. cit.*, p166.
- ¹⁹ An account of the rule of Kamougué and the Comité Permanent from 1979-82 can be found in the article 'Le Sud, L'Etat et la Révolution' by Bernard Lanne in the special issue of 'Politique Africaine' on *Le Tchad* (see bibliography).
- ²⁰ A number of revenge killings of southerners occurred at this period, including that of Lt Col Ngolobaye Allafi (on 23 October at Lai), whose misrule in Tibesti had been one of the causes of the 1968 uprising.
- ²¹ See *Africa Confidential*, Vol 26, no 10 of 6 May, 1985.
- ²² With the help of funds reportedly supplied by the French.
- ²³ See *West Africa*, 25.3.85, p592.
- ²⁴ The word is a pun in French as *épervier* is also a fisherman's thrown seine net.
- ²⁵ William J. Foltz in his CSIS Africa Notes 1987 essay on Chad lists six reasons for Habré's success: 1) military prowess, 2) FAN style of operations and decision-making, 3) Habré's own personality, 4) mobilisation of external aid, 5) mistakes and ineptitude of his opponents, especially Goukouni and Gaddafi, 6) general 'societal fatigue'.
- ²⁶ In December 1982 Idriss Miskine said Chad's agricultural economy had fallen back 50% in three years. In 1985 the World Bank placed Chad bottom of the country table of GNP per capita. Both these references are from Buijtenhuijs, Vol 2, p 423.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Antoine, Bangui, *Prisonnier de Tombalbaye*, Hatier, Paris 1980.
- Bouquet, Christian, *Tchad: Genèse d'un Conflit*, Harmattan, Paris 1982.
- Buijtenhuijs, Robert, *Le Frolinat et les Revoltes Populaires du Tchad, 1965-76*, Mouton, The Hague 1978; *Le Frolinat et les Guerres Civiles du Tchad, 1977-84*, Karthala, Paris 1987.
- Chapelle, Jean, *Le Peuple Tchadien, ses Racines et sa Vie Quotidienne*, Harmattan, Paris 1980.
- De Decker, Marie Laure and Tondini, O., *Pour le Tchad*, Editions le Sycomore, Paris 1978.
- Decalo, Samuel, *Historical Dictionary of Chad*, The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, New Jersey 1977 (Revised 1987).
- Desjardins, Thierry, *Avec les Otages du Tchad*, Presses de la Cité, Paris 1975.
- Foltz, William J., *Chad's Third Republic: Strengths, Problems and Prospects*, Africa Notes No. 77, 30 October, 1987, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC.
- Gatta, Gali Ngothe, *Tchad: Guerre civile et Désagrégation de l'Etat*, Presence Africain, Paris 1985.
- Lanne, Bernard, *Tchad-Libye, La Querelle des Frontières*, Karthala, Paris 1983; and annual chapter on Chad in *Africa South of the Sahara*, Europa Publications, London.
- Le Cornec, Jacques, *Histoire Politique de Tchad de 1900 à 1962*, Librairie generale de Droit and Jurisprudence, Paris 1963.
- Le Rouvreur, Albert, *Sahariens et Sahéliens du Tchad*, Berger Levraut, 1962.
- Lefèvre, Eric, *Tchad: Opération Manta*, Lavauzelle, Paris 1984.
- Lemarchand, Rene, *Crisis in Chad*, chapter in African Crisis Areas of US Foreign Policy, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1985; *Chad: The Misadventures of the North-South Dialectic* in African Studies Review, vol. 29, no. 3, September 1986, ASA, Los Angeles.
- N'Gangbet, Michel, *Peut-on encore Sauver le Tchad?*, Karthala, Paris 1983.
- N'Gangsop, G.J., *Tchad: Vingt ans de Crise*, Harmattan, Paris 1986.
- Spartacus, Colonel, *Opération Manta 1983-4*, Les Documents Secrets, Plon, Paris 1985.
- Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, *Conflict in Chad*, C. Hurst, London 1981 and *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*, Stanford University Press, California 1960.
- Weinstein, Brian, *Eboué*, Oxford University Press 1972.
- See also: *Politique Africaine*, special issue on *Le Tchad* (no. 16, December 1984) *Tchad: une Néo-Colonie*, Editions Git-le-Coeur, Paris 1982.
- Amnesty International Reports (published annually).
- Africa South of the Sahara*, published annually by Europa, London.
- Periodicals: *Africa Magazine*, London (ceased publication 1986); *Africa Confidential*, London; *Afrique-Asie*, Paris (ceased publication 1987); *Jeune Afrique*, Paris; *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, Paris; *West Africa*, London.



The Reports already published by the Minority Rights Group are:

- No. 1 **Religious minorities in the Soviet Union (Revised 1984 edition)** — 'systematically documented and unemotionally analysed'; 'telling'; 'outstandingly good and fairminded'¹.
- No. 2 **The two Irelands: the double minority (New 1984 edition)** — 'a rare accuracy and insight'; 'lucid ... without bias'; 'the best pages on Ireland's contemporary political problems that have found their way into the permanent literature ... excellent'².
- No. 3 **Japan's minorities: Burakumin, Koreans, Ainu and Okinawans (New 1983 edition)** — 'sad and strange story ... a frightening picture'; 'expertly diagnosed'³.
- No. 4 **The Asian minorities of East and Central Africa (up to 1971)** — 'brilliantly sketched'; 'admirably clear, humane and yet dispassionate'⁴.
- No. 5 **Eritrea and Tigray (New 1983 report)** — 'one of the best short works on the Horn of Africa'⁵.
- No. 6 **The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet treatment of some national minorities (Revised 1980 edition)** — 'brilliant'; 'great accuracy and detail'⁶.
- No. 7 **The position of Blacks in Brazilian and Cuban society (New 1979 report)** — 'another important contribution ... from this increasingly important group'⁷.
- No. 8 **Inequalities in Zimbabwe (Revised 1981 edition)** — 'outlines all the thorny problems'⁸.
- No. 9 **The Basques and Catalans (New 1987 edition)** — 'very valuable'⁹.
- No. 10 **The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'a well-documented and sensible plea'¹⁰.
- No. 11 **The Biharis in Bangladesh (Fourth edition, 1982)** — 'a significant fusion of humane interest and objective clear-headed analysis'; 'a moving and desperate report'¹¹.
- No. 12 **Israel's Oriental Immigrants and Druzes (Revised 1981 edition)** — 'timely'¹².
- No. 13 **East Indians of Trinidad and Guyana (Revised 1980 edition)** — 'excellent'¹³.
- No. 14 **Roma: Europe's Gypsies (Revised 1987 edition) (aussi en français) (also in Romanian)** — 'the first comprehensive description and analysis of the plight'; 'one of the worst skeletons in Europe's cupboard'¹⁴.
- No. 15 **The Amerindians of South America (New 1987 report)**
- No. 16 **The new position of East Africa's Asians (Revised 1984 edition)** — 'a comprehensive analysis'; 'illuminating and acute'¹⁵.
- No. 17 **India, the Nagas and the north-east (Revised 1980 edition)** — 'India has still not learned for itself the lesson it taught Britain'; 'a lucid presentation of the very complex history'¹⁶.
- No. 18 **Minorities of Central Vietnam: autochthonous Indochinese people (New 1980 report) (aussi en français)** — 'perhaps the most vulnerable of all the peoples MRG has so far investigated'¹⁷.
- No. 19 **The Namibians (New 1985 edition)** — 'excellent ... strongly recommended'¹⁸.
- No. 20 **Burundi since the genocide (New 1987 report)** — 'most illuminating ... a major contribution'¹⁹.
- No. 21 **Canada's Indians (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'excellent'; 'fascinatingly explained'²⁰.
- No. 22 **Race and Law in Britain and the United States (New 1983 edition)** — 'this situation, already explosive, is likely to be aggravated by the current economic plight'²¹.
- No. 23 **The Kurds (New 1985 report)** — 'admirably objective'; 'valuable'²².
- No. 24 **The Palestinians (New 1987 report)** — 'admirably summarised'²³.
- No. 25 **The Tamils of Sri Lanka (Revised 1988 edition)** — 'a warning that unless moderation and statesmanship are more prominent, terrorism could break out'²⁴.
- No. 26 **The Untouchables of India (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'discrimination officially outlawed ... remains as prevalent as ever'²⁵.
- No. 27 **Arab Women (Revised 1983 edition) (aussi en français)** — 'skillfully edited, treads sensitively through the minefield'²⁶.
- No. 28 **Western Europe's Migrant Workers (Revised 1984 edition) (aussi en français) (auch auf deutsch)** — 'compassionate ... plenty of chilling first-hand detail'; 'excellent'²⁷.
- No. 29 **Jehovah's Witnesses in Africa (Revised 1985 edition)** — 'a terrible fate ... deserves widespread protest'²⁸.
- No. 30 **Cyprus (New 1984 report)** — 'excellent ... unhesitatingly recommended'²⁹.
- No. 31 **The Original Americans: U.S. Indians (New 1986 edition)** — 'excellent'; 'timely and valuable ... well-researched and highly readable'³⁰.
- No. 32 **The Armenians (Revised 1987 edition)** — 'an able and comprehensive account'; 'the hard historical information contained makes reading as grim as any that has passed across my desk'³¹.
- No. 33 **Nomads of the Sahel (Revised 1979 edition)** — 'cogent and convincing'³².
- No. 34 **Indian South Africans (New 1985 edition)** — 'outstanding'; 'masterful'³³.
- No. 35 **Aboriginal Australians (New 1988 edition)** — 'standards of health, housing and education remain abysmal'³⁴.
- No. 36 **Constitutional Law and Minorities** — 'possibly the MRG's most important single report ... it can hardly be faulted'³⁵.
- No. 37 **The Hungarians of Rumania (aussi en français)** — 'fair and unbiased'; 'compulsive reading'³⁶.
- No. 38 **The Social Psychology of Minorities** — 'must be greeted with enthusiasm ... extremely important'³⁷.
- No. 39 **Mexican-Americans in the U.S. (tambien en castellano)** — 'another excellent pamphlet from MRG'³⁸.
- No. 40 **The Western Saharans (New 1984 report)** — 'excellently produced ... just the right balance'; 'it would be hard to imagine a better brief overview'³⁹.
- No. 41 **The International Protection of Minorities** — 'timely'⁴⁰.
- No. 42 **East Timor and West Irian (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'well-documented'⁴¹.
- No. 43 **The Refugee Dilemma (New 1985 edition)** — 'the outlook appears to be a cumulative nightmare'⁴².
- No. 44 **French Canada in Crisis (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'a readable narrative'⁴³.
- No. 45 **Women in Asia (Revised 1982 edition)** — 'women have often suffered rather than gained from development'⁴⁴.
- No. 46 **Flemings and Walloons in Belgium** — 'we have come to expect a high standard from MRG reports, and the 46th does not disappoint. Hopefully its lessons will not be confined to those interested in Belgium'⁴⁵.
- No. 47 **Female circumcision, excision and infibulation: facts and proposals for change (Revised 1985 edition) (aussi en français, also in Arabic and Italian)** — 'a tremendously good pamphlet'; 'a horrifying report'⁴⁶.
- No. 48 **The Baluchis and Pathans (New 1987 edition)** — 'sets out all the basic facts'⁴⁷.
- No. 49 **The Tibetans (New 1983 report)** — 'one of the best reports by the MRG'⁴⁸.
- No. 50 **The Ukrainians and Georgians** — 'a fascinating study'⁴⁹.
- No. 51 **The Baha'is of Iran (Revised 1985 edition)** — 'very balanced and informative'; 'all credit to the MRG ... timely and objective'⁵⁰.
- No. 52 **Haitian Refugees in the US (Revised 1987 edition)** — 'poverty and oppression are so intertwined'⁵¹.
- No. 53 **International Action against Genocide (Revised 1984 edition)** — 'exhaustively researched ... argues persuasively'; 'If there were a peace prize for sociologists, it should be awarded to him'⁵².
- No. 54 **Diego Garcia: a contrast to the Falklands (Revised 1985 edition)** — 'cutting through a fog of secrecy, evasions and downright lies'⁵³.
- No. 55 **The Sami of Lapland (New 1988 edition)** — 'a new feeling of Sami consciousness'⁵⁴.
- No. 56 **The San of the Kalahari** — 'unique way of life is increasingly threatened'⁵⁵.
- No. 57 **Latin American Women** — 'excellent'⁵⁶.
- No. 58 **Puerto Ricans in the US (tambien en castellano)** — 'highly recommended'⁵⁷.
- No. 59 **Teaching about Prejudice (New 1985 edition)** — 'readable and valuable'; 'excellent and concise'⁵⁸.
- No. 60 **The Inuit (Eskimo) of Canada** — 'excellent'⁵⁹.
- No. 61 **Lebanon: a conflict of minorities (Revised 1986 edition)** — 'excellent'; 'extremely well done'⁶⁰.
- No. 62 **Central America's Indians** — 'caught in the crossfire of regional conflict, over 2 million have been killed'⁶¹.
- No. 63 **Micronesia: the problem of Palau (Revised 1987 edition)** — 'helpful'⁶².
- No. 64 **The Rastafarians** — 'extremely good'⁶³.
- No. 65 **The Sikhs (Revised 1986 edition)** — 'the most balanced and best expressed account we can hope for'⁶⁴.
- No. 66 **Uganda**
- No. 67 **The Falashas: The Jews of Ethiopia** — 'extraordinary story'; 'important'⁶⁵.
- No. 68 **Migrant Workers in the Gulf** — 'valuable insight'; 'the best analysis'⁶⁶.
- No. 69 **Children: Rights and Responsibilities** — 'of great value'; 'brilliant'⁶⁷.
- No. 70 **The Maori of New Zealand** — 'it concentrates on today and the future in a wide ranging review'⁶⁸.
- No. 71 **The Kanaks of New Caledonia** — 'well presented'⁶⁹.
- No. 72 **Co-existence in some plural European societies** — 'praiseworthy'⁷⁰.
- No. 73 **Minorities and Human Rights Law** — 'condenses a wonderful amount of interesting information ... his judgements are pointed and persuasive'⁷¹.
- No. 74 **The Rights of Mentally Ill People** — 'urgent action ... is needed'⁷².
- No. 75 **Fiji** — 'challenges common assumptions'⁷³.
- No. 76 **The Jews of Africa and Asia**
- No. 77 **Women in Sub-Saharan Africa**
- No. 78 **The Southern Sudan**
- No. 79 **The Miskito Indians of Nicaragua**
- No. 80 **Chad**

¹The Internationalist; ²New Society; ³Times Lit. Supplement; ⁴Belfast Newsletter; ⁵Irish Post; ⁶International Affairs; ⁷Sunday Independent; ⁸S. Asian Review; ⁹The Friend; ¹⁰Afro-Asian Affairs; ¹¹E. African Standard; ¹²Sunday Times; ¹³New Community; ¹⁴The Times; ¹⁵Information; ¹⁶The Observer; ¹⁷Irving Horowitz; ¹⁸The Guardian; ¹⁹Peace News; ²⁰The Freethinker; ²¹The Spectator; ²²The Geographical Magazine; ²³New World; ²⁴Melbourne Age; ²⁵The Economist; ²⁶Neue Zürcher Zeitung; ²⁷Resurgence; ²⁸Feedback; ²⁹Time Out; ³⁰Evening Standard; ³¹Tribune of Australia; ³²The Scotsman; ³³The Financial Times; ³⁴New Statesman; ³⁵The Nation; ³⁶Bernard Levin; ³⁷BBC World Service; ³⁸International Herald Tribune; ³⁹Education; ⁴⁰Times Ed. Supp.; ⁴¹The Middle East; ⁴²City Limits; ⁴³South; ⁴⁴Choice; ⁴⁵S. Asia Research; ⁴⁶New African; ⁴⁷Voluntary Action; ⁴⁸India Weekly; ⁴⁹The Jerusalem Post; ⁵⁰Race Relations Abstracts; ⁵¹Third World Affairs; ⁵²Tarzie Vittachi; ⁵³Lord Lyell in House of Lords debate; ⁵⁴Workaway; ⁵⁵Prof. Lemarchand; ⁵⁶Prof. Banton.

Copies £1.80 (or US\$4), plus 20% surface mail postage and packing on orders of less than ten Reports, are obtainable from M.R.G., 29 Craven Street, London WC2N 5NT, or good bookshops (ISSN:0305-6252).

Please also inform MRG if you would like to make a standing order for its future Reports;

or send a subscription: £7.50 (US\$15) for the next five Reports, post free.

Chad – Conflict or Reconciliation?

Since its Independence in 1960 Chad has been torn apart by internal rebellion and civil war. A series of regimes have imposed various forms of arbitrary rule while large areas have been held under the changing fortunes of warlords, disaffected military commanders, opposition groups, guerrilla bands and foreign backed forces, including those of France and Libya.

Is it possible for a poor landlocked country with many different ethnic groups to build a viable Nation-State? Chad's diverse population is divided between the numerous African Sara peoples of the far south, the Arabic speakers of the centre and the minority tribes of the northern third of the country. The Sara are mainly Christians and animists while the others are Muslims. Ethnic and religious antagonisms have been – and continue to be – fuelled by resentment at economic exactions, widespread corruption and arbitrary rule.

Conflict, whether in riots or civil war, has led to many thousands of people dying and hundreds of thousands fleeing into exile as refugees. Attempts by the OAU to bring about reconciliation have not been successful. Today with the regime of President Hissen Habré most of Chad is again under one government, this time dominated by a small minority group from the far north – but can Habré win the peace?

Chad, Minority Rights Group report no 80, examines the roots and course of the conflict in this desperately poor African nation. Written by Kaye Whiteman, Editor-in-Chief of *West Africa* and an experienced commentator on Africa, this report outlines Chad's bloody history since Independence and its prospects for the future. Essential reading for all those interested in modern Africa and its future.

ISBN 0 946690 60 X



- ★ The Minority Rights Group, an international human rights group and registered educational charity, investigates the plight of minority (and majority) groups suffering discrimination and prejudice – and works to educate and alert public opinion...
- ★ We produce readable and accurate reports on the problems of oppressed groups around the world. We publish 5 new reports a year, as well as constantly revising and updating previous reports. To date we have produced 80 reports in addition to the World Minorities books.
- ★ We work through the UN and elsewhere to increase awareness of human rights issues and – with your help – are giving oppressed groups a voice in the international arena.

For full details –

THE MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP,
29 Craven Street, London WC2N 5NT

£1.80
US\$3.95