

Peoples under Threat 2016

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Over 20 years after the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, the *Peoples under Threat* index demonstrates both the improved capacity of the international community to predict mass killing and its inability to prevent it. Meanwhile, those facing ethnic, religious or political persecution in their home countries are acting with their feet. The United Nations (UN) refugee agency's 'population of concern', which includes refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs), rose to nearly 60 million last year, having tripled in the past decade.

The *Peoples under Threat* index identifies those country situations around the world where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing or systematic violent repression. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources (see box), *Peoples under Threat* has been compiled every year since 2005 to provide early warning of potential future mass atrocities.

Last year, *Peoples under Threat* highlighted 17 situations with pressing risks, comprising states either at the top of the index or those rising swiftly up it. It is estimated that those accounted for the vast majority of civilians subsequently killed last year – and for over three-quarters of the global refugee population.

Rising threats

The global refugee crisis in 2015 was a direct manifestation of the persecution faced by communities in those states at the top of the *Peoples under Threat* table. That the crisis is far from over is indicated by rising threats in an expanding range of countries in 2016.

Some of the most vulnerable communities are those newly displaced, whose precarious situation is exacerbated by lack of basic services or protection. In Iraq, for example, the population of IDPs has now exceeded 3.3 million, including a large proportion of religious minorities, but the UN's humanitarian response plan is less than one-quarter funded. South Sudan has over 1.6 million IDP victims of a devastating ethnic war, but just over a quarter of the funding required for the crisis response plan has been received. Jordan has warned that the massive Zaatari refugee camp near the Syrian border is unsustainable, and Kenyan authorities are threatening to close down

Dadaab camp near the Somali border, the largest refugee camp in the world with a population of some 330,000, including a high proportion of Somalian minority Bantu.

The international failure to address these situations makes further mass population movements inevitable. Meanwhile, the situation in the two most significant refugee embarkation points for Europe, Libya and Turkey, is rapidly deteriorating.

The Middle East and Africa again dominate the list of states that have risen most prominently in the table this year, but the spread of peoples under threat is expanding, both as the conflicts involving Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) affect more states and as the risk of reactivating old conflicts increases. ISIS affiliates (not including Boko Haram) are now active in some 15 countries from Algeria to the Philippines. In most states ISIS-affiliated forces remain small or their connection to the self-declared ISIS caliphate is tenuous. In many cases, pledging allegiance is effectively a re-branding exercise by existing militant groups attracted by ISIS' profile and international support network. Given the limited capacity of many of the armed groups concerned, their survival typically depends on extortion and smuggling activities, and on the classic asymmetrical strategy of provoking a disproportionate response from the state. For the general population, and particularly religious and ethnic communities, the risk of mass abuses needs to be understood not just in terms of atrocities perpetrated by extremist opposition groups but also the violent reaction by government forces. The wider threat, then, derives both from the reactivation of a series of dormant grievances and highly disparate struggles, and from the potentially disproportionate response of the state. Both these factors are central to the situation in a number of major risers in the index this year.

Despite successes in pushing back ISIS and regaining territory in the centre and west of the country, **Iraq** has climbed again in the *Peoples under Threat* table to be this year's most prominent riser. Two specific threats in 2016 face a population already exhibiting a high level of vulnerability, with over 3.3 million IDPs and more than 8 million requiring humanitarian assistance. A long-planned assault on Iraq's

Major risers since 2015

Rank	Rise in rank	Country	Groups	Total
3	+2	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaean, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	20.92
6	+3	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	20.13
12	+5	Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	17.39
15	+6	Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	15.05
18	+2	Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'í; Nubians, Bedouin	13.83
22	+2	Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	13.55
23	+3	Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	13.07
27	+7	Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	12.24
32	+12	North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	11.61
34	+18	Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	11.58
38	+10	Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	10.73
39	+7	Azerbaijan	Armenians	10.71
43	+10	Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners	10.47
53	New entry	El Salvador	Political/social targets	9.98
66	New entry	Mozambique	Northerners	8.93

second city of Mosul, an ISIS stronghold, may create a further 500,000 to 1 million IDPs. Other recent battles over urban centres in Iraq have seen escalating violence from ISIS in an attempt to retain control and high civilian casualty rates from indiscriminate bombardment by the Iraqi Security Forces. Second, the remobilization of the Shi'a militias, with both governmental and religious backing, and the return of Moqtada Al-Sadr to the national political stage, have made further sectarian violence almost inevitable.

The fact that **South Sudan** has climbed further in the critical reaches of the *Peoples under Threat* table, despite another peace agreement concluded in August, demonstrates the lack of good faith exhibited by both the main parties to the conflict, destabilization by neighbouring Sudan and the ethnic character of the violence. Tens of thousands are believed to have been killed since the dispute began between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar, pitching their respective Dinka and Nuer communities against each other, but the fact that there is not even a proper accounting of the dead is an indication of how bad things have become. The conflict has left a quarter of the population

in acute food insecurity, with 40,000 facing starvation.

With two rival parliaments, an array of competing militias and tribal forces, and a rapidly expanding branch of ISIS, **Libya** shows few signs of escaping the mantle of a failed state, despite the agreement to establish a government of national unity. Both the ethnic cleansing perpetrated during the Libyan uprising in 2011 and more recent cases of religious persecution – including the extra-judicial execution of over 50 Christians in February and April 2015 – establishes a worrying track record. It is clear that the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya set two dangerous precedents for Libya's new rulers: refusing to account for civilian casualties and appearing to tolerate widespread militia abuses. Libya is one of the highest climbers in the *Peoples under Threat* index this year.

Ukraine has jumped another six places this year. Announcing the effective annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin professed great respect for people of all ethnic groups living in Crimea and committed to political and legislative action to restore the rights of Crimean Tatars

and 'clear their good name'. Two years later the Russian government suspended the Crimean Tatars' representative council on trumped up charges of extremism. But the instrumentalization of minority issues had the most devastating consequences in the east of Ukraine, where Russian-backed separatists are waging a war against Ukrainian government forces and paramilitaries that has resulted in over 2,500 civilian deaths (many of them from indiscriminate rocket attacks from both sides), caused over 2.5 million to flee their homes and laid waste to many urban centres in Donetsk and Luhansk.

The downing of a Russian passenger jet over Sinai in **Egypt** in October 2015 brought global attention to the local ISIS offshoot, formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. In fact, Ansar had been engaged in attacks against both Egyptian and Israeli targets since 2011, seeking to recruit North Sinai Bedouin embittered by poverty and marginalization. As President Sisi consolidates his hold on power, official harassment of journalists and human rights defenders has increased and accountability for the August 2013 killing in Cairo of over 1,000 Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators is off the agenda. There appear to be few constraints on the use of force in today's Egypt and the country moves two places up the index.

The demographic features **Burundi** shares with Rwanda, and its own terrible history of ethnic mass killing, led international observers to fear the worst last year when violence escalated in the run-up to presidential elections in July. Pierre Nkurunziza was re-elected with a disputed 69 per cent of the vote, but his move to continue in power for an unconstitutional third term brought angry protests. The situation is significantly different from Rwanda in 1994, not least because of the absence of a major armed insurgency. But over 250,000 have fled the country, targeted killings have been reported (including by government forces) and Burundi's nightmare is a return to the horrors of 1972 and 1993.

The re-election of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema in **Equatorial Guinea** in April 2016 with 94 per cent of the vote means that he is entering his 37th year in power, the longest period in power of any sitting head of state

worldwide. His grip on the country was aided by mass arrests of opposition activists before the election. But the slide in oil prices has hit the economy badly, unemployment is rising and Obiang and his family have been pursued in both the US and French courts for corruption. Obiang's coup in 1979 followed a period of mass bloodshed that resulted in over a quarter of the population fleeing their homes.

Algeria has risen seven places in the table this year, reflecting both communal conflict between Arab and Mozabite (Amazigh) communities in Ghardaia and continued clashes between the Algerian army and Islamist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jund al-Khalifa and other such groups evolved from a splinter faction of the old Groupe Islamique Armé, a principal in Algeria's civil war. They command little popular support, but the civil war was sufficiently recent (ending in 2002) and the violence sufficiently terrible (up to 150,000 deaths) that any indication of a return to the practices of the '*sale guerre*' is a potent threat. Armed Islamists based in Algeria claimed responsibility for the Bamako hotel attack in neighbouring Mali in November 2015.

As **North Korea** sinks further into international isolation, the risk to its people grows. The staging of nuclear tests and rising tensions with South Korea have captured the headlines, but the country remains remarkably opaque to external scrutiny. Comprehensive evidence is yet to emerge concerning the state of North Korea's people, including its many religious minorities, its impoverished rural population and the 100,000 detained in the prison camp system. China's increasingly critical relationship with Pyongyang boosts the potential for some form of change, but with it the risks.

The position of **Turkey** as the foremost host of refugees from the Syrian conflict – and venue for the first World Humanitarian Summit – has drawn international attention away from its own deadly civil war. Hostilities between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) escalated dramatically from mid 2015, triggered by devastating ISIS suicide bombings in Suruc and Ankara in which each side accused the other of being complicit. By the end of the year, Kurdish militants had declared

Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2016

Rank	Country	Group	Total
1	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	27.03
2	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	23.28
3	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	20.92
4	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	20.63
5	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	20.27
6	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	20.13
7	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	19.37
8	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	18.65
9	Burma/ Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingya, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	18.16
10	Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	18.02

autonomy in a number of districts in Sirnak, Mardin and Diyarbakir, and Turkish armed forces were subjecting Kurdish-majority towns to military assault with tanks, helicopters and fighter jets. Meanwhile the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which had fared well enough in June elections to deny the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) an absolute majority, was subjected to heavy repression, effectively denying much of Turkey's Kurdish population a democratic voice.

Political intimidation, including the imprisonment of human rights and opposition activists and tight controls on freedom of expression, continues in **Azerbaijan**. But the biggest risk for mass killing is the rising tension over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The rise in hostilities between Azerbaijani forces and Armenian-backed separatists in Karabakh in April 2016 led to the worst violence for 20 years.

El Salvador is a new entrant to the index at number 53. Because *Peoples under Threat* is

specifically designed to measure the threat of genocide or mass political killing, the indicators are slow to pick up the risk of violence from crime, even if it is extensive. But in the case of Mexico – which remains just outside the 70 states listed in the index – and El Salvador in particular, criminal violence has reached an unprecedented intensity. El Salvador suffered 6,000 murders last year, giving it the highest murder rate in the world. Although much of the violence is clearly drug and gang related, evidence of official complicity in the killing is now growing in both countries.

Sporadic violence after the RENAMO opposition rejected the result of the 2014 elections in **Mozambique** escalated in 2016 with armed attacks in provincial centres. RENAMO is not the military force it was during Mozambique's civil war, when it was backed by apartheid South Africa. But many communities in the north and centre of the country have long complained of marginalization. In April 2016 the

office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights raised the alarm about reported summary executions and other human rights violations by the Mozambican army, as well as abuses by RENAMO fighters. The worst violence has hit Tete province, but it is spreading.

Peoples at greatest risk

While a significant rise in the index provides early indication of threats in the future, the mass killing of civilians is already under way in the 13 states at the top of the table.

The agony of **Syria** goes on as a partial 'cessation of hostilities' agreed in February 2016 continues to break down. The formal entry into the conflict of the US and the international coalition against ISIS in September 2014, and of Russia a year later, have not brought a resolution any closer. Instead, deaths have escalated, passing a quarter of a million by August 2015. The vast majority of civilian casualties are caused not by ISIS but through indiscriminate bombardment by Syrian and Russian aircraft, including the continued use by the Syrian air force of barrel bombs in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 2139. Christians and other minorities, historically subject to repression under the Syrian government, now find themselves largely confined to government-held areas. Meanwhile, the Kurdish-held cantons in northern Syria, the closest to a functioning democracy the country possesses, are threatened by powerful enemies: to the south by ISIS and to the north by Turkey.

A new offensive by al-Shabaab rebels early in 2016, and the extension of attacks in Kenya, keep **Somalia** in second place in the table. Plans by the Kenya government to close down the huge Dadaab refugee camp near the Somali border place in question the safety of the camp's 330,000 residents, including a significant proportion from the Bantu minority. Meanwhile, Somali political leaders with UN backing have agreed plans for 2016 elections, not on the basis of universal suffrage but according to a power-sharing arrangement. Under the 4.5 formula, the main clan groupings divide representatives equally between them while the country's minorities together only have half a share, limited to some 11 per cent - long a source of concern for human rights activists, who argue that the actual

proportion of minorities in the population is far higher.

The government of **Sudan** has made waging war on its own people the defining feature of its approach to governance. For over three decades, first in what is now South Sudan, then in Darfur and more recently in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, Sudanese armed forces have perpetrated attacks on civilian targets. Opposition armed groups also continue to mount attacks, but such blatant official disregard for the principle of distinction is partly sustained and legitimated by an ideology of Arab superiority and an approach to African or 'black' tribes of barely concealed racism.

Fourteen years after the Sun City peace accords, the **Democratic Republic of Congo** appears to have settled into a permanent state of low-intensity conflict. Bloody clashes between Bantu militias and Batwa in Katanga, attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army in the far north, raids by rival Mai-Mai militias and rebels of the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) in the Kivus and the continued threat from former M23 rebels are just some of the factors that leave large parts of the Congolese population, particularly in the east, living in fear. Ethnic or tribal factors underpin many of the struggles, but they are also driven by local resource competition, cross-border conflicts and their own circular logic of violence.

The wholesale division of the **Central African Republic** along religious lines has seen a decrease in the worst of the violence between Christian 'anti-balaka' militias and Muslim ex-*Séléka* rebels. Muslim communities still living in the capital Bangui or in areas controlled by anti-*balaka* are largely confined to enclaves guarded by UN or French peacekeepers, who themselves face accusations of sexual abuse. Presidential elections passed off peacefully in early 2016 but land disputes between Muslim pastoralists and Christian farmers in the centre and north of the country will be challenging to resolve, as will claims for autonomy in the north-east.

Civilian casualties rose again in **Afghanistan** in 2015, according to the UN, with 3,545 killed and nearly 7,500 recorded injured. The Taliban and other opposition forces continue to be responsible for the majority of civilian

deaths (over 60 per cent) but civilian casualties attributable to pro-government forces are rising, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total killing. Most occurred in the context of ground engagements or aerial operations, including the US attack on a Médecins sans Frontières hospital in Kunduz in October 2015 which killed 42. (Despite the long-anticipated end of the NATO International Security Assistance Force mission at the close of 2014, some 22,000 US troops remained in the country, either under the terms of a bilateral security agreement or as part of the new NATO support mission). The Taliban insurgency has always been a movement with national political ambitions, but one rooted in Pashtun communities and with strong sectarian tendencies. In 2015 there was a rise in Taliban and ISIS attacks on Shi'a Hazara in central Afghanistan, in the context of land disputes between Sunni Kuchi pastoralists and Hazara.

Targeted attacks against Shi'a in **Pakistan** continue, not just in Baluchistan but across the country, although not at the rate of some previous years. For example, 43 Ismailis were killed in a bus attack in Karachi in May 2015. Demonstrations by both Shi'a and Christians against the government's failure to halt the attacks on their communities by Sunni extremist groups have brought limited results. Pashtun communities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain at risk from the continuing Taliban insurgency, both from military operations and from attacks on health workers. Meanwhile, conflict has also escalated in Baluchistan, with civilians killed by both Baluch rebels and by security forces.

With Aung San Suu Kyi now installed as *de facto* leader, democratic forces are in the ascendant in **Myanmar**. But the political struggle over national power has yet to deliver benefits to the third of the population that constitutes the country's minorities or ethnic nationalities. Armed conflict continues in Kachin and Shan states and neither the National League for Democracy nor Myanmar's generals appear prepared to take action against the violent Islamophobia preached by Buddhist politicians and activists. On the contrary, new laws

restricting freedom of religion were passed by the parliament, and international pressure to address the plight of the Muslim Rohingya was largely snubbed.

The weight of the indicators in the *Peoples under Threat* index assesses internal factors within a state conducive to mass killing. But in some states high in the table, one or more of the principal threats comes from abroad. This is the case with **Yemen**, where an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and supported by the US, UK and France, has launched intensive and often indiscriminate air strikes against urban centres controlled by al-Houthi rebels or forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Since his successor, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, fled the country in March 2015, over 3,000 civilians have been killed in the course of attacks by different parties to the conflict, including by the Houthis, ISIS and other rebel forces, or by Saudi Arabia and the international coalition. ■

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How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. This research enabled the identification of those preconditions that were most likely to lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide).

Minority Rights Group International has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat* is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing,

it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. Minority Rights Group International has identified those groups in each state which we believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank; conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the Center for Systemic Peace; data on the flight of refugees, internally displaced persons and other populations of concern from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the US State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides; and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2015. ■

Country	Group	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators			Total	
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law		J. OECD country risk classification
Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.6446	10.0	9.9	-1.800	-2.757	-1.339	7	27.03
Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1	0.2139	9.5	10.0	-2.134	-2.488	-2.389	7	23.28
Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.1232	10.0	9.6	-1.208	-2.472	-1.364	7	20.92
Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1	0.0765	9.7	9.8	-1.734	-2.356	-1.145	7	20.63
Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	4	2	1	0.1210	8.9	9.3	-1.162	-2.458	-1.534	7	20.27
South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1	0.2058	10.0	10.0	-1.520	-2.538	-1.800	7	20.13
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Barwa/Bambutu, other groups	4	2	1	0.0313	9.5	9.5	-1.312	-2.274	-1.430	7	19.37
Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1	0.0117	10.0	9.2	-0.742	-2.436	-0.780	7	18.65
Burma/ Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1	0.0165	9.7	8.3	-1.393	-1.063	-1.166	7	18.16
Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboom, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0	0.2050	9.6	10.0	-1.423	-2.673	-1.733	7	18.02
Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	5	2	0	0.0477	9.4	9.4	-1.336	-2.527	-1.171	7	18.02
Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	4	2	0	0.0708	7.8	9.1	-1.147	-2.324	-1.523	7	17.39
Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1	0.0092	9.9	9.8	-0.647	-2.106	-1.084	5	17.34
Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	1	1	0.0016	8.5	8.6	-1.256	-1.240	-0.420	7	15.91
Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	2	0	0.0384	7.0	8.0	-0.080	-1.929	-0.787	7	15.05
Iran	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'í, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomen	4	0	1	0.0016	8.5	9.4	-1.572	-0.908	-1.033	7	14.89
State of Palestine	Gazans, Bedouin	5	1	0	0.0224	9.7	8.1	-0.848	-1.986	-0.444	7	14.59
Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'í; Nubians, Bedouin	5	1	0	0.0003	8.7	9.0	-1.193	-1.582	-0.602	6	13.83
Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews	5	1	1	0.0007	9.3	8.1	-1.042	-0.840	-0.711	4	13.75
Mali	Tuareg, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	2	0	0.0165	7.6	4.9	-0.199	-1.738	-0.651	7	13.71
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, Europeans, political/social targets	2	0	1	0.0048	7.8	9.7	-1.277	-0.648	-1.422	7	13.69
Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Barwa	0	1	1	0.0433	8.0	7.9	-1.019	-0.894	-0.934	7	13.55

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Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1	0.0003	6.3	8.2	-1.981	-0.390	-1.403	7	13.07
Philippines	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1	0.0046	8.3	8.0	0.128	-0.703	-0.328	3	12.54
Lebanon	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0	0.0015	8.6	9.3	-0.417	-1.721	-0.759	7	12.52
Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	0	0	0.0062	8.2	9.5	-1.327	-1.533	-1.116	7	12.36
Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1	0.0002	8.2	7.7	-0.929	-1.171	-0.733	4	12.24
Sri Lanka	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1	0.0091	9.3	9.1	-0.718	-0.251	-0.150	6	12.03
China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	1	1	0.0002	8.3	7.2	-1.544	-0.463	-0.334	2	11.93
Eritrea	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	0	0	0	0.0849	6.1	8.1	-2.039	-0.759	-1.463	7	11.85
Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Basongora, Barwa	2	0	1	0.0050	8.7	8.9	-0.562	-0.929	-0.389	6	11.61
North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0	0.0001	6.3	8.5	-2.134	-1.093	-1.537	7	11.61
Colombia	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0	0.1425	8.0	7.6	-0.097	-1.121	-0.341	4	11.58
Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	2	0	0.0009	9.0	7.3	-0.322	-1.059	0.037	4	11.58
Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	2	0	1	0.0031	7.3	7.2	-1.138	-0.273	-1.097	5	11.08
Kenya	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo, Muslims, Turkana, Endorois, Masai, Ogiek, other indigenous groups	2	1	0	0.0003	9.0	8.9	-0.158	-1.269	-0.451	6	10.86
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1	0.0427	7.1	8.7	-0.093	-0.063	-0.204	7	10.80
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0	0.0005	7.3	8.1	-1.066	-0.825	-1.890	7	10.73
Azerbaijan	Armenians	4	0	0	0.0654	6.4	7.9	-1.439	-0.502	-0.607	5	10.71
Guinea	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0	0.0027	8.7	9.6	-0.891	-0.931	-1.376	7	10.65
Thailand	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern Hill Tribes	5	1	0	0.0000	8.5	10.0	-0.845	-0.908	-0.151	3	10.61
Tajikistan	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0	0.0002	7.3	8.4	-1.440	-0.678	-0.962	7	10.57
Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners	2	0	0	0.0042	8.1	9.1	-0.996	-0.945	-0.871	6	10.47
Kosovo	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0	0.0362	8.1	8.0	-0.229	-0.336	-0.480	7	10.47
Cote d'Ivoire	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	0	0	0.0049	8.7	9.1	-0.523	-1.014	-0.609	6	10.41
Cambodia	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1	0.0008	7.4	8.2	-1.082	-0.040	-0.925	6	10.41
Niger	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0	0.0061	7.5	8.9	-0.245	-1.267	-0.690	7	10.38
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks, Russians	2	0	0	0.0007	8.4	8.0	-0.533	-0.785	-0.936	7	10.37
Uzbekistan	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0	0.0002	7.6	8.8	-1.888	-0.232	-1.082	6	10.19
Djibouti	Afars	1	0	0	0.0016	6.6	7.3	-1.405	-0.717	-0.845	7	10.18

Country	Group	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators			Total	
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law		J. OECD country risk classification
Guinea Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0	0.0019	5.7	9.6	-1.040	-0.742	-1.357	7	10.08
Vietnam	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1	0.0034	6.5	6.9	-1.339	-0.003	-0.311	5	10.05
El Salvador	Political/social targets	0	2	1	0.0054	6.3	4.3	0.126	-0.149	-0.518	5	9.98
Rwanda	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1	0.0082	8.8	8.0	-1.126	-0.100	0.080	6	9.78
Haiti	Political/social targets	0	0	0	0.0080	6.7	9.1	-0.845	-0.611	-1.194	7	9.74
Laos	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0	0.0011	6.3	8.3	-1.650	0.460	-0.706	7	9.72
Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0	0.0003	7.1	7.8	-2.222	0.075	-1.331	6	9.71
Bangladesh	Ahmadiyya, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong Hill Tribes	3	0	0	0.0002	8.4	9.6	-0.472	-0.876	-0.720	5	9.70
Serbia	Bosniaks, Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma	2	0	1	0.0362	8.1	8.0	0.229	0.179	-0.158	6	9.55
Nepal	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, Janajati, linguistic minorities	2	0	0	0.0005	9.1	8.3	-0.443	-0.704	-0.677	6	9.48
Mauritania	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0	0.0101	6.9	8.8	-0.914	-0.581	-0.819	7	9.41
Moldova	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0	0.0011	6.5	7.8	-0.023	-0.101	-0.273	7	9.17
Georgia	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0	0.0699	7.8	9.1	0.226	-0.233	0.202	6	9.07
Belarus	Poles	0	0	0	0.0006	6.8	8.3	-1.446	0.124	-0.813	7	9.04
Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0	0.0041	6.6	6.7	-1.078	-0.289	-1.071	6	8.95
Mozambique	Northerners	2	0	0	0.0001	5.9	6.9	-0.227	-0.351	-0.840	7	8.93
India	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other Adivasis; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	1	0	0.0000	8.3	7.3	0.422	-0.961	-0.089	3	8.85
Indonesia	Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, religious minorities	4	0	1	0.0001	7.3	7.0	0.130	-0.369	-0.346	3	8.84
Guatemala	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1	0.0017	7.9	6.0	-0.370	-0.642	-0.986	4	8.83
Ecuador	Afro-descendants, Indigenous peoples	2	0	0	0.0004	7.8	8.2	-0.265	-0.010	-1.050	6	8.75

Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- Conflict indicators:** The base data used was from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2015, Heidelberg, HIIK, 2016), Minority Rights Group International, and the Center for Systemic Peace ('Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2014' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2015)). Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2015 were ranked on a scale of 0-5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed conflicts were

classified as 2=ongoing in late 2015; 1=emerging from conflict since 2011 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.

- Prior genocide or politicicide:** Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.
- Indicators of Flight and Group Division:** Data for the flight of refugees and IDPs comes from UN High Commissioner for Refugees, total population of concern by country of origin, Mid-Year Trends 2015, as a proportion of total country population at the same date (population figures from UN DESA. Group

division indicators are from the Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015.

- Democracy/Governance Indicators:** Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2015.
- OECD country risk classification:** Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2016.

Data for Kosovo include some indicators relating to Serbia. Data for the State of Palestine include some indicators

relating to both Israel/Palestine; data relating to Palestinian refugees include those under the UNHCR mandate only. Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an approximate equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:

$$(A/2) + (B \times 1.25) + (C \times 2) + (D \times 10) + (E + F) / 6 + (G + H + I) / -1 + (J \times 0.625)$$