

CYPRUS



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- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world.
- To help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised, are very difficult to resolve; and
- To foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.

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29 Craven Street
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01-930 6659

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CYPRUS

by Keith Kyle

Contents

<i>Map of Cyprus</i>	3
Introduction	4
The Historical Background	4
The decolonization of Cyprus	5
The 1960 independence constitution	7
Crisis: 1963	8
Crisis: 1967	11
<i>Maps: Turkish-Cypriots enclaves 1960</i>	
<i>Turkish-Cypriot enclaves 1974</i>	12
Crisis : 1974	13
Multiparty politics	17
International consequences (1974-1984)	18
<i>Map: Territorial proposals</i>	19
Conclusions	21
Footnotes	22
Bibliography	23

THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from any fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interest.

Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.


Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Cyprus



1 Cyprus at the beginning of 1984

Introduction

When with his rough humour Nikita Khrushchev remarked, in the presence of the British and of a sulkily silent Gromyko, that Foreign Ministers were useless and had never settled anything, it was generally felt at that time to have been a pity that no one had been quick enough to point out that three Foreign Ministers had just settled Cyprus. The Zurich Agreement of February 1959 between Greece and Turkey, followed immediately by the Lancaster House settlement which also involved Britain, arranged the grant of independence to the island under conditions that purported to impose constitutional arrangements on the new state that were unchangeable and were, furthermore, entrenched in international instruments. So, it was thought, Cyprus would never now be permitted to reopen the century-long Greco-Turkish struggle which had supposedly been laid to rest for ever by the grand reconciliation of 1923-30, widely accounted the one lasting achievement in peace-making during the interwar years. The sense of relief and of accomplishment at the Zurich settlement was widespread. Yet by the end of 1963 it all lay in ruins and a dispute had been reopened that remains unsettled two decades later.

Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles (the combined size of Norfolk and Suffolk) in the eastern Mediterranean, of oblong shape parallel to the equator. It is 141 miles in length and at its widest point 59 miles in breadth. It is an island of mountains – the long narrow and elegant Kyrenia range that overshadows the inland capital of Nicosia runs just below the northern coastline; in the centre and west is the Troodos massif, including one of those heights which the Greeks named Olympus. Between these two is a plain, 12 to 15 miles wide, which is very fertile provided the rains arrive – which they sometimes do not. Scenery and climate alike seem to justify the classical reputation of Cyprus as the birthplace of Aphrodite, which explains the heavy dependence of the modern economy on the tourist industry. The northern shore faces Turkey, from which at the nearest point it is only 43 miles distant; Syria is 64 miles to the east, while the Greek mainland is 500 miles away. The great majority of the population is and has been for more than 3,000 years Greek by language and culture.

Of a population estimated at independence at 556,000, excluding the British (most of whom would in future live within the Sovereign Bases), 80% were Greeks, whereas under 19% were Turks¹. By comparison the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland is somewhere near 40%. The proportion of Turks to the total population of Cyprus is similar to that of the French Swiss in Switzerland or the Tamils in Sri Lanka and is rather smaller than the Protestant population would be in a united Ireland. But – and this point is vital to the whole story – the Turkish Cypriots were at the time of independence scattered over the whole island in no single sector of which did they form a numerical majority. Are we confronted here with a problem of minority rights? We have already touched the heart of the controversy: for it is the Turkish population's contention that it is not a minority but a separate and equal community; hence that the concept of minority rights offers no solution that is of interest to it.

There was, when Cyprus achieved independence in August 1960, no Cypriot nation – nor much sign of one emerging, despite the common experience of British colonial rule which had left its mark on both communities and a common affection for the nature of the island. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had just emerged from a 'liberation struggle' in which they were on opposite sides. There was no university in Cyprus, no private business partnerships between Greeks and Turks, virtually no intermarriage. The one institution that was shared – the trade unions – had been substantially (though not entirely) torn apart by the pressures of the anti-colonial struggle.

There are basically three types of political solution that are available for this type of plural society and all three have been proposed for Cyprus. There is, first of all, the classic régime of *guaranteed rights for the minority* – rights over religious observance, education, use of language in schools, in law courts, in communications with government, in broadcasting – probably with at least one minister charged with protecting minority rights, and a few seats in the legislature. Apart from these special rights, normal rule by

democratic majority prevails. Such was the system proposed under the British by the Radcliffe report – though, to be sure, sovereignty and powers over certain matters were reserved to the British. The second type has been called the *consociational system, or power-sharing*, when for a distinct range of matters the communities are treated as units within which decisions may be arrived at democratically but between which they can only be made through consensus, forbearance, deals. The Government under such a scheme is a compulsory coalition between the leaders of the different communities. Consociation is a constitutional method which is usually extremely complicated in description, depending as it does on a series of checks and balances; it depends for its success on the willingness of the participants to accommodate each other in practice once the nature of the game comes to be understood and accepted as being at least the lesser of the evils available. Such was the 1960 constitution drawn up for Cyprus. Finally there is *federation*, which requires a sufficient physical separation of the communities to ensure that each of them is dominant in at least one federated unit. Given the demographic situation in Cyprus this was impractical – short of a really drastic transfer of populations of the kind that had happened between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s and in East and Central Europe at the end of the Second World War.

After Cyprus became independent in August 1960, the period up till 1974 was devoted to attempts to contrive some acceptable method of power-sharing that would not involve such a traumatic upheaval which could in practice only be undertaken by the exercise of physical force by the Turkish army. Since 1974, when that force was employed, the unresolved task has been to arrive at some tolerable accommodation to the results of its having been exercised.

The Historical Background

It is generally considered, as the result of excavations, that the Mycenaean Greek colonization of Cyprus took place towards the end of the second millennium B.C., when the indigenous population accepted Greek civilization and culture. During most of its recorded history Cyprus has been the object rather than the initiator of historic events. Part of the Assyrian empire and the Persian, it was picked up by Alexander the Great and then by Ptolemy. It became subject to Rome and afterwards to Constantinople. The (Greek Orthodox) Church of Cyprus is autocephalous (that is, independent of any Patriarch) on the grounds of its personal foundation by the Apostle Barnabas. Although this status was disputed it was upheld at the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD and subsequently in 498 by the Emperor Zeno after the bones of St Barnabas clutching a first edition of St Matthew's Gospel had been providentially discovered. Henceforth and to the present day the Primate – known since 688 as the Archbishop of Justiniana Nova and All Cyprus² – is allowed imperial privileges: to hold a sceptre, wear the purple, and sign his name in red ink. Exceptionally, among Archbishops, he is addressed as 'Makariotatos' (Most Blessed).

Byzantine rule over Cyprus was brought to an abrupt end in 1191 by Richard Coeur de Lion, who captured it in a fit of temper and later sold it to the Latin house of Lusignan. Under Latin rule the Greek Orthodox church was harshly subordinated to that of Rome; the Greek bishops (cut down from 14 to 4) had to do homage to those of Rome and were forced to live in remote villages. Possession of Cyprus passed in 1489 into the hands of Venice, which explains the presence of Othello on the island, and the Turks captured it from the Venetians in 1570-1. For the Greek Orthodox Church, Muslim rule meant liberation. The Latins were swept out and Muslims settled across the island principally on formerly Latin estates; many Latins and some Greeks allowed themselves to be converted to Islam. But the orthodox bishops were allowed to return to their sees, and, since the absence of an Archbishop was, according to Ottoman practice, bureaucratically irregular, one was hastily produced from Constantinople and recognized as Ethnarch, or spokesman for his people. Later, from about 1670 onwards, he was given the additional responsibility for imposing and raising taxes. This ensured the Church's pre-eminence among the Greeks of Cyprus. There was, nevertheless, a basic sense of insecurity in living under Turkish rule which periodically became justified. The Greek rebellion of 1821 in the mainland and in the Aegean islands, but not in Cyprus, began a century of bitter struggle between Greeks and Turks for the disentangling of the two cultures,

religions and peoples which at that time were intermingled not only on the European mainland and the Mediterranean islands but also on the Asian mainland, where there were substantial Greek populations at Smyrna (now Izmir) and elsewhere. On Cyprus, which had not risen, the immediate Turkish reaction to the rebellion was to execute the Archbishop and his three episcopal brethren and some 500 prominent Greeks.

The Kingdom of Greece, whose independence was recognized in 1832, was simply a core area of sovereignty, by no means including all the Greek territory on the European mainland and only a few of the Greek islands. Independence was therefore the beginning and not the end of the struggle for *enosis*, the Hellenic ideal of the coming together of all territory that was culturally Greek; the Greeks were henceforth actively concerned with collecting together the individual pieces of that empire. A second chunk of the mainland was added on in 1881. Britain had contributed in 1864 when Palmerston and Russell gave way to the demands for *enosis* in Britain's Greek empire, the Ionian islands including Corfu.

Fourteen years later Cyprus fell into the hands of Britain. In 1878 at the time of the Congress of Berlin, Turkey, retaining nominal sovereignty, gave the island over to British administration as an assembly base for the rapid deployment force which Britain was supposed to have at the ready to deter further Russian penetration of the Ottoman Empire. Although there never in fact was such a force and Cyprus was not used for any military purpose until the Suez invasion of 1956, the idea that possession of the island was closely related to Turkey's strategic safety was firmly implanted in the Turkish mind. On the other hand, when the first British High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, arrived at the Cypriot port of Larnaca, he was greeted by Kiprianos, Bishop of Kition, with the message: 'We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected.' Every subsequent High Commissioner became accustomed to hearing the petition for *enosis* on ceremonial occasions. In 1912 the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council resigned *en bloc* to campaign for this purpose. For a fleeting moment in 1915 Britain was willing to fulfill these hopes in return for a quick entry of Greece into the war; the offer was withdrawn when Greece declined.

In the meanwhile Greece put together other Hellenic fragments. In a sequence of events that has not been far from the minds of both sides during the current Cyprus dispute, the Greeks in Crete, whose Turkish population (once in the majority) were still in the 19th century a larger minority than in Cyprus, rebelled against the Turkish rule in 1821, 1856, 1878, 1896 and 1897.

There followed a succession of complicated and doomed constitutions, imposed by international intervention and intended to enable the two populations to live peaceably together under Ottoman sovereignty. After 1897 Crete was not off the international agenda till its final union with Greece in 1913 as a consequence of the Balkan Wars. The determination of the Turks that Cyprus should not be a similar story with a similar ending half a century later was to be a major factor in determining their policy.

Under the Treaty of London in 1913 by which Greece acquired Crete, she also extended her mainland territory to the north and north-west and acquired Lemnos, Samos, and other Greek-speaking islands. In 1919, after Turkey's further defeat in the First World War, Greek troops were authorized by the allies to land on the Asiatic mainland at Smyrna, where there was a large Greek and Armenian population, a landing that was marked by the killing of some two to three hundred Turkish civilians. But the Greeks' ambitions had outstripped their strength. The 1921 war against Mustapha Kemal, with the Greeks marching into the Anatolian interior almost as far as Ankara, was a catastrophe for them, for the Greek and Armenian population in Asian Turkey, and for the city of Smyrna whose terrible destruction by fire and sword brought to an end the possibility of a Christian population in Asia Minor. By the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) a massive and compulsory exchange of populations was agreed, eliminating the Greeks from Asia and allowing them in Turkey to stay, with guaranteed minority rights, only in Constantinople (Istanbul) and a couple of islands. In compensation, the Turks were turned out of their homes in Crete and in the whole of Greece's territories except for Western Thrace, where they were promised similar minority rights. The financial settlement was not finally confirmed until 1930 when Venizelos and Atatürk, on behalf of the two countries and cultures, lavishly

celebrated the end of a century of murderous feuding. Arnold Toynbee wrote in Chatham House's Annual Review for 1930 that 'this terrible process of segregation [of Greeks and Turks] – a process which had inflicted incalculable losses of life and wealth and happiness upon four successive generations of men, women and children in the Near East – had at last reached its term'. This was of course, with the exceptions noted, the abandonment rather than the celebration of the cause of minority rights.

But Cyprus was left out of this grand reconciliation between old enemies because, having been annexed by Britain in 1914 the moment Turkey came into the war, it was not involved in the population exchanges. Indeed, as part of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced forever any claim to sovereignty over the island in favour of Britain. The Italian-ruled Dodecanese islands (including Rhodes and Cos) were united with Greece as the result of the Second World War, bringing Greek territory in the Eastern Aegean very close to a large part of the Turkish coast. Greece felt herself as much an island nation as a mainland one, thinking of the Aegean as her high street rather than as a waterway separating her from Turkey. Meanwhile, however, the effect of Soviet pressure led both Greece and Turkey to accept American assistance, and in 1951 to join NATO, thus involving the armed forces of both in the structure of integrated command and joint military exercises. Greeks came back to Izmir (Smyrna) for the first time since 1922 as part of the joint NATO staff.

The decolonization of Cyprus: 'Never'

At the end of the Second World War Britain came to realize that her European colony of Cyprus was politically among the most backward of her colonial territories. The Legislative Council had not met since 1931 when for the second time the Greek members walked out, whereupon a crowd shouting for *enosis* burnt Government House to the ground. Nor since that year had there been an Archbishop. First, two of the four bishops were deported from the island, on suspicion of fomenting the unrest; then immediately afterwards the incumbent Archbishop died and the one remaining bishop declined to organize the election of a successor. (There is still in the Church of Cyprus, a process of indirect election largely by the laity, as in the earliest Christian churches). The press was censored, political parties forbidden, the flying of the Greek flag prohibited by law. In these circumstances the trade unions emerged as the principal element of opposition to the colonial establishment and the only one to cross communal lines. When in 1941 political parties had been allowed again, it was not surprising that the first one to be formed, AKEL, sprang from the union movement. Its original leaders spanned the political spectrum but before long it came under communist control.

Sixty years of British rule had done nothing to encourage the emergence of a Cypriot nation, though to be sure the Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike displayed the marks of British law and administration. To a certain degree the two communities had been played off against each other. So long as there was a Legislative Council British Governors relied on the votes of the Turkish Cypriot members to block periodic bursts of Greek Cypriot political activism. Greek and Turkish schools largely looked to their respective 'mother countries' for inspiration and in many cases for staff, though the Greek connection was the more active of the two. For Turkish Cypriots the 1931 crisis had been a revelation of the Greek Cypriots' continued devotion to union with Greece; it guaranteed the Turks' alignment with the colonial power even though their own political expression was as much denied to them as was the Greeks'. Both kinds of Cypriot were to be found among the leaders and members of the Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour (PEO). A wealthy Turkish Cypriot was likely to be a landowner (often absentee); the rôle of the bourgeoisie was filled almost exclusively by Greek Cypriots.

There were Turkish quarters in all the main towns, and of the villages in 1960 114 or about 18% were mixed (though this was only a third of the number seventy years before). Even in the mixed villages, however, it was possible to tell which was the Greek and which the Turkish part. There were 392 purely Greek and 123 purely Turkish villages but typically they were to be found cheek-by-jowl with villages of the opposite community. This was so in each of the island's administrative districts, although not many Turkish Cypriots were to be found in the Troodos mountains. The anthropologist Peter Loizos has pointed out that most Cypriots had

for most of the time been able to live close to the members of the opposite community without friction:

'Very few of them have intermarried and this is normally frowned on by both sides. But they have had both some social relations and economic cooperation and, although there has been consciousness of difference and sometimes antagonism and mistrust, the ordinary people have never found it hard to "live together", i. e. to share the island, villages, suburbs, coffee-shops and wedding festivities.'³

Unfortunately, the world is full of examples (Northern Ireland being one) where the existence of this degree of social toleration under one set of circumstances will offer little safeguard when the circumstances change.

The opposition to British colonial rule and to all British proposals for self-government was led by two men, Michael Mouskos, who in October 1950, at the age of 37, was elected Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus taking the title of Makarios ('Blessed') III, and Colonel George Grivas, a Cyprus-born Greek officer who had headed an extreme right-wing guerrilla group during the Axis occupation of Greece. Three years before Makarios's election the British had permitted the bishops to return, whereupon, to the alarm of most Orthodox leaders, the communists in AKEL, being the most efficient politicians, organized the election of an Archbishop, who died early. As it happened there were three such elections in as many years; and, already by the time of the second, AKEL's opponents had recaptured the machinery of election and the political leadership of the Greek community. AKEL's idea of petitioning the United Nations against colonial rule was taken over by Makarios, already a bishop, who at the beginning of 1950 organized a plebiscite campaign through the machinery of the Orthodox Church which produced a 96% vote in favour of union with Greece. In the following October, when he was elected Archbishop, he declared that 'no offer of a constitution or any other compromise will be accepted by the people of Cyprus'. Colonel Grivas, though an obsessional anti-communist, decided that violence was necessary against the British to dislodge them from Cyprus and began preparing for the day. He expounded his ideas to Makarios, who was at first sceptical and insisted that in any case the colonel should think in terms of sabotage rather than of guerrilla warfare.

When the British proposed a first-stage form of self-government (the Winster constitution) the right and the Church would not talk because it was not *enosis*; the left would talk but demanded for a European island with well-qualified professional cadres something more advanced. This being the period of the Greek civil war the British, who were in any case being criticized for allowing too much freedom to communists, were not prepared to yield more to the left.

Up to this point, the Turkish Cypriots, who until about this time were normally referred to as the Muslims, had not figured at all prominently in discussions about Cyprus. Being a rather stagnant society they did not make their point of view well known. Nor was it actively pressed by Turkey though representations were made in 1948 and there was one robust official declaration of interest in 1951. It is the Greek and Greek Cypriot thesis, from which nothing will move them, that Turkish interest and involvement, which would otherwise have remained quiescent, was fomented by the British, especially by Anthony Eden. One must say straightaway that there was a motive. The British had decided that they would have to leave the Suez Canal and were now planning to transfer the whole panoply of their Middle East Command to Cyprus, thus for the first time giving it the military significance it was supposed to have in 1878. Nevertheless the Greek assumption that with British goodwill the island could have been swiftly transferred, complete with sleeping Turks, to Greek rule without serious conflict may well be questioned. It does not follow from the fact that Britain's two reasons for staying – strategic and the need to avoid stirring up Greco-Turkish hostility – were mutually supporting, that one of them had to be bogus. After all, Greece and Turkey were both military allies of Britain and of each other.

On 28 July 1954 the Minister of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, replied to a debate about Cyprus with an ineptitude that came oddly in a former professional diplomat, that there were certain territories in the Commonwealth 'which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent'. After adding mysteriously that he would not go as far as that about Cyprus, he then promptly did go that far by recalling that he had already said 'that the question of the abrogation of British

sovereignty cannot arise – that British sovereignty will remain.' Greece then, for the first time, tried to internationalize the dispute by bringing it before the United Nations General Assembly as a simple case of self-determination. Thanks to British and American influence she did not on this occasion get much change and the debate provided the occasion for Turkey to declare that Cyprus had never belonged to Greece, historically its people were not Greek, and geographically it was an extension of Anatolia. They would not, said the Turks, accept any change in the status of the island that had not received Turkey's wholehearted consent. These Turkish arguments had an anachronistic sound in an era when first priority is supposed to be given to the views of the people concerned. After all, if people thought they were Greeks, then Greeks they were – and in any case past relationship to a kingdom that had only existed since 1832 could have no meaning. The relevant issue was the position of the Turkish Cypriot community and how much, if at all, the weight to be attached to that community of less than 20% of the total population should be boosted by Cyprus's geopolitical location – near Turkey and far from Greece. The main UN reaction (in the age of Western domination of that body) was one of horror at the sample of the Greco-Turkish polemic that threatened in the event of the Cyprus issue being fully discussed.

In the autumn of 1954 the Greek prime minister, Field Marshal Papagos, who had been personally offended by Eden's dismissive treatment of the case for *enosis* (in a conversation in Athens in September 1953), and Archbishop Makarios both gave the go-ahead to Grivas who, in hiding in Cyprus, had called his underground organization EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston, National Organization of Freedom Fighters) and himself 'Dighenis' to launch a campaign of sabotage. On 1 April 1955 the transmitters of the Cyprus Broadcasting Station were blown up and a series of simultaneous, but less effective, explosions took place across the island. The revolt had begun.

British attempts at a solution

The Cyprus problem could either be tackled domestically – that is, as between Britain and her colonial subjects, or internationally. And, if internationally, a solution might be attempted between Britain and Greece or at a three-power level (Britain, Greece and Turkey); at a NATO level which would include particularly the United States and the Secretary-General of NATO (at first Lord Ismay but later Paul-Henri Spaak); and at the level of the United Nations, where the diplomacy was essentially of a declaratory nature. The domestic politics of Greece, Turkey and Britain (in which a section of the Labour party, led by Barbara Castle, was markedly pro-Greek Cypriot) at various times obtruded. There was a basic absence of understanding between the British and the Greek Cypriots in their analysis of the political problem. The latter, and especially the Orthodox church, identified themselves with the whole island, and thought of the dispute with Britain as a classic anti-colonial one in which complications about the Turks were only a British excuse. Greek Cypriots simply did not take seriously warnings about the likely reaction of the Turkish Cypriots to any change of sovereignty, and felt – and retrospectively still feel – that it was unnecessary for Britain in the circumstances of the 1950s to do so. The Turks themselves did not take seriously the possibility of Britain yielding to such a demand. It is correct that Britain alerted them not to count on this too complacently. Anthony Eden states in his memoirs that he minuted a telegram in July 1955 that it was as well that Turks should speak out 'because it was the truth that the Turks would never let the Greeks have Cyprus'.⁴ This could be interpreted as inciting the Turks, but it could also be considered a prudent precaution against Greek overconfidence.

However one decides to interpret this, Eden chose the tripartite route. A conference of the three allies was convened in London for the end of August 1955 at which Harold Macmillan, then Foreign Secretary, proposed that the problem of self-determination (by now the code-word for *enosis*) be left to one side and that Cyprus should receive self-government by stages at the end of which the Governor would control only foreign affairs, defence and public security. The Turks would have a share of ministerial portfolios and Assembly seats proportionate to their share of the population and there would be a tripartite (British-Greek-Turkish) committee that would supervise the arrangements both for transferring power and for guaranteeing minority rights. The initiative was a failure:

Greece would not accept anything which disregarded the issue of self-determination; Turkey would not accept anything that did not explicitly renounce it. Macmillan later admitted that 'it could not be denied that the conference had perhaps increased rather than lowered tension'.⁵

While this conference was going on there was an alarming burst of anti-Greek rioting and demonstrations in Istanbul, probably stage-managed in the first instance but running rapidly out of control. The targets were the Greek merchants and the Greek Orthodox church while the Turkish press was full of stories which complained of the treatment of the Muslims in Western Thrace. No effort seemed to have been made by Turkish police to protect the pillaged churches and shops, and 29 out of 80 Greek Orthodox churches, 4000 shops and 2000 homes in Istanbul were completely destroyed. The message was clearly meant to be that Turkish forbearance was not to be too much counted on.

As the EOKA revolt gathered momentum and casualties on both sides mounted, Britain tried to escape from the box of 'never'. Field Marshal Harding, who had been sent out as Governor, bore with him a painstakingly crafted formula, explaining that whereas self-determination was not on at the moment for strategic reasons and 'on account of the consequences on the relations between NATO Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean' the situation might change if self-government showed itself in practice to be 'capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community'. A constitutional commissioner from Britain was to recommend how this might be done. After agonized debates in the Ethnarchy Council, Archbishop Makarios for the first time agreed to negotiate but on three conditions: the Governor's reserve powers were not to include internal security; the Turkish minority's rights were to be confined to religion and education; and there was to be an immediate general amnesty. Grivas, anxious to sabotage any negotiations at all, ended any chances of agreement by a series of massive explosions in Nicosia as the Colonial Secretary arrived.

The British deported Archbishop Makarios and his more intransigent enemy, the Bishop of Kyrenia, to the Seychelles (where they were kept for a year and then allowed to return to Europe but not Cyprus) but pressed ahead with the Constitutional Commissioner, Lord Radcliffe. Radcliffe abandoned any suggestion of a handing over of functions by stages because of the 'adult people' he found on Cyprus. Bearing in mind his terms of reference which required that foreign affairs, defence and internal security were to remain with the Governor, Cyprus should have maximum self-government at once. Radcliffe completely rejected the case which the Turkish Cypriots, led by a physician, Dr Fazıl Küçük, advanced for equal representation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the legislative assembly. This, he declared, could only be justified in the case of a federation for which there was no basis either territorially or in the numerical balance of the population. Guarantees of minority rights were appropriate to the Turkish case, with a Turkish Cypriot minister and 6 reserved places in the legislature and reinforced access to the courts in case of allegations of administrative or legal discrimination.

In a way the bargain offered to the Greek Cypriots was a very good one, especially as the Governor's powers were in practice likely to dwindle once the Greek Cypriot majority had effectively taken over the Government. Some retrospectively regret the way in which it was immediately rejected. But Archbishop Makarios was not returned and the Colonial Secretary, in presenting the Radcliffe Report to Parliament made the classic blunder of stating that if the time ever came at which it would be possible to grant self-determination it should be granted to both communities. A veteran Turkish diplomat, looking back over the 'enormous and patient work' required to secure Turkey a 'right of say' in Cyprus, described this British statement as 'in a way, a road leading to *taksim*'⁶ (i.e. partition). *Taksim* became the slogan which was used by the increasingly militant Turkish Cypriots to counter the Greek cry of '*enosis*'. In 1957 Küçük declared during a visit to Ankara that Turkey would claim the northern half of the island.

The Turkish Cypriots were therefore already discussing during British rule and under the pressures of the EOKA revolt, solutions – federation and partition – which logically would require an exchange of populations on, proportionately, an immense scale (for example, the movement of more Greek Cypriots than the entire Turkish Cypriot population) to make them feasible. At first they were merely calling attention to the kinds of unwelcome issues that might be raised by the majority's persistent cry for self-

determination. But as Grivas went ahead with his campaign, accompanying EOKA acts of violence against the British and their Greek Cypriot collaborators with civil disobedience by sections of the community (especially schoolchildren), economic boycott of British goods and services, and acts of ruthless coercion against those Greek Cypriots – especially the communists in AKEL and the trade unions – who did not wish to cooperate, the British fell back more and more for support on the Turkish community⁷. They used the Turkish Cypriots to build up the police and the special constabulary and to form a mobile reserve. This created hostility between the two communities; when a Turkish policeman was killed by EOKA the Greeks saw a policeman fall, the Turks saw a Turk. In January 1957, for instance, a Turkish Cypriot auxiliary was killed and three wounded by a bomb when guarding a power station; a Turkish Cypriot crowd smashed a number of Greek shops. Ten days later there was similar trouble in Famagusta. On 27 and 28 January 1958, there were two days of serious rioting by thousands of Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia leading to pitched battles with British forces at the end of which seven Turks were dead. This was a clear sign of the rise of a Turkish para-military organization, the TMT (Turk Mudafa Teskilat – Turkish Defence Organization) and the loss of confidence by the Turkish Cypriots in the durability of Britain's stand against the Greeks.

The cell structure of EOKA was copied by Rauf Denktaş, one of the TMT's founders, who went to Turkey to obtain the assistance of the Turkish Government and Army with training and weapons.⁸ Also, like EOKA, the TMT was strongly anti-communist and brought intense pressure to bear on Turkish Cypriot members of left-wing unions and clubs. Premises were burnt down, some left-wing Turkish personalities were killed, hundreds of Turkish Cypriot members of the communist-led PEO (Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour) felt it necessary to leave and were in fact advised to do so for their own safety by their Greek Cypriot comrades. Demands began to be heard for the establishment of a Turkish army base on Cyprus.

On 7 June 1958, following a bomb explosion outside the Turkish press office in Nicosia, there was an immediate invasion by Turkish rioters of the Greek sector, and Greek Cypriot residents were expelled from a mixed district. Communal clashes followed in the rural areas between neighbouring Greek and Turkish villagers armed with knives, sticks and stones, in the worst of which a group of Greeks just released from arrest by the British were murdered at Geunyeli. Grivas was known to be organizing Greek villagers against expected Turkish attacks and making plans for reprisals. The new Turkish militancy was also apparent in Istanbul where demonstrations in the summer of 1958 were held against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Movements northward from Turkish Cypriot villages in the south, most of them spontaneous, some organized by TMT, were taken as clearing the ground for partition. In July Grivas ordered raids on police stations with Turkish policemen as chief targets, and waived all restrictions on killing Turks. Many Turkish villages were burned. But in August an intercommunal cease-fire was proclaimed and held.

Meanwhile in London, Harold Macmillan, by now Prime Minister, had reassessed British strategic requirements in the eastern Mediterranean. 'I am not persuaded', he wrote on 15 March 1957, 'that we need more than an airfield on long lease or in sovereignty. Then the Turks and the Greeks could divide the rest of the island between them.' In 1958 he asked the Secretary-General of NATO to act as conciliator. In the summer Archbishop Makarios indicated for the first time that he would accept independence for Cyprus rather than union with Greece; he had been persuaded that Macmillan would otherwise go through successfully with his threat of partition or, at the very least, establish Turkey in a position on the island from which it would be impossible subsequently to dislodge her. Responding to these developments Greece and Turkey entered into direct talks which produced the Zurich Agreement followed immediately by the Lancaster House settlement between them and Britain, both in February 1959. Although Makarios and a very large delegation from Cyprus were present in London and although in the end he felt obliged to accept the terms, this was a solution imposed from outside Cyprus by the three interested powers.

The 1960 independence constitution

Cyprus gained her sovereign independence by virtue of a constitution and three treaties – the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of

Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into operation the same day – 16 August 1960. They were interrelated so that, for example, the 48 ‘basic articles’ of the constitution were incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee, while the two Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were in turn said in Article 181 of the constitution to ‘have constitutional force’. The third treaty, the Treaty of Establishment, makes it clear that the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus do not coincide with those of the island, in that Britain retains absolute sovereignty over two enclaves, totalling 99 square miles which contain the military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Britain is also given certain military rights (such as exclusive control of Nicosia Airport in the event of an emergency) on the territory of the Republic.

The constitution was drawn up explicitly in terms of the two communities – and was referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a functional federation, though that expression does not actually appear. The official languages were Greek and Turkish; the Greek and Turkish flags might be flown without any restriction, though there was to be also a national flag; the Greek and Turkish national holidays must be celebrated by right. The country was defined as ‘an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential régime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turkish elected by the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus respectively.’ There were ten ministers, seven chosen by the President, three by the Vice-President of whom one must receive one of three major portfolios (in practice a Turkish Cypriot was appointed to Defence). Decisions in the Council of Ministers were to be taken by absolute majority, except that either the President or the Vice-President had an absolute veto over decisions relating to foreign affairs, defence or internal security and a delaying one on other matters.

The legislative system was unicameral. The House of Representatives had 50 members, 35 Greek and 15 Turkish. According to Article 78(2) ‘any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.’ This provision also applied to any change in the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities. This last question had baffled the constitution-makers. In five of the towns separate Greek and Turkish municipalities had emerged as a consequence of the communal confrontations of 1958 and had been recognized by the British. They would now be officially established, thereby becoming the only organ of the constitution based on the idea of territorial separation, but for only four years during which the President and the Vice-President were supposed to decide between them whether they were to continue. Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto – absolute on foreign affairs, defence and internal security, delaying on other matters – as in the Council of Ministers.

Outside the House of Representatives there were to be elected two communal chambers, one Greek, the other Turkish, which were given separate functions not entrusted to the House. These included education, religious matters, personal status, sport, culture, producer and consumer cooperatives and credit establishments. For these purposes they were entitled to impose taxes, set up courts and conduct their own relations with the Greek and Turkish Governments over help with funds or with personnel.

The judicial system was headed both by the Supreme Constitutional Court and by the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, each with a neutral president (who should not be Cypriot, Greek, Turkish or British). The High Court had mainly appellate jurisdiction but could also deal with ‘offences against the constitution and the constitutional order’. The Supreme Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of functions and powers between the various institutions. Either President or Vice-President might appeal to this court whenever he thought that a law including, specifically, the budget, would have the effect of discriminating against one of the communities. Moreover human rights were strongly protected. A long series of guarantees against discrimination and in support of fundamental rights and liberties (Articles 6 to 35) were closely based on the appropriate European conventions.

Finally, the constitution recognized the bicomunal nature of Cyprus in its arrangements for administration. The public service should approximate in all grades of its hierarchy to a 70:30 ratio (compared with the 80:20 that might have been expected). The

Public Service Commission was to consist of ten members, seven of them Greek, but a number of decisions were made dependent on the approval of at least two of the Turkish members. There was to be a Cypriot army, 2000 strong, of whom 1200 should be Greeks and 800 Turks, together with Security Forces, comprising police and gendarmerie, also totalling 2000, but this time with 1400 Greeks to 600 Turks; forces stationed in parts of the Republic inhabited almost totally by one community should have policemen drawn entirely from that community.

A first reaction to this document must be that for a nation of 556,000 this was a very elaborate and very rigid constitution. It runs to 199 articles and of these the 48 ‘basic’ ones were to remain unalterable in perpetuity. The remainder could in practice only be altered by mutual agreement of the two communities. Constructed with the help of a Swiss constitutional adviser, the constitution was of the consociational variety which gives the preservation of the ethnic balance higher priority than majority rule. Moreover the constitution, thus heavily freighted, was screwed into the international system by the accompanying Treaties. Under the Treaty of Guarantee with Britain, Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to uphold her own independence and her own constitution; not to participate in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever; and to prohibit any domestic action likely to promote union with another state or partition. In return Britain, Greece, and Turkey recognize and guarantee not only the independence, integrity, and security of Cyprus but also ‘the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.’ They also will ban activity favouring *enosis* or *taksim*. In the event of a breach of the provisions of the Treaty, the three guarantors ‘will consult together’ about ‘measures necessary to ensure observance’. Then follows the most critical wording of the Treaty, currently cited to support the Turkish position. If, says, Article IV, concerted action should not be possible ‘each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by this present Treaty.’ The Treaty of Alliance, which was between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, thus not including Britain, was intended to reinforce the rationale of the whole series of arrangements: that Greco-Turkish friendship was in the last resort worth more than the strict arithmetic and practical convenience of Cypriot politics. A committee of the three foreign ministers was ‘the supreme political body’ of the alliance. Under its authority there should be a tripartite headquarters established on the island, with military contingents of 950 Greeks and 650 Turks to provide for the defence of the new Republic and to train the new Cypriot army. The various treaties were signed on behalf of Cyprus both by the Greek President and by the Turkish Vice-President, thus in Turkish eyes sanctifying the equal status of the two communities as ‘co-founder partners’ in the new State.

The extent to which this complex of arrangements, redolent of old-fashioned diplomacy, was legally valid in the light of the United Nations Charter has been the subject of much debate among international lawyers. The question was whether a constitution so rigid and unalterable was compatible with the equal sovereignty which was recognized in the Charter and whether its unamendable nature could validly be enforced under a Treaty which permitted any one of the signatories individually to take action. It is a complex argument which has not been resolved.⁹ Certainly Professor Forsthoff, the German who had been the first President of the Supreme Constitutional Court was to say: ‘I consider it wrong to regard Cyprus under the present agreement and constitution as an independent state’. The guarantors, he added, ‘include also a right of actual intervention – there can be no guarantee without the right of intervention’.¹⁰ Clearly the signatories, it may be presumed, thought they were signing valid documents. Archbishop Makarios subsequently claimed that the settlement was imposed on him by *force majeure* and that he did not in consequence feel morally bound by it.

The crisis of 1963

Archbishop Makarios was elected the first President of Cyprus by the Greek voters in December 1959 and Dr Fazıl Küçük the first Vice-President by the Turks. The Archbishop had critics both on the right from supporters of Grivas (who left the island for a hero’s welcome in Athens and the rank of a retired general) and on the left because the settlement had been brought under the aegis of NATO. He moved swiftly to consolidate his position – by appointing

EOKA people to key positions, most notably Polycarpus Yorgadjis as Minister of the Interior, and by launching a vigorous foreign policy of friendship with the non-aligned powers which served to disarm the potential opposition of the Communists in AKEL who were given five unopposed members in the first House. But the same process of satisfying the political needs of the Greek Cypriot community straightaway led to a series of conflicts with the Turks, in which the feelings of the two communities about the Constitution were made plain. The Greek Cypriots' feeling was that the constitutional privileges accorded to the Turkish community were preposterous; the Turkish Cypriots' that these were the bare minimum, to be exercised to the last ounce.

The disputes concerned:

(a) *The seventy-thirty ratio in the public service:* The Turkish Cypriots required that the proportion should be attained within five months of independence as had in fact been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect. The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not overnight draw from 18% of the population which was poorly qualified suitable candidates to fill 30% of the jobs. Standards and qualifications could not be lowered; after three years the Greek Cypriots published figures to show that real progress had been made in all grades towards the objective. But the subject rankled and aroused resentment in both communities. At the end of 1963 there were 2000 appeals outstanding in the Supreme Constitutional Court about public appointments.

(b) *Taxes:* Since a majority vote of the Turkish deputies in the House was needed to pass tax legislation the Turkish Cypriots sought to use this as leverage to force compliance over the Seventy-Thirty ratio and over legislation for separate municipalities, and a more generous approach towards the grant of subsidy to the Turkish Communal Chamber. As a result the colonial income tax law expired whereupon Makarios ordered that existing taxes should continue to be collected. In December 1961 the Government at last came out with its own proposals, but whereas the Greeks wanted a permanent law, the Turks wanted it renewable annually, which would enable them to use their bargaining power each session. Since there was again deadlock, personal income tax was abandoned by the House and the Greek Cypriots enacted it instead through the Greek Communal Chamber.

(c) *The Cypriot army:* The Minister of Defence, who was a Turkish Cypriot, proposed an army of five battalions, each of three companies. At the battalion level they should be mixed, but at the company level the units should be from one community or the other. The majority of the Cabinet decided that on the contrary the units should be mixed at every level. On this issue the Vice-President used his power of final veto. The President therefore decided not to have an army at all.

(d) *Separate municipalities:* Existing colonial laws had to be extended eight times while Greeks and Turks conducted a dialogue of the deaf about whether fresh legislation should establish separate municipalities as the constitution required and the Turks demanded. In December 1962 the Greek majority rejected further continuation of the *status quo*. The Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber then purported to confirm the position of the Turkish municipalities, while the Council of Ministers fell back on a pre-1959 colonial law to replace all the existing elected municipalities by appointed development boards. The actions of the Turkish Communal Chamber and of the Council of Ministers were both brought before the Supreme Constitutional Court and were both by the vote of the neutral court president found unconstitutional. The President offered the Turkish Cypriots compensating safeguards but made it quite clear that he had no intention of implementing the provisions of the constitution which he regarded as opening the way to partition.

(f) *The status of the Vice-President:* Dr Küçük complained that since he had an absolute veto over foreign policy he should be told what that policy was about. Spyros Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister, was not, he said, showing him the papers. He objected strongly to Makarios adopting on his own a policy of non-alignment and going to the Belgrade non-aligned summit without his agreement.

The record of the first three years of the new Republic could not therefore be described as an unqualified success. The necessary restraint on both sides if such a delicate mechanism of checks and balances is to work or, alternatively, if by informal arrangements it is to be shortcircuited, was absent. Already by the end of 1961 the Turkish language press was calling for the intervention of Turkey, Greece and Britain and the resignation of Archbishop Makarios over the income tax issue.

The question of whether President Makarios ever meant the 1960 constitution to work or whether from the outset his acceptance of it was a manoeuvre first to obtain independence and then to clear the ground for union with Greece is still highly controversial. As an Archbishop he was predisposed to see the whole island as Hellenic; in both his capacities he took part throughout the remainder of his career in what the Irish call 'verbal republicanism', namely the celebration of anniversaries of heroic deaths during the war against the British (a civic memory which counted the Greek Cypriots in and counted the Turks out) with many references to his own fidelity to the cause for which they had died, specifically the cause of *enosis*. But to what extent and at what periods this sentiment was purely verbal it is rather difficult to say (and, of course, even when purely verbal it affected the climate of opinion). Certainly there are many Greek Cypriots who think that Makarios did for a time support the constitution until he concluded that, unless amended, it was unworkable. Turkish Cypriots rather naturally call attention to a confidential document called the Akritas Plan which was later published in the press. This, which is generally thought to have been circulated in great secrecy by Yorgadjis, the Minister of the Interior, lays down a scenario according to which the 'negative elements' in the constitution should be stressed in public while lavish use should be made of such internationally acceptable concepts as 'self-determination' and 'minority rights' to describe the case for amending it. By this means Cyprus would win control over her own institutions and thus effectively nullify the Treaty of Guarantee since the constitution it was to guarantee would by then be no more. If the Turkish Cypriots showed fight they were to be struck down hard before there was time for outside intervention to arrive.

The Turkish Cypriots had made some preparation for a breakdown, since they were determined that independence should not mean, as Rauf Denktaş put it, 'a change of colonial masters for the worse'. In October 1959, after the Zurich and London Agreements but before independence, the Turkish motorboat *Deniz* was intercepted by the British when gunrunning to Cyprus. But many of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders counted on the constitution settling down. They were encouraged in this by the first Turkish Ambassador to Nicosia, Dirvana, who was a philhellene, and tended to discount the warnings of Denktaş, now President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, who claimed through intelligence sources to know better. According to Denktaş, who was political adviser to the TMT, most of that organization had been stood down and there were only 40 active members in it when the fighting started.

Yorgadjis, a man who ran his Ministry as if he were still in EOKA and who attracted to himself attributions of the most intricate plotting, used the constitutional breakdown over tax collection as an excuse for getting Makarios's authority for building up a 'secret army' of ex-EOKA men. There were also other freelance gangs of armed irregulars on the Greek side. According to a Canadian researcher (Richard A Patrick) 'These dissident groups maintained their autonomy either because they were opposed to the official leadership or because membership in such gangs was a means of maintaining a position of social status in a society whose more recent heroes were EOKA gunmen.'¹¹

On 30 November 1963, President Makarios wrote to Vice-President Küçük proposing thirteen amendments to the constitution which, he said, would 'remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state'. He did so apparently with the knowledge and encouragement of the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clarke, whether personally or officially is not clear: the full story of this remains obscure¹². The approach certainly had the qualities of comprehensiveness and candour.

Taken together, the amendments would have had the effect of resolving all outstanding issues in the Greek favour. The President and Vice-President would lose the right of veto; the necessity for separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members for the passage of certain laws, including taxes, would go, so would separate

municipalities; the ratio in the public services and in the army and police would be the same as the ratio of population; the Public Service Commission would be smaller and take decisions by a simple majority; the separate Greek Communal Chamber would be abolished (though the Turks could keep theirs); and the administration of justice would be unified so that a Greek could not demand to be tried by a Greek judge and a Turk by a Turkish judge. It must be said in favour of these proposals that they streamlined the administration and removed many of the features that laid stress on whether a Cypriot citizen was Greek or Turkish. But from the Turkish Cypriot point of view they removed almost all the props to their claim to be the 'co-founders' of the Republic and demoted them to the status of a minority. In the view of the Greek Cypriot constitutional lawyer, Polyvios Polyviou, who is a sharp critic of the 1960 constitution, the course followed by the Archbishop was 'a grievous error' which 'could not but have appeared to the Turkish Cypriots as a dangerous development that might change the internal balance of power and be taken internationally as a sign that the bicomunal nature of the State was giving way to unitary and majority principles'¹³. In Polyviou's opinion it would have been much better to have tried to change things gradually; a view shared at the time by the Greek Government which, not having been warned in advance, told Makarios that if he had asked their advice it would have been against. The Archbishop's proposals were hastily rejected not by the Vice-President, though he did so at length later, but by the Government of Turkey.

The atmosphere after the presentation of the thirteen proposals was very tense, with the Turkish Cypriots interpreting the move as a preparation to slide into *enosis*. On 21 December 1963 a street brawl in a Turkish quarter in Nicosia between a Turkish Cypriot crowd and Yorgadjis' plainclothes special constables was followed immediately by a major Greek Cypriot attack by the various paramilitary forces against the Turks in Nicosia and in Larnaca. At first an attempt to calm the situation was made jointly by the President and the Vice-President and by other leaders but it had clearly got out of hand and in any case the ex-EOKA element was strong in the security forces. Although the TMT organized the defence of the Turkish minority and there were a number of acts of retaliation directed at the Greek Cypriots, there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months were Turks. 700 Turkish Cypriot hostages, including women and children, were seized in the northern suburbs of Nicosia. The mixed suburb of Omorphita suffered the most from an independent gang of Greek Cypriot irregulars led by Nicos Sampson who, claiming to be rescuing a Greek section surrounded by Turks, in fact made a full-dress assault on the Turkish Cypriot population. During the first half of 1964, fighting continued to flare up between neighbouring villages. 191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks remained missing and could also be presumed dead. There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia and Nicosia. Food and medical supplies had to be shipped in from Turkey. 24 wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Later Turkish Cypriots returned to 5 of their own villages and 19 of the mixed villages. Most of the moves seem to have been spontaneous and hasty, following a local incident of violence, the people leaving clothing, furniture, and food behind. But in some cases orders were received for the people to go, and once villagers had moved, the Turkish paramilitaries, now much expanded in numbers and known simply as 'the Fighters', exercised substantial coercion to prevent returning in most cases to government-controlled areas. The necessary territorial basis for partition was being found.

In Nicosia the guarantors began to move over the Christmas week. The 650-man Turkish army contingent in Cyprus under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance moved out of its barracks and positioned itself astride the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. Turkish jets from the mainland buzzed Nicosia. The Turkish fleet set sail for Cyprus. President Makarios, by now alarmed that a Turkish army might indeed land, agreed that the British should intervene from the Sovereign Bases in order to avoid worse. This produced a cease-fire in Nicosia, an exchange of hostages, and the establishment of the 'Green Line', a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish quarters in the capital which has existed till the present day. The Turkish Cypriots expelled from their side of that line the entire Armenian community of Nicosia on the ground that it had aligned itself with the Greek position.

What the guarantors did not do was to carry out the one purpose for which they existed – the restoration of the 1960 constitution. The establishment of the 'Green Line' brought peace to Nicosia though not yet to other places, but it did not bring the fractured Government together. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot ministers remained on opposite sides of the line. According to the Turkish Cypriot thesis there was, from this time on, no legal government in Cyprus – solely provisional bodies on both sides pending the establishment of a new legal order, the old one having been overthrown by force. According to the Greek Cypriot thesis there continued to be a legitimate and democratically elected Government representing the great majority of the people which had, as many ex-colonial countries were doing, asserted its right to gain control of its institutions – and had done so at a time, moreover, when the Vice-President and minority ministers had wilfully continued to absent themselves.

At a conference in London of the three guarantor states and the two Cypriot communities, Makarios demanded the termination of the 1960 agreements as unworkable and their replacement by 'unfettered independence' – a unitary government with freedom to amend the constitution. He offered the Turkish Cypriots minority rights, which as usual they rejected out of hand. The Turks said that the December fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. Consequently they demanded a fully Federal State of Cyprus with a border between Turkish and Greek provinces known as the Attila line, which is not unlike the present cease-fire line, or, failing that, 'double *enosis*', which would bring a frontier across Cyprus between Greece and Turkey themselves – both solutions that would imply a population transfer. The London conference broke down with no chance of agreement.

While the cease-fire held in Nicosia, the British were unable to prevent the Greek Cypriots from attacking the Turkish Cypriots at Limassol, causing widespread casualties and damage. Turkey announced for the second time that her fleet was sailing for Cyprus, and the British, desperately anxious not to get bogged down in another Cyprus conflict, insisted on the peace-keeping burden being shared. Aiming above all at preventing a clash between two NATO partners – but wanting to keep the dispute within the NATO family – the United States tried to organize a NATO intervention but Makarios would not consider it. It was necessary after all to bring in the United Nations. By the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 UNFICYP (UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus) and a UN mediator were set up and despite a further severe Turkish warning the danger passed. Makarios interpreted the UN resolution as recognizing the 'unfettered independence' which he sought and appointed Greek Cypriot ministers to take over the Turkish portfolios.

The UN force which was set up and remains till the present day was originally of over 6000 men and is now about 2300. It has always had a substantial British contingent often over 1000, but now down to 750, making it unusual among UN forces which normally exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council. It is otherwise supplied by Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Ireland and Canada. It has achieved a good deal but not what was expected of it by either side since, as is usual with peace-keeping operations, it does not use force except in self-defence. As Dr Richard Patrick, who served in UNFICYP, put it:

'It could not kill Cypriots to prevent them from killing each other. The force's main deterrent was its presence. Its observers ensured that the communities' version of events could now be verified and internal support for their causes could be lost or gained by these observers' reports.'¹⁴

By use of persuasion they were able to prevent many killings that would almost certainly have happened, but they could not be everywhere and they could not stop a determined attack. In the first few months the UN had the greatest difficulty in getting a purchase on events because there were repeated outbreaks of fighting in different parts of the island.

Since there was no Cypriot Army, President Makarios now formed a National Guard, introducing conscription and ignoring the veto of Vice-President Küçük. Supplies of arms came in from Czechoslovakia and a Greek general from the mainland took command. In April Makarios paid a long visit to Athens during which George Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece, committed himself to the campaign for Cyprus's self-determination. He declared publicly that the UN resolution made the 1960 agreement invalid. According to Andreas Papandreou, who was then a Minister in his father's government:

'A clandestine operation then began on a huge scale of nightly shipments of arms and troops, of "volunteers" who arrived in Cyprus in civilian clothes and then joined their "Cypriot" units. The process was not completed until the middle of summer. No less than 20,000 officers and men, fully equipped, were shipped to Cyprus.'¹⁵

Greece undertook to defend Cyprus militarily in case of Turkish attack. 'A war', George Papandreou remarked, 'between Greece and Turkey would be madness but if Turkey decides to enter the insane asylum we shall not hesitate to follow her.'¹⁶ At the same time he laid down to Makarios the doctrine of the 'National Centre'. If Greece's policy was to be committed to Cyprus she must not take initiatives without consulting Greece.

In June there was another alarm. It was learnt that a decision had been made in Ankara to establish a Turkish bridgehead in Cyprus and bring about the complete separation of the two communities. The Americans intervened swiftly and effectively. Lyndon Johnson promptly sent what Under-Secretary George Ball described as 'the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen'¹⁷ to Ismet İnönü, the Turkish Prime Minister, which had the effect of stopping the expedition in its tracks. Papandreou and his son Andreas were in turn told of America's inability to go on protecting Greece from Turkey's military action. The object was to get both to accept American mediation between them so as to find another solution that could be imposed on Cyprus.

Meanwhile, despairing of the disorder and anarchy prevailing on the island because of the large number of weapons in the hands of undisciplined gangs, the Greek Government sent Grivas back to Cyprus. He went there to command the mainland Greek troops but it was not long before he also took over the National Guard. Grivas did very rapidly restore discipline but, noting that possession of the beach-head at Kokkina was enabling the Turks to bring in arms and men from Turkey, in August he launched, in defiance of the UN who were seeking to negotiate a local cease-fire, a major attack to eliminate this sore spot. Turkey attacked Greek positions from the air with rockets, bombs and napalm. Makarios threatened that unless these air attacks were called off within two hours he would order an attack on every Turkish Cypriot on the island. He also appealed for help both to the Greek Government and to the Soviet Union. 'We did not [send planes]' Andreas Papandreou later wrote, 'not because we did not wish to but because it was technically impossible'.¹⁸ Khrushchev sent word to the Archbishop that a cease-fire would be 'an important contribution'. Grivas was obliged to abandon the attempt to eliminate the Turkish beach-head and a UN cease-fire was accepted by Cyprus and Turkey. There followed a period of comparative calm. The clash at Kokkina had drawn sharp attention to the realities of Cyprus's geographical situation – vulnerable to Turkish strikes, beyond the range of Greek planes. Diplomatically, too, there was soon bad news for Makarios: the Soviet Union and Turkey were mending diplomatic fences with a series of top-level visits during 1965. As early as January the Soviet delegation spoke, to the evident discomfiture of Moscow's Cypriot supporters in AKEL, of there being 'two communities' with sovereignty and legal rights on the island. Shipments of Soviet arms to Cyprus continued until May 1965 but then apparently stopped.

The crisis of 1967

In 1964/5 two major attempts to settle Cyprus by outside mediation failed:

(1) The Acheson plan

In the margins of the UN mediation in Geneva, Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, attempted to settle the problem by a political deal between Greece and Turkey. This would give Cyprus the choice of independence or union with Greece, in exchange for a sovereign Turkish base on the eastern panhandle of the Karpas peninsula and the cession to Turkey of the Greek island of Kastellorizon, which is just off the coast of Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots would have two or three areas in which they would have 'local self-administration' and a resident international commissioner would look into complaints of discrimination. The plan was initially accepted in principle by both Greece and Turkey, but finally rejected by George Papandreou as 'partition masquerading in the rhetoric of *enosis*' because of the total opposition of Makarios. The Turks then rejected a revised version which sought to meet Greece's willingness to see a base leased to Turkey in Cyprus but not ceded.


(2) The UN mediator's report (26 March 1965)

This was the work of Galo Plaza, the former President of Ecuador. Superb in its analysis of the problem, it was instantly rejected by the Turks as being grossly partisan in its conclusions. It considered the 1960 solution as 'a constitutional oddity' which could not in practice be maintained against the will of the majority. The mediator saw *enosis* as the decisive problem but he did not detect unqualified support for it among Greek Cypriots as a whole. Cyprus after all had a higher standard of living and a higher wage level than Greece. As an act of 'enlightened statesmanship', preferably to be confirmed by popular referendum, Cyprus should voluntarily undertake not to give up her independence. She should also be demilitarized. The UN mediator rejected the Turkish case for federation because this would involve 'a compulsory movement of the people concerned contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time'.¹⁹ He recommended a unitary constitutional system that embodied generous provision for minority rights, some of them of a transitional nature until Turks would have been more integrated into the Cypriot community. There should be a general amnesty, incorporation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights into the constitution and, for as long as necessary, a resident UN commissioner, and staff to see that fair play was being observed.


The reaction of the Turks was that they would have no further dealings with Galo Plaza; as with Count Folke Bernadotte in the early days of the Arab-Israeli dispute he had no sooner spoken than the idea of UN mediation was dead. Later UN contributions towards peace in Cyprus have had to be couched in much more tentative and circuitous language.

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot community had by now concentrated into enclaves in various parts of the country. They were organized into groups of villages, sub-regions where full-time Fighter units were stationed and where Turkish army officers were posted, and seven regions, mostly based on the Turkish quarters in the towns, where civil government was controlled by District Officers and the Fighters were commanded by Turkish army colonels. In Turkish Nicosia the top civilian authority was the General Committee, headed by Vice-President Küçük, which subsequently became the Provisional Government, and military command was exercised by a Turkish general, Kemal Çoşkun, who went under the *nom de guerre* of Bozkurt (Grey Wolf). All told there were about 5000 Fighters. There was therefore in miniature the apparatus of a 'state within a state'. It was, however, fragmented and did not enjoy any of the services of the Cyprus Government since it excluded its officers.

The Cyprus Government also imposed an economic blockade against the enclaves, which was at first total but which was soon modified under UN and Red Cross pressures to let in quotas of food. Later, passage of specific 'strategic materials' was prohibited; this was a large and growing list which severely affected economic activity. There was some passage and commerce between Greek and Turkish areas but this was subject to much delay, tedious searches, and – sometimes – instances of kidnapping and hostage taking mainly by the Greeks but also sometimes, when opportunities for retaliation were seen, by the Turks. This was, perhaps, inevitable when the two communities were on a permanent war footing though even now this atmosphere did not prevail everywhere. In parts of the country Dr Patrick²⁰ speaks of 'local understandings' which 'often represented a compromise by local officials of both Cypriot communities between instructions from distant superiors and a desire to live and let live.' In the Paphos district for example an imaginative UN commander was able to turn a series of vendettas between Greek and Turkish villages into a system of local cooperation²¹. The trouble was that the Turkish Cypriot leaders who were themselves confined to the Nicosia enclave where they were protected by the Turkish army contingent could not allow their people to conform too much to the UN's conception of normality because that conception included the recognition of the existing (Greek) Cypriot Government. Determined not to become a minority in Greece (which would be the consequence of *enosis*) they believed that once the Greek Cypriots really overplayed their hands their woebegone situation was totally reversible once the aid of the Turkish army could be enlisted. The Greek and Greek Cypriot forces now amounted to some 30,000. There was continual work being done on coastal defences and by both sides on fortifications. The UN were continually engaged in negotiations to secure Turkish Cypriot 'freedom of movement'



II(a) The dispersion of Turkish-Cypriots at Independence, 1960



II(b) The development of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves 1963-1974

without needless molestation, and in mixed rural areas mediating complicated arrangements about police patrols.

On 21 April 1967 democracy was overthrown in Greece, bringing to power a group of colonels, some of whom – such as Colonel George Papadopoulos – had had experience of serving in Cyprus. They declared that the Cyprus dispute had gone on long enough and should be wound up. On 2 July they issued a statement calling for the resignation of those leaders in Cyprus who ‘on the eve of decisive developments’, set ‘groundless conditions and subversive prerequisites’. In September the Greek and Turkish leaders had what was intended to be a dramatic meeting on the Greco-Turkish border, at which Papadopoulos made the Turks a secret offer in return for their permitting *enosis* which he thought that they could not refuse. It was probably very much on the lines of the Acheson plan. To Papadopoulos’s surprise the offer was turned down; the bold move did not come off.

Relations with Makarios who did not fancy either union with a dictatorship or the junta’s solution for Cyprus became increasingly strained. The President began cutting the budget of the National Guard, building up his own para-military force, and becoming more amenable to UN suggestions for easing tension. Road blocks, for instance, were removed from outside the Turkish quarters of Paphos and Limasol, and they were allowed to buy ‘strategic materials’. General Grivas, meanwhile, was getting out of hand. The number of shooting incidents, which had fallen off since August 1964, began to increase alarmingly. There were also terrorist attacks on AKEL and its affiliated movement, the Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour.

On 15 November, arising out of a long drawn out but minor dispute about police patrols, Grivas – arguing that he must deny the Turkish Cypriots access to the coastline – attacked them at Kophinou. Fighting was heavy. Turkey instantly sent an ultimatum to the junta in Athens, demanding that Grivas be recalled immediately, that all Greek troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance be withdrawn, that Greek Cypriots be disarmed and that all economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community be removed. The Turkish air force made sorties over Greek Thrace and troops were concentrated on the Greco-Turkish border. The junta withdrew Grivas at once and after an intense period of American shuttle diplomacy by Lyndon Johnson’s envoy Cyrus Vance (the future Secretary of State) an agreement between Greece and Turkey was reached. Besides the withdrawal of excess Greek and Turkish troops within 45 days the National Guard was to be dissolved and the size and powers of the UN force was to be increased. These terms were partially implemented. Some 12,000 Greek troops were shipped back to Greece, and, in March 1968, the last economic restrictions were withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves, a gesture which was not reciprocated by the Turkish Cypriots who continued to maintain their road blocks in order to bar Greek Cypriots from their enclaves. But in a decision which he lived to regret, Makarios did not dissolve the National Guard with its officers from Greece and its intense anti-communist indoctrination, and he blocked any increase in the UN force.

The events of 1967 had a profound effect on Archbishop Makarios’s sense of direction. Although he may perhaps have favoured independence in 1959–1961, he had certainly later swung back towards his original aim of union with Greece. But the failure of Greece, especially under a military government to stand up to the Turks altered his outlook. He publicly acknowledged this on 12 January 1968. ‘A solution by necessity’, he said, ‘must be sought within the limits of what is feasible which does not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable.’ He then called a presidential election to endorse his position, whereupon the bishops of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus expressed the view that if he were to be forced to give up *enosis* he should not continue as President. He ran nevertheless receiving 95.4% of the vote, with an intransigent enotist getting 3.7%.

The crisis of 1974

Three developments followed from Makarios’s acceptance of the impracticality of *enosis* after the crisis of 1967:

(1) The UN sponsored intercommunal talks between the two interlocutors, the Greek Cypriot President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Cleridis and the Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktas that went on from 1968–74.

(2) The fomenting of a new internal opposition against Makarios by supporters of Grivas and *enosis*.

(3) The deterioration and collapse of relations between Makarios and the junta.

The intercommunal negotiations made, in one sense, rather striking progress despite repeated setbacks between 1968 and 1974. Denktas, on returning from exile in Turkey, had found the Turkish Cypriot community in some danger of disintegration. While taking full advantage of the lifting of the blockade to move around the island and build up morale, he decided to change the direction of Turkish requirements. Subject to agreement over the whole document he was willing to go a very long way towards accepting the thirteen amendments and eliminating the deadlocks in the system which he said had cast the Turkish Cypriots in a perpetually negative rôle. In return he needed new provisions on local government. But these did not turn out to be easy. The Turkish Cypriots wanted villages, municipalities and groups of villages to be run by councils with ‘independent powers, duties and jurisdiction’ spelled out in the constitution; these to be subordinated only to the appropriate Greek or Turkish members of the House of Representatives meeting separately, who would be able to issue regulations within the compass of an Organic Law. In that way the Turkish enclave system would be institutionalized. The Greek councils would be dealt with by the Greek side of the House, the Turkish councils by the Turkish side and the councils for mixed villages by whichever side possessed the majority of their population. The Greeks insisted that there must be some state administrative supervision, while the Turks said that such supervision should be minimal and could only be undertaken *ex post facto* by the judiciary. Glafkos Clerides eventually agreed that the business of securing sufficient uniformity and coordination could in some circumstances be achieved by the Supreme Court.

This was the one period in which the Greek Cypriots could have escaped from the Turkish Cypriot vocabulary of federal equality for the two communities. But the opportunity was missed. Apart from the intrinsic difficulty of the problems and the residue of recent bitterness (somewhat modified in respect to the personalities of the two interlocutors), the negotiations lacked consistent political support. Clerides was personally very committed to an agreement; so that it did not help that throughout these prolonged talks – which were being held in secret – he was being persistently undermined by local critics and not always supported by his own Government which itself was being undermined by Athens. Denktas gave the impression to the Greek Cypriots of being often held in check by Ankara.

Many Greek Cypriots were fearful that the Turks were trying to reintroduce at the level of local government the same federal or cantonal ideas they had abandoned in the centre. Not every Greek was reconciled to life without *enosis* and Makarios, as was his habit, continued to take in public an equivocal line. On several occasions Clerides felt obliged to offer his resignation, which was however always refused. Moreover, until the intercommunal talks had temporarily broken down in 1971, they lacked the presence of an independent party with the ingenuity to suggest methods of overcoming obstacles. When talks resumed in 1972 the UN representative Osorio Taffall carried out this task with distinction. But by then it was too late; the domestic system was too unstable.

The deteriorating relations between the Archbishop and the junta in Athens and the development of a terrorist opposition to Makarios on Cyprus were shaping events. These two factors were linked since important elements in Athens had decided that for the Cyprus question to be settled Makarios must go. The settlement they sought was one that achieved *enosis* but yet bought off Turkey. That, however, would involve concessions to Turkey on Cyprus on the lines of the Acheson Plan that Makarios would not make. In any case Makarios supported the exiled King rather than the junta. To break Makarios the junta backed a group in Cyprus calling itself the National Front that accused the Archbishop of betraying Hellenism. There was a campaign of sabotage and terrorism, and in March 1970 President Makarios’s helicopter was shot down, with him narrowly escaping. Polycarpus Yorgadjis, the former Minister of the Interior, was said by the Archbishop to be implicated, only to be murdered a week later in mysterious circumstances. General Grivas returned clandestinely to Cyprus in the Autumn of 1971 and began a rerun of his rôle in the 1950’s, setting up a movement

called 'EOKA B' which was meant as a threat to Makarios insofar as he would betray *enosis*.

Then, in February 1972, the Greek Government sent a note telling Makarios to dismiss his long-time Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, and other open opponents of the junta and create a 'government of national unity' composed of all segments of 'nationalist Cypriot Hellenism' (that is, excluding AKEL and others lacking enthusiasm for *enosis*). Makarios was told to remember that 'the National Centre is always Athens'. A fortnight later the Bishops of the Church of Cyprus, purportedly in Holy Synod, ordered Makarios to resign as President on the grounds of the incompatibility of ecclesiastical authority and temporal power. Makarios replaced Kyprianou but held mass rallies to prove his popularity, refused to form the type of government demanded, and sponsored a new newspaper which attacked the junta and supported the King. Clerides told Makarios that he was fighting on three fronts – the Greek junta, 'EOKA B', and the Turks. He advised him to settle with the Turks. But that advice was not taken: Turkey was in any case becoming impatient. Early in 1974, after an election, Bülent Ecevit came to power being in no doubt that what Cyprus needed was a federation. He complained bitterly to the United Nations Secretary-General that the intercommunal talks had been allowed to drift on without any clear understanding over political philosophy. He thought it quite wrong to say, as the UN had persistently done, that the devices under discussion could be fitted into a 'unitary state'.

The plot against Makarios thickened. On 13 April the three bishops declared the Archbishop deposed and reduced to the rank of layman. Makarios soon rallied the bigger spiritual guns by bringing together a Synod of Eastern Orthodox Churches which vindicated his position, found the rebel bishops guilty of schism and disobedience to canon law, and unfrocked them all. Politically, the Archbishop enjoyed an unopposed re-election. But there was still a disinclination to take strong measures against Grivas and 'EOKA B', despite incidents of terrorism, because of a wish not to be seen using methods reminiscent of the British during the freedom struggle and because Grivas being a royalist and being, like Makarios, opposed to 'partition disguised as *enosis*' might still be useful. However, Grivas died of a heart attack in January 1974 and control of 'EOKA B' was rapidly taken over by the agents of the junta. Moreover, apart from the Tactical Reserve Force, which was supposed to guard a few key positions, plus a small paramilitary organization headed by the President's physician, Dr Lyssarides, the Government had no reliable security force of its own. The Cyprus police were heavily infiltrated by ex-EOKA men while the National Guard of 10,000 officers and men was controlled by the Greek Army and was a recruiting ground for 'EOKA B'.

In the autumn of 1973 there was a further military coup in Athens in which the original Greek junta was replaced by one still more obscurantist headed in fact by the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Ioannides, though the actual head of state was General Phaedon Gizikis. Makarios wrote to President Gizikis on 2 July 1974 in a letter which he made public complaining bluntly that 'cadres of the Greek military régime support and direct the activities of the 'EOKA B' terrorist organization'. More than once, the Archbishop said, he had felt and in some cases he had almost touched a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate him. Although he wrote 'I cannot say that I have a special liking for military régimes, particularly in Greece the birthplace and cradle of democracy', he had still regarded whoever was in power in Athens as the government of the mother country. So he had found it 'absolutely inadmissible' that Greek officers had enrolled fifty-seven candidates for reserve commission in the National Guard whose names had been rejected by his Council of Ministers. The Archbishop asked for the 650 Greek officers staffing the National Guard to be withdrawn and ended proudly:

'I am not an appointed prefect or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and as such I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Centre towards me'.

The Greek Government's immediate reply was to order the go-ahead to the conspiracy that had been long maturing against Archbishop Makarios. On 15 July 1974 the National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the Government, demolished part of the presidential palace and announced that the Archbishop was dead. He had however escaped to Paphos from where he was rescued by an RAF helicopter and taken to the Sovereign Base at

Akrotiri. As far as world opinion was concerned the last straw was the man whom the conspirators installed in Makarios's place: Nicos Sampson, former EOKA terrorist and leader of the 1963 assault on the Turks of Omorphita. If Turkey ever wanted to establish herself on Cyprus she would never have such a favourable opportunity again – the legal grounds of the Treaty of Guarantee, which could hardly be cited again if they were neglected now, the transparent intervention of the Greek Government, which was soon to be confirmed by President Makarios himself before the United Nations, the insult of 'President' Sampson. Ecevit, who was personally well regarded by western leaders, made the correct gesture by flying to London to invite Britain's cooperation as co-guarantor. The British Government were placed before a difficult choice. If it did not act under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee it would seem to be giving the go-ahead to the Turks. But there were only effectively 3000 troops available on the Sovereign Bases and the ability of this small force to overthrow Sampson and restore Makarios seemed dubious; lacking even more was the political will to take a gamble on it. There was the undoubted fear of getting once more caught up in the tears and fury of Cypriot politics and guerrilla warfare if Britain acted alone, even with Makarios on the same side, while if Britain opted to intervene jointly with the Turks the chances of misrepresentation of British motives among Greeks and Greek Cypriots would be infinite. One difficulty was that the Treaty contemplated intervention solely to restore the 1960 constitution; and even in 1964 Britain had attempted no such thing. Another and by far the most serious problem was that the United States was not for the time being a fully functioning power, as President Nixon, bowed down by the Watergate scandal, was moving into the last three weeks of his administration. Kissinger was not really concentrating on the problem; and British action was not realistically to be expected without strong American backing. In any case, the American Administration considered Turkey to be the more essential ally of the two and Makarios as the kind of ruler whom no-one should be in a hurry to restore. Still, many Britons were left feeling uncomfortably that, in a situation in which Britain's reputation and treaty obligations were involved, something more enterprising should have been attempted. This was subsequently to be the vigorously expressed view of the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus.²²

On 18 July Ecevit sent Athens an ultimatum calling for the resignation of Sampson, the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard and firm pledges of Cyprus's independence. The junta were foolishly confident that America would, as before, stop the Turks from using force and sent an equivocal answer. What Ecevit called 'the peace operation' then went forward. Under cover of aerial bombardment and with the use of napalm, Turkish troops made an assault landing near Kyrenia at dawn on 20 July and met with fierce resistance. When they occupied Greek Cypriot villages the way they were alleged to have treated the civilians spread terror along the path of their future advance. The European Commission on Human Rights, which was denied the chance by Turkey of investigating Cyprus's subsequent charges fully (on the ground that the Government of Cyprus, not being a legal government, could not bring charges) found 'very strong indications' that the Turks had committed a number of mass murders of civilians.²³ There was also plentiful evidence of how thoroughly they looted property. By the time the UN Security Council was able to obtain a cease-fire on the 22 July they had only secured a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia, which they succeeded in widening during the next few days in violation of the cease-fire. They had achieved this at the expense of exposing the Turkish enclaves around Cyprus to instant occupation, or in the case of Famagusta to siege, by highly excitable young men of the National Guard and 'EOKA B' who regarded the enclaves as Trojan horses and in some cases took a brutal revenge on Turkish Cypriot families.²⁴

In Athens Brigadier Ioannides wanted to attack Turkey on all fronts but his fellow officers in the junta, many of whom outranked him, declared it impossible. The junta collapsed and handed over power to civilians under Constantine Karamanlis. In Nicosia Sampson had given up the usurped Presidency in favour of Makarios's constitutional deputy, Glafkos Clerides.

James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, summoned a conference of the three guarantor powers to Geneva. There they issued a declaration that the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended, that the Turkish enclaves should immediately be

evacuated by the Greeks, and that a further conference should be held at Geneva with the two Cypriot communities present to restore peace and re-establish constitutional government. In advance of this they made two observations, one upholding the 1960 constitution, the other appearing to abandon it. They called for the Turkish Vice-President to resume his functions, but they also noted 'the existence in practice of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community'. However, massive Turkish reinforcements continued to arrive, more Greek Cypriot villages were occupied and their inhabitants driven out, or, it was claimed, taken to Turkey as prisoners, and Turkish enclaves remained either occupied and looted or besieged and shelled.

By the time that the second Geneva conference met in August, international sympathy – which had been with the Turks in their first attack – was swinging back towards Greece now that she had restored democracy. At the conference there was a curious reversal of rôles: Clerides, taking Turkey's claim to have acted under the Treaty of Guarantee at its face value, asked for the full restoration of the 1960 constitution. But the Turks and Turkish Cypriots were no longer speaking in that language. Denktaş and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Professor Turan Günes, took the view that the new crisis disproved the assumption made after 1967 that *enosis* was dead. The Turkish Cypriots had been made to feel unwanted in Cyprus, so, it was said, it was now essential to have a geographical federation of two autonomous zones, of which the Turkish zone would occupy the northern 34% of the island. The Turkish Cypriots would then have an adequate sense of security and a reliable guarantee against *enosis* since, if there were again to be any move towards union with Greece, they would then be in a position to achieve partition. Horrified at what Callaghan is said to have described as the creation of two separate states within a Cyprus turned into a refugee camp, Clerides called the Greeks the true minority who needed protection. Although they were a majority on the island they were a small and defenceless minority in the strategically relevant area, given Turkey's geographical proximity and military might. Told by Callaghan that he must suggest something, Clerides filed a plan for a bicommunal constitution based on the work of the intercommunal talks about autonomous Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administration of groups of villages. On 13 August the Turks demanded that either their main plan or a new version produced by Professor Günes under which the Turkish federal zone would be divided between six cantons in different parts of the island but would still add up to 34% must be accepted in principle that night without further delay. Under extreme pressure to yield the principle of federation to save Cyprus from a further invasion Clerides asked for 36 to 48 hours to consult with Athens, with Greek Cypriot community leaders, and also with Archbishop Makarios who was in London. (Clerides also contacted a Soviet diplomat and asked him for a limited Russian military presence on Cyprus as a deterrent to Turkish attack. When he had first raised this idea with the Soviet Ambassador before he had left Nicosia, the Russian had asked whether the request had been cleared with the Americans; nothing further was heard from Moscow.²⁵) To Callaghan's extreme indignation the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would notoriously use it to play for still more time. The truth was that the Ecevit Government's political position was precarious and that the Turkish Army, feeling itself awkwardly confined in its existing corridor, would not wait. An hour and a half after the conference broke up the new Turkish attack began. It rapidly occupied even more than was asked for at Geneva. Thirty-six-and-a-half per cent of the land came under Turkish occupation reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient which now bisects the main road from Larnaca to Nicosia, forcing a diversion. This Turkish action created the basic political circumstances of Cyprus today. It brutally transformed the situation from an argument over how the intermingling of two different populations was to be regulated – by minority rights, by power-sharing, or by devolution – into a different kind of argument, one about what sort of federal link could be built between territorially separate communities.

The economic consequences of 1974

The effect on the Greek Cypriot population of what had happened was traumatic. Out of a total community of 500,000 some 180,000 were refugees. Callaghan's nightmare of the island as a gigantic refugee camp had come true. The reputation of the 'terrible Turk'

went ahead, fed by rumours of what had happened in July; as in the case of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948-9 the Greek Cypriots left their homes instantly and fled at word of the Turks' approach. One cannot blame them but the Turks would have been faced with a real problem if in the mass they had stayed. Nothing more was heard about the precisely limited objectives originally attributed to the Turkish 'peace operation'.

As for the human cost of the two operations the Greek Cypriots afterwards collected records of 1619 missing people, half of them unarmed civilians, about whom it was claimed that there was definite evidence that they had been in Turkish hands and in some cases had been taken to the Turkish mainland. The Turkish Cypriots say that some of these were in all probability killed in violence done by Greeks to Greeks at the time of the coup against Makarios. By the beginning of 1984 the discussion of these cases and their investigation had got no further than the procedural stages; and the chances of any of the people being still alive must be slender. The Turkish Cypriots in their turn naturally recall the deadly incidents of retaliation by armed Greek Cypriots on Turkish Cypriot villagers in August 1974, for example in the mixed village of Tokhni, where all the Turkish menfolk of any age who could be found were shot. Other mass graves contain, according to the memorial which the Turkish Cypriots have raised, the bodies of the families of Aloa, Sandalaris and Maratha.

Clerides and Denktaş met again after the fighting was over and by the following year had negotiated an agreement by which Turkish Cypriots, who had been attempting with great difficulty to leave for the north, were allowed to do so. In return the 10,000 or so Greek Cypriots who had stayed in the north were to be allowed to go on doing so and be joined by family members from the south with minority rights safeguarded or to leave if they genuinely wanted to. Oddly, the Turkish Cypriots subsequently termed this an 'Exchange of Populations Agreement' – a phrase no doubt intended to stir echoes of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) and the permanent nature of its demographic decisions. But no such language was in the 1975 agreement. In fact, though, the Greek Cypriots in the north nearly all left in the next few years. Apart from specific claims of harassment, life, in the circumstances, was no doubt uncomfortable for them. So that there are now only 829 Greeks in the north – mainly in two villages in the Karpas. There are about 130 Turks in the south. These groups are regularly visited by UN staff who provide relief supplies of food, clothing and oil, and deliver mail.

With these small exceptions what has in effect happened has been the transformation of the island into two mono-ethnic zones, with an impassable (to most Cypriots) barrier between them running across the island and right through the middle of the walled city of Nicosia. That barrier is kept in place by the UN, who maintain and police a buffer zone, generally two to four and a half miles wide but narrowing down to 20 metres in the walled city itself, between the two front lines that run for 112 miles across the island with 139 observation posts, 71 of them permanently manned. Foreign visitors can cross the border from south to north provided that they return to a hotel in the south the same day. Visitors who are staying on the Turkish side may not cross the other way (because, according to the Cyprus Government's rules they will have entered the country illegally), though pre-1974 foreign residents can. Journalists in general can cross (though certain restrictions are sometimes put on those coming to the north from the south).

The problem of the barrier for the Greek Cypriots is both material and psychological. As the Kyrenian hills loom over Nicosia it is natural for a Greek Cypriot to gesture in the direction from which he fears that one day the Turks will be coming to swallow up the rest of Cyprus. The belief that Turkey is intrinsically an expansionist country is nowadays widely expressed. Whereas the Turkish Cypriot community used to fear being swallowed up by Greece the reverse case is now a deeply felt psychological factor. On the Greek Cypriot side one hears no call for *enosis* – the geopolitical lesson has been learned – but the Turkish Cypriots are so isolated from contact with Greeks that they find this very difficult to accept.

The vast majority of the refugees from the north were not townsmen but came from villages with close-knit kinship ties and attachments to the land and their orange and lemon groves. Those who were able boarded with relatives and friends in the south. The rest had to be accommodated in light shacks made of plywood and gypsum looking very like rabbit-hutches and desperately cold and draughty

in winter. Although the last 4000 of them, almost all single people, still live in shacks, the immense task of rehousing refugees, with emphasis on self-help schemes and subsidies for all whose resources were below a certain level, is approaching its end. But most of the ex-villagers who had to take work in the construction industry and are now, after years of emergency housing, settled in the new housing estates, still talk and think about returning to their former homes in the north.

The territory which the Turkish Army had seized for the Turkish Cypriots contained most of the country's cargo-holding capacity in the port of Famagusta, the great majority of its tourist industry (65 per cent of existing tourist accommodation and 87 per cent of the hotel beds under construction), half the agricultural exports, including 75 per cent of the citrus fruits, and nearly half of its industrial production. Faced with the task of providing relief for the vast mass of refugees and the need to build up fresh assets to replace those that are gone, Government planners went in for labour-intensive projects and maximum incentives with few planning restrictions. The Cyprus tourist industry which had been the money-spinner of the country's first decade had grown very quickly from very little since 1960. What had been done before could be done again. Although it had been assumed that the north had most of the tourist attractions, necessity forced the Greek Cypriots to look to the potential assets of the rest of the island. There was an uncontrolled building boom – Limassol was sacrificed to the spirit and even Paphos imperilled – but there is now a mood of careful planning.

Although the investment in tourism has proved a triumphant success the Government is determined to diversify, and to move up-market. "We have had a settlement of accounts opened by the invasion", I was told. "Now we have to choose new directions." The act of choice is not easy because so much hangs on the kind of capital-intensive investment that is made. Cyprus is handicapped by her tiny internal market and the fact that she has not made up, in terms of balance of payments, for having lost the citrus exports in the north. One big boost has come from the self-destruction of Beirut, which has greatly improved the chances of turning Cyprus into an economic, financial and servicing centre for the Middle East. 'Cyprus's geographical location has been the cause of all her troubles', her planning chief Dr Aristidou told me. 'Now we are going to make it work for us.'

(Greek) Cyprus's rapid economic recovery could not have come about without the initiative and sheer hard work of the people (many of whom do two jobs a day and some three). But it is also true that proportionately they have attracted a high quantity of international help. The Turkish Cypriots in the north do not share in this except for their aid from Turkey and various modest amounts from international schemes where the aid has to be divided on a four-to-one (population ratio) basis. Nor, of course, do they have access to the World Bank, to the EEC and to bilateral credit facilities. This is a great grievance to them. But it springs from the source of all their present complaints which is that the Government on the Greek Cypriot side of the 'Green Line' in Nicosia is universally acknowledged (except by Turkey) as the Government of the whole island.

As the Government of the whole it receives and allocates foreign aid grants and loans; as the Government of the whole it represents Cyprus at IATA where it ensures that Ercan (Greek name: Tymbou), which the Turkish Cypriots have converted from a small landing-field into a full-sized airport, is unused except by Turkish planes; while at the Universal Postal Union Congress at Rio de Janeiro in 1979 the Government of Cyprus secured a declaration that Turkish Cypriot postage stamps were 'illegal and of no validity'. The same argument is used to stop the purchase of citrus exports from the north. Every effort is made to discourage ships from going to Famagusta even to the extent of imprisoning a ship's captain who was so incautious as to stop off afterwards in the south of the island. The Greek Cypriots defend their embargo by saying that it is the only answer that is open to them to reply to the illegal occupation of more than a third of their country by the Turkish Army and the theft of their assets.

A visitor to the north of Cyprus cannot avoid noticing a change from the dynamic pace of life in the south. As the UN Development Programme Report on Cyprus (March 1982) put it: 'The economy of the North has stagnated and has become heavily dependent on assistance from Turkey'. This should not be misunderstood. The economy may be stagnant but North Cyprus is neither lethargic nor

depressing. There is in fact a great sense of release from the tensions and miseries of living in enclaves and a determination by the people to make a go of their own society. Although it is a small community and, except for the law courts (which were located in the Turkish section of Nicosia) it has had to build everything up from the beginning, the apparatus of government is in place, there is a lively multi-party politics which went on unhindered during the period of military government in Turkey and reasonable press freedom. There is no doubt either that the declaration of independence of November 1983 was very popular.

Turkish Cypriot publications put the present population of North Cyprus at 153,000, whereas the latest (1982) estimate by the Government of Cyprus of the Turkish population of the islands is 121,000²⁶. The difference may partly relate to estimates of birth rate but clearly is connected with the number of Turkish immigrants from the mainland who have settled down. Thousands of families came over in the first years after 1974 to occupy some of the houses left vacant by Greek Cypriot refugees and to try to keep the economy going. The local press reported friction between some of them and Turkish Cypriots. A substantial number certainly returned to the mainland but many are clearly intending to stay.

There is not much official unemployment (2.65%) but the 1983 report from the State Planning Organization says that with such a high proportion being employed in the services sector, 'lack of productivity and disguised unemployment are the two important resultant problems'. There are 13,000 people of all grades in the civil service, which is kept at that rather surprising figure so that too many educated people shall not emigrate, and only 8000 in industry other than construction. The great aim is to expand that sector but to do that the Turkish Cypriots have got to interest outside investors. They are trying hard with Famagusta where they have established a free port and zone with an attractive prospectus of incentives for foreign investors; they can point to the establishment of a Saudi-owned Islamic Bank. But there are not yet many takers. That is one of the reasons for proclaiming independence. They are hoping for early recognition from four Muslim states – Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia. If they get it they can see Famagusta taking off.

But at the same moment the dependence on Turkey is very great. In 1983 the Turkish lira became the official currency of North Cyprus confirming the area's reliance on Turkey's rocky economy, resulting in a three-figure rate of inflation in 1970, descending to 24% by the end of 1983. Turkey pays for about two-thirds of the total budget, including virtually the whole of the development budget and over half of the operating budget. Exports, mainly oranges and lemons – Britain being the best customer – have since 1980 covered an increasingly smaller proportion of imports (only 33% in 1982). Tourism has to try to fill the gap but the large numbers of Turks who came at first from the mainland to spend their holidays in North Cyprus have been dropping off, though the gradual increase in non-Turkish tourists has begun to compensate. Off season, despite the mild climate, North Cyprus can seem a very dead place indeed. And the necessity to bring in every tourist by Turkish airlines has in practice ruled out cheap charter flights from West European capitals.

Clearly much of the employment is, in effect, seasonal. One estimate of the comparative incomes north and south of the Green Line that was made for 1981 puts per capita income for the Turkish Cypriots at \$1100 and for Greek Cypriots at \$4400. The Turkish Cypriot authorities tell potential investors in the *Investors Guide* for December 1983 that 'Skilled or unskilled labour are always available with very low wages. The minimum wage at present is £70 sterling per month plus 15% social benefits'. That wage is little more than enough to pay a month's rent for married quarters. But some Turkish Cypriots are clearly making money. Some of the neatly painted shop fronts in Kyrenia and Turkish Nicosia reveal shelves lined with videos and other electronic goods from the Far East to tempt the Turkish 'baggage tourist' from the mainland. To those with the flair and connections to see that there was a market which would attract people to Cyprus who were starved of such goods at home have gone the rewards.

Varosha, a southern suburb of Famagusta, presents a remarkable spectacle: a long row of skyscraper hotels (located rather too close to the waterline, one would think, for sunbathing) totally empty and abandoned. Though they are on the Turkish Cypriot side of the line, the Turkish Cypriots have never felt that they could run them. They are fenced off from the rest of the town though that does not

restrain visits from the giant rats which inhabit them. Denktas has always intended to use Varosha as a bargaining chip with the Greek Cypriots; an agreement that Greek owners and staff could come back and open up Varosha for tourism (after spending the large sums that will be required by now for putting the buildings in order) in advance of a final settlement being reached has several times been offered. But the Greek Cypriots have always complained that the offer has been surrounded by impossible conditions. Ten years have passed and the empty line of luxury hotels moulders away.

Multiparty politics in Cyprus: (a) Greek style

Multiparty politics in both Greek and Turkish Cyprus have shared three characteristics: they both started with an emphasis on unity; in both they went on to an extreme clash of political philosophies which is reflected in minor differences of policy and in both there are regular expressions of the priority of the 'Cyprus problem', a priority that is not wholly observed.

Greek Cypriot politics was specially affected by their first leader being an Archbishop who belonged to no party and by the previous existence and organizational strength of a communist party, AKEL, with close associations with the main trade union movement. Throughout this story it needs to be borne in mind that everyone concerned was acting in awareness that the Cypriot Communists could command the steady support of about a third of the Greek Cypriot people and sometimes more. The Turks talked about the danger of a Mediterranean Castro; the Americans would undoubtedly have felt easier could Greece and Turkey between them have found a way of eliminating altogether an entity which was non-aligned and had such a large communist vote. Moreover AKEL, under its longtime leaders Ezekias Papaioannou and Andreas Zartides, has been among the most loyal supporter of the Moscow line outside the Soviet bloc. There is no hint of Eurocommunism there.

In the 1950s AKEL was both banned by the British and terrorized by EOKA because it had provoked Grivas's dangerous wrath. Makarios by contrast did not lose contact with the communists, who got five of the 35 Greek seats in the first House of Representatives, which were otherwise bestowed on Makarios's various followers, loosely grouped in a Patriotic Front. There was no further election until 1970 when AKEL decided to fight nine seats, almost certainly a deliberate underestimation of its optimum strength, and won all nine, with an average vote per candidate greatly in excess of others in the field. Wherefore this modesty? The answer must lie in Moscow's policy priorities. Makarios was keeping Cyprus non-aligned and was blocking NATO's diplomatic initiatives. A communist victory or near-victory would have attracted undesirable attention. AKEL's policy towards the Turkish Cypriots has always been a conciliatory one, springing from colonial days when the communist-led PanCyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) had at least 4000 Turkish members. After 1974 both party and union have preserved such contacts, for example at international conferences, as seemed possible.

The election of 1976 followed the final break between Glafkos Clerides – hitherto the second man in the Republic and invariable Greek Cypriot interlocutor in intercommunal talks – and the President-Archbishop. It brought out the issues which operate still. Clerides and his new Conservative party, the Democratic Rally, were firmly pro-western and anti-communist. He argued that an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots was the only practical way of getting any of the refugees back to their homes and that such an agreement had been possible in the past and might well be so again. Most of Archbishop Makarios's associates joined together in a party headed by the former Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou. Kyprianou's thesis was that the Cyprus problem should be internationalized, that the main emphasis should be placed not on talking to Denktas but on building up the moral and legal case against Turkish aggression and occupation on all international fronts. The struggle, they said, might be a long one but piling on the economic and diplomatic pressure was the way to get results. Clerides's technique had been too much one of offering concessions and not getting any real return (and indeed inviting rebuff as had happened on a recent occasion when Clerides had shown, without authorization, a draft Greek Cypriot proposal to Denktas in advance). There should be no leaning towards the West; non-aligned or Eastern help were all welcome. Clerides tended to be

rather dismissive of the accumulation of favourable UN and other resolutions; but he was politically damaged by having accepted into his new party some former members of 'EOKA B' since the bitterness between Greek Cypriots which this movement has generated was lasting.

Greek Cyprus still operated the first-past-the-post system in multi-member constituencies. Three parties – Kyprianou's DS the communist AKEL and the small middle-class socialist party EDEK led by Dr Vassos Lyssarides – linked arms to shut out Clerides, which they very effectively did since he got no seats for 25% of the vote. The system having been changed for one of reinforced proportional representation, the same protagonists confronted each other under different ground rules with much the same arguments for the 1981 election. The big difference was that Makarios was dead and Kyprianou was President. This time AKEL and Clerides's Rally fought each other to a stand off, each getting 12 seats. Kyprianou's Democratic Party (DIKO) came third, with eight seats, and Lyssarides's EDEK fourth with three.

This appeared to place Kyprianou in a weak position for the approaching Presidential election of 1983 especially because of a rift between him and AKEL, which withdrew its support from the Government because it had lost confidence in the President's handling of the Cypriot problem. In practice the views of Clerides and of AKEL, at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, seem remarkably similar on the issue which is supposed to have priority. But when it comes to the point AKEL could not take any course that would contribute to the election of a pro-NATO presidential candidate like Glafkos Clerides. Consequently it announced well in advance its endorsement of Kyprianou, whose re-election, when in due course it came, was thus entirely thanks to the communist vote. This caused considerable irritation in Athens, but not because the pro-NATO candidate was now going to be defeated. This, on the contrary, would have pleased Andreas Papandreou, who had now become the left-wing anti-NATO Prime Minister of Greece. But he was very much opposed to AKEL's dovish attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots, which he feared might now direct Kyprianou's strategy.

It must be said that, so far, Papandreou seems to have worried unduly. AKEL appears to have got very little in return for its indispensable electoral support. The free market economy, of course, is untouched but although the communists say they are happy with Kyprianou's performance on domestic issues – there has been some progressive social legislation – on the conduct of negotiations they appeared throughout 1983 and at least until the framework proposals of January 1984 to have got no satisfaction whatever. Since, however, the system is a presidential one the initiative remains substantially in the hands of Spyros Kyprianou.

Multiparty politics in Cyprus: (b) Turkish style

By the time that the Turkish Cypriots had decided to hold elections on 5 July 1970 to coincide with the Greek Cypriot elections to the House of Representatives, Rauf Denktas had established himself as the outstanding personality and natural leader of the community. At that stage he was opposed to party politics; and it was not until December of the same year that even a marxist opposition party was formed, the Republican Turkish Party. Parties were not encouraged until after the proclamation in 1975 of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris. The constitution that was adopted provided for both a President and a Prime Minister; the President's powers were not extensive but that has not prevented Rauf Denktas remaining the dominating personality under that title.

Denktas was first elected in 1976 by a vote of 76.6 per cent from an electorate which in total size resembled that of a single British constituency. The conservative National Unity Party (NUP) which drew together Denktas's companions in the leadership of the struggle, dominated the first 40-member Assembly. However there was not too much unity in the National Unity Party. There were many resignations from office and from party, and two changes of government. The economy was not flourishing after the first two or three years – the projected 7% annual growth rate assumed for the first Five Year Development Plan had been not remotely approached – and there were many conflicts between the old guard of the NUP and young graduates back from Turkey, including Rauf Denktas's son Raif. The principal opposition parties were both left wing – the Communal Liberation Party of Alpay Durduran and the

Republican Turkish party. Before the elections of 1981 young Raif Denктаş tried but failed to get an 'alternative list' of candidates adopted by the NUP who would be a contrast to what he regarded as old style patronage and clientage.

The election campaign was fought at a worrying period economically. The opposition parties argued that Rauf Denктаş should not get away with blaming all failures on the 'Greek-Cypriot economic embargo'; North Cyprus would have done better if there had not been false priorities in the use of scarce foreign exchange for the benefit of a few local capitalists. Both left-wing parties advocated greater flexibility in negotiating with the Greeks. Durduran in particular wanted interim measures of North-South détente such as harmonization of investment policies, regular trading relations and joint activities by professional bodies, to smooth the way for a settlement. In the result Denктаş himself just managed to retain an overall majority, being re-elected by a vote of 51.7%. But the NUP did not. In the new Assembly it faced, with 18 seats, one left-wing opponent – Durduran's CLP – with 13 seats plus the other – the RTP – with six. It was a hung parliament with two minor parties holding the balance. There was great difficulty in forming a stable administration and in December 1981 a motion of no confidence was carried in the NUP Government. But in the end Denктаş avoided having to call the left to office. His son, Raif Denктаş, with a group of contemporaries, formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) at the end of 1982, arguing that the Government should cut down the underemployed bureaucracy and allocate many more resources to investment in the manufacturing sector. He thinks the economy is developing on unsound lines and wants to avoid the leftists having a monopoly of this criticism. His party has also proposed a Constituent Assembly (25 politicians from each side of the line) to meet in public in the Ledra Palace Hotel, which is in the UN buffer zone, to debate the form of the future Federal Republic.

For a full year before the 'declaration of independence' of North Cyprus on 15 November 1983 the senior Denктаş had been talking about the merits of such action and opposition members had been mocking him on the grounds that he was a prisoner of Turkey which would never let him do it. Thus when he finally did it the ground was swept out from under the opposition's feet; the Assembly, confronted without notice with the proposition of 'independence' endorsed it unanimously. Denктаş, taking the view that once this vote was taken the existing constitution was no more, rushed through a measure, without the two-thirds majority or the popular referendum required, by which the awkward 40-member Assembly was instantly increased by 30 seats and called a Constituent Assembly. Twenty of these new seats have been filled by nominees of various organizations and ten by Denктаş himself. Among the constitutional provisions rendered inoperable in this fashion is the one that limits a President to two consecutive terms. Denктаş appointed a non-party Prime Minister and, distancing himself still further from the NUP, announced that he would run for the new Presidency as an Independent.

International consequences (1974-84)

Greeks and Greek Cypriots drew some lessons from their traumatic experience in 1974. The first was to blame the United States, on whom they both had relied to save them in the final analysis, from the Turks ever turning threats into reality. There were anti-American riots in Nicosia on 19 August in the course of which the new American Ambassador was killed. In Greece Karamanlis, whose initial instinct during the fighting had been to send in Greek troops and had even asked Britain fruitlessly to protect the convoy that would carry them, had been compelled by his military – themselves sulking after their political overthrow – to abandon any such idea.²⁷ He therefore pulled Greece out of the integrated NATO command, though not out of the alliance itself. Henry Kissinger was accused of having first supported the junta in power and then having 'tilted' in favour of the Turks during the actual clash by refraining from addressing them in the harsh manner that Lyndon Johnson had in 1967. It was argued that Turkey would never have had the strength and capacity to invade if it had not been for the large supply of American weapons that were intended for deterrence against the Soviet Union. On these grounds the American Congress, which was at that time exploiting the

weakness of the Presidency immediately after Watergate, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. The sponsors hoped to influence the course of subsequent negotiations. But the ban was lifted partially in October 1975 and totally repealed in September 1978.²⁸

Internationally the Cyprus issue has continued to be dealt with at several levels. At the level of United Nations debates and Non-Aligned Summit meetings Greece and the Cyprus Government could now count on receiving either unanimity or overwhelming majorities in favour of resolutions calling on 'foreign armed forces' and 'foreign military personnel' to leave and all refugees to be allowed to return to their homes in safety. At the NATO level the issue became even more complicated because Cyprus ceased to be alone in the dossier of grievances between Greece and Turkey arising from the Greek theory of a 'political continuum' between mainland Greece and her islands. The Greeks began actively promoting their case that Greek islands, including those close to Turkey's front doorstep, had claims to the continental shelf of the Aegean every bit as valid as those of the Greek mainland. This would Hellenize practically the whole shelf, with its potential for offshore oil, whereas the Turks wanted to split the shelf down the middle of the Aegean, which would have the effect of placing 130 inhabited Greek islands within a Turkish zone of exclusive economic rights. Likewise there were disputes over territorial limits and over the control of air space. As a direct consequence of events in Cyprus, the Greeks stationed troops on the Eastern Aegean islands that were labelled as demilitarized by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923), which the Greeks say was rendered obsolete by the subsequent Treaty of Montreux, and of Paris (1947) which concerned the Dodecanese. These are now confronted by the powerful Fourth Aegean Army which the Turks have massed on the mainland opposite, heavily equipped and trained in amphibious warfare²⁹. Thus, instead of Cyprus being an exception, though admittedly a very conspicuous and distressing one, to the general condition of Greco-Turkish friendship, it had now become one among a whole range of potential flashpoints of hostility between the two.

The Makarios-Denктаş guidelines

The chief lesson the Greek Cypriots learned domestically from the 1974 experience was that of geography: that the weight of neighbouring Turkey in their little island was inevitably going to be greater than they had hitherto blithely imagined. They did not come by this conclusion rapidly and may not yet have come to it sufficiently. There have, after all, been terrible experiences to absorb.

Glafkos Clerides tried to move fast while he was still Acting President. He declared in a speech in Nicosia on 6 November 1974 that Greek thinking had been based on 'false assumptions, terrible mistakes and illusions', the main one of which was 'that we could treat the Turkish Cypriot community as a simple minority without taking into account that it was backed by Turkey with a population of 33 million'³⁰. He openly acknowledged that it would be necessary to accept federation with the Turkish Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus on 7 December 1974 and immediately resumed the Presidency, declaring that Clerides had 'demonstrated an over-enthusiasm for making concessions'. The Turkish Cypriots then proclaimed 'the Turkish Federated State of Kibris' (Cyprus), of which Rauf Denктаş, who had all along been easily the ablest of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, was elected President. The theory was that this was a unit-in-waiting of a still-to-be-formed Federation and that in a just (to the Turks) world the universally recognized Government of Cyprus would have no higher status. Until November 1983 when the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their independence, they were not therefore in the business of seeking diplomatic recognition.

After several ineffective rounds of negotiations under UN auspices, Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denктаş met twice at UN headquarters in Nicosia in February 1977 and agreed on four guidelines for future negotiations that taken together represented a marked departure from previous Greek Cypriot positions. Makarios confirmed his acceptance of the idea of a Federal Republic, which should be independent, non-aligned (about which, interestingly enough, there seems by this time to have been no difficulty on either Cypriot side, Turkish or Greek) and bi-

communal. Secondly, he agreed to the proportions of territory 'under the administration of each community' being discussed 'in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership', rather than, inferentially, according to the population ratio. This suggested that it would be possible to arrive at boundary lines by objective criteria. The third point dealt with one of the main embarrassments that the Turks had about an agreement. They are a small and economically weak community. If a federation were to guarantee the full range of human rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration and the European Convention there was a distinct danger that Greek Cypriots using their freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to own property would swarm into the Turkish area and swamp it commercially and perhaps in actual numbers. The Archbishop now agreed that in discussing such freedoms they should bear in mind 'the fundamental tasks of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community'. The final point spoke of the powers and functions of the central federal government being such as to safeguard the unity of the country. This was no doubt meant as a reassuring point for the Greek Cypriots but did not conceal the fact that major concessions had been made.

It may be asked why, if so much had been granted by the Greek Cypriots in 1977, there is still no agreed constitution. One reason is, probably, that a few months after the agreement Makarios died of heart failure. At many points in the past he had been responsible for delays and ambiguity but he was still immensely popular and he had now put his entire reputation behind this new policy, against the advice of many of his leading associates including Spyros Kyprianou, who was to be his successor. He could, it has been thought, have carried public opinion with him when the scale of the price it was necessary to pay for peace became apparent. A second explanation, much favoured by many Greek Cypriots, would be that Denktas did not from the start want a settlement. He was, it is said, gradually getting his tiny kingdom into some shape, though still heavily subsidized by Turkey, and was not at all anxious to be swamped by Greeks.


Whatever the merits of that, a third reason is undoubtedly the fact that federation is not an easy form of government anyway and particularly not on a small island with half a million people, only two units, disputed boundaries and disproportionate numbers.

There are in fact no examples of successful two-unit federations, and a number of examples of failed ones, especially in the neighbouring Arab world. The slow motion negotiations that have followed since the 1977 agreement, with the parties being prompted and prodded into fresh encounters after considerable intervals mainly by the UN but sometimes by other powers, have been reminiscent of many other exchanges (for example, between Adoula of the Congo and Tshombe of Katanga) on the meaning of federation. One party, in this case the Greek Cypriots, who want a strong central government, accuse the other of producing a constitutional draft which is appropriate for a confederation and not a federation. The other party, who want a weak central government, reproach the first with seeking a unitary state and calling it a federation.

The Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement

Under the Greek Cypriot map of a federal Cyprus, the Turkish zone would shrink back to 20% of the island, from the 36% occupied by the Turkish Army – though to be sure Archbishop Makarios hinted that this could be expanded perhaps as high as 25% if other features of the settlement were satisfactorily arrived at. This, explained the Greek Cypriots, should contribute to the Turkish Cypriots' sense of security because the majority of the Greek refugees wanted to return to areas that in this scheme would fall on the Greek side of the proposed line. The remaining 50,000, even if they all went back, would not be a threat to the Turkish Cypriots' predominance in their zone. The Turkish Cypriots did not appreciate this reasoning. They protested that all that would be left to them would be the mountainous area of the Kyrenia range and the coastal strip running to the north of it, and that these would not meet the criteria in the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of economic viability, productivity and land ownership. Indeed when it came to the point – and Denktas continually found reasons for putting off the production of a Turkish map which was not finally presented till August 1981 – there were only comparatively modest corners of what the Turkish Army had acquired for them that the Turkish Cypriots did not find essential to meet these criteria³¹.

In his 'evaluation' made in 1981 of the intercommunal talks, UN Secretary-General Waldheim reflected wearily: 'The two sides'



III The territorial issue: the first proposals

estimates of natural resources, land ownership, infrastructure, percentage of land under each side's control, number of displaced persons, differ . . . consequently there is no easy basis for an objective suggestion.' This is borne out most dramatically by the rival claims on land ownership. According to Greek Cypriot figures, which are derived from the Land Registry, the Turks owned at most 16.8% of the land (that is less than their proportion of the population). According to Turkish Cypriot claims they owned 33.8%³². No working party has ever been set up from the two sides' experts attending the endless negotiations to resolve this astonishing gap.

Makarios's successor Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktaş, brought together by Waldheim in May 1979, reached a ten-point agreement which supplied the interlocutors with fresh opportunities for ill-feeling and deadlock. Talks were to be resumed on all territorial and constitutional questions on the basis of the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines and of the 'relevant UN resolutions on Cyprus'. But, it was said, 'priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, simultaneously with the beginning of talks on the wider agenda. After agreement on the tourist paradise of Varosha had been reached 'it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome' of the other discussions. Under the following point (Point 6), the two sides were to 'abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks' and they should especially take measures to promote confidence, goodwill and the return to normal conditions.

Since Varosha was to have 'priority', the Greek Cypriots expected rather naturally that it would be taken first. But the Turkish Cypriots held that everything had to be taken together and that it was quite inconsistent with Point 6 that the Greeks should persist with their economic blockade against the Turkish zone. When the UN had arranged for a regular rotation of topics at monthly meetings between four different items, the Turks came up with a suggestion about Varosha which was unacceptable. According to the Greek side this would offer access only to a narrow enclave on the coast, permit only a very limited number of refugees to return and subject them to Turkish border control and administrative veto. In effect they would be managing the resort, which the Turkish Cypriots were unable to do, for the economic benefit of the Turkish Cypriot zone.

On constitutional matters, too, the drafts presented by both sides disclosed that the extent of the gulf had been little altered by the acceptance of a federal republic. Greek proposals emphasized that the Republic was 'one and indivisible', that it should be 'a federation and not a confederation', that there should be complete freedom of movement, residence and right to own property; that the federal government should have overriding powers in the regulation of taxes and of the economy, that residual powers should be with the centre, and that participation in all federal organs should be proportionate to the ratio of population. In the Turkish Cypriot draft most of the realities of power are in the hands of the two federated states. In the light of Cyprus's recent history of mutual mistrust and the inherent difficulty of organizing a two-unit federation, the Turkish Cypriots say that the best way of avoiding deadlock is to start the federal institutions on a modest scale with room for evolution and transfer of additional powers and functions as trust and confidence are built up³³. The Turkish Cypriot emphasis is on the policy-making powers of the two federated states: even where functions are assigned to the centre they are usually to be carried out by 'co-ordinating' the activities of the states. Residual powers, almost needless to say, in the Turkish Cypriot document lie with the federated states. Whereas the Greek proposal provides for a presidential system at the federal level, the Turks want a Federal Council, with three Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, elected for a four-year term, and the Presidency of the Republic circulating every year, in the Swiss manner, among its members, thus ensuring that in half the years the Presidency should be Turkish. Both sides have now switched to the idea of a two-chamber legislature, but whereas in the Assembly proposed by the Turkish Cypriots the two federated states are represented equally in both chambers, in the Assembly favoured by the Greek Cypriots they are both represented proportionately. While the two proposals for the Federal list have a certain similarity at first glance the Turkish Cypriot proposal, for instance, after including customs and excise in the list, mentions that: 'Each Federated State will have the right to impose a tax in respect of any class of goods not originating in that State solely with a view to protecting its economy

within the Federal Economic Objective, that is the removal of the economic disparity and the maintenance of equilibrium between the Greek Federated State and the Turkish Federated State.' Finally, while both constitutional proposals contain guarantees of human rights, the critical rights of freedom of movement and settlement are in the Turkish draft made subject to legislation in each of the federated states.

In 1981 Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, produced an 'evaluation', disappointingly incomplete, of these depressingly divergent documents, and made some suggestions as to how nevertheless to proceed. For example, in the case of the federal legislature he suggested that the upper house should have ten members for each community and the lower house one member per 10,000 of the total population. There was no suggestion as to how deadlocks between them would be resolved. In addition to the four provinces, there should be a Federal District which would be the seat of government, and a special Development Fund should be set up for the Northern Province to enable it to catch up with the South. There were some other proposals into which he went in detail. But Waldheim was not pressing his luck too far, since a fairly lengthy list of the really sensitive points remained completely uncovered. He was concerned to persuade the sides to inch forward.

In 1983 the new Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, attempted to move forward by suggesting a set of options which he termed 'indicators', which the parties were invited to accept as a procedure for narrowing down the points of difference. In regard to territory, for example, it was suggested that the Turks should keep a minimum of 23% and a maximum of 30%. On the constitution, there should be a personal link between the federal government and the two provincial governments. Under the first option, a full presidential system, the President of the Republic would always be the president of the southern province (Greek) which would leave the Vice-President to be equally always the northern provincial president (Turk), in which case the members of the Council of Ministers would be in a 6:4 ratio. Under the second option, a President-cum-Prime Minister system, these two top executive posts should be held by the presidents of the two provinces in rotation (without it being yet said how frequently they were to rotate). Then with the Turk getting his turn in the Presidency, the proportion of Ministers was a shade more favourable to the Greeks, with a ratio of 7:3. The legislature should be as in the Waldheim evaluation, the only difference being that if there was no consensus about the lower house the ratio should be fixed at 7:3.

In subsequent weeks and months the parties have been circling round these indicators, sniffing them, holding consultations with constitutional advisers, with the two 'mother countries', with the UN secretariat. The (Greek) Cypriot Foreign Minister, Rolandis, felt a sense of urgency to reach a political solution, a sense that time was not on the Greek Cypriots' side and that if de Cuellar's initiative were to be allowed to run into the ground there would not be a second chance. 'How will the Cyprus problem be solved then?' he demanded in his letter of resignation to the President (Sept 1983) 'With wishes, with prayers, with resolutions? Or with definite partition (if not a worse outcome), all due to our omissions?'

The intercommunal talks had been in suspense since May 1983 because of the decision of the Greek Cypriots, very much in accordance with the strategy favoured by the Government in Athens under Papandreou, to rally the declaratory force of world opinion by seeking a new resolution endorsing many Greek Cypriot points in the UN General Assembly. It was carried on 13 May by 103 votes to 5, with 20 abstentions by, among others, the United States, Britain and six other members of the European Community. It dealt on a plane of international morality, of Turkish aggression and armed occupation, of the right of refugees to return. This so antagonized the Turks and Turkish Cypriots that it brought the already languishing negotiations between the parties to an end. Nevertheless, on Denktaş's initiative a summit meeting between himself and Kyprianou was being discussed 'for the purpose of clarifying the intentions' of both sides. Kyprianou was in no great hurry; he accepted for the following March (1984). Then on 15 November Rauf Denktaş and the Turkish Cypriot Assembly proclaimed the independence of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. Britain was quick to act as a guarantor power in bringing the move before the UN Security Council which on 18 November by 13 votes to 1 (Pakistan, with Jordan abstaining) said that the declaration was 'legally invalid' and should be withdrawn and that

no state should recognize the new entity. The Council did not however meet Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for sanctions against Turkey. So far Turkey and Turkey only has recognized the new 'Republic'.

Conclusions

At the time of writing (January 1984) the Cypriot scene is still dominated by the Denktas UDI, and by President Kyprianou's subsequent presentation to the UN of an (as yet unpublished) framework for a comprehensive settlement. Many Greeks have never thought that Denktas was serious in negotiating for a Federal Republic and many more are coming round to that view after UDI. It is argued that Denktas has always wanted to be president of his own statelet and that it can be shown that at each stage whenever a hopeful move was in the wind he regularly stepped up the ante. He himself says that he has learned from a lifetime of negotiation with Greek Cypriots the importance of a good fallback position, which independence now gives him.

Most people, including the opposition leaders in the north, suppose that Denktas must have obtained advance permission from Ankara. But he insists that he did not, that he had in fact had only recently received the latest of various messages from President Evren asking him not to do it. The timing was obviously determined by the approach of the handover to civilian administration in Ankara. As a *fait accompli* of the last days of military government it could be accepted without embarrassment by Turgut Ozal, the new Turkish Prime Minister. In any case the Turks did not seem put out. In his first speech as Prime Minister, Ozal referred to Cyprus by an old phrase as 'a dagger pointed at the belly of Turkey', suggesting that Turkey's traditional strategic anxieties are still paramount.

Rauf Denktas himself was in great form before the UN Security Council claiming that he had 'broken a vicious circle'; independence might bring federation nearer because it would have ended illusions. 'If we are talking federalism', he said when he offered to reopen talks, 'we are not counting heads; we are looking at how many units there are.' To which the Cypriot delegate replied: 'We cannot agree that 18%, the Turkish community, equals 82%, which is the number of the Greek Cypriots. This type of numerical equality strikes at the roots of democratic principle.' Stated like this the gulf seemed as wide as ever. But in his statement of 2 January Denktas again emerged as the advocate of gradualism. Various interim measures reappeared including the opening of Nicosia international airport and Greek Cypriot resettlement of the limited part of Varosha defined by the Turkish Cypriot map, but this time both under exclusively UN administration. Bracketed with this was the reasonable-sounding arrangement that the two sides should, 'refrain from hampering each other's interests' in all economic fields and should set up a joint technical body to 'share equitably' any international aid that might be forthcoming for Cyprus. By such 'goodwill measures', responded Kyprianou tartly on 12 January, the Turkish Cypriots would achieve in practice all the benefits accorded to an independent state; this would thus remove any inducement to solve the Cyprus problem.

Each side seems to have absorbed some of the ideas circulating within its own camp. Denktas, in his new position of being above party, talks the language of the opposition in proposing interim measures – joint cultural and sporting activities, a feasibility study for a joint university, plans for the teaching of Turkish and Greek as a second language and 'a seminar on federalism in general.' A joint commission should study cooperation in trade, tourism, the water supply. But he does not give the impression that he is in any hurry; he would obviously like some governments beside Turkey to recognise his new Republic before he engages in any major talks.

Kyprianou's proposals are said to be the most comprehensive yet, embodying the idea of compromise over both constitution and territory, with plans for the complete demilitarisation of the island and for assisting the north to catch up economically with the rest. The Turkish Cypriots would have to hand back the modern town of Famagusta (including the Varosha suburb) as well as Morphou, which until 1974 was almost entirely inhabited by Greeks but

where some thousands of Turkish families from the south of the island have been resettled. But their administration would be confirmed over 25 per cent of Cyprus (and there are possibly two or three more percentage points available for bargaining). In return for this shrinking of the land they at present hold courtesy of the Turkish army, the Turkish Cypriots would get much stronger provincial government and much weaker central government than the Greeks have previously contemplated. However, there is a bedrock of authority that the Greek Cypriots insist that any federal government must have. There is also a refusal to be trapped, as the Greeks see it, into adopting wholesale the constitutional vocabulary of the Turkish Cypriots who always seek by use of phrases like 'bizonality' and 'partnership' to import into the discussion of any topic the concept of the invariable equality of two numerically unequal communities. The Greek Cypriots are prepared to accept equal numbers on the Supreme Court and will probably do so for the upper house of the legislature. But they are not prepared to see this principle run throughout the federal institutions.

Apart from the central and indispensable bargain that any settlement would involve, the acceptance of very real sacrifice by the leaders, and painful explanations to make to their peoples, there would be a number of other points of considerable delicacy to be settled. There is room merely to mention three: *guarantees*, *Turkish immigrants* and *minority rights*. Are there, for example, to be any minorities in the two provinces? Or would the apartheid principle prevail? Rauf Denktas is liable to say that Greek Cypriots will be allowed in only 'under careful supervision' because of the bitterness of feeling of Turkish Cypriots towards, for example, ex-'EOKA B' men. But the problem is wider than that. There is a possibility of refugees coming back in large numbers and trying to claim their property. Turkish Cypriots say that restrictions would only apply to the first phase of the evolving federation while elements of mistrust and hostile suspicion exist on both sides and while the communities are still at different levels of economic and social development. This could be self-defeating: segregation does not sound like the quickest way to catch up, nor will it contribute to overcoming the sense of alienation between the two communities. Greek Cypriots are inclined to say rather stiffly that a European country, a member of the Council of Europe and an associate member of the EEC could scarcely operate under permanent laws that would be found illegal by the European Commission of Human Rights. It rather depends whether the Turkish Cypriots turn out to want only reserve powers for a short transitional period as some of them say they do, or whether they want to impose them wholesale and indefinitely.

Then there is the question of guarantees. The Turkish Cypriots have made it clear that they would expect the Treaties of Alliance and of Guarantee to continue under the new constitution whereas President Kyprianou has proposed complete demilitarization of the Republic – the Turkish Army to go first, then the complete disbandment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot Security Force, and then the international community to be ready to keep peacekeeping forces in the island indefinitely – and would certainly want to eliminate any Turkish excuse for coming in again. Finally the Greek Cypriots regard the Turkish colonists in the north as illegal immigrants, involved in the demographic changes denounced by the United Nations, whom they would wish to send packing to Anatolia. What is missing, moreover, from all this is any positive provisions for bringing Greek and Turkish political interests closer together so as to create a sense of political identity. One would hope for something in the final package that would encourage political candidates of one community to look to a certain extent for support from the other. There has been a singular lack of any cross-voting incentive in the history of Cyprus to date and there are systems from which it would be possible to borrow.

With this kind of agenda an early settlement will not be reached without intense effort and political will. Phobias will have to be overcome on both sides: there really is no real interest now on the Greek Cypriot side in *enosis* with Greece; nor is there much reason to think now of Turkey as an expansionist power. It is necessary to make use of the mounting feeling that time is running out, that as years pass and new generations grow up fewer people will have any personal experience of living with members of the other Cypriot community and that this would be bad for Cyprus.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ The Greek population at 442,138 was 77.1% when the 1960 census of the whole island was taken including the British population of 17,513. The Turks, 104,320, were 18.2%. The Armenians, Maronites and Latins who made up the remainder, chose to be treated politically as Greek.
- ² Duckworth, Rev. H.T.E. pp 8-9. The archiepiscopal title refers to the new town, Justinianopolis on the shores of the Hellespont, to which Emperor Justinian II compulsorily moved most of the Christians in Cyprus in 688. They soon returned to the island.
- ³ MRG previous report on Cyprus 1976, p 14.
- ⁴ Eden, Anthony, *Memoirs: Full circle*. Castell 1960 p 400.
- ⁵ Macmillan, Harold, *Tides of Fortune*. 1945-55. Macmillan 1969 p 672.
- ⁶ Melih, Esenbel, former Turkish Foreign Minister and former Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, interview in *Milliyet* 30 July 1983.
- ⁷ All told, during the Revolt, 504 people were killed in Cyprus on account of it – 278 Greeks, 142 British and 84 Turks.
- ⁸ Denктаş, Rauf R. 'Cevdet Sunay and Cyprus Turks.' *Belge* 14 June 1982.
- ⁹ Higgins, Rosalyn, *UN Peacekeeping Vol. IV* gives a brief but very helpful survey of the controversy on p 93 note 24. Also Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-67* pp 70-77.
- ¹⁰ UPI interview with Professor Forsthoff in Heidelberg 30 December 1963. Text in Alper Faik Genç, from *My 1974 Diary* p 16.
- ¹¹ Patrick, R.A., *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*, p 30.
- ¹² Sir A. Clarke having died without leaving memoirs, this strange incident will not be illuminated until his reports are available under the 30 year rule. Glafkos Clerides, who drafted the thirteen amendments, says that Makarios showed him the draft amended in Sir Arthur's handwriting and that later Sir Arthur told him (Clerides) that he had given advice as a personal friend.
- ¹³ Polyviou, P., *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation*, pp 32-34.
- ¹⁴ Patrick, op.cit. p 64.
- ¹⁵ Papandreou, Andreas, *Democracy at Gunpoint*. Andre Deutsch 1970, p 100.
- ¹⁶ Papandreou, op.cit. p 99.
- ¹⁷ Ball, George, *The Past Has Another Pattern*. Norton 1982, p 350.
- ¹⁸ Papandreou, op.cit. p 104.
- ¹⁹ Higgins, Rosalyn, op.cit. p 325.
- ²⁰ Patrick, op.cit. pp 86-87.
- ²¹ Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*. pp 116-120.
- ²² House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus, but see especially the minority views of Sir George Sinclair.
- ²³ Report of the European Commission of Human Rights. Cyprus against Turkey. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75. Council of Europe, 1976, passim but especially pp 110-119 (and also see the dissenting opinion of the Turkish member, pp 186-192.)
- ²⁴ *The Times* 23 July 1974, *New York Times*, 29 July 1974.
- ²⁵ Polyviou, op.cit. p 117. Interview with Clerides in Nicosia, December 1983.
- ²⁶ The 1982 estimate of Greek Cypriots is about 510,000.
- ²⁷ Woodhouse, C.M., *Karamanlis*, pp 217-220.
- ²⁸ Brademas, Ex-Congressman John, 'Remarks on the role of Congress in American Foreign Policy', in *Hellenic Review of International Relations*, 1982 p 82.
- ²⁹ Wilson, Andrew, *The Aegean Dispute*, passim.
- ³⁰ An underestimate even for 1974. A decade later the population of Turkey was 47 million with an army of 470,000, compared with Greece's population of 9,700,000 and army of 163,000.
- ³¹ Nedjatigil, Z.M., *The Cyprus Conflict* (2nd ed) pp 171-3. The author cites a Greek Cypriot view that the amount offered back amounted to '2.83 per cent of Cyprus territory plus the buffer zone representing 0.75 per cent of the Republic.'
- ³² The Turkish Cypriot figure is understood to derive from a claim to have owned 30 per cent of the land (itself 65 per cent of the total) which is arable and to be entitled (as co-founder of the original Republic) to a 50 per cent share of the remainder.
- ³³ Ertekün, N.M. *In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement*, pp 347-357, where the whole rationale of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position is set out in Appendix 49, the author's *Explanatory Note of the Turkish Cypriot Proposals*.
- ³⁴ Tornaritis, Criton, *Cyprus and its Constitutional and Legal Problems* (2nd ed), especially Appendices VIII, IX and X, pp 177-233. Nedjatigil op.cit. pp 165-173.

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KEITH KYLE, who formerly worked first for *The Economist* and then for BBC Television's current affairs programmes, reporting from the United States, the Middle East, Africa, the EEC and Ireland, is now on the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). He was in Cyprus twice in 1983, visiting both northern and southern areas.



The cover photograph shows Nicosia as a divided town today.



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¹The Internationalist; ²New Society; ³Times Lit. Supplement; ⁴Belfast Newsletter; ⁵Irish Post; ⁶International Affairs; ⁷Sunday Independent; ⁸Asian Review; ⁹The Friend; ¹⁰Afro-Asian Affairs; ¹¹E. African Standard; ¹²Sunday Times; ¹³New Community; ¹⁴The Times; ¹⁵Information; ¹⁶The Observer; ¹⁷Irving Horowitz; ¹⁸The Guardian; ¹⁹Peace News; ²⁰The Freethinker; ²¹The Spectator; ²²The Geographical Magazine; ²³New World; ²⁴Melbourne Age; ²⁵The Economist; ²⁶Neue Zürcher Zeitung; ²⁷Resurgence; ²⁸Feedback; ²⁹Time Out; ³⁰Evening Standard; ³¹Tribune of Australia; ³²The Scotsman; ³³The Financial Times; ³⁴New Statesman; ³⁵The Nation; ³⁶Bernard Levin; ³⁷BBC World Service; ³⁸International Herald Tribune; ³⁹Education; ⁴⁰Times Ed. Supp.; ⁴¹The Middle East; ⁴²City Limits; ⁴³South; ⁴⁴Choice; ⁴⁵S. Asia Research; ⁴⁶New African; ⁴⁷Voluntary Action; ⁴⁸India Weekly; ⁴⁹The Jerusalem Post; ⁵⁰Race Relations Abstracts; ⁵¹Third World Affairs; ⁵²Tarzie Vittachi; ⁵³Lord Lyell in House of Lords debate; ⁵⁴Workaway; ⁵⁵Prof. Lemarchand.

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