

CENTRAL AMERICA'S INDIANS



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- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world.
- To help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised, are very difficult to resolve; and
- To foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.

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CENTRAL AMERICA'S INDIANS

by David Stephen and Phillip Wearne
with a summary by Rodolfo Stavenhagen

“We must get rid of the words ‘indigenous’ and ‘Indian’” – General Oscar Mejia Victores

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THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from any fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interest.

Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

PART I – AN OVERVIEW by David Stephen

1. The new Indian consciousness in Latin America

The position of Indians in Latin America today cannot be understood without some reference to the process of colonization by the Spaniards and Portuguese which began following the 'discovery' of the Americas by Christopher Columbus in 1492. Like most colonists, the men who followed Columbus to the Americas sought fame and fortune: the colonies provided an opportunity for social mobility and material gain which was simply beyond the dreams of the average person in the metropolitan country back home. But the process of colonization always had a missionary element: there were those educated men who sought to spread the benefits of civilization, and there were the men of the cloth who saw, in the teeming millions of heathens across the seas, the need for souls to be saved for God.

'Pre-Columbian' Latin America included not only the empires of the Mayas and Aztecs in Mexico and Central America, but the previous Inca Empire stretching from what is today Ecuador, down through Andean Peru and Bolivia into present-day northern Argentina. The Spanish 'conquistadores' – like Hernán Cortés who subdued the Aztecs and their descendants – saw Indians as quaint and uncivilized creatures to be subjugated to Spanish rule but also as cheap labour, not only as miners to provide the gold which every Spaniard dreamed of, but also to provide agricultural labour and house servants. Spaniards from relatively low social origins aspired to the status of *grandee*: free from any need to do physical or manual labour of any sort, waited on hand and foot.

Nowhere in Latin America did the Spaniards adopt the form of colonization adopted by the British in India or West Africa, of simply colonizing the country by imposing a colonial government structure on the top of the existing indigenous system. The pattern was conquest, and settlement of colonists, not dissimilar from European patterns of colonization in Zimbabwe and South Africa or as in the case of Argentina where the Indian population was largely exterminated, not unlike British settlement in Australia. As in southern Africa, if the native population was not required as labour or servants, it was left largely alone, but Europeans grabbed the best land and, with the traditional rulers and religious leaders of the Indian communities liquidated, most Latin American Indians became marginalized subsistence farmers, rarely playing any part in 'national' life, rarely even learning Spanish. The process of Latin American independence in the first decades of the nineteenth century was a struggle between creole settlers and the government in the Iberian peninsula, between *criollos* and *peninsulares* – from which the Indian population was largely excluded. Indians only impinged on the consciousness of the rulers of Latin America when Indian uprisings occurred, often desperate attempts at rebellion put down with extreme ferocity.

Today, in Latin America as a whole, there are something like twenty-six million Indians in about 400 different ethnic groups. Two countries, Guatemala and Bolivia, almost certainly have an Indian majority in the population.¹ Their history has been summed up by a prominent Mexican scholar as one of

'extermination, enslavement, serfdom, oppression, pillage, exploitation, betrayal and expropriation by the representatives of the dominant society, whether colonial administration, national government, Church, land-owning class or transnational corporation. The few honourable exceptions simply prove the general rule.'²

Enlightened liberal creoles, like the framers of the independence constitutions, looked forward to a goal of 'national unity' – but the aim was assimilation of the Indians into the dominant Hispanic culture. Politics took place in cities: Indians lived in the countryside. Despite formal proclamations of Indian equality, discrimination and inequality were the order of the day. One of Peru's most distinguished left-wing political analysts, José Carlos Mariátegui, in his *Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality*, published in 1928, held that life for Indians became harder under the independent republic than it had been under the Spanish viceroyalty, because a new class of exploiters began grabbing Indian land on an unprecedented scale. Mariátegui observed that in the high Andes 'barbarous and omnipotent feudalism' subsisted still: attempts to promote the Indian cause had been well-meaning but had failed. Mariátegui, however, detected signs of an Indian

awakening: like most Marxists, he saw it as the inevitable result of economic exploitation.

Today, generally speaking, Indians remain the objects of government policies rather than participants in decision-making. The progressive military government in Peru, which came to power following a coup in 1966, tried to incorporate the Indian masses into national life by a series of policies and mechanisms clearly devised from the centre: but it was not until the early seventies that Quechua, the language of nearly half of the population of Peru, became the second official language. The revolutionary government in Nicaragua attempted to offer the benefits of the revolution to tribal peoples whose fate had been largely ignored by the previous regime, and found (as we shall see in detail later) that their motives were misunderstood, setting off a process of alienation, with accusations of counter-revolutionary activity, which have had serious international ramifications.

What seems to be happening is that Mariátegui's 'awakening' is occurring, but that it is taking an 'ethnic' rather than an 'economic' dimension. The very term 'Indian' – originally applied by Columbus to people he took to be East Indians – has undergone something of a semantic revolution. Originally a term of contempt – 'Indians' being of so little concern that it hardly mattered to the colonists whether they came from India or Mexico – the term is now being adopted by Indians themselves as a badge of ethnic and cultural pride. Even the word 'native' – 'indígena' in Spanish – is undergoing a change. Indians are often proud to be called natives, not because it makes them feel inferior but because, it is argued, it is a good term to describe the representatives of 'pre-Columbian' civilizations in republics formally independent but in practice ruled by European-oriented Spanish-speaking élites.

In the last thirty years, a number of international congresses and meetings have been held, bringing together Indians and their supporters and sympathizers. The Interamerican Native Congress, held in Cuzco, Peru, in 1948, attempted a definition of the term 'Indian':

'The Indian is the descendant of pre-Columbian nations and peoples who shares a social awareness and a lifestyle – recognizable to his own people as well as to outsiders – in his system of work, in his language and in his traditions even where these have undergone some modification through outside contacts.'

Marie-Chantal Barre notes³ that 'Indian' has now become a more radical term, used, for example by those groups which present their demands and platforms in terms of a 'national liberation struggle', while the term 'Indígena' is used by more moderate groups, who almost by definition see themselves as minorities living, with other groups, in a single nation-state. Indians therefore, according to Barre, are seeking national liberation; 'indígenas' are involved in building alliances with other groups.

The new Indian awareness has been shown by the growth of national ethnic groups and associations and by the presence of representatives of such groups at international gatherings. Indian representatives from Central and South America have even begun meeting with Indian leaders from North America: the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, for example, held its first meeting in Canada in 1975, while other important gatherings have taken place in Geneva in 1977 and 1981 and in Finland in 1977. The first international conference of Central American Indians was held in Panama in 1977: the first congress of Indian movements from South America was held in Peru in 1980. As a result of the Panama meeting, a Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples of Central America (CORPI) came into existence. The work of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, has been particularly important in recent years. A recent report to the Sub-Commission by the Special Rapporteur, Sr. José R. Martínez Cobo, contained a detailed survey of legislative, executive and judicial measures affecting indigenous peoples throughout the world, including Latin America.

The Congress of Indian Movements, held in Peru in 1980, marked perhaps a watershed in Indian ethnic politics in Latin America. Previously controversy had raged over ideology: Marxists and their sympathizers arguing that Indians should be viewed in class terms – as an exploited class whose political liberation would come with the development of 'class-consciousness' – while the 'culturalists' emphasized the colonial and ethnic aspects of the Indian situation, and voiced demands of a linguistic and cultural

¹ Footnotes to Part I on page 8



CENTRAL AMERICA – A QUICK REFERENCE

	Area in sq km	Total population	Population density/sq km	Estimate of ethnic Indian population*	% of total population
Guatemala	108,889	7,100,000	65	2,700,000 (official) 3,600,000 plus (unofficial)	38% 50% plus
Belize	22,963	150,000	6.5	15,000	10%
Honduras	112,088	3,595,000	32	250,000	7%
El Salvador	21,393	4,813,000	225	960,000	20%
Nicaragua	148,000 (surface area: 130,000)	2,733,000	18 (21)	135,000	5%
Costa Rica	50,900	2,286,000	45	20,000	0.1%
Panama	75,650	1,830,000	24	100,000	5%

*includes those of mixed Afro-Caribbean-Carib descent (e.g. in Belize; Maya; Ketchi; Garifuna)

nature, while stressing the importance of Indian traditional land-holding systems and other forms of economic organization. The 1980 congress saw the decisive defeat of the 'class analysis' school and the victory of the culturalist or decolonization approach.

The intellectual underpinning of the emergence of the culturalist/ decolonization approach had come a few years earlier, in a meeting of anthropologists and sociologists held in Barbados in 1971. The 1971 'Declaration of Barbados' had been concerned mainly with the Indians of the Amazon region but had made its theme the cause of liberation: 'the liberation of native peoples can only be brought about by the peoples themselves, or it is not liberation'. The Barbados meeting, sponsored by the World Council of Churches, aroused considerable debate in church circles – particularly among missionaries and those actually living or working with Indians – and a further Barbados symposium was held in 1977. The Mexican writer on Indian questions, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, in an introductory paper, stressed two aspects of the Indian situation (drawing in particular on Mexican and Central American experience): ethnicity as a strong and important social reality, and the existence of a 'culture of resistance' five centuries old, seeking outlets and making use of token opportunities for Indian expression (and also increasing demographic pressure and the emergence of a new Indian élite taking part in such institutions as Indian Councils). Bonfil Batalla therefore concluded that the seventies had seen an undeniable increase in mobilization among Indian peoples in Latin America. More Indian organizations had come into being, and more people were now defining themselves as Indian.⁴

The 1977 Declaration of Barbados described Indian peoples as suffering both economic and cultural domination. 'Cultural domination', it stated, 'can be considered to exist when the mind of an Indian has come to accept that Western culture is the only, and the highest, level of development, and when his culture is not looked on as culture, but rather as the lowest level of backwardness...'. The Declaration divided Latin American Indians into three groups: those who had remained more or less isolated and had conserved their own cultures; those who still conserve much of their culture, but are dominated by the capitalist economic system; and those who have been de-indianized by 'integrationist forces'.

The backing of such groups as the World Council of Churches for Indian liberation has been important, but the involvement of Indians in the political and social conflicts in Central America has also shed important light on the Indian predicament. Groups seeking radical political change – such as the Sandinista revolutionaries in Nicaragua or the guerrilla groups in El Salvador – have tended to take an orthodox Marxist view of society, seeing events in terms of economic interests and class struggle. The situation in Guatemala is different. Indians do appear to have been active supporters of some, though not all, of the guerrilla groups, and much of the counter-insurgency activity of the regime seems to be targeted on Indians. It is possible to argue that, even though some of the leaders of the revolutionary left in Guatemala are urban-based, Spanish-speaking intellectuals, there is a state of incipient Indian rebellion in the country, with the traditional *Ladino* elite pitched against the Indian masses and their leaders. But that is not how the situation is generally presented. The government of Guatemala and its friends present the issue as one of communist-led insurgency: many critics of the regime, citing cases of brutality by the armed forces and of systematic 'disappearances', look on Guatemala as a case of grave violations of human rights. But again, the repression in Guatemala seems to take quite different forms in the cities from its manifestations in the rural areas. Particularly under the short-lived regime of President Rios Montt, urban repression was softened, while 'counter-insurgency' measures in the countryside were intensified. The human rights violations in the countryside have been largely against Indians.

Everywhere in Central America pressure on land and natural resources is affecting Indian peoples. Mining developments, tourism, and land resettlement schemes threaten peoples whose traditional attitude to land is not based on ownership but on a sharing of natural resources, including hunting, fishing and cultivation. The 'cultural' element cuts across the usual left-right political divisions: a multinational mining corporation, proposing to quarry or mine in traditional lands, a social democratic government planning a hydro-electric scheme involving the flooding of Indian hunting-grounds, or a revolutionary government

aiming to resettle landless peasants on communal land – all pose an equal threat to the Indian way of life.

2. Central America and its Indians

Leaving aside Mexico (which is usually classified as 'North' rather than 'Central' America) the countries of Central America contain only one, Guatemala, where the indigenous population could be said to form a majority of the population. (Official figures give a figure for 'Indians' of under 50% of the population: the story has been one of a steady decline in the proportion of Indians, according to the official statistics, from about 80% two centuries ago to about 40% today, but the criterion of what constitutes an Indian – whether the concept is self-assessed or otherwise, for example – is not clear.) Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Belize and Nicaragua all fall clearly into the other category: countries where Indians form a small part of a population which today consists of a Spanish- or European-descended majority, plus a large black (Afro-Caribbean) minority (the reverse in the case of Belize). Costa Rica is almost wholly inhabited by the descendants of Spanish colonists: apart from Afro-Caribbean groups on the Atlantic coast the only other minority are Indians. Of Costa Rica's total population of about 2.5 million, only about 20,000 people are Indians. They form about six distinct ethnic groups.

If, on the other hand, we take the threefold typology put forward in the Declaration of Barbados of 1977, a further category is added. The Indian groups in Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Belize clearly fall into the first category (those who have conserved much of their cultures mainly because of their isolation) while Guatemala falls into the second category (those who still conserve much of their culture, but are dominated by an alien economic system). Into the third of the 'Barbados' categories would fall El Salvador – a country whose Indians have been 'de-Indianized'.

El Salvador is distinct from all the other countries of Central America because of the high density of its population: this physical characteristic has been the origin of major social and political influences in the country which are also different from those elsewhere in the region. Indians were reduced to the status of landless peasants in the middle of the last century and, as pressure for the commercial exploitation of land for coffee cultivation increased, communal lands were abolished. The peasantry were Indian in origin, but seem gradually to have lost their distinctive cultural features: the uprising of 1932, followed by a brutal massacre still known as *la matanza*, was the last 'Indian' uprising in El Salvador. But even if elements of Indian culture may have been present in the uprising (which was led by Farabundo Martí, the communist leader whose name has been adopted by the present revolutionary Front) it is clear that the repression which followed also involved the repression of any signs of 'native' dress or culture. General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who ruthlessly put down the uprising, is said to have ordered his troops to eliminate any peasant seen dressed as an Indian.

The combined effects of the Spanish conquest and the handing over of the countryside to monoculture in the form of coffee plantations, plus the specific nature of the later repression, seem to have eliminated Indian-ness, on any scale, from El Salvador. Besides, the Indians in El Salvador at the time of the Spanish conquest were themselves on the periphery of the great Mayan Empire, and were perhaps more easily culturally dominated by the Spaniards than their brothers and sisters in Guatemala to the north. Certainly there is today a noticeable absence of Indian or 'indigenista' language in the platform of the revolutionary left, though death squads have been active against the few Indian leaders who remain. The mass of the population of El Salvador is now made up of mestizo peasants. Estimates vary as to the racial mix of the Salvador population, but about a fifth of the population can probably be said to possess Indian racial features. Salvador is, therefore, quintessentially a country where an Indian population has, in the words of the Barbados Declaration, been 'de-Indianized'.

Although Belize is slightly different (because although there are small 'indigenous' Indian communities, several thousand of the Indian people now living in Belize came as refugees from Guatemala) all of the other Central American countries except Guatemala have small Indian populations whose strategy for

survival dictates some form of co-existence with the states in question. In Panama and Costa Rica scattered communities live, basically, as subsistence farmers – preserving their languages and cultures – but increasingly involved, often through missionaries, with the Spanish-speaking, ‘Western’, world. Threats to the Indian way of life – planned mining in Panama by the British multinational, Rio Tinto, or dam projects which would have flooded Indian land in Boruca, Costa Rica – have provided platforms for mobilization.

Countries like **Costa Rica** were of little interest to the conquistadors precisely because there were neither masses of Indians nor any obvious signs of gold or other riches to exploit: as a result, Costa Rica was settled mainly by coffee-growers and farmers, and remains to this day the most ethnically and socially homogeneous of the Central American states. Generally, the Spaniards pushed the Indians off the best land, forcing them into higher and more isolated locations. But it would be a mistake to see Central America simply in terms of Spaniards and Indian natives. Indian groups living on the Caribbean side of the Central American isthmus had little or no contact with the great Maya or Aztec civilizations, and were largely ignored by the Spaniards. Indeed, ethnically and geographically there is a distinct difference in Central America between the highlands, where Spaniards settled and either displaced or lived alongside Indians (where the climate was often more salubrious than at sea-level) and the eastern jungle areas by the Caribbean coast. Spanish colonialism hardly penetrated into the Caribbean coastal region, which saw more of British pirates and colonialists from Jamaica and other British colonies than of any Spanish conquistadors. And the British took with them to the Caribbean coastal areas of Central America black slaves from their Caribbean colonies.

Belize was the only territory formally annexed by Britain in Central America, and it remains an English-speaking, predominantly Afro-Caribbean country. It was hardly a British colony in any real sense: there was very little settlement by British people, and for many years it was ruled from Jamaica and simply treated by British merchants and traders as a source of easy profits from timber-shipping (mainly high quality tropical woods). There were traces of Indian settlements from Mayan times, and several thousand Indians spilling over from neighbouring Guatemala, of the same Kekchi and Mopan groups as the Indians in Guatemala. Many of these Indians have come, some in very recent decades, as a result of persecution and land hunger in Guatemala. Since Belize is by far the least densely populated country in the region, it has become sought-after by refugees from elsewhere in the area. Several thousand Salvadorean refugees have resettled in Belize (where they are actively farming in hitherto ‘wild’ territory) and there has been talk of resettling refugees from Haiti in the country. Certainly Belize is already a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country, with both Indian and Hispanic languages and cultures jostling for position with the country’s traditional Anglo-Caribbean culture.

Belize’s independence constitution, adopted in 1981, provides for equality for every citizen regardless of race: this clause, and the arrival of refugees to resettle in the countryside, are regarded by some Indians as threatening them with cultural assimilation and the loss of traditional lands. As elsewhere, there are grass-roots Indian organizations coming into existence to defend Indian rights, such as the Indian Cultural Movement of Toledo. Their demands are cultural rather than directly political: they would like to see, for example, more teachers from their own communities and their own local administration.

Right down the Caribbean coast to Panama there are settlements of black English-speaking people of Caribbean origin; in Nicaragua (to which we shall return later) the blacks have often intermarried with Indians to form a local creole population, still largely English-speaking. Bluefields in Nicaragua, like Puerto Limón in Costa Rica or Colón in Panama, are towns with sizeable black, English-speaking populations. Their inhabitants include descendants of slaves brought in to ship timber and work in the fields two or three hundred years ago, but most are of more recent origin, being descended from Jamaicans brought in in the early part of the century to help dig the Panama Canal, or more recently to work in banana plantations.

Blacks are emerging to play some part in national life in both Costa Rica and Panama, and there are now black members of the Costa

Rican congress: but until very recently blacks were regarded by the dominant Hispanic groups as inferior. Indians were looked upon as backward natives: the blacks were simply disregarded. Until the late 1940s black people were not permitted to travel from Puerto Limón to the Costa Rican capital, San José: it is said that a notice is still to be seen at a railway station on the way from Limón to San José saying ‘Blacks alight at this point’.

Nicaragua and **Costa Rica** both offer interesting illustrations of the different politics of ethnicity in the two countries. Costa Rica underwent a social-democratic revolution in 1948: Nicaragua, having been ruled by a corrupt and brutal dynasty for forty years, underwent a radical revolution following the taking of power by Sandinista guerrillas in 1979. Costa Rica’s Indian population is minute: Nicaragua’s small and concentrated in the neglected Caribbean coastal region. The Costa Rican policy can be summed up as one of ‘we have no Indian problem here’ – an attitude which is gradually being undermined by increasing Indian cultural awareness and militancy: the Nicaraguans, having until the 1979 revolution totally ignored the Indians, set about offering them the benefits of revolutionary change in a way that caused widespread misunderstanding and serious political difficulties.

As far back as 1945, the Costa Rican government accepted that Indian people had a right to the land in which they lived, and each family was accordingly allotted sixty hectares (148 acres) for their own use. However, the formal registration of land in this way placed a weapon in the hands of those who were able to manipulate the legal bureaucracy, and there is little doubt that in numerous cases whites were able, sometimes by trickery, to acquire land that had been allotted to Indian families. By the 1960s it was clear that few Costa Rican Indians held any land, and a press campaign led to the establishment of a National Commission of Indian Affairs to attempt to rectify matters. Special groups were set up in ministries to watch over Indian affairs. By 1976 President Daniel Oduber was giving personal attention to the question. He created five areas, totalling over 100,000 hectares where non-Indians would not be allowed to buy or own land, and declared a ‘national emergency’ in the Indian lands in order to speed up government action.

In fact, Indians meeting in the capital, San José in 1978, said that President Oduber’s measures had not been enforced: Donald Rojas, the representative of the Indigenous Association of Costa Rica, told the FLACSO conference in 1982⁵ that the Oduber law had not been implemented and that the National Commission had been a failure, with no clearly defined policies. The Association had, he said, been founded in 1980 as the organization of the Costa Rican Indians themselves and would take the Indian case up nationally, and seek support abroad. Rojas appealed specifically for technical assistance and training which, he said, could be used to support the needs and values of Indian communities. Other speakers drew attention to oil-drilling and other exploration activities by multinational companies in the Talamanca area, saying that Indian interests were not being adequately safeguarded.

The Nicaraguan case is quite different. Here Indian militancy or self-awareness did not come into contact with state policies: rather the state went out and sought to bring the benefits of revolution to the Indians. A combination of factors, including the leadership of the Indians themselves, their deep-rooted hostility to the ‘Spaniards’ from the west of the country, and the apparent cultural insensitivity of some of the revolutionary officials, caused the Indians to reject the revolution, and many fled north into Honduras, where some joined the counter-revolutionary forces. What began as a political and cultural reaction has now escalated into a major international issue, with the Indians being cast in the role, respectively, of ‘victims’ of a heartless revolution, or as ‘tools’ of counter-revolutionary forces.

The Indians of Nicaragua include Miskito, Sumo and Rama groups, all of them living mainly by hunting and fishing in the coastal Caribbean lowlands. There are also said to be some Garifuna (black Caribs). All of the groups straddle the Honduran border, and the Miskitos in particular: the Miskitos are the most numerous, numbering probably about 100,000 in all. Their previous contacts had been with the British: their religion, derived from German missionaries, is Moravian protestant. It is probably only an accident of history that ‘Mosquitia’ did not become, like Belize, a separate and predominantly Anglo-Caribbean state in the region.

English pirates like Henry Morgan traded with the Miskitos: one story is that Morgan traded food and women for muskets, which

gave the Miskito people their name. Britain declared a 'Protectorate of Mosquitia' in 1687, and took a Miskito Indian from Nicaragua to Jamaica to become the first crowned head of the protectorate. Nicaragua was born as a separate nation in 1838, but it was not until the 1890s that Nicaragua actively sought the reinstatement of Mosquitia into the national territory. With American backing, the Nicaraguans pressed for the 'reincorporation of Mosquitia' and the British finally withdrew in 1894. The Miskito were then largely left to their own devices, although during the periods of occupation of Nicaragua by United States forces (1912-26 and 1927-33) they seemed to have developed both contact and identification with the Americans.

The Miskitos do not seem to have taken any major part in the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, but their leaders joined an organization set up by the revolutionary government to be a channel of communication with the Indian peoples. The organization was called MISURASATA: Miskito, SUMO, RAMA and SANDINISTA, and Steadman Fagoth became the vocal Miskito representative on the group, and the representative of the group on the Council of State. Fagoth is now a highly controversial personality: many people, not only from inside the government of Nicaragua, believe him to have been a counter-revolutionary all along, and in the pay of the exiled Somoza forces. Since the supporters of the revolutionary government claim that genuine difficulties with the Indians are being deliberately manipulated and magnified by counter-revolutionaries backed by the United States (one of whose representatives, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to the United Nations, has described Sandinista treatment of the Miskitos as one of the worst cases of violations of human rights to be found anywhere) the whole subject is fraught with emotion and controversy.

After the revolution, the Miskitos were the target of literacy schemes and development projects developed by the Sandinista government in Managua. The Sandinistas offered a partnership in development, with agricultural assistance, seed distribution programmes and other plans: but the fruits of the development were to be shared nationally. None of these programmes appear to have been welcomed or even understood by the Indians. They wanted self-determination: they wanted to retain access to their lands and fishing grounds. After an acrimonious series of accusations and counter-accusations, Fagoth and thirty-two other Miskito leaders were arrested in early 1981 and MISURASATA declared a counter-revolutionary organization.

Thousands of Miskitos fled over the border into Honduras, and Fagoth, on his release from prison in May 1981, began making radio broadcasts to his people and rallying them to the opposition. The Sandinista regime began resettling Miskito away from their homes on the Rio Coco to a new area, further inland but covering an area of 53,000 hectares, called 'Tasba Pri' (meaning 'free land'). On 26 June 1983 the Cuban communist newspaper *Granma* reported:

'More than thirty communities have moved into five new settlements (one for Sumo Indians). They worked the land and built hundreds of dwellings, were given medical care, education, supplies for their personal use and other materials provided by the Nicaraguan government. There was also a community transportation service provided by twenty new vehicles. We were able to witness all this activity and talk with the people, who came from communities such as Kisalaya, Lagun Tara, San Alberto, Santa Fe, El Carmen, Leimus, and San Geronimo (all of which border on Honduras ...). Santiago Ruiz Pérez, a Miskito, says, "Here we have peace. On the Coco River we couldn't work well or live happily".'

This report in *Granma* had followed reports in the West (for example, *Guardian*, 18 May 1983) that Fagoth, with a force of five hundred Miskito guerrillas, was heading south into Nicaragua from Honduras, and allegations that the Sandinista government was forcibly removing from the Honduran border area whole communities of Miskitos, not, as the *Granma* report implied, to give them a better life away from the war zone, but to prevent Fagoth and other 'contra' forces from seeking support and supplies in their villages. In October 1983 Professor Bernard Nietschmann of the Department of Geography of the University of California, Berkeley, made a statement to the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights in which he accused the Sandinista regime of grave and systematic violations of Miskito rights. In February 1982 the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua had stated:

'... with painful surprise, that in certain concrete cases there have been grave violations of the human rights of individuals, families, and entire

populations of peoples. These include relocations of individuals by military operations without warning ...'

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees there were in February 1984 15,000 Nicaraguan refugees, mainly of Sumo and Miskito origin, in Honduras.

Despite the attempts of the Sandinista government to make amends – notably by appointing a Minister for the Atlantic Coast, with a team of expert sociologists and anthropologists to advise – the bitterness remains. While Fagoth now campaigns openly from Honduras for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, one of his former colleagues, Brooklyn Rivera – a man not tainted with accusations of Somoza contacts like Fagoth – now campaigns against the Sandinistas from Costa Rica. The Sandinistas are acutely aware that the Miskitos have in fact destabilized their regime and have further potential for de-stabilization.

'... after its assumption of power, the national liberation movement FSLN was not in a position initially to give answers to the problems of the internal colonialist relationship between the Pacific and the Atlantic parts of Nicaragua and thereby to lessen the conflict which had already been traced out by history. The Sandinistas ... have constantly shown themselves to be heirs of a line of thought which measures revolution for everyone according to the same indicators (of "western definition") of social and material progress. This inevitably resulted in centrally and paternalistically drawn programmes for the integration of the Miskito coast, which was simply and solely declared "backward" ...'

The result is a situation beset with extreme difficulties on both sides. After a year of hard and ultimately bloody confrontations, the Miskito population finds itself torn apart. ... For the Sandinistas ... the continual and growing pressure on the revolution – both diplomatic and economic – also limits the possibility of a political opening towards indigenous peoples.'

The other Central American country with a sizeable Indian minority is **Panama**, where there are an estimated 100,000 Indians, mainly Guaymi (?60,000) and Kuna. The Kuna have a history of tough negotiating with governments: they hold the title to their lands and have formed a recognized self-government. But they have recently been threatened by tourist developments on their lands. The more numerous Guaymi are not in such a strong position politically, but are campaigning for a recognition of their rights similar to that accorded to the Kuna. Recently a proposed mining project in Cerro Colorado by the British multinational RTZ caused widespread international concern and has been shelved for the moment. But it, and other developments in Panama, pose a considerable threat to the Indian way of life. The forging southwards of the Panamerican highway, and the opening up of forests for agriculture, pose new threats, particularly to nomadic groups like the Emberá, who only number about 6000. Nevertheless, Indian self-awareness, financially and politically backed from abroad, is now a force for any Panamanian government to have to reckon with.

3. Introduction to Guatemala

Guatemala is quite different from all of the other Central American nations because its Indian population is a majority (despite some official claims to the contrary) and the strategy of 'national liberation' is therefore being adopted by Indian groups.

The International Indian Treaty Council, in a paper to the UN Human Rights Commission, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in August 1983, stated

'For many years there have been denunciations against the systematic violations of human rights against the Guatemalan population. This situation is, without doubt, one of the most serious in all America, in which the Indians have been victims of massacres, tortures, detention on a massive scale, the destruction of their homes, crops and harvests ... The Episcopal Conference of Guatemala estimated that more than one million persons were displaced from their regions and villages internally ... it is estimated that there are 90,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico ...'

Part II of this Report is taken up entirely by Phillip Wearne's account, collected from on-the-spot witnesses, of what is happening in Guatemala today. It is a complex picture, in which the demands of the Indian majority of the population are part of a cycle of violence and revolution, reaction and repression. It is conceivable that the government of President Jacobo Arbenz, one of only two genuinely elected leaders Guatemala has ever known, and who was overthrown in a coup in 1954, might have brought the Indians and their lifestyle into the mainstream of national life: but the politics

which have followed the 1954 coup have been dominated by narrow cliques with little vision who have usually equated Indian rights with communist subversion. As Wearne shows, the true picture is much more complicated: as in Nicaragua, Western-oriented Marxist revolutionaries are not automatically accepted as the natural leaders of the Indians, and Marxist revolutionaries seem to find it hard to accommodate Indian demands for communal lands and economic systems outside the ambit of the state.

Numerous reports have testified to the extreme violence which characterizes the counter-insurgency policies of the Guatemalan government. A delegation of *European catholic agencies*, led by Bishop Eamonn Casey of Ireland, concluded in August 1983 that 'Guatemala could be considered the worst violator of human rights in Latin America, even when compared to El Salvador'. The report on 'The Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala', prepared by the *Interamerican Commission of Human Rights* for its session in October 1983, is deeply critical of grave human rights abuses in the country: 'the Guatemalan army has been principally responsible for the most grievous violations of human rights, including destruction, burning and sacking of entire towns and the death of both combatant and non-combatant populations in these towns'. The *UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities* passed a resolution on 5 September 1983 calling on the government of Guatemala to 'refrain from forced displacement of Indian communities, and their confinement in strategic hamlets, as well as massacres, scorched-earth policies, and forced disappearances'. The *UN General Assembly*, at its thirty-eighth session, noted in a resolution on 5 December 1983 its 'deep concern' about 'the continuing massive violations of human rights in Guatemala, particularly the violence against non-combatants, the widespread repression, killing and massive displacement of rural and indigenous populations'. And a delegation of *Canadian indigenous leaders*, which visited Guatemala in May 1983, stated:

'Guatemala is the clearest example of genocide of Indians in Central America. It has had, and continues to have, a policy of pacification of Indian areas. This means that men, women, children and elders are being tortured and murdered. Whole communities have been massacred. These communities exist no longer.'⁸

Other reports come from *Americas Watch* (Washington), *the European Parliament*, *Amnesty International*, *Survival International*, and the *International Federation for the Rights of Man*. All of them condemn the policies of the Guatemalan military government and draw attention to the plight of indigenous peoples, including non-combatants. Only one recent report, one prepared for the UN Human Rights Commission by the Special Rapporteur, *Lord Colville*, has provided any encouragement for the Guatemalan government.

As Phillip Wearne's account shows, the four main guerrilla groups operating in Guatemala – the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the military wing of the Guatemalan Labour Party (PGT) – have not always been successful in gaining Indian support. Indian recruitment, especially to the EGP and ORPA, grew however after the massacre of more than 100 Kekchi Indians at Panzós in 1978 and the Spanish Embassy massacre in 1980. Both militarily, under the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), and politically, under the Guatemalan Patriotic Unity Committee (CGUP) the left-wing in Guatemala is now showing some signs of uniting. But as Wearne shows, the

repression is taking its toll. There has also been encouragement for the Guatemalan government from the United States: in January 1984 the Reagan administration authorized the sale of \$2m. worth of helicopter spares to Guatemala, and a \$24m. aid package has also been agreed.

Only relatively recently have the conflicts in Guatemala been viewed, either from outside or within the country, as racial or ethnic in origin. The theoretical journal of the Guatemalan left, *Polémica*, published in Costa Rica and concerned with analysis, from a revolutionary perspective, of the Guatemalan situation, recently (February 1982, No. 3) devoted a complete issue to the theme of the 'native' and racism in Guatemala.

Wearne's account does not attempt any forecast of the likely turn of events, although it is clear from his account that military victory by armed guerrillas seems highly unlikely – at least in the short term. But one point is quite clear: there is an upsurge in Indian consciousness. The *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, in a special issue entitled 'Death and Disorder in Guatemala' stressed the change of outlook which seems to have come over Guatemala's Indians during the late 1970s.⁹ That is the new, and unpredictable, factor in the politics of Guatemala.

FOOTNOTES TO PART I

- ¹ N. Rodriguez, E. Soubié, 'La población indígena actual en América Latina', in *Nueva Antropología Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, III, 9, Mexico, 1978.
- ² Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'Indian Ethnic Movements and State Policies in Latin America', in *IFDA Dossier*, 36, July/August 1983, Nyon, Switzerland: International Foundation for Development Alternatives.
- ³ Marie Chantal Barre, 'Políticas Indigenistas y Reivindicaciones Indias en América Latina 1940-1980', in *América Latina: Etnodesarrollo y Etnocidio*, Ediciones FLACSO, San José, Costa Rica, 1982.
- ⁴ *Indianidad y Descolonización en América Latina: Documentos de la Segunda Reunión de Barbados*, Mexico: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1979.
- ⁵ *América Latina: Etnodesarrollo*, etc., op.cit., p.307.
- ⁶ Michael Rediske and Robin Schneider, 'National Revolution and Indigenous Identity: The Conflict between the Sandinist Government and the Miskito Indians 1979-82', in *National Revolution and Indigenous Identity*, edited by K. Ohland and R. Schneider, Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1983.
- ⁷ Paper ref. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/NGO/6.
- ⁸ Quoted in Newsletter of Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, Toronto, Winter 1983-84, which carries a detailed analysis of human rights violations in Guatemala.
- ⁹ *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1983.

PART II: GUATEMALA by Phillip Wearne

1. Who are the Indians? A definition:

'An historical definition of a Guatemalan Indian is easy', commented one anthropologist in the course of this study. 'Deciding who is one today, is not.'

Guatemala's Indians are, as they refer to themselves, the nation's indigenous or 'natural' people. They are the pure-blooded descendants of the Mayan architects of the 'lost' jungle cities of Central America, builders of such a classic civilization that one archaeologist has described them (rather ethnocentrically) as 'the most brilliant aboriginal people on the planet.'¹ Despite the total cultural dominance of Guatemala's other main ethnic group, the Ladino (of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent) the nation's Indians have maintained much of their Mayan heritage. While Spanish is the official language the indigenous people still speak in the glottal stops of a dialect of one of the 21 Mayan languages used. Though conquered in the name of Christianity, many Indians still perform ritual worship at pagan shrines in the mountains. Indigenous *shamans* (medicine men, magicians, diviners) still count 13 months of 20 days on one of the three Mayan calendars and many Indians wear one of over 100 brightly-coloured, home-woven costumes bearing designs related to the hieroglyphic symbols on Mayan stelae.

Yet history does not define an Indian today. Some anthropologists have argued in the past that the essential criteria are biological and racial, but all now seem to agree that culture and language are the essential criteria. 'The criteria are a little subjective', says one Guatemalan census official. 'We ask the subjects' neighbours if they're indigenous, then consider dress, language, and general socio-economic condition.' This problem of definition has resulted in widely differing estimates of the proportion of Indians in the population of Guatemala. A preliminary figure from the 1981 census puts it at 38% but independent estimates range up to 70% (see Section 2).

The problem in essence is that no one single cultural criterion is definitive. Racially, many Ladinos have the dark brown skin and hairless features of the Guatemalan Indian. Geographically, Guatemala's indigenous people are not confined to the western *altiplano* (highlands) as is generally thought. Although overwhelmingly rural, living in the smallest units of settlement – *aldeas* (villages) and *caserios* (hamlets) – they inter-mix with Ladinos even there. Neither language nor dress is a definitive criterion. Many Indians speak perfect Spanish, albeit as a second language, and only a minority of men, though not women, now sport Indian dress. In short, there are broad areas of cultural overlap; as one anthropologist concluded about many customs, 'there are differences only of degree.'² Yet these are obvious. Indian men often squat and Indian women kneel; Ladinos sit. Indian men carry loads on their backs by means of a leather headstrap, the *mecapal*; Ladinos don't. But, ultimately, there is, as observers have noted, more to being an Indian than outward characteristics. Perception and outlook on the world are probably the only criteria that allow 21 often widely different groups to be classified together as Indian yet apart from the Ladino.

'Traditionally it has always been more important for the Indian to be somebody rather than have something', is how one experienced indigenous observer put it. 'How he is seen by his neighbours is vital.' Indigenous thinking is undoubtedly marked by less materialistic, and to some extent less individualistic, qualities than the Ladino's Western-orientated outlook. Digital watches and cassette recorders, though highly desirable, are not deemed to be all important. 'A Ladino of whatever category will not live in a *rancho* (Indian hut) if he can afford a house . . . such cannot be said with equal certainty about indigenous people.'³ Such desire as there is for economic success is usually linked to increasing prestige and respect in the community and must meet strict requirements. 'Approval is given only if the person's activity is regarded as honourable and not exploitative. A person who uses his work position to take unfair advantage is severely criticized as *mala gente* (bad person)', notes the same writer.

Respect, responsibility, honesty and hard work are the traditional indigenous values that have been woven into a code from which there was little individual deviation. Within this code striving and competition were unnecessary, one writer noted, as 'everyone who

follows patterns and precepts received status sometime during life'.⁴ Such respect and status have traditionally been won by community service in a system of religious brotherhoods known as *cofradías*. Positions and respective responsibilities vary considerably but *cofradías* were always age-grade hierarchies that served social and political functions as well as their patron saint. As teenagers, members would perform menial tasks like sweeping the market-place or running messages; *alguaciles* in their late teens or early twenties served as village policemen. In their forties and fifties, a member might expect to become *cofrade* himself or a *regidor* (councilman) and finally *alcalde* (mayor) but only after serving the prescribed year at every level. *Principales*, old men who have graduated through the whole system, were the ultimate overseers, maintaining the vital links with the ancestors simply by virtue of their age and experience in the local *costumbres* (tradition) that governed the whole structure.

Land ownership, and attitudes towards it, is another major facet of indigenous outlook. The vast majority of Guatemalan Indians are subsistence farmers, so their tiny plots of mountainous land (or *milpas*), are vital for the maize, beans and squash that are Indian staples. But, land means much more. Firstly, it is identity. A *milpa* is an Indian's 'symbol of his right to live'.⁵ For many, being a *milpero* (subsistence farmer) is an essential symbol of 'Indianness', not just because Indians were all traditionally farmers but because without it one usually had to leave the village and thus sever the ties that are the basis of one's cultural identity. Inheritance from father to son means that land is a vital link with one's ancestors and thus represents an Indian's personal as well as cultural identity. Land is *who*, as well as *what*, he is. Land also represents virility – ability to provide for children both as dependents (food) and adults (inheritance).

Secondly, land has religious significance. The land is the home of the most important Indian god, the omnipotent *Dios Mundo* (earth god). A traditional Indian will consult a Mayan *shaman* on when to start any major part of the agricultural cycle, begin it with religious ceremonies in the *milpa* itself, and apologize to the ground before breaking it, in an effort to appease *Dios Mundo*. Cultivating the land is the most profound communion with God an Indian can aspire to.

Thirdly, land produces the almost sacred ear of maize, whose flour is patted into the *tortillas* (flat maize pancakes) that are the basis of every meal. Traditional indigenous belief maintains that if they do not eat maize flour they will somehow lose their 'Indianness' and a legend of the Quiché Indians preserved in the sacred Popol Vul records how the first men were moulded of corn paste, an ideal substance after 'The Makers' had rejected mud as too soft and wood as being too hard.

Perhaps more than any other attribute it is the Guatemalan Indian's attachment to the land which remains intact today. It is amply illustrated by stories about a wealthy Indian businessman who returns to his village and *milpa* in a suit every planting season and of the Indian guerilla fighter who deserted the revolution because it was harvest time.

A third facet of the Indian outlook is an all-pervading sense of the religious, magical and supernatural. 'Animals talk, plants have emotions, it is possible for a hoe to work alone; . . . ghosts are always abroad; the soul of a person leaves his body for hours or days while he still lives. These are not simply superstitions, they are part of the life of the community and normally taken into consideration in determining courses of action.'⁶ Central to these beliefs are the shamans or *Aj K'ij's* who divine, cure, interpret and advise, operating with much ritual by means of various pieces of jadeite or obsidian, beans, seeds and copal, an Indian incense. Most significantly, these shamans have inherited the traditions of the ancient Mayan priests and observe the 260-day religious calendar called the Sacred Round of Tzolkin. Each day in the thirteen 20-day months is given a name, deity, such as Jaguar (*in Quiché Ix*) or Monkey (*Batz*), and number from one to thirteen. The combination of these decides the day's power for good or evil. 'The day is the only way to decide what sickness the patient has', a *shaman* confided to this writer. God is everywhere in nature in traditional Indian belief and is thus worshipped in rituals at shrines, on rivers, up mountains and in other venerated places. Animals and nature command love and respect as personifications of God, the sun and the earth being the most powerful. Many Indians pay their respects to the sun by genuflecting to it at dawn, and 'Don't Fall!'

¹ Footnotes to Part II on page 20

LINGUISTIC MAP OF THE HIGHLANDS OF GUATEMALA



the literal goodbye of several Indian languages, reflects the hope that you will not offend the Earth God by tumbling on him, as much as the perils of walking the mountain trails that lace Indian areas.

This all-pervading religious sense and curious logic applies to medicine, the other main concern of the *shaman*. 'Health to us is the absence of disease. Health to an Indian is a sense of fulfilment or well-being.' According to several doctors who have worked with Indians, their routine, established codes of behaviour and task-simple culture amount to a psychological contentment which generates this sense of fulfilment. 'The Indian is less violent and less prone to anger', says one. 'They suffer little frustration or stress and their emotional balance is reflected in the almost total lack of accidents they have, even when using dangerous tools like machetes and axes.' This 'total', relative concept of health leads to a shock being equated to a 'loss of soul' when an Indian feels 'spiritually' sick. Physical illness itself is often broken down to an imbalance of hot and cold forces in the body. 'We are strictly trained to draw certain conclusions from certain data. The Indian has an equally strict, and to him logical, interpretation of the same data, quite alien to us', observed one *Ladino* doctor.⁸ Yet, the perception is always logical – according to another physician, 'Indian mothers give babies coffee instead of milk. Of course – give it milk and it gets drowsy and seems sick. Give it coffee and it perks up and, logically, is well.'

Such Indian perceptions and values are apparently fundamentally irreconcilable with those of *Ladino* society. Yet somehow both Indians and *Ladinos* have co-existed for centuries, if not always peacefully, at least as separate cultural identities. Why?

Historically, potential culture shock was cushioned by the fact that the society the Spanish conquistadores introduced had many structural similarities to that of the indigenous people. For the vast majority of Indians the Spanish hierarchy just took the place of the Mayan lords and priests. The saints the new priests introduced became personifications of the deities already worshipped, while the cross had always represented eternal life and the four cardinal points in Mayan religion. Since the conquest, the Indian has chosen to survive rather than be wiped out by confronting a superior force. Over the centuries submission has moulded the indigenous character and its symptoms are obvious today. Despite ethics which value honesty many Indians tend to tell outsiders what they think they want to hear, not necessarily the truth, as a result of years of trying to please the patron. From this apparent subjugation and cultural conquest Guatemala's indigenous people have moulded a very adapted, but still essentially Indian, way of life. If today's Indian dress was imposed by the Spanish, as many maintain, it is now a symbol of ethnic pride, not submission. Surnames imposed by the conquistadores have been 'indianized'. The *cofradías* and individual land ownership, both originally imposed, are now pillars of indigenous society.

Adapt and survive. It is probably the most obvious – and essential – indigenous trait, both in the past and the present. Only in the light of this process can we understand the Indian's position in Guatemalan society today.

2. Discrimination: The Indian's place in Guatemalan society

Guatemala City is full of government officials who, when asked about the nation's indigenous people, will relate how the Indians were parcelled out with *encomiendas* (royal land grants) as virtual slaves, herded into *congregaciones* (settlements) as a means of control, stripped of their lands and forcibly 'civilized'.

But although today's officials might admit to a little 'discrimination', none will admit that the structure of Guatemalan society is essentially the same today – 'endo-colonial' since independence from Spain in 1821, according to one commentator;⁹ more colonial, according to another. According to the latter, many *criollos* (Spanish descendents) saw independence as 'the only way of eliminating impediments such as regulations on the treatment of Indian labour'.¹⁰ Social structure, laws and attitudes since independence seem to bear this out.

One observer has stratified Guatemala's ethnic hierarchy thus: a small elite of white Europeans at the top, followed by a group of mixed bloods known as *Guatemaltecos*, urban *Ladinos*, followed by rural *Ladinos* with Indians firmly at the bottom.¹¹ Carib blacks, centered around Livingstone on the Atlantic Coast, and a sizeable

Chinese community have to be fitted into this hierarchy somewhere – but certainly not below Indians. 'It's better to be black than Indian', several objective informants told this writer.

The ethnic pecking order matches the socio-economic pyramid almost exactly. Europeans are wealthy industrialists and agro-export businessmen with big ranches to their names. *Guatemaltecos* tend to be professionals, military officers, lesser industrialists and farm owners, with urban *Ladinos* being petty bourgeois business people or white collar employees, and their rural counterparts small scale farmers. Indians are sub-subsistence farmers, 'penny' merchants, migratory farm workers and, in urban contexts, servants, maids, factory staff and construction workers.

Ethnic discrimination is very basic in Guatemalan society, as a few questions to almost any *Ladino* will testify. Inevitably, it takes many forms. The Indian is ignored at government hospitals, overcharged in *Ladino* shops and buses, sent to the back of any queue. But it's *Ladino* comments that say most about the nation's racial discrimination. Indians are dirty, lazy, indolent and, above all, primitive or backward. They need 'civilizing', in short, *Ladinoizing*. 'You can't teach the Indians anything. How many times have we tried to improve their way of life, but they won't change', says one *Ladino*.¹²

But the attitude runs deeper. Not content with labelling Indians '*inditos*' – itself an insult – *Ladinos* often equate Indians with animals or other sub-humans in what is probably a reflection of early *conquistador* doubts about the humanity of indigenous peoples. 'If you're not careful you will be ruled by the mules (the Indians)', one *Ladino* warned some younger colleagues.¹³ 'They're not children, they're Indians', one ranch owner's daughter recalls being told by her father, when worrying about an outbreak of coughing among Indian labourer's children.¹⁴

But Guatemala's racism is made particularly insidious by the thin veneer of equality proclaimed by the state. Article 43 of the constitution (suspended in 1982) states: 'Discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, birth, economic or social condition, or political opinion is prohibited.' Articles 133 and 189 spell out the aim of 'integration' of 'the indigenous groups' into the 'national culture'.¹⁵ Cultural absorption, not racial equality, is the aim of the *Ladino*-dominated state.

As part of this government policy of pretence there are two small government departments concerned with Indians. At the National Indigenous Institute (INI) six investigators research and publish numerous reports but, as one employee told this writer, 'no recommendations are made and there is no action'. The Service for the Development of the Indian Economy seems even more suspect, its aim being that of the constitutional articles quoted above – the incorporation of Indians into 'national' life by strengthening their economy.

Perhaps even more objectionable is both the states' and private interests' exploitation of elements of indigenous culture. The government's INI's slogan refers to Indian culture as 'the base of our nationality'. In 1976 the Guatemalan government entered an Indian *Ixil* costume for the Miss Universe native costume competition. 'Guatemala' won with a white-skinned model displaying the *Ixil* women's ceremonial *huipil* (embroidered overblouse). The Mayan numbering system and the Quiché Indian chief Tecún Umán, who was killed fighting off the conquistador invaders, appear on national bank notes and – in the most macabre irony – numerous Indians have been killed by a regiment named after the Mayan god of war. Indians decorate tourist posters, postcards, and even advertisements. In short, they are used whenever there's some advantage in terms of international recognition or financial profit.

The basis of Guatemalan racism appears to be fear and greed – a classic complex of a rich exploitative group that has inherited a subconscious paranoia as a result of their traditional numerical inferiority. As in other plural societies this fear has come to justify itself by creating prejudices about 'the natives', the trepidation being further compounded in Guatemala by the stubborn pride and determination of the Indians not to be incorporated into a *Ladino* state.

Measuring discrimination is intensely complicated by cultural divisions which are in themselves cemented by discrimination. Health care is one criterion often cited; the discrimination being both economic, with rural – and thus Indian – areas receiving

virtually no attention, and cultural in that Indian ways and medical thinking are not considered. Despite their ideal concept of total health, Indians are far from healthy physically. Life expectancy among Indians is 16 years lower than that of Ladinos – 45 years compared to 61.4.¹⁶ Indigenous infant mortality might be as high as 100 per 1000 live births,¹⁷ while according to the government's own family planning campaign, 80 out of 100 Guatemalan children are malnourished. Doctors working with Indians claim that virtually all are malnourished, anaemic and suffering from parasites.

But – true to the government's claim – there are now health posts and medical centres throughout Indian areas. The real problem is an almost total lack of materials and staff combined with the Indians' reluctance to use whatever there is. Even before the IMF ordered a cut in Guatemalan social spending in November 1981, the country's health expenditure was the lowest in Central America (US\$4.54 per annum, per head in 1970) and the bulk of this was concentrated in urban, and thus Ladino, areas.¹⁸ The health budget in a typical Indian town works out at 35 cents a head per year.

Education provides a similar illustration of the central government's discriminatory integration strategy and resource allocation. Even when schools were available in the locality Indians have often not attended them because from the earliest ages they were needed to help work the *milpa*, wash, weave, or care for younger children. School hours were not matched to their needs; in some secondary schools uniforms were compulsory and Indian dress was not permitted, and – above all – teaching was in Spanish after a first year of 'Castilianization' that could be culturally brutal. Few saw the point of what was taught in the Ladino-oriented curriculum. As a result, a mere 18% of Indians over seven are literate, compared to 37% of Ladinos.¹⁹

Economics are the other side of the coin. In most Indian families all resources are channelled toward basic survival and there is no money for the textbooks and pencils schoolchildren require. While 20,000 Guatemalan teachers are unemployed, many rural schools are unstaffed. 'I've got teachers working as servants', complained one Ministry of Education official.

But it is land and labour that best illustrate the cultural bigotry of integration, the persistent colonial attitude and, more recently, the government's pretence of doing something for the indigenous people. The GINI coefficient, the accepted method of measuring land distribution, shows that in 1979 Guatemala had the worst land distribution ratio in Latin America.²⁰

Two tendencies in land distribution are apparent. Firstly, land is becoming concentrated into bigger units (50 to 450 hectares is now the favoured size), and, secondly, the smallest farms are getting smaller, their overwhelmingly Indian occupants becoming 'sub-subsistence' farmers or landless. In 1950, there were 74,269 plots under 0.7 of a hectare. By 1964, they had climbed to 85,083 and by 1975 the figure had virtually doubled to 166,732.²¹ By 1970, 90% of rural Indian families did not own their land or owned less than the 7 hectares considered the minimum necessary to support a family.²²

The Spanish colonists' basic formula had been to control labour by controlling land. Expropriation of indigenous land was designed to create a landless Indian work force that, deprived of its livelihood, would have to work on colonial plantations. This basic equation has, if anything, become more pronounced since independence. When coffee (still the basis of the Guatemalan economy) was introduced in the late 1870s, it needed both intensive labour to harvest the crop and the higher mountain land onto which the Indians had retreated to escape Spanish and Ladino colonization. Orders were issued by President Justo Barrios requiring magistrates and departmental governors to surrender 'the number of hands to the planters that they asked for'. Vagrancy laws were passed requiring Indians not working on plantations to work 40 days a year on government projects, such as roads and railways. Debt peonage was legalized. Simultaneously, over 100,000 acres of Indian communal land were expropriated on the grounds that they were not being productively employed. Communal lands were simply made illegal.

Expropriation was a cultural attack of the first order. The Indian communal land system – where terrain was divided according to need – was a cornerstone of indigenous society. The law not only

forced Indians to own land individually, it obliged them to divide already small plots among all their sons and become the migrant labourers the agro-export-dominated government had always wanted.

Today, as many as 650,000 highland Indians make the annual migration to the coastal plantations. Whole families are transported in open trucks to coffee, cotton or sugar cane *fincas* (plantations). Many are housed in *galerias* (open sleeping barns) where privacy and sanitation were recently described by the International Labour Organization as 'totally unacceptable with regard to hygiene, health, education and morality'.²³ Though conditions have improved considerably on some *fincas*, the best most Indians can hope for is a heavy dose of paternalism. Food is often included in the wage structure and, if not, is bought from the owner or his shop.

Many Indians return home scarcely better off and sickness, both on the *fincas* and on return home, is rampant – highland Indians being particularly susceptible to the malaria of the coast and the pesticides often sprayed from planes while they are working. Once again, official legislation means next to nothing. Work code regulations on dismissal, days off and minimal health care are not enforced and few *fincas* pay the legal minimum wage of 3.2 *quetzales* (dollars) a day.

Today Indians are losing their land to Ladino landowners by only slightly more subtle derivatives of debt peonage and direct expropriation. The lack of adequate credit facilities means that many have to pledge their land as security and often lose it as a result of crop failure or other expenses. The fact that many Indians are either too poor or too ignorant of their rights to go to the provincial capital to pay a lawyer to draw up a land title means that judicial claims on their land by bigger landowners are often upheld. Yet again, there is a government agency and law to rectify the problem. The National Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA), in practice, effects no such transformation, being chiefly dedicated to distributing state lands or the one-third of the national territory being opened up by the Northern Transfer Strip road and other highways in the Petén. INTA also grossly overestimates its work. In 1978 the agency boasted the handout of 4962 land titles, covering 41,130 hectares. The real figure, according to a recent study, was 1960 titles covering only 14,549 hectares.²⁴ Although most of the new acreage was handed out to government officials and military officers, there were attempts to settle Indian and Ladino peasants in cooperatives in three specific colonization areas. The problems, as ever, were both cultural and economic. Land being identity, Indians were reluctant to relocate. 'If you leave Patzún for another area then you're no longer a Patzún Indian', points out one aid worker. Proposals to settle 70,000 families in 10 years were soon scrapped and in 1978, the army attempted to forcibly relocate 12,000 *campesinos* in the area.

Those who did relocate usually found themselves abandoned without the most basic necessities and were often settled on poor limestone soil that was, even in the government's opinion, useless for regular crop production. Disappearances and killings in the area intensified as the land, much of it suitable for big ranch cattle raising, increased in value. Many Indian settlers became the cheap labour force agro-businesses and construction projects needed. Official attitudes to Indian co-ops in the area – 'a form of communism', in one army officer's words – were perhaps best articulated by Colonel Oliverio Casasola, head of FYDEP, the government department responsible for development of the department of the Petén. 'Of the 2849 immigrants to the Petén, 1903 were Indians and 941 non-Indians, since no matter how much sympathy we may have for the Indian problem, they are not the human contingent the Petén needs to progress.'²⁵

The effects of such discrimination have revolved around two quite contrary trends. The first has been for Indians to 'ladinoize' by dropping dress, language, customs and values as the only passport to full participation in Guatemalan society. The second has been to retreat into Indian society as the only sure defence against this same hostile world. 'Ladinoization' is impossible to quantify. According to Guatemalan government censuses the proportion of indigenous people in the national population has declined from 78% in 1774 to 43% in 1964. 'The general trend is a slow reduction in the Indian population', observes one census official. In proportion yes; but in numbers no. The number of Indians is actually increasing steadily and the figures on the reduction in

proportion say nothing about how much of this trend is due to indigenous people passing into Ladino society.

Furthermore, even the proportional figures are probably wrong. Both the census office's methods and criteria are dubious. The decision as to whether or not an individual is an Indian is usually left to poorly-trained Ladino officials and it is predominantly rural Indians who escape the censurers. Even the census office admits to a 12% error margin. For all these reasons and others, the proportion of Indians in the Guatemalan population is probably much higher than the 38% estimated today.

'Ladinoization' is however a trend and some of its nature is clear. An Indian usually ladinoizes after leaving his native community. The speed of the process varies enormously but the individual would normally pass through a stage where he or she might be described as 'modified' or between cultures. In addition, it can be said with certainty that the process is occurring much more rapidly in the east and south of Guatemala than elsewhere. Here, indigenous groups like the Pokoman and Chorti are relatively isolated islands in a sea of Ladinos.

There is one other cause of ladinoization worth noting – conscription into the army. Although some Indian boys do return to their communities after service, recruitment has to be generally considered the most brutal form of ladinoization in Guatemala as well as yet another infraction of Indian rights. After being kidnapped in a local *cupo* (grab), indigenous conscripts are brutalized until capable of administering the same treatment themselves. One youth grabbed in Sololá told this writer how, on arrival at the local barracks, one of his group was killed during a beating handed out for being too slow off the army truck. Similar stories abound.

More remarkable than the ladinoization trend, however, has been the indigenous tendency to cut themselves off from the outside world. It is the ultimate in ironies that Ladino racism has contributed enormously to the preservation of indigenous culture, its insults and discrimination leading Indians to seek refuge in their own, known world.

Indians see Ladinos as *sinvergüenza* (without shame) and all dishonourable, exploitative qualities are associated with them. Such feelings are usually hidden, especially from foreigners, but, as one writer noted, in the security of his own home an Indian will often express such sentiments. 'The same man who didn't seem to understand that he was being insulted and laughed at during the day will carry on for half an hour about the uncultured brutes who never learn to keep their mouths shut.'²⁶

But this method of cultural protection could work only as long as the culture itself is sufficiently robust. If indigenous society began to fragment, so would the shield it provided. Similarly, racism is only possible if those subjected to it will stand for it. What if some Indians decided they wouldn't?

3. Growing awareness: 1944-76

In October 1944 a Guatemalan university professor returned from exile in Argentina to be elected president. Juan José Arévalo stood on a platform of repealing obligatory labour laws, democratic organization of municipal governments and political plurality. He was a reformist and he heralded the most momentous period of change Guatemala's indigenous people had seen since the conquest.

Under Arévalo, and more particularly his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, national political parties spread to Indian *municipios* (towns) and *aldeas*, a rural labour movement sprang up and, finally in 1952, an agrarian reform law was passed. One hundred thousand families received land, numerous Indians won control of their own *municipios* for the first time and labour organization 'provided the campesino and labourer with a device whereby they could confront the employers directly'.²⁷ Culturally, the reformists' motives were dubious. The constitution still referred to the 'integration' of the indigenous people, but, by the time Arbenz was overthrown in a right wing coup in 1954, a seed had been sown.

On the basis of such 'communist' threats as Arbenz, Guatemala's archbishop Monsignor Rossell y Arellano secured government permission to launch *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action), a lay catechist movement designed to re-establish Catholic orthodoxy

by wresting control of local religion from the *cofradías* as well as acting as a buttress against revolutionary activity. Highland Guatemala was carved up among foreign missionary orders. Spanish Sacred Heart priests went to El Quiché, American Maryknollers to Huehuetenango, Carmelite Spaniards and Italian Franciscans to Sololá. The 119 foreign clergy in Guatemala in 1944 soared to 434 by July 1966. By 1969 the missionaries boasted an estimated 4100 Catholic Action *catequistas* (catechism teachers) in the three towns of the Ixil area of El Quiché alone.²⁸ By 1981, over 50% of the adult population of the capital of El Quiché, Santa Cruz, were members of Catholic Action, with an estimated 25 to 30% of the population in the smaller towns being members as well.²⁹

But Protestant success was even more phenomenal. The number of Protestant adherents in Guatemala has doubled in the last ten years to include at least 20% of the population³⁰ and, as one evangelist put it, 'we're having a lot of success because there are so many Indians'. During the seventies every Indian valley seemed to be ringing with 'Hallelujahs' and handclapping. The change was obviously of great significance. Religion is one of the most fundamental aspects of an Indian's life and changing it involved risking the wrath of the ancestors and the sting of village gossip that was such a powerful means of social control. So, what were the attractions?

Many Catholic Action missionaries won favour and acceptance by showing every respect for indigenous culture. They integrated with indigenous communities by living in the villages and learning their languages. Priests and nuns were already respected figures and Catholic Action was presented more as a correction of previous practices than a significant break with the past. Another factor was escape from the *cofradía* system and its burdensome financial obligations. Paying for the gallons of *aguardiente* (cane alcohol) that were required for the endless rituals of the *cofradía*, could break a family economically. One aid worker tells of an Indian who had to sell all his family's 200 *cuerdas* of land to serve a year as *cofrade*. Suicides on appointment as *cofrade* were not uncommon. Catholic Action gave many villagers the respectable withdrawal they had been looking for, requiring no expenditure and only a few hours a week.

Being a member of Catholic Action was also much more than religion. Co-op membership, literacy class participation and health education often went hand in hand with the movement in communities where the priest or sister was usually a full community member-agriculturalist, basic doctor and teacher all rolled into one. Finally, Catholic Action offered further educational opportunities at the movement's schools, usually in the nearest provincial town.

Protestantism had some similar attractions, offering schools and an escape from the *cofradía* system, but there were important differences. One of the strongest attractions was the evangelicals' ban on alcohol. Joining a Protestant church was virtually the equivalent of joining Alcoholics Anonymous for many Indians. With more money and less domestic strife as a consequence, many Protestant adherents tended to 'get ahead', as one preacher put it, this in turn being recognized by others in the community who followed suit. Participation and spiritual neglect were other factors. 'They love the singing, clapping and camaraderie', commented one pastor. 'The Catholic church has neglected them for so long.'

But the impact of Protestantism was much more momentous and often contrary to that of the revived Catholicism. If the Catholic renewal movement was generally radical, Protestantism was often conservative. If Catholic Action was a reaffirmation of ethnic pride, Evangelicalism was usually a denial of it 'Show me an Evangelical Indian who isn't in the process of Ladinoizing', one worker challenged. Not all the Protestant groups were conservative. Many were involved in community action projects, especially the 'mainstream' groups of Baptists, Adventists and Pentecostals. But there were some alarming tendencies among the scores of fundamentalist micro-sects. For one thing, authority is not to be opposed. 'He who resists authority is resisting that which has been established by God', one preacher told a Quiché audience.³¹ The Protestants' heavy emphasis on spiritual rather than material needs and their concentration on individual salvation subjugated community identity. 'Improving oneself' economically often meant becoming an exploiter indistinguishable from the *patrones* the Indians had suffered under previously. Another reason for their

success was the saturation nature of the Evangelicals' aggressive search for souls. 'Evangelicals make sophisticated use of the media, money, personnel and know-how sent by American church groups.'³² Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Evangelicals penetrated Indian communities through their own languages, preaching in the languages and dialects of the highlands.

But ultimately both Catholics and Protestants benefited from a new openness to change brought about by basic changes in Indian social structure. Yet again, land was the key. A massive population explosion that saw the number of Guatemalans rise from 2.8 million in 1950 to an estimated 7.5 million in 1981 was inevitably reflected in intense pressure on land – most particularly Indian land. It was no coincidence that the department with the highest proportion of Indian residents became the area with the highest percentage of smallest farms. Apart from having to divide smaller and smaller plots among a greater number of sons, Indians found their lands under attack from the commercial farming sector. As land became more valuable and Indian farmers found it harder to make any real living from agriculture, more and more highland plots fell into big landowners' hands. Peasant farms lost 25% of their acreage during the 1970s while the area devoted to export crops swelled a staggering 45%.³³

Wage labour became more common and, as the 1964 and 1973 censuses show, thousands of Indians became a cheap labour supply for the plantations or burgeoning industries of Quetzaltenango and Guatemala City. Ties to community and culture were almost impossible to preserve but, at the same time, this new group of Indians, with what anthropologists termed a 'low residential continuity', was particularly receptive to new ideas in what was, effectively, a new world.³⁴ As they worked with almost equally poor Ladinos, racial barriers began to break down. Indians who stayed at home found it essential to diversify into cash crops or develop other paying work. Vegetables were grown and transported and whole villages developed specialized rural industries as something of a small trader entrepreneurial class developed.

Most significantly, the vagrancy laws, which as late as 1935 had decreed that those working less than 1.6 *manzanas* (unit of land) must work 150 days on the plantation, became unnecessary as an annual 30, 60, or 90 day migration to the plantations became vital. Yet even harvest time migrations couldn't solve the real problem. While Guatemala enjoyed economic growth rates averaging 5.5% in the 1960s, and even 7.8% in 1977, the daily wage rate of a rural family averaged 1.15 quetzales in 1975, just over a quarter of the minimum considered necessary to subsist.³⁵

In the villages, rural Indians turned increasingly to co-ops as a way out. Dating back to Arbenz, the foreign missionaries had begun to promote them in the late 1950s as an answer to the land crisis. In the 1960s and 1970s, aid workers from the Peace Corps and the United States Agency for International Development (AID) expanded the missionaries' work and, by 1967, there were 145 agricultural, consumer and credit co-operatives in Guatemala. By 1976, the number had grown to 510, with a membership of 132,000 people. 57% of these were located in the Indian Highlands.³⁶

Co-ops introduced major changes. First and foremost, they got Indians working together in a communal way that was being increasingly lost. Secondly, they broke down traditional social taboos, such as men and women not being permitted to work together. Perhaps most importantly they taught new skills and techniques. Buying, marketing and farming were nothing less than revolutionized in some villages, the new skills adding to members' sense of their own capabilities.

Increased economic and social contact with the outside world was to a large extent made possible and intensified by the coming of radio and roads. Both took the Indian 'out' into another world, while bringing that same world in. 'When we first came there was nothing', said one aid worker in a village on Lake Atitlán. 'Now, there's a road, four boats and even daily buses to Guatemala City.' In the sixties and seventies the new roads brought a rising tide of tourists and almost every Indian met on the mountain trails seemed to be carrying a transistor radio.

The effects of this social and economic change are probably best divided into two: the psychological impact on indigenous thinking and the physical appearances that were an illustration of it. It is true to say that increased Ladino contact intensified trends towards Westernization, or, at least, produced an awareness of Indian society and values as part of a much wider world.

The changing perception came from inside Indian mentality as well as the outside world. *Cofradia* service or being a subsistence farmer were clearly no longer definitive criteria for being an Indian now that many who were obviously indigenous, did neither. The psychological perception of being an Indian had to be broadened, along with the perception of the Indian world. In essence, the clearly defined Indian concept of 'role' was being eroded. The Indian concept of 'destiny', a conviction that a person's station in life is pre-ordained and that he must remain in the role into which he is born, was disappearing. This amounted to Indians being capable of equality with Ladinos – a concept reinforced by the missionaries' basic tenet that all men were equal in the eyes of God. This thinking was further emphasized by the fact that some Indians began to receive secondary education and returned to their villages as teachers and even government officials. They were doing what had always been considered Ladino jobs.

From this sprang the most revolutionary concept of all – Indians had rights. The missionaries further emphasized this, both as a tenet of their religion and as a result of their origin in societies where everyone enjoyed equal rights. How years of subservience and dependency might be changed was illustrated by the religious worker who was told by an Indian mother that her child was sick. 'I told her to take her to the doctor', said the aid worker. 'She replied, "If the doctor will do me the favour of seeing the child". That's the result of centuries of subservience. I explained that the doctor is paid a salary to see her child and now she seems to understand that seeing him is her right.'

All these changes became obvious in village life. Although the outlook of many Indians changed, others clung to the old as the best defence against the new. This represented a break-up in the previous unanimous outlook and caused a vicious fragmentation in once homogenous communities. Some joined co-ops, others did not. Some became traders, others did not. Above all, some joined Catholic Action groups or became Evangelicals, and others did not. 'Every community experienced a holy war of sorts between *catequistas* (progressives) and *costumbristas* (traditionalists), violence erupted often, especially in the 1950s'.³⁷ Catholic Action's village *directivas* (councils) challenged the *cofradías* directly for control of fiestas and religious rites and many villages developed dual celebrations. Furthermore, Catholic Action members tended to be young and power in the hands of youth challenged the age-authority structure that had been the basis of indigenous society. A new leadership had emerged but how much of the community they led was another question. As health educators, storekeepers, co-op officials and Catholic Action catechists became the new representatives of power and prestige, villages became hopelessly divided, making them, in turn, even more vulnerable to outside influence. In the mid-seventies one aid researcher identified 37 different power groups in a single village.

Evangelicals represented this division and change more than any others. Conversion meant rejection of the saints and, in effect, village traditions, as virtually all were religious-based. Many fundamentalist sects turned converts against their neighbours, convincing them that the Pope was the anti-Christ and, according to one pastor, that 'their Catholic neighbours were not Christians'.

Another symptom of the changes was dress. Many Indian men dropped their native dress and today there are only about 20 villages where men habitually wear complete traditional dress. The reason was apparently obvious. Men came into contact with Ladinos more often, travelling away from home to work and being exposed to Ladino shops, styles and discrimination in the process. But, just as significant a factor was cost. 'It's 40 quetzales for Indian trousers', said one Santa Catarina resident, pointing to his friend's multi-coloured knee-length shorts. 'It's only 10 quetzales for these ordinary cotton ones.' But the trend was not all one way. Many younger Indians began to demonstrate their dual world by wearing western clothes away from the village and Indian dress at home.

A further indication of changing consciousness was an increasing demand for education and health care. 'They're not dumb', said one doctor. 'They don't want to go back to the time when they lost 200 children in a simple whooping cough epidemic.' Rejection of western education began to give way to a pride in being literate. 'I can't read but my children can', boasted an Indian father.

Inevitably, the concept of rights began to filter into the political system. The Christian Democrats were particularly active in the

highlands during the sixties and seventies, organizing peasant leagues and training rural community leaders. In the predominantly Indian department of Chimaltenango indigenous candidates won eight of the eleven mayoral races they contested during the 1974 elections. Even more significantly the same elections saw two Indians win seats in the national Congress. Between 1974-78 both deputies wore Indian dress and spoke their own languages in the national assembly. Ironically, both were accused of 'racism' as a result.

Repression grew correspondingly. Between 1970-73 the targets began to include centrists, intellectuals and – increasingly – the new Indian leadership as the then-president Carlos Arana Osorio lived up to his nickname, 'The Butcher of Zacapa'. In January 1971 alone, 483 people disappeared.³⁸

Worse still, the second most powerful earthquake in Latin American history hit the Guatemalan highlands on 4 February 1976. Twenty-seven thousand people were killed, 77,000 injured and more than one million left homeless. Virtually all of them were Indians. In Guatemala, even earthquakes were discriminatory, it seemed. The earthquake rapidly accelerated the processes already affecting indigenous communities. The relief effort brought intensified Ladino contact, with evangelicals in particular making large numbers of converts. Perhaps most significantly of all, the reconstruction effort taught many Indians the power of their own organization.

By the mid-seventies the seed of social and economic consciousness was sprouting but repression and electoral frauds were making the Indian's chances of improving his or her position in Guatemalan society look increasingly hopeless. As both the process of awareness and repression intensified, something had to snap.

4. Indian revolt: 1976-82

In January 1972, sixteen men crossed the cleared strip of jungle that marks the border between Mexico and Guatemala. Although survivors of a previous guerilla front in eastern Guatemala, they had totally discarded the traditional leftist thinking that 'backward' Indians were poor revolutionary material. They viewed the indigenous people as the potential vanguard of the revolution, a mass social base from which they intended to forge a 'prolonged popular war' that would last 'ten, perhaps twenty years'. The group's culturally sensitive approach demanded that they learn as much as they taught. 'With them, we learned how to calculate how a tree would fall, to plant with a digging stick, to orient a house ...' wrote one guerilla of their first Ixil contacts in the group's Ixcán jungle base.³⁹ Without firing a shot the guerillas studied and learnt for more than three years. Then, in mid-1975, they announced their arrival by killing a rapacious Ixcán landowner. They called themselves the Guerilla Army of the Poor (*Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres* – EGP).

The EGP were not alone. In the Sierra Madre mountains of Quetzaltenango, San Marcos and Sololá, ORPA, the Organization of the People in Arms (*Organizacion del Pueblo en Armes*) worked silently among Indians and plantation workers for eight years before declaring themselves in 1979. And in the northern jungles of the Petén and Alta Verapáz, Guatemala's oldest guerilla group, the FAR (*Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes* – the Rebel Armed Forces) seemed to be rethinking its attitude towards the Indians. 'We know that it is the Indians, half of the population, who will determine the outcome of the revolution in this country', one of the group's leaders had declared as early as 1967.⁴⁰

But it was the EGP's 'general mobilization' plans, calling for the involvement of whole Indian families, that were to have the most impact on indigenous communities. The group's Local Clandestine Committees, their basic village power unit, had Indians organized into sub-committees responsible for logistics, political education, operations and mobilization. Local Irregular Forces aided regular guerilla units and were responsible for village self-defence. By the end of 1981, this structure was providing shelter, intelligence and food as well as harassing the army on a district, regional and 'frente' (front) level throughout much of the western highlands. The widespread social base supported up to 400 *combatientes* (armed fighters) in each frente, and they too were overwhelmingly indigenous. A Mexican editor who spent three months with the EGP in Huehuetenango and El Quiché noted that one guerilla column was '99% Indians (of the Mam, Jacalteco, Achi, Ixil,

Quiché, Karjobal, Cakchiquel and Chuj groups), of these, 30% are young women less than 18 years of age'.⁴¹

In February 1982, United States Embassy press handouts in Guatemala estimated that eight out of ten guerillas were Indians, while the State Department put their strength at 3500 combatants, 10,000 members of Local Irregular Forces and 30,000-60,000 actively organized supporters.

Why? What explains the apparently subservient, politically apathetic Indians' apparent conversion to a radical movement?

The overwhelming reason seems to be protection and self-defence, both individual and cultural. The announcement of the EGP's existence and the February 1976 earthquake had brought army occupations of Indian towns and villages, and kidnappings, murders and 'disappearances' became commonplace as each particular community was occupied. It is impossible to relay the full horror or extent of the excesses but, by as early as February 1977 it was reported that killings had included 68 co-operative leaders in the Ixcán, 40 community leaders in Chajul, 28 in Cotzal and 32 in Nebaj.⁴² Bodies that were located were horribly mutilated, dismembered or sexually abused.

Later, this process broadened to encompass wholesale slaughter in a determination to wipe out any protest. On 29 May 1978 more than 100 Kekchi Indians were killed and 300 wounded when their peaceful protest march to the town plaza in Panzós, Alta Verapáz, was met with bullets from 150 soldiers. On 31 January 1980, 39 people were killed including 23 Quiché Indians when security forces stormed the Spanish Embassy that had been occupied in peaceful protest. The sole survivor among the Indians, Gregorio Yuja Xona, was dragged from his hospital bed the following day, despite terrible burns and a police guard. His tortured body was discovered shortly afterwards.

Attacks on Indian communities or indigenous groups, combined with the elimination of Indian community leaders, convinced many that the government was waging an ethnic genocide, and the history of Indian uprisings in Guatemala indicates that the one time the nation's indigenous people will fight back is when they fear cultural annihilation. In some communities, self-defence mechanisms against the army were already operating by the time the guerillas first made contact. The Indians' deeply entrenched survival instinct dictated that the guerillas were the best hope. On an individual level, many simply felt they had no choice. One rural development worker told of a friend who stated that her brother had been killed and that 'she was next. She said she had no other choice; it was either death or join the guerillas'. Another aid worker spoke of friends discussing joining the guerillas 'on the grounds that they would be safer with them than at home'.⁴³ It was for most Indians a pragmatic, not a political, decision.

These feelings were reinforced by the guerillas themselves. Cultural preservation and individual protection were the constant themes of their village meetings as they took every possible step to identify themselves with indigenous communities. Guerillas used Indian languages, arrived en masse to celebrate Indian fiestas, and even employed the *shaman* to 'work spells on the army', according to one Quiché villager. One EGP informant told how even the local custom of paying for brides was tolerated as long as half went to guerilla war funds. If most Indians' support was hardly a political conversion, the EGP was hardly a hardline Marxist group.

The cultural identification that led to the guerillas being widely described as 'our army' was further facilitated by the numerous Indian legends that told how one day 'the foreigners' would be driven from the country. Tales of Tecán Umán, the Quiché king killed fighting the Spaniards, and Tata Lopo and his attempt to establish an independent republic in the highlands, became more current. History informed by the Indian sense of balance dictated that the war having come up from the south must return from the north.⁴⁴ The time, it seemed to many, had finally come.

Many of those who became active guerillas bear out the self-defence/protection motive. They tended to be direct victims of army violence or relatives of the same. Landless, workless and even familyless after an army attack, they had nothing more to lose and without the strong social links of relatives and *milpa*, they joined the swelling ranks of Indians receptive to such new ideas as the guerillas brought.

There were, however, other recruits and other motives. The new Catholic Action co-operative leadership became firm guerilla

sympathizers as they realized that working for peaceful change was both suicidal and unrealistic and that the rebels' teaching on equality, freedom and community was a logical extension of the missionaries' message. Motivated by a Christian sense of right and a desire to protect and expand their social development programmes, Panzós, the Spanish Embassy attack and, most particularly, the 1974 and 1978 electoral frauds were for this group particular watersheds. As hundreds of catechists and 12 priests were singled out for army bullets, more and more religious people came to the EGP's own conclusion that in Guatemala one could 'not be a Christian and not a revolutionary'.⁴⁵ Priests began to speak of the guerillas as 'counter-violent', *combatientes* attended Bible classes and catechism sessions and, in early 1982, Donald McKenna, a young Maryknoll missionary from Belfast wrote home to say that he had joined the EGP and 'was going into battle'. There were others.

But the guerillas were not the only radical opposition mobilizing support during this period. As the recession of the late seventies began to bite, growing numbers of non-rural Indians took leading roles in unions, slumdweller's committees and community groups. Once again, repression forced these groups to broaden their concept of self-defence and seek closer ties with the armed groups. In November 1977, 300 Mam Indians protested at the closure of the tungsten mine where they worked in San Idelfonso Ixtahuacán by marching to Guatemala City. Their arrival drew 100,000 onto the streets and the government met their demands. In March 1976, delegates from 65 unions formed the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS) and on May Day 1978, a conglomeration of co-operatives, Christian groups and peasant leagues formed the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC), announcing their arrival in a parade that included the largest Indian turnout the capital city had ever seen.

From the start, the CUC acted as a major back-up to guerilla forces, aiding harassment of the army, self-defence, and – above all – co-ordinating political education among workers on the plantations. In February 1980, the organization shared its muscle by co-ordinating an unprecedented walkout by 75,000 workers on coffee, sugar and cotton plantations. The results were equally unprecedented – the CUC securing a near 300% rise in the legal minimum wage from 1.12 to 3.20 Quetzales a day.

What did all this add up to? The effects of Indian involvement in both the guerilla and labour movements might be described as an intensification of consciousness, for they were, in essence, a realization of it. Fighting, striking or protesting alongside *Ladinos* was at least a tacit recognition by Indians that they had something in common even though a recognition of class divisions as more important than ethnic ones was a long way off in most rural Indians' minds. But the success of both the labour and guerilla movements did give many Indians a previously unknown sense of their own power.

The result of this changing attitude was yet another group of Indians with yet another outlook to be added to an already severely-fractured indigenous society. For the first time in centuries, a significant number of fighting Indians had emerged. 'We are witnessing a new scene with actors different from the Indian who removes his hat, places it on his chest and humbly asks the *patrón* for a few centavos more.'⁴⁶

This change saw hundreds of thousands of Indians give active or passive support to the guerillas or labour movements. The depth of involvement depended on the individual's perception of the change but most Indians' political connotation of the struggle stretched only as far as believing the guerillas or union organizers might improve specific aspects of their lives – e.g. protection from army attacks or improved wages and living conditions. Achieving both of these was demanded by the Indians' will to survive, not by political persuasion. In other words, much Indian support for the guerillas would last just as long as indigenous communities needed protection and just as long as the armed movement could provide it.

On 23 March 1982, a group of young officers, disillusioned by the army's poor performance in the war and yet another electoral fraud, surrounded the national palace and demanded General Romeo Lucas Garcia's resignation. José Efraín Ríos Montt, the born-again Christian who took his place, claimed power by 'God's will'. In the next three months 'unknown' gunmen's attacks on centrist politicians and intellectuals in the cities came to a virtual halt and, as 'counterinsurgency' intensified, attention shifted to the

guerillas' real power base, the Indian countryside. Barely a day went by without reports of Indians being hacked to death, bombed, raped, shot and, most commonly, burnt alive in their homes. Between 24 March and the end of July, Amnesty International recorded 68 separate incidents.⁴⁷ The Indian surnames listed – Xen, Panjoj, Ajú, Yaqui, to cite just a few – made it clear who the real victims were. Even the conservative daily paper, *El Grafico*, was moved to an unprecedented outburst. '... The type of genocidal annihilation that is taking place in the Indian zones of the country is truly horrifying', stated a May 20 editorial.

But, even this three month butchery was nothing in comparison to what followed. With the press silenced by a ban on independent reports, a 30-day amnesty was followed by the declaration of a 'state of siege', which in Ríos Montt's own words gave the regime 'the juridical framework for killing'. Promising 'a merciless struggle' the General sent 10,000 combat troops into the Indian departments of El Quiché, Huehuetenango, San Marcos, Chimaltenango, Alta and Baja Verapaz and Sololá. Plan Victoria '82 was based on the two-pronged approach put forward by 'The National Plan of Security and Development'. Army sweeps through Indian areas would be backed up by the establishment of a permanent government presence in the form of military garrisons and government development workers. Under the banner '*Fusiles y Frijoles*' (Bullets and Beans) and, later, '*Techo, Trabajo y Tortillas*' (Shelter, work and bread) it was a plan of attack that allowed no neutrals. 'If you're with us, we'll feed you; if not, you're dead', one army officer described it.⁴⁸

In essence, the plan was a two-pronged cultural attack on the indigenous people. Not only would they be killed and driven out of their villages, but the development aspect of the plan would bring a massive effort to integrate them into 'national' life. This was what the National Plan meant by 'changes in the basic structure of the state'. But Defence Minister, current President, General Mejía Victores was even more explicit. 'We must get rid of the words 'indigenous' and 'Indian'.

First came the bullets. On the maps in the operation's nervecentre four different coloured pins classified Indian villages according to guerilla influence. Red meant, in the words of one health worker, in effect 'guerilla stronghold – wipe everybody out'. Coya, San Miguel Acatán (Huehuetenango), where about 200 Indians were slaughtered on 20 July, and Finca San Francisco, Nentón (Huehuetenango), where more than 300 Chuj Indians were wiped out, were just two of the communities selected for elimination. Amnesty International's October 1982 assessment of 2000 Indians and peasant farmers massacred since the end of the previous March, was described by America's Watch as 'responsible and conservative'. By the next month, the latter group was putting the figure at 10,000.⁴⁹

But the 'scientific killing' of Plan Victoria '82 had much broader aims than simple elimination. 'Scorched earth' and 'preventive terror' were the military jargon for destructive sweeps through villages marked on the general's maps with pink and yellow pins. Troops shot villagers as they fled, then burned their homes and *milpas*, destroying everything they could find in an attempt to deny the guerilla's anything that could be of use.

Although some human rights groups have cautiously attributed such incidents to 'armed men', it is worth stating that neither displaced Indians nor the military are under any illusions about who is responsible. Villagers state that they could identify the killers as military because they arrived in the jungle fatigued of the Guatemalan army and often by helicopter. If the culprits were in civilian dress, they noted army boots, haircuts and weapons. Even more condemning is the fact that soldiers talk openly about the nature of the campaign, specifying how they shoot villagers as they flee, then burn their houses and cut down their crops. Some conscripts told this writer that they had been on 'about 80' such operations. Although Indian survivors say that they fled because they were frightened, soldiers maintain that since the villagers were not 'surrendering' they must be guerillas or be running off to join the guerillas.

This military attitude that classifies all Indian civilians as guerillas comes right from the top. Ríos Montt's press secretary was quite specific during the 'campaign': 'The guerillas won over many Indian collaborators. Therefore, the Indians were subversives. Clearly, you had to kill Indians because they were collaborating with subversion.'⁵⁰ Such logic was fed by the campaign itself. Cold

and half-starved, those who fled were gradually forced to come out of the mountains and 'surrender' to the army, as if they had been active guerillas. This, in turn, gave the military a chance to present its acceptable face as well as try and win Indian hearts and minds, as soldiers fed and housed refugees under the 'Beans' part of the campaign.

But emergency relief was only the beginning of a long-term plan designed to control and integrate indigenous communities under the guise of improving their socio-economic condition. The military-run National Reconstruction Committee designated the long-term strategy's stages as 'pre-development' when a basic highland infrastructure would be built up and 'development' when resettled Indians, now grouped in regularly laid-out 'model' villages, 'protected' by army garrisons, would supply the national economy with basic cash crops and labour. As a start, Indians were set to work building roads, reconstructing communities and reforesting mountainsides. The process varied in each locality. In some areas Indians were paid (ironically, less than the legal minimum wage), in others, one day's labour was conscripted free every week or two, and in still others, 'food for work' schemes were developed, with six basic foodstuffs being handed out in fixed quantities.

Nothing illustrated the basic aims of control and integration – not to mention abuse of the indigenous population – better than the formation of civil patrols. All men between the ages of 18 and 50 (neither age limit seems to apply) are obliged to serve in a civilian militia that both supplements army operations and denies the guerillas their popular support base. By November 1983, some 700,000 men – nearly one tenth of the population – had been recruited.⁵¹

Conditions and demands vary. In the bigger towns, service is often only every 15 days, but in the smallest *aldeas*, it can be every four. While manning checkpoints and patrolling the bounds of the community are the normal occupations, civil patrols can be called out on active army operations for up to ten days. Unlike the military, many Indians have little food to take, no protective clothing and often little more than rope, machetes or slings as weapons. Families left at home during such extended operations often go hungry until the man returns – if he does. Civil patrollers have, on occasion, been at the forefront of army attacks and just walking the trails are exposed to guerilla mines and trip-wires. 'Why lose military-trained soldiers when these militias can suffer the casualties?', asked one young lieutenant.⁵² The cultural impact of all this was, as it was officially intended to be, devastating and probably constituted the most sustained attack on indigenous lifestyles since the Spanish conquest.

Signs of the disruption are visible throughout the highlands. Women now work the fields because their husbands are dead or patrolling, markets that were such an integral part of indigenous life lie abandoned because local economies are virtually non-existent, and girls complain that they can't weave because their supply of thread has been disrupted. With the military in occupation, 'official' celebrations, such as Army Day and Independence Day have taken the place of indigenous fiestas and flag-raising rituals and renderings of the national anthem are standard fare at the frequent meetings called by the army. Indian civil authorities have become virtually defunct as the local military commanders have assumed total power, appointed their own candidates as mayor and *commandante civil* (civil commander) and, in many villages, abolished the position of *regidor* (councilman) that was an important facet of consensus community rule.

But, once again, probably the most significant cultural attack was that on land. Incorporation and control the Indian has lived with to some extent for centuries – denied land, indigenous society can erode rapidly as the last generation demonstrates. Because land provided both guerillas and their indigenous support base with food, as well as providing the Indian with a modicum of independence, military strategists regarded it as the key factor of control in the war. That meant driving tens of thousands of Indians from home and *milpa*, cutting the vital link between location and culture in the process.

Today, thousands of Indians in model villages and refugee settlements cling to minute, postage-stamp size plots of land as the last tenuous link with their former identity as subsistence farmers and thus, to many, Indianness itself. Many families have been split up, undermining the other basic unit of indigenous society. Whatever remains of traditional lifestyle is being worn down by the

demands of the army, daily waged labour and what might loosely be termed 'culture shock' as some of the most traditional Indians in Guatemala are integrated into *Ladino* society – socially, politically and economically.

Despite the force of the odds stacked against them, it is worth noting that the most obvious Indian motivation throughout the whole war has been survival. It was self-preservation that dictated siding with the guerillas and it is the same instinct that sees most Indians now apparently on the army's side. Survival ordained initial flight from the military and survival later dictated surrender to the same army, as the desperate conditions of refugees coming down from the mountains indicates. An astute ex-guerilla observed about the indigenous people: 'These people will go with whoever can protect them.'⁵³

But, even given the necessity for survival, many Indians do feel they were deserted by the guerillas, who they claim tended to retreat into the mountains, leaving hopelessly ill-equipped village defence forces to take on helicopters and machine guns. The rationale is simple – to most Indians 'our army' existed to protect them. Despite all the guerilla promises, few had any conception that the rebels would fail in this, but since they had, they had forfeited their 'raison d'être'.

There are other complaints about the guerillas, too. In some areas, Indians complain of an increasing number of threats and demands made, bans on alcohol at fiestas and restrictions on travel outside of their villages. This harder line only seems to have emerged in 1981. Although selective guerilla killings of government *orejas* (informants) or exploitative landlords – usually after warnings – were distinct in indigenous minds, many more traditional Indians found such murders and other examples of guerilla 'lawlessness', such as pillaging vehicles and farms, too flagrant a violation of their own sense of law and order.

This feeling intensified as guerilla attacks seemed to broaden during 1981 and 1982 – the killing of civil patrol members being seen as a personal attack on their community and people by many Indians. 'The guerillas admit they've had to "get tough";' says one Guatemala-based writer. 'I've personally seen Indian bodies left with notes "Submit to the revolution, not the civil patrols".'

Guerilla attempts to get indigenous communities to work together communally also seem to have caused considerable friction. Any rural development worker in Guatemala will testify how hard it is to get seemingly communally-oriented villages to trust each other sufficiently to pool resources and share workloads. This may be the result of Ladino-imposed values, particularly that of individual rather than communal land ownership, but it is a fact. Guerilla-organized farming co-operatives were generally not liked by Indians and were thus often a failure and counterproductive. 'We'd never been so short of maize as we were that year', an El Quiché refugee complained. 'Nobody worked.'

Ladino-indigenous conflicts seem to be another major reason for guerilla discredit, particularly among the *combatientes* and those Indians most closely involved. There seems to be widespread disagreement amongst both the rebels and Guatemalan army intelligence officers about what rank Indians rose to in the guerilla movement. However, it appears that senior commanders were generally Ladinos and foot soldiers generally Indians – a power structure dangerously similar to that on which Guatemala's 450 years of hatred and distrust are based. Conflicts were often deep and bitter. 'We were afraid the Indians wouldn't put their guns down after the revolution', one Ladino ex-guerilla told a journalist. 'After it's all over, we're going to organize our own revolution', countered one Indian.

Obviously, the major reasons for the erosion of indigenous support for the rebels are military and essentially revolve around the simple fact that the guerillas could not provide protection when indigenous communities needed it most. But the other reasons given by Indians for not following the guerillas any more reflect their very non-ideological, individual views of what the guerillas represent. If the co-operative failed, so had the guerillas, if they threatened a friend then the rebels, obviously, weren't friendly. And, above all, if they couldn't keep the army out, then what use were they?

5. Now and forever?

As this report goes to press in March 1984 it is obvious that the only real losers in what has been termed 'the dirtiest war' are

Guatemala's indigenous people.⁵⁴ An estimated five to ten thousand are dead, some one hundred thousand in exile and up to one million uprooted from their homes.

Today, the mountain trails of El Quiché, Huehuetenango and Alta Verapaz, amongst others, are littered with the debris of a culture – earthenware cooking pots smashed, weaving equipment broken, machetes bent double and Indian clothing ripped into shreds. Skulls and human bones litter the sites of massacres. In many communities every house has been burnt to the ground. The fertile ash and dampness of the rainy season have spawned dense vegetation. Whole *aldeas* are hard to locate. They have, to all intents and purposes, been wiped off the face of the map.

Some 40,000 Guatemalan Indians are languishing in 32 refugee camps over the border in Mexico. Tens of thousands more have been absorbed into the population of southern Mexico, and there are over 2000 refugees in Belize and Honduras. Most arrived exhausted, sick and starving after long treks – many braved bullets along the border where the Guatemalan army allegedly created a free-fire zone. Even abroad they are not safe: Guatemalan troops have conducted raids into both Mexico and Honduras.

Tens of thousands more are internal refugees. Without identity papers, whole families live in total fear, trying to hide themselves in provincial cities or the capital. Many stay only a few weeks in the same place. Indian dress and language are quickly discarded so as to prevent being identified with a subversive area. Many are simply starving. 'I know whole Indian families living on 30 cents a day', says one nun in Guatemala City.

Back in the highlands, army commanders boast about how many schools and health posts they have 'built' even though their own troops destroyed most of them in the first place. Anyone who believes these are solely works of charity needs to examine both the past and present more thoroughly. Today's problems are the same as yesterday's. Health posts, but no medicines. Schools, but no books. Promises but little reality. Four hundred and fifty-year-old racial attitudes as reflected in government spending priorities do not change overnight. The Guatemalan government is bankrupt. There is no money for Indians. Even most of the current aid effort is private.

Look to the past and one sees all the old tactics resurrected, couched in new finery, new rhetoric. The *conquistadores* settled Indians in model villages, formed them into work gangs, incorporated them into armies to fight other Indians in someone else's war. It is hard to avoid the conclusion made over 50 years ago – the more Guatemala changes, the more it stays the same.⁵⁵

Since many of those most affected by the violence were among the most isolated and traditional Indians, it is worth asking if they view the army's present strategy of control and integration in a similar light. Essentially, yes. Most Indians see it as the latest cycle in 450 years of similar treatment and even the least educated can articulate an accurate analysis of the conflict. 'It just doesn't suit them that we improve ourselves', commented one Ixil Indian.

Curiously, it is not the wave of deaths itself that Indian communities have found the hardest to cope with but rather the violent manner of death and social upheaval it causes. Death itself is as inevitable as the natural disasters of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions that have moulded the Indians' surroundings, but violence and murder were almost unknown in the indigenous communities most affected by the war. One Indian civil patroller put the dilemma thus: 'These patrol members are just humble people who never had the chance to make a decision about whether they wanted to get involved in this killing. They just think there must be a different solution, not killing people.'

Apologists for the Guatemalan government have argued that most of the violence of the war stems from centuries-old indigenous rivalries and land disputes. The concept is absurd. Land disputes there were and still are, but these are primarily between export-oriented Ladino farmers and indigenous groups and any inter-community strife there was rarely came to blows. The guns, violence and deep suspicions of each other that the war has spawned, are, however, crowding out the traditionally peaceful methods of resolving disputes. The army has obliged and encouraged Indians to make both individual and community denunciations, even fixing a 'quota' of subversives on occasions. In the town of Chichicastenango, El Quiché, there have been at least three cases of civil patrols killing suspected subversives in their own villages, according to one foreign diplomat.

But the Guatemalan state's abuses of the indigenous population are, of course, much more general. There are at least three levels on which the Indians suffer human rights abuses.

On one level there is the denial of physical and civil rights expressed in murder, torture, kidnapping and enforced relocation. On another level there is the denial of social and economic rights – health, education, legal wages and market prices for products. Being at the bottom of the pile socially and economically, Indians suffer from the denial of these rights particularly acutely, but the phenomenon is by no means confined to the indigenous ethnic group. Ladinos are also murdered and tortured, sick and illiterate.

What Indians suffer exclusively is an abuse of *cultural rights*. In a nation already noted for its use of legal veneers, the right to a different manner of dress, living, language and outlook is not even recognized *de jure* in the constitution, let alone *de facto* in everyday life.

All these rights are of course intimately interlinked. Because the Indian enjoys no cultural recognition, he suffers particularly damning denials of economic and social rights, one of the most obvious examples being forced to carry out any official business in a second language. But vice versa the process is even more significant. Because the indigenous people have no social, economic or civil rights, their culture is under attack. More than anything it has been socio-economic deprivation that has caused the erosion of indigenous society and it is their lack of access to land that demonstrates it best.

In view of this, what does either side of the polarized political spectrum offer?

After four and a half centuries of rule it is reasonable to assume that the current authorities in Guatemala have little to offer the Indian but more of the same: the institutionalized terror of the army and death squads at worst, cultural integration and paternalism at best. There is now a mountain of evidence linking death squads directly to the government but it makes little difference to an Indian victim whether the killers are a uniformed platoon or civilian-clothed freelance group.⁵⁶ At the very least their attempts to wipe out any Indian leadership and rural development groups represents a government attitude.

Attempts at cultural integration can now be expected to continue apace in line with the officially declared policy of 'building up nationalism as a doctrine opposed to international communism'.⁵⁷ It will be spearheaded by the civil patrollers training in nationalistic military ritual, the government's culturally insensitive development programmes and the wage labour necessary as a result of relocation.

Paternalism and co-option of Indian leadership, though apparently preferable, might be just as detrimental. 'Paternalism is the stabest form of tyranny because it establishes intimate and personal ties of dependence across ethnic or racial ties of cleavage.'⁵⁸ On the other hand, co-option of certain Indian 'representatives' with the aim of creating a government-sanctioned indigenous leadership threatens to further split Indian loyalties. Rios Montt's appointment of 10 indigenous 'representatives' to a consultative Council of State and the great play made of them might well represent the beginning of a trend.

What the left offers Guatemala's indigenous people is less quantifiable. There is no reason to doubt their commitment to securing the Indians' social, economic and civil rights but many anthropologists are sceptical about whether or not Indians could survive as cultural entities under a leftist regime. They cite Arevalo and Arbenz's attempts to integrate the indigenous population by building up a power base in rural areas and they point to the Sandinistas' initial cultural insensitivity towards the Indian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. 'Radical and socialist thought does not tolerate ethnicity.'⁵⁹

Indeed, even the EGP, distinguished by its ethnic approach to the revolution, spoke of the indigenous population's 'integration' into 'the new society'.⁶⁰ Furthermore, if the organization was less respectful of ethnic customs and traditions from the autumn of 1981, one possible interpretation is that the movement was becoming too ethnic for its leading ideologues as it repeatedly compromised leftist concepts with indigenous practice.

Given that October 1981 saw the start of a major army counter-insurgency campaign, an even more likely explanation is that

cultural respect came to be considered something of a luxury in this period. As one anthropologist observed: 'Even well-intentioned commitments to respect cultural differences may give way before the more urgent need for survival of an organized, disciplined fighting force once an escalating cycle of violence begins.'⁶¹

All this may indicate that while political groupings battle for indigenous hearts and minds, their future is, in fact, all too predictable. Like aboriginal peoples the world over they will be absorbed as the mechanisms that have traditionally protected them from the outside world are eroded, a penchant for such consumer goods as cassette recorders and digital watches proves fatal, and the government becomes aware of them as a potential 'security threat'.

Fortunately, reality in Guatemala is not so simple. Firstly, there is numerical strength. Despite the fact that tens of thousands of Indians have fled Guatemala and that the national census office applies dubious criteria in dubious ways, preliminary figures for the 1981 census put the indigenous population at 38.7% of the total. A truer estimate would probably be over half the population.

Secondly, anthropologist Sol Tax's observation that indigenous peoples do not necessarily disappear culturally when confronted with persistent contact with the 'modern world system' is as true today as it was when first made in Guatemala in the 1930s. Indian towns within minutes of Guatemala City – such as San Lucas, San Juan, San Pedro Sacatepéquez – illustrate the indigenous determination to persist in their traditional ways in the face of what is often regarded as the threat of the outside world. A missionary describes it thus: 'Four hundred and fifty years ago the Crown sent commissioners to get Indians to eat off tables. They still don't.'

Thirdly, Guatemalan indigenous culture is never stagnant, having developed a remarkable adaptability as part of its will to survive. Some of today's lifestyles and dress would not be recognized by ancestors of a mere two or three generations back, yet remain totally Indian. Indeed, Indians have not only repeatedly adapted to the intrusions of the outside world but have manipulated them to secure the benefits they offer to protect their own culture rather than destroy it. One example of this comes from Jorge Echeverría, who, as accountant to President Jorge Ubico in the 1930s, recalled a petition by Indians in Nahualá asking the president to remove the 'corrupting influence' of a Ladino civil governor, military control and post and telegraph officials. When the president refused, the Indian leaders proposed that they send their own most intelligent youth to the city to be trained for the posts, if the government would send them back to the town as officials to replace the Ladinos. (Incidentally, the president agreed).

Given westernization tendencies and traditional indigenous determination not to be assimilated, these two trends seem to be moving in opposite directions, further accentuating today's divisions among Guatemala's Indians. Several observers have noted a cyclical pattern: 'There's a period of heavy westernization, then there's a reaction with traditional aspects coming right back into fashion.' But, whether or not any traditional revival can be anything more than temporary, considering the economic and social odds against the Indian, is doubtful. It seems more relevant to ask exactly what 'Ladinoization' entails.

For some it is exactly that – a conversion to western language, manner, ways and, most importantly, thinking. Some Indians consciously try to pass as Ladino – usually because it is synonymous with socio-economic climbing – others fall into it more gradually as a result of being cut off from their home community and language group. The process, inevitably, tends to be more common in or near towns and cities where there is more economic incentive to pass, more Ladinos to imitate and more racism to avoid, says one development worker. 'It affects young men worst, it's more modern and *macho* to be western.'

But, true to Indian adaptability, there is another trend. Anthropologists have noted in various areas the growth of a middle group somewhere between the two cultures. Many still define these as

Indian – the question really revolves around definitions and more accurately, changing definitions. This 'middle group' includes the increasing number of Indian professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, as well as factory workers, merchants and construction workers, and are regarded as at least partially Indians by Ladinos and indigenous people alike.

The key seems to be values. 'If they keep a traditional Indian sense of respect and responsibility they are still essentially Indian', insists one keen observer. These values could be broadened to include a traditional Indian sense of family, indigenous language and emphasis on social relations with other Indians. This in itself accords with the Indian definition of a fellow Indian. It is a person '*sin respeto*' (without respect) or a '*mala gente*' (bad person) who is classified as '*como Ladino*' (like a Ladino), ie non-Indian. Indian social contacts are important but not completely vital. 'That an indigenous person's personal network includes strong links with non-Indians does not cause him to be classified '*como Ladino*'.⁶²

But, what of those rural Indians who have managed to remain in their highland villages? Change is obviously coming and it is absurd to oppose it when indigenous people themselves are now showing a strong desire for modern education, health and farming methods. The real debate should revolve around what type of change indigenous communities will face and who will control it.

Indians have shown repeatedly that they can benefit from change offered on a voluntary basis, even using such changes to reinforce indigenous society rather than undermine it. But, the kind of enforced change now being imposed in the western highlands is a completely different matter. Cultural sensitive change is possible, probably its best guarantee being the maximum involvement of indigenous people themselves in any development projects. In specific terms, land reform (along with protection of the existing, eroding land base) and bilingual education would probably do most to protect indigenous society. Meaningful land reform would have to involve expropriation of coffee *fincas* in the highland areas where land rightfully belongs to Indians.

Bilingual education is now a government policy; the problem, once again, is its lack of priority. The programme covers only four indigenous languages, has a budget of only 1.5 million quetzales and several Indian teachers have been murdered – 'not by the guerillas', according to one senior official.

Ultimately, the current situation of Indians in Guatemala is laced with ironies.

Firstly, there is the official belief that Indians want to change Guatemalan society ideologically when this is probably not true. 'I know no real Indian who associates with Marxism, ideologically', says one doctor. The Indians' strong sense of independence and small trader interests would indeed appear to be poor socialist material. Said another observer: 'What the Indian is looking for is a place in Guatemalan society, not its overthrow.'

Secondly, there is the irony of the cynical Ladino belief that Indians have nothing to offer Guatemalan society, when all the indications are to the contrary. The Indians' strong sense of community service, respect for others and even business sense could all be used to reinforce Guatemalan society rather than be regarded as 'subversive' to it – *if* the indigenous people were afforded an equal place in it.

But ultimately, of course, any solutions should revolve around what Guatemala's indigenous people want. The previous record of local military governments proves that it will not. Furthermore, indigenous society is now so split there may be no consensus among Guatemala's Indians as to what exactly they do want. However, after talking to dozens of Indians this writer believes that it is one of the few topics on which there is any agreement. Indians persistently ask that they be 'left alone' and 'treated equally'. Granted both, indigenous perceptions and values in yet another very adapted form might survive indefinitely; given neither, as is probable, absorption of one sort or another is inevitable.

FOOTNOTES TO PART II

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PART III – A SUMMARY by Rodolfo Stavenhagen

In Latin America today we find one of the largest remnants of colonialism in the world . . . The concept "Indian" itself is, of course, a European invention which served the colonizers well for reducing the varied and numerous cultures and societies which existed in the 16th century, to an undifferentiated mass of subordinate and exploitable "natives" . . .

To put it succinctly, this has traditionally been a relationship of oppression and exploitation of the Indians by the European settlers and their descendants, the principal mechanisms of which has been the agrarian structure. By depriving the Indian communities of their own land base, and therefore of their economic self-sufficiency, the colonial and national governments and, more particularly, the ruling landowning classes, created for themselves an almost inexhaustible cheap and subordinate labour supply. Rebellious groups were pushed into the marginal fringes of jungles and inaccessible mountains, or simply repressed through military might. This basic system of economic exploitation (which has a number of regional and local variants) has been upheld over the centuries by a supporting structure of political power, social constraints and ideological justification which has placed the Indians at the bottom of the social hierarchy and outside the mainstream of what has come to be known as national culture. Economically subordinate, politically powerless and culturally isolated from the national decision-making centres, the native population of Latin America has become a marginalized under-class of rural proletarians, exiles in their own countries, discriminated against by the dominant Spanish-speaking population, even in such countries as Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador where they represent at least half of the total population.

Under these circumstances, the maintenance of Indian ethnic identity can be said to have a twofold function. On the one hand, it is an oppressive stigma, facilitating the more brutal forms of social discrimination and economic exploitation characteristic of pre-capitalist agrarian societies (sometimes referred to as caste systems or internal colonialism). And on the other, it is a corporate defence mechanism necessary for the survival of the community in the face of relentless and persistent outside aggression. Undoubtedly this twofold function creates permanent tension within the group and leads to differential and sometimes contradictory forms of social action and reaction . . .

It is too early to assess the impact of these movements on state policies and on the real social and economic conditions of the Indians, or their real political significance on the Latin American scene. But there is no doubt that certain changes are taking place and that the Indian ethnic question is becoming a political factor in more than one country. In Mexico, for example, for the first time a self-identified Indian was a presidential candidate for one of the smaller left-wing parties in the 1982 political campaign. And the candidate of the ruling political party has for the first time admitted that Mexico is a multi-national state. In Nicaragua, there have been attempts to use the Miskito Indians of the Atlantic coast for counter-revolutionary activity against the Sandinista government, in part because it did not recognize in time the specific grievances and conditions of the Miskitos. As a result the government over-reacted and state-Miskito relations are still tense at this time. In Guatemala, the revolutionary guerrilla movement is now firmly based among the Maya peasantry; earlier unsuccessful revolutionary movements in the sixties had failed to take the ethnic factor into account. In the Andean highlands the Quechua and Aymara movements refuse to recognize as valid the 'artificial colonial' boundaries between Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. In Chile, the Mapuche movement is in the forefront of the struggle against the military junta. In Colombia the regional Indian organizations of the Cauca valley are fighting for agrarian reform, and the national government can no longer ignore their demands. And in Brazil, the weak and incipient organizations of the jungle tribes are struggling to preserve the Amazon basin's natural resources against the predatory activities of the multinational corporations. All of this does not yet add up to a complete overturn of established political process and dynamics in Latin America (and probably it never will), but it is no longer possible to ignore the nascent Indian ethnicity as an emerging political factor on the continent.

The various movements insist upon the ethnic identity of the groups they represent: Mapuche, Quechua, Shuar, Mixtec, etc. But over

and beyond group specificity they recognize a Pan-Indian identity and civilization. Many documents speak of an 'Indian nation' on the American continent (including the United States and Canada). They consider the ethnic distinctions among themselves to be of less importance than their common Indianness. They identify themselves first as an ethnic group or as Indians in general, and only secondly as citizens of a particular nation-state. The more radical groups deny the validity of the modern nation-state completely, which they consider simply as a colonial artefact of which they have been the historical victims, and which continues to oppress them as a people . . .

The Indian movements have repeatedly stated a number of specific demands, addressed to governments, to the community at large or to their own peoples. Some of these demands are the following:

- i) Defence and recuperation of their lands. The link with the land is a major theme in Indian thinking.
- ii) Recognition and acceptance by the national society of the Indian languages and their use, and in general of the Indian ethnic specificity.
- iii) Adaptation of the educational system to the cultural needs of the ethnic group and community control over the schools.
- iv) Equal rights and treatment by the State and the cessation of abuses, discrimination and racism.
- v) Protection against violence and abuses practised against Indians by the non-Indians.
- vi) Rejection of religious missionary activity (though a number of Indian groups recognize the cooperation they have received from progressive sectors of the churches).
- vii) Rejection of technocratic and paternalistic government Indigenist programmes imposed on the Indians against their best interests and without their participation.
- viii) Greater political participation of Indians in the management of their own affairs and, generally, rejection of the traditional party system.
- ix) At the extreme, political self-determination of the 'Indian nations'.

There does not exist a single unified Indian movement in Latin America, but the various organizations propose unity as a recurrent theme. There is no single, coherent set of principles, objectives, strategy or tactics, not even at national level. There is, rather, an emergent social movement and an incipient 'Indianist' ideology, based on ethnic criteria, which represents a break with past practice, which questions existing and traditional state policies and established cultural and political models of the Latin American societies, and which represents a challenge for social scientists and political analysts.

There have been a number of theoretical approaches used by social scientists when dealing with Indian cultures in Latin America. Perhaps the most widely accepted approach may be called 'culturalist', and it has been developed mainly by the anthropologists. It states that the Latin American countries are made up of a dominant national culture (of Iberian origin) and a number of Indian minority cultures (of pre-Hispanic origin but containing many features from colonial times). As the national societies evolve, so the national culture will absorb, by transforming them, the various minority cultures, until complete cultural homogeneity is achieved. This approach has inspired most of the *indigenista* policies and it foretells, indeed, it proposes, the disappearance of the Indian cultural minorities (or majorities).

Another widely held interpretation is that of traditional Marxism, shared not only by many academic social scientists but also by a number of political parties on the Left. It recognizes in the poverty and exploitation of the Indian masses the expression of a social class structure. To the extent that this structure is still partially pre-capitalistic, the Indians constitute a particularly over-exploited segment of the working and peasant classes. Indian ethnicity is considered to be a survival of a pre-capitalist mode of production and an obstacle to the development of class consciousness by the exploited Indians. The Indian cultural characteristics will tend to disappear as the class struggle advances. This analysis also tends to favour the disappearance of the Indian ethnic groups as such, and considers positions favourable to Indian cultural development as essentially reactionary.

A somewhat more sophisticated Marxist position, which does not deny the essential class nature of the exploitation and oppression of the Indians emphasizes rather the colonial nature of this exploitation and uses terms such as 'internal colonialism' to refer to the articulation between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the pre-capitalist peasant mode of production of the Indian communities. This kind of analysis sometimes refers back to the early Marxist (and Leninist) discussions about oppressed nationalities, and leads logically towards a strategy of 'national liberation' side by side with the class struggle. However, given the historical characteristics of the Latin American nation-states, the concept 'cultural emancipation' is used in preference to that of 'national liberation'.

A rather less structured approach, which I would call 'civilizational', takes over much of the argument of the new Indian movements themselves. It is more concerned with attempting to interpret the persistence and significance of Indian ethnicity on its

own terms rather than with an analysis of the global society. It sees in the Indian and non-Indian ethnic groups two fundamentally opposed and irreducible civilizational phenomena and it rejects both the 'culturalist' and the Marxist approaches as incapable of understanding the essence of Indianity.

Even a schematic reading of these various interpretations points to an important conclusion. None of them are exclusively theoretical; each of them has direct bearing on political action. The future of politics – or rather the politics of the future – in a number of Latin American countries will necessarily have to take into account the question of Indian ethnicity, and the various theoretical and ideological approaches outlined above will have their say on the matter.

– Rodolfo Stavenhagen
from *Indian Ethnic Movements and State Policies in Latin America*
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The cover photograph, of Lucinda with her son at Patzun, Guatemala, was taken in August 1983 by Jenny Matthews (Format).

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¹The Internationalist; ²New Society; ³Times Lit. Supplement; ⁴Belfast Newsletter; ⁵Irish Post; ⁶International Affairs; ⁷Sunday Independent; ⁸Asian Review; ⁹The Friend; ¹⁰Afro-Asian Affairs; ¹¹E. African Standard; ¹²Sunday Times; ¹³New Community; ¹⁴The Times; ¹⁵Information; ¹⁶The Observer; ¹⁷Irving Horowitz; ¹⁸The Guardian; ¹⁹Peace News; ²⁰The Freethinker; ²¹The Spectator; ²²The Geographical Magazine; ²³New World; ²⁴Melbourne Age; ²⁵The Economist; ²⁶Neue Zürcher Zeitung; ²⁷Resurgence; ²⁸Feedback; ²⁹Time Out; ³⁰Evening Standard; ³¹Tribune of Australia; ³²The Scotsman; ³³The Financial Times; ³⁴New Statesman; ³⁵The Nation; ³⁶Bernard Levin; ³⁷BBC World Service; ³⁸International Herald Tribune; ³⁹City Limits; ⁴⁰Education; ⁴¹Times Ed. Supp.; ⁴²The Middle East.

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