

# Peoples under Threat 2015

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## Introduction

The 2015 release of the *Peoples under Threat* index marks the 10th year that Peoples under Threat has sought to identify those communities around the world that are most at risk of genocide, mass political killing or systematic violent repression.

A number of the countries which rose most sharply in the index last year, including Syria, Yemen and Ukraine, saw escalating violence over the course of 2014–15 and the killing, in total, of tens of thousands of civilians.

This year again the publication uses current indicators from authoritative sources to highlight where the risks are highest and where they have risen most significantly over the last year. It also provides an opportunity to review risk factors over the last decade and the predictive power of the index itself.

## Rising threats

The list of major risers in the *Peoples under Threat* index in 2015 features countries from every major world region except the Americas. Four out of ten are from the Arab world. Most of the civilian killing in the region is currently perpetrated by governments or government-backed forces, but the threat levels have also increased with the expansion of attacks attributed to the opposition extremist group *Da'ash* or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), including attacks in Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt and Libya.

With over 200,000 people now dead in the conflict and up to half of the population forced from their homes, the crisis in **Syria** continues to worsen. The situation has become highly fractured, with the military involvement of neighbouring states, foreign armed groups including ISIS and Lebanese Hezbollah, and US-led air strikes. The extreme sectarianism which characterizes ISIS and related jihadi groups, as well as the pro-government *Shabiha* militias, has now infected much of the country. Nearly all the remaining Christian communities in Syria live in enclaves in government-held areas. Only in the Kurdish-held regions of the north in al-Jazeera, Kobane and Afrin has there been a serious attempt at establishing an inclusive democracy.

Its fragility was demonstrated by a prolonged ISIS assault on Kobane in autumn 2014 that emptied the city and surrounding countryside of its inhabitants, until it was retaken by Kurdish and opposition forces in January 2015.

**Iraq** headed the table when the *Peoples under Threat* index was first published in 2006 and it has never been far from the top of the index in the intervening years, despite earnest protestations from the Iraqi government and its international partners that the security situation was coming under control. An increase in killings in 2013 was followed by a catastrophic upsurge in violence over the last year, with the advance of ISIS first into Anbar in western Iraq and then across Ninewa in the north. Over 14,000 civilians were killed in 2014, many of them in massacres perpetrated by ISIS as it expelled minority communities, including Chaldo-Assyrians, Shabak, Turkmen and Yezidis, from Mosul, Sinjar and the Ninewa plain. Thousands of Yezidi women and girls remain in ISIS captivity. The risk remains acute not just for minority groups and for Shi'a communities threatened by ISIS, but also for Sunnis at risk of retaliation from Iraqi Security Forces and allied Shi'a militias seeking to recapture territory.

Conflict in the **Central African Republic (CAR)** continued between the largely Muslim former *Séléka* rebels and anti-*balaka* militias comprised mainly of Christians. In the aftermath of the January ouster of the ex-*Séléka* from Bangui, the country's new interim government and African Union, European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) peacekeepers failed to quell the violence. While both sides have been accused of committing mass atrocities against civilians and reprisal attacks have been widespread, in the wake of an ex-*Séléka* withdrawal to the north and east of the country, members of the Muslim minority – regarded as *Séléka* sympathizers by virtue of their religion and language – have faced a violent campaign by Christian militias to extirpate them from the CAR. Upwards of 850,000 people – nearly one-fifth of the country's population – were refugees or internally displaced at the end of 2014, and many tens of thousands more fled their homes in the first months of 2015. With fighters on the ground still out of control, and without the backing of the transitional government, the

## Major Risers since 2014

Rank	Rise in rank since 2014	Country	Groups	Total
1	+2	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawis, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	24.95
4	+1	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	20.50
5	+1	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Fails Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	19.90
9	+3	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	18.37
10	+4	Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	18.35
16	+3	Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews	14.82
17	+8	Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	14.78
20	+3	Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'í; Nubians, Bedouin	13.76
21	+39	Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	13.70
29	+15	China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	12.21

UN, or France, a controversial peace agreement was signed in April 2015 between ex-*Séléka* and anti-*balaka* leaders in Nairobi.

**Egypt** rose another three places in the index this year. Former army chief Abdul Fattah el-Sisi became president in May 2014, leading to a further crackdown on opposition groups and human rights activists. Hundreds of sentences of death, or life imprisonment, were imposed on members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood. While under pressure from escalating military operations, Islamist militants based in North Sinai enlarged the scope and scale of their attacks against security personnel and other government targets, and in November pledged loyalty to ISIS. Ongoing fighting and toughening security measures have affected the lives of Sinai Bedouin, who have long suffered political and economic marginalization. Human rights activists also continued to criticize the government for doing too little to provide security for Coptic and other Christian communities, especially in Upper Egypt, where individuals, their homes and places of worship regularly came under attack.

The dominance of Middle Eastern and African states in the Peoples under Threat table this year was perhaps inevitable, but of equal concern is

the rise in risk in two of the world's major powers: China and Russia.

In **China**, there was a severe escalation in the tactics used by Uyghur militants seeking independence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Public train stations as well as police stations were targeted in attacks, including suicide bombings, both in Urumqi and also outside Xinjiang in Hunan, Yunnan and Guangdong. Hundreds of people were killed, many others detained in mass arrests and dozens of death sentences handed down. Little was done, however, to address the legacy of under-development and exclusion of Uyghur communities that lies behind the unrest, with the authorities placing further restrictions on association and religious activities during the last year. The government's strategy of labelling Uyghur human rights activists as terrorists has forestalled attempts to improve the situation.

The return of a more autocratic style of government in the **Russian Federation** is regularly denounced by President Putin's critics, and it coincides with rising xenophobia in Russian society against migrants, whether from abroad or from the Caucasus. But the threat is greatest in the North Caucasus itself, where

regular clashes continue between Russian forces and Islamist separatists in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and, particularly, Dagestan.

While the rising threat level in Russia has left minorities there living in fear, Russia's proxy war with **Ukraine** has seen whole communities in Donbas and other areas of eastern Ukraine sheltering in their basements or pushed from their homes. Some 2 million Ukrainians have now been displaced within the east or have fled to Russia, Belarus or Poland. Even in the heart of Europe, objective monitoring of the situation of populations on the ground has been submerged by waves of allegation and counter-claim issued by the different parties to the conflict. In Russian-annexed Crimea, the voices of human rights activists have been suppressed, including a prominent activist from the minority Tatars, who was prevented from testifying to the UN and the OSCE when he was attacked on the street and his documents stolen in September.

## Peoples at greatest risk

Although *Peoples under Threat* is designed to assess the risk or threat of future events, in those states that occupy the very top of the table, mass killing is already under way.

Ongoing armed conflict involving the extremist group al-Shabaab continues to secure the place of **Somalia** near the top of the *Peoples under Threat* table. Due to advances by the Somali National Army and the African Union mission AMISOM, throughout 2014 al-Shabaab lost much of the territory previously under its control. Still, particularly in South-Central Somalia, al-Shabaab persisted in launching numerous deadly assaults on AMISOM and Somali forces, as well as assassinations of political figures associated with the federal government and attacks on significant government buildings in Mogadishu and the compound housing AMISOM's headquarters. Severe political instability continues to exacerbate the vulnerability of minorities including Bantu and Benadiri.

In December the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court suspended investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur in **Sudan** in the face of inaction by the UN Security Council, which

had referred the situation to the Court back in 2005. It was symptomatic of a wider failure by the international community over Sudan, where hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed since 2003 in campaigns of repression by government-backed forces against insurgencies in Darfur and, more recently, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Government forces repeatedly targeted civilians over the last year, including bombing hospitals and schools, leaving thousands dead. The re-election of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2015 signalled a policy of no change. He won 94 per cent of the vote in an election boycotted by the main opposition parties and widely criticized as unfair.

In the **Democratic Republic of Congo**, a series of rapidly mutating conflicts involving local Mayi-Mayi militias, Ugandan and Rwandan rebels, and Katangan separatists, continued to claim hundreds of lives, even as limited progress was made in the demobilization of fighters of the former M23 rebellion. The UN mission MONUSCO continues to undertake operations in support of Congolese armed forces who themselves have repeatedly been accused of committing atrocities.

The contested outcome of the presidential election in **Afghanistan** in 2014 brought a period of worrying uncertainty and fears over ethnic politics, so it was with some relief in the international community that defeated candidate Abdullah Abdullah was appointed 'chief executive officer' in President Ashraf Ghani's new national unity government in September. Civilian casualties reached record levels in 2014, rising 22 per cent overall compared with the previous year and including nearly 3,700 deaths, according to the UN mission. NATO declared the end of its combat role in December 2014, but a new status of forces agreement, as well as a bilateral security agreement between the US and Afghanistan, mean that up to 18,000 foreign troops will stay. Fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces rose during the year, and the Taliban gained ground in parts of the country. Hazara continued to face targeted killings and the Taliban presence in peace talks has raised fears over what the future may hold for Afghanistan's minorities. In April 2015 ISIS was blamed for a suicide bomb attack on government

## Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2015

Rank	Country	Group	Total
1	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawis, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	24.95
2	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gaboye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	23.58
3	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	20.68
4	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	20.50
5	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	19.90
6	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	19.80
7	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadi, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	19.01
8	Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	18.40
9	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	18.37
10	Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	18.35
11	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	17.49
12	Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	17.33

staff and military personnel in Jalalabad.

Following the collapse of peace talks in **Pakistan**, the military intensified its offensive in June against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the country's north-west, where more than a million people were displaced during the year. Across the country religious extremism has grown while the situation faced by both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities has become more perilous, characterized by growing intolerance and hate crimes, as well as political and social marginalization. Extremist groups continue to perpetrate mass killings with apparent impunity: MRG reported in June that some 700 Shi'a had been killed over the previous year. Ahmadis and Hindus have also been targeted. The threat to Christians was underscored in March 2015 when a TTP splinter group bombed two churches in Lahore.

Multi-party elections in **Burma** scheduled for late 2015 have raised hopes, not least among supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, that the Burmese generals

will ease their grip on power. Members of the country's ethnic nationalities appear sceptical about whether this will actually happen, or whether it would make much difference if it did. After seven rounds of talks, a draft ceasefire agreement between the government and representatives of 16 ethnic armed groups was concluded in March 2015, even while conflict continued in Kachin state and martial law was declared over a new crisis in Kokang. Meanwhile, the Rohingya and other Muslims in Burma face continued violence from Buddhist nationalists.

### Predicting persecution: 10 years of *Peoples under Threat*

In one sense, the position of Syria at the head of the *Peoples under Threat* table this year does not tell us anything new. We already knew that things were very bad, and if the sectarian dimension to the conflict has grown over time, with Syria rising continuously in the index over the last four years

(see graph), it is still only one facet of a deadly combination of forces in the country.

The value of the index is clearer where significant rises in the index appear to anticipate episodes of mass killing, particularly if they provide a form of early warning that is otherwise absent in the international system. Sri Lanka, for example, rose sharply in the index in 2007 and continued to rise until 2009 when a bloodbath of Tamil civilians accompanied the final stages of the Sri Lankan government's war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

The year 2007 also witnessed a jump in the place of Pakistan in the index. Within a year, increased militancy in Pakistan's tribal areas (itself partly a response to US air strikes) led to the formation of the Pakistani Taliban. In Baluchistan, hundreds of political activists were forcibly disappeared in the course of 2008. The country has been found in the critical level of the index ever since.


The country that has climbed most consistently in the index over the past decade is **Yemen**. In 2014 the state fell apart. Having taken control of numerous cities including Sana'a by September, al-Houthi (Shi'a) rebels succeeded in deposing President Hadi's government. Fighting with

Sunni militias brought concerns of violence escalating along sectarian lines. March 2015 then saw the first major attack in Yemen by ISIS – suicide bombings of two Shi'a mosques in the capital. As Houthis engaged in fierce clashes with Hadi loyalists in Aden, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia launched country-wide air strikes on Houthi targets. Yemen's slide into humanitarian catastrophe continued with al-Qaida seizing the port city Mukalla in April.

The creation of the state of **South Sudan** in 2011 was marked by much celebration among the population as well as international human rights activists, but also by the new country's entry straight into the uppermost levels of the *Peoples under Threat* index. Two and half years after independence, a dispute between the president and his deputy triggered a spate of mass ethnic killing. Neither the threat of famine nor the imposition of US sanctions in 2014 brought a reconciliation between the mainly Dinka forces of the government of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the opposition forces, largely recruited from ethnic Nuer, of former Vice-President Riek Machar.

**Libya** is another case of a country whose rise in the *Peoples under Threat* index has at times

### Selected countries, 2006-2015



appeared to run against the grain of international public opinion. Libya re-entered the index in 2010, a year before the war that removed President Gaddafi from power, but then steadily rose in the table as Libya held its first democratic elections in 2012 and many international actors hailed a new era of democracy for the country. In fact the revolution had seen the expulsion from their homes of up to 1 million migrant workers and black Libyans in the context of public attacks on sub-Saharan Africans and the rise to power of unaccountable, and at times openly racist, armed militias. As Libya rises again in the index this year, these forces are now tearing the country apart in renewed civil war. In early 2015, a group pledging allegiance to ISIS publicized its mass

beheadings of Ethiopian and Egyptian Christians. It is feared that tens of thousands of refugees may die seeking to cross the Mediterranean from Libya to Europe unless EU search-and-rescue operations are restored. ■

*Additional research by Kara Chiuchiarelli and Umamah Basit*

**Visit [www.peoplesunderthreat.org](http://www.peoplesunderthreat.org) – a new online map presenting information from the *Peoples under Threat* index. View data by year or by country and links to reports, press releases and further information on the communities under threat.**

## **How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?**

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. This research enabled the identification of those preconditions that were most likely to lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide).

Minority Rights Group International has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat* is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not

all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including habituation to

illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. Minority Rights Group International has identified those groups in each state which we believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank; conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the Center for Systemic Peace; data on the flight of refugees, internally displaced persons and other populations of concern from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the US State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides; and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2015. ■



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**Case study** by *Mark Lattimer*  
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## Aleppo, Syria

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The general threat to civilian populations increases according to a known set of conflict- and governance-related indicators, but within the city environment risk levels are also affected by patterns of settlement and the structure of the urban space.

Aleppo is Syria's largest city and boasts a history of continuous civilization and cultural diversity going back thousands of years. Many Armenians who fled the Ottoman genocide during the First World War settled in Aleppo. By the turn of the last century, Sunni Arabs lived side by side with communities of Kurds, Christians, Alawis and Druze (although nearly all Syria's Jewish population had left in the decades following independence). When Aleppo was named Islamic cultural capital of the year in 2006 by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a Syrian official statement praised the city as 'an example of coexistence among religions, communities and races'.

Neighbourhoods of central Aleppo around the Citadel display a typical maze of unplanned and often very narrow streets, with high population density. At the start of the battle for Aleppo in July 2012, this helped the eastern part of the city fall quickly under rebel control and made it hard for government forces to retake. Heavy civilian casualties have been recorded in the attempt, including thousands killed by indiscriminate government shelling.

The situation as at March 2015 is shown in the map. Territory still controlled by the government extends in the shape of a claw from the south into central Aleppo, but is surrounded by opposition-held areas. The zones of greatest destruction are focused on the current and former frontlines and, in particular, the opposition strongholds of east-central Aleppo with mostly Sunni Arab neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, ISIS threatens along a separate wide front further east.

The precarious situation of the predominantly

Christian neighbourhoods of Azizieh, Siryan, Sulaimaniyah and Midan (numbered 1–4 on the map) can readily be appreciated from the geography. A relatively small change in the frontline could have catastrophic effects for the communities living there. Although there are Christian individuals who are prominent in both the Syrian government and in the opposition, Christians often state that they have not taken sides in the conflict. Nevertheless, their remaining communities in Syria, including in Aleppo, are now almost all located in government- or Kurdish-held areas. This has not protected them from bombings. But what the Christians fear most is the advance of ISIS.

The Kurdish enclave of Sheikh Maksoud is controlled by Kurdish forces. It has avoided being the target of government shelling and a truce has also been agreed with the opposition. This has led the neighbourhood to become a haven for thousands of IDPs, including Arabs from eastern Aleppo as well as Kurds. Humanitarian conditions within Sheikh Maksoud are difficult, however.

If political control in Aleppo city is finely balanced, it is also highly unstable. Given recent events, almost any change will result in threats to the population. In April 2015, rebel shelling of Sulaimaniyah led to dozens of reported deaths. The extremist group Jabhat al-Nusra attempted an incursion in Sheikh Maksoud in May. And in June, the UN special envoy for Syria condemned the death of at least 70 civilians from barrel bombs dropped by government helicopters in Aleppo, including on a market in the eastern neighbourhood of Al Shaar. ■



**Political Control and Destruction in Aleppo (March 2015)**

By Joana Dabaj

**Reference maps**  
 Archivilians, The Military Situation in Aleppo city, March 9, 2015  
 UNOSAT, Damage Assessment of Aleppo, June, 2014  
 Amnesty International, May 2013

Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
<b>Peoples under Threat 2015</b>				
Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawis, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1
Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gaboye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1
Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1
Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	4	2	1
Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Fails Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	5	2	1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Barwa/Bambutu, other groups	4	2	1
Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadiis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1
Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1
South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1
Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0
Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	5	2	0
Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1
Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	1	1
Israel/ Palestine	Palestinians in Gaza/West Bank, Israeli Palestinians, Bedouin	5	2	0
Iran	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'ís, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomen	4	0	1
Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews	5	2	1
Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	2	2	0
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, Europeans, political/social targets	2	0	1
Mali	Tuareg, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	2	0
Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'í; Nubians, Bedouin	5	1	0
Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	2	0

Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
0.4370	10.0	9.6	-1.773	-2.685	-1.477	7	24.95
0.2104	9.3	10.0	-2.190	-2.748	-2.443	7	23.58
0.0757	9.9	10.0	-1.775	-2.201	-1.252	7	20.68
0.1178	8.7	9.4	-1.288	-2.474	-1.671	7	20.50
0.0698	10.0	9.6	-1.096	-1.989	-1.471	7	19.90
0.0497	9.6	9.5	-1.467	-2.230	-1.549	7	19.80
0.0078	10.0	9.5	-0.831	-2.595	-0.879	7	19.01
0.0168	9.3	8.6	-1.497	-1.155	-1.220	7	18.40
0.1557	10.0	10.0	-1.407	-1.759	-1.440	7	18.37
0.2762	9.5	9.7	-1.529	-2.146	-1.834	7	18.35
0.0136	9.3	9.4	-1.353	-2.349	-1.159	7	17.49
0.0004	9.8	9.5	-0.744	-2.079	-1.158	5	17.33
0.0013	8.9	8.7	-1.293	-1.394	-0.622	7	16.38
0.0086	9.7	8.1	-0.869	-1.900	-0.440	7	15.63
0.0013	8.8	9.4	-1.600	-1.269	-0.983	7	15.28
0.0007	8.5	8.1	-1.013	-0.750	-0.784	4	14.82
0.0131	7.5	8.1	-0.996	-1.810	-1.363	7	14.78
0.0084	8.1	10.0	-1.386	-0.690	-1.568	7	14.12
0.0272	7.5	4.9	-0.302	-1.685	-0.750	7	13.95
0.0003	8.6	9.4	-1.040	-1.620	-0.602	6	13.76
0.0016	6.4	8.0	-0.326	-0.758	-0.825	7	13.70

Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
<b>Philippines</b>	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	1	0
<b>Burundi</b>	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1
<b>Lebanon</b>	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1
<b>Chad</b>	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	0	0
<b>China</b>	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	1	1
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	Uzbeks, Russians	2	1	0
<b>Thailand</b>	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern Hill Tribes	5	2	0
<b>Eritrea</b>	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	0	0	0
<b>Colombia</b>	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0
<b>Algeria</b>	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1
<b>Uganda</b>	Acholi, Karamojong, Basongora, Batwa	2	0	1
<b>Angola</b>	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	2	0	1
<b>Tajikistan</b>	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0
<b>Kenya</b>	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo, Muslims, Turkana, Endorois, Masai, Ogiek, other indigenous groups	2	1	0
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1
<b>Kosovo</b>	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0
<b>Bangladesh</b>	Ahmadis, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong Hill Tribes	3	0	0
<b>Guinea</b>	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0
<b>Guinea Bissau</b>	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0
<b>North Korea</b>	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0
<b>Rwanda</b>	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	Armenians	4	0	0
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0
<b>Venezuela</b>	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0

Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
0.0065	8.3	8.0	-0.012	-1.059	-0.427	3	13.16
0.0057	9.0	9.4	-0.768	-1.051	-0.932	7	13.00
0.0317	8.1	7.9	-0.965	-1.298	-1.062	7	12.68
0.0014	8.9	9.3	-0.441	-1.695	-0.776	7	12.58
0.0003	6.6	8.2	-1.962	0.081	-1.318	7	12.54
0.0085	9.3	9.4	-0.619	-0.606	-0.271	6	12.45
0.0054	8.5	9.8	-1.384	-1.101	-1.372	7	12.34
0.0002	8.6	7.2	-1.577	-0.546	-0.456	2	12.21
0.0007	8.2	8.0	-0.565	-0.910	-1.139	7	11.95
0.0000	8.0	9.5	-0.432	-1.322	-0.133	3	11.68
0.0547	6.4	8.1	-2.149	-0.776	-1.389	7	11.66
0.1249	7.7	7.7	-0.116	-1.269	-0.449	4	11.65
0.0002	7.9	7.3	-0.891	-1.170	-0.681	3	11.40
0.0016	8.3	8.9	-0.549	-0.841	-0.357	6	11.38
0.0039	7.1	7.2	-1.120	-0.372	-1.280	5	11.32
0.0002	7.0	8.4	-1.475	-1.137	-1.239	7	11.30
0.0002	9.3	9.3	-0.242	-1.148	-0.744	6	11.24
0.0429	7.4	8.7	-0.160	-0.366	-0.165	7	11.18
0.0311	8.0	8.0	-0.270	-0.985	-0.570	7	11.18
0.0002	8.7	9.3	-0.423	-1.613	-0.832	6	11.12
0.0023	8.4	9.6	-1.065	-1.226	-1.421	7	11.11
0.0015	6.0	9.6	-1.414	-0.932	-1.623	7	10.96
0.0001	6.6	8.2	-2.192	-0.530	-1.286	7	10.85
0.0082	8.5	8.2	-1.179	-0.084	-0.148	7	10.65
0.0653	6.7	7.9	-1.354	-0.410	-0.674	5	10.65
0.0002	7.4	8.8	-1.944	-0.549	-1.204	6	10.65
0.0004	6.8	7.7	-0.953	-1.077	-1.790	7	10.62

Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
<b>Djibouti</b>	Afars	3	0	0
<b>Cambodia</b>	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1
<b>Niger</b>	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	1	0
<b>Cameroon</b>	'Westerners', Southerners	2	0	0
<b>India</b>	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other Adivasis; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	2	0
<b>Nepal</b>	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, Janajati, linguistic minorities	2	0	0
<b>Laos</b>	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0
<b>Mauritania</b>	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0
<b>Vietnam</b>	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1
<b>Haiti</b>	Political/social targets	0	0	0
<b>Serbia</b>	Bosniaks, Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma	2	0	1
<b>Georgia</b>	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0
<b>Belarus</b>	Poles	0	0	0
<b>Indonesia</b>	Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, religious minorities	4	0	1
<b>Moldova</b>	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0
<b>Congo (Rep.)</b>	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0
<b>Guatemala</b>	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1
<b>Togo</b>	Ewe, Kabre	0	0	0
<b>Madagascar</b>	Côtier, Merina, Indians/Pakistanis	0	0	0
<b>Ecuador</b>	Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	0	0

## Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- Conflict indicators:* The base data used was Monty G Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946–2014' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2015) and, for self-determination conflicts, Monty G Marshall and Ted R Gurr, 'Peace and Conflict 2005' (CIDCM, University of Maryland, 2005) updated for 2014–5 using figures from Center for Systemic Peace, MRG and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2014, Heidelberg, HIIK, 2015).
- Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2015 were ranked on a scale of 0–5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed conflicts were classified as 2=ongoing in late 2014; 1=emerging from conflict since 2010 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.
- Prior genocide or politicide:* Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.
- Indicators of Flight and Group Division:* Data for the flight of refugees and IDPs comes from UN High Commissioner for Refugees, total population

Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
0.0013	6.4	7.6	-1.445	-0.119	-0.756	7	10.54
0.0009	7.3	8.6	-0.980	-0.156	-0.990	6	10.53
0.0020	7.5	8.9	-0.355	-1.296	-0.745	7	10.53
0.0010	9.0	7.3	-0.263	-1.195	0.080	4	10.36
0.0007	7.8	9.5	-1.042	-0.518	-1.046	6	10.25
0.0000	7.8	6.8	0.412	-1.187	-0.099	3	10.19
0.0004	9.0	8.3	-0.568	-1.141	-0.756	6	10.11
0.0011	6.0	8.3	-1.588	0.065	-0.769	7	10.06
0.0095	7.2	8.5	-0.931	-1.017	-0.947	7	9.98
0.0034	6.0	6.9	-1.336	0.224	-0.487	5	9.91
0.0075	7.0	9.1	-0.790	-0.663	-1.299	7	9.88
0.0311	8.0	8.0	0.286	-0.095	-0.343	6	9.88
0.0628	8.0	9.5	0.099	-0.464	-0.025	6	9.68
0.0002	6.9	7.8	-2.171	0.175	-1.360	6	9.56
0.0006	7.1	8.3	-1.539	-0.025	-0.889	7	9.40
0.0001	7.6	7.0	0.003	-0.500	-0.554	3	9.36
0.0009	6.2	7.8	-0.106	-0.034	-0.410	7	9.27
0.0033	6.3	6.7	-1.125	-0.466	-1.092	6	9.13
0.0010	7.6	6.0	-0.404	-0.695	-1.112	4	8.99
0.0017	4.8	7.6	-0.979	-0.427	-1.009	7	8.87
0.0000	4.9	7.6	-0.780	-0.714	-0.897	7	8.85
0.0002	7.5	8.2	-0.286	-0.195	-0.950	6	8.80

of concern by country of origin, Mid-Year Trends 2014, as a proportion of total country population at the same date (population figures from UN DESA). Group division indicators are from the Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

- *Democracy/Governance Indicators*: Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2014.
- *OECD country risk classification*: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2015.

Data for Kosovo include some indicators relating to Serbia. Where separate indicators are available for Israel and Palestine, the latter have been used.

Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an approximate equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:

$$(A/2) + (B \times 1.25) + (C \times 2) + (D \times 10) + (E+F)/6 + (G+H+I)/-1 + (J \times 0.625)$$