Uzbekistan

As President of Uzbekistan from 1989 until his death in 2016, Islam Karimov presided over widespread and systematic human rights violations and earned a reputation as one of the world’s most brutal rulers. Karimov’s authoritarian leadership, while purporting to protect minorities by ensuring peace and order, has produced a largely inhospitable environment for members of ethnic and religious minority groups. It was unclear how his death might alter the country’s human rights landscape over the long term, but indicators suggest that his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will continue many of his repressive practices, including the large-scale jailing of members of smaller religious groups. 

A few positive steps were taken by the new government, however. The Uzbek authorities announced during the autumn of 2017 that they had removed some 15,000 names from a ‘blacklist’ of 18,000 people suspected of belonging to banned or unregistered religious groups. Moreover, the government invited the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit in October 2017. The Special Rapporteur was the first representative of the UN Special Procedures to be granted access to Uzbekistan since 2002. He noted that religious observance is ‘subject to excessive regulations that prioritize security over freedom’, but the trip itself was nevertheless significant. Two other important steps were taken at the end of 2017: the time a person can be detained before being brought before a judge was lowered from 72 to 48 hours, and Mirziyoyev signed a decree in November 2017 explicitly banning the use of torture to extract confessions. These developments should however be viewed against Uzbekistan’s longstanding record of repression, and it remains to be seen to what extent real change for the country’s minorities will actually take place. 

Religion 

The Uzbek state restricts the public and private conduct of its citizens in ways that observers frequently say violate basic human rights. Many of these restrictions govern practices which the state sees as threatening tradition. Restrictions on religious practice are widely seen to be particularly intrusive and far-reaching. Along with requiring religious bodies to register according to a stringent procedure that is particularly onerous for smaller groups, the authorities are known to regularly harass, fine and mistreat members of non-Muslim minorities such as evangelical Christians and interfere with their religious practice. 

While Baptists, Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses are regularly among the believers subject to fines and jail time for their religious activity, the harshest punishments are faced by Muslims whose practices fall outside of state-mandated Sunni Hanafi teachings. Restrictions take many forms, from police ordering women wearing the hijab to remove their scarves or re-tie them at the back of their neck in keeping with more widespread Uzbek custom, to arrest and imprisonment. 

According to a 2016 estimate by the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Defenders, a prominent national NGO, over 12,000 people were currently in jail on dubious charges related to non-violent religious activities, with hundreds arrested in the previous 12 months. 

In 2016, when a new President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, came to power, he initiated reforms in the field of religion. The Cabinet of Ministers passed three decrees that supported secular education while also emphasizing the importance of religious tolerance in a secular society.  

A 2019 US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) report said that despite positive changes, in 2018, violations of religious freedom continued, including against Muslims. According to the USCIRF, about 15,000 names were removed from the government’s blacklist of alleged religious extremists, and 575 people were released, according to official figures. Still, by the end of 2017, thousands remained in custody on charges of religious extremism or for participating in banned religious groupings. ‘Of the prisoners who have been released under the administration of President Mirziyoyev, none of them have been rehabilitated for full reintegration into society, and the government has yet to provide a means for former prisoners to seek justice and exonerate their names,’ noted in the report. In 2018, the US State Department included Uzbekistan in the ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ list under the United States’ International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for systematic violation of religious freedom. 

In August 2020, the Uzbek authorities developed a draft update to the Law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations. They officially requested an opinion from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. In October 2020, the OSCE and the Venice Commission issued their joint opinion, stating that while the draft provided some improved protections, it ‘also maintains major restrictions and suffers from deficiencies incompatible with international human rights standards’. Nevertheless, due to the government’s efforts, Uzbekistan was removed from the US ‘Special Watch List’ for religious freedom violations in 2020.  

In July 2021, President Mirziyoyev signed the Law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations without incorporating many of the recommendations from international agencies to bring the Law into line with international standards. While the amended Law presented some improvements, including simplifying rules for registering religious organizations and lifting the ban on wearing religious clothing in public, it preserved many of the previous legislation’s most restrictive elements. The Law still severely limits the rights of all religious groups and facilitates government control of religious activity, including the majority Muslim community. In 2021, the government resumed many repressive practices against Muslim individuals and continued to imprison over 2,000 peaceful religious believers. 

Uzbekistan’s Shi’a Muslim minority also continued to endure difficulties. They were prohibited from possessing and publishing unapproved religious materials and remained unable to open mosques that had been shut down during the Soviet period. Finally, the Law retained broad prohibitions on unregistered religious activity, private religious education, missionary activity and proselytism. Members of minority religious communities, particularly ethnic Uzbeks who have converted to religions other than Islam, suffer continued discrimination from the majority Muslim population. At the same time, their own families put pressure on them to reject their new religion. Members of Christian religious groups are perceived as proselytizing and continue to face greater societal scrutiny and discrimination. 

In light of the negative trend in religious freedom in 2021, in its annual report, USCIRF recommended that the US Department of State place Uzbekistan again on its Special Watch List for ‘engaging in or tolerating severe religious freedom violations’. Although Uzbekistan has made some progress in furthering freedom of religion over the past years, any changes have not yielded significant results, and serious concerns remain. 

While the law provides for non-discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and national origin, officials reportedly reserve key positions in government and business for ethnic Uzbeks. Opportunities for ethnic minorities to study in their native languages have shrunk steadily since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, methods for remedial Uzbek-language instruction remain underdeveloped, leading to narrowed academic opportunities for non-native speakers of Uzbek, particularly ethnic Tajiks, to study in their native languages. Minority Tajik language and culture have also increasingly become casualties to the tensions between the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 

Karakalpakstan

The use of the Karakalpak language in Karakalpakstan is also reportedly decreasing, with concerns that Karakalpaks face increasing barriers to the practice of their traditional culture, livelihoods and way of life. The Aral Sea ecological crisis, along with state concerns about separatism – the region has produced several independence movements – both contribute to this. As a result of poorly conceived Soviet-era agricultural practices, some of which persist to this day, Uzbekistan’s portion of the sea has gone from being a drainage basin for the region’s largest rivers to a toxic desert. Fishing and cattle ranching, traditional sources of income for Karakalpaks as well as for members of other ethnic groups living alongside them, now range from unsafe or unprofitable to impossible. Meanwhile, the region sees few of the profits from the newly thriving oil and gas industries. Karakalpaks claim that key government posts in the province are dominated by ethnic Uzbeks, many of whom are from the national capital, Tashkent. 

In July 2022, the Uzbek government’s constitutional amendments that would have stripped Karakalpakstan of its autonomous status led to protests and unrest in the region. The President made concessions and left the Constitution unchanged regarding the legal status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan but warned that incitement to separatism would be punished in line with the current legislation.  

The authorities’ response to the protests led to international condemnation. Human Rights Watch called the government’s unlawful use of force against protesters ‘worrying’ and urged the Uzbek authorities to ‘adopt an approach that respects human rights’. The police used drone footage to identify those who participated in the protests, and mass detentions took place in Karakalpakstan. Most detainees were charged with ‘violation of the order of holding meetings, rallies, street marches or demonstrations’. Some detainees said they were beaten and humiliated (including on the basis of ethnicity) while in detention. 

The protests in Karakalpakstan were unusual for Uzbekistan. In fact, this was the first mass political protest in the country since the violence in Andijan in 2005. The authorities’ crackdown in Karakalpakstan appeared to be less severe than the Andijan massacre, but what happened leaves fears that President Mirziyoyev’s forward-leaning reform agenda is nothing more than a facade and that he can bring back his predecessor’s repressive policies anytime. It also demonstrates a disconnect between his government and the public.

History

Large groups of Turkic tribes started to move into this part of Central Asia following the Mongol invasions of the 13th century which saw the disappearance or absorption of many of the native Iranian peoples. Their language derived from Chagatai, an extinct Turkic language which acted for a time as a lingua franca in Central Asia. Other tribes arriving in the 15th and 16th centuries were to coalesce into what would become known as ‘Uzbeks’, forming for a while their own state (‘Uzbekistan’) which would break up into three parts and eventually be absorbed into the Russian empire during the mid to late 19th century when the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva became Russian protectorates in the period after the Tsar’s conquest of Tashkent in 1865. Few Russians settled in Uzbekistan during the Tsarist period, but many of the millions of Russians and Ukrainians who settled throughout Central Asia under the Soviet regime ended up in this country. 

Until 1924, most settled Turkic populations were known as Sarts by Russian authorities, and only those speaking Kipchak dialects were called ‘Uzbeks’. What are today the borders of modern Uzbekistan are for the most part the result of the creation in 1924 of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic which would become independent after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was also in 1924 that the Soviets abolished the term ‘Sart’ and that all of the settled Turkic speakers would be known as Uzbeks. 

Some of Uzbekistan’s minorities are from ethnic groups such as Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, and Crimean Tatars which were exiled here en masse under the directive of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin during World War II. 

During perestroika, Uzbekistan was a scene of serious inter-ethnic violence. In 1989 bloody clashes occurred between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana valley, and further interethnic tensions arose when fighting broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations of the Osh Oblast (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990. Border crossings were sealed to prevent up to 15,000 armed Uzbeks joining their co-nationals in Kyrgyzstan to retaliate. A state of emergency was declared in the Andijan oblast, bordering Osh in Kyrgyzstan. 

Uzbekistan declared independence on 31 August 1991. Islam Karimov, a former first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, was elected President. Russian-speaking minorities supported Karimov, seeing him as capable of restraining the nationalist opposition. However, Karimov’s rule became increasingly authoritarian. Minorities left Uzbekistan in very large numbers, partly as a consequence of the repressive regime of President Islam Karimov, but also because of the limited opportunities for minorities often linked to discriminatory practices by authorities in favour of the Uzbek majority. It is thought that throughout the 1990s between 85,000 and 150,000 people left Uzbekistan every year, almost entirely minorities: as a result, out of perhaps 600,000 Germans living in Uzbekistan, perhaps more than 95 per cent have emigrated. By some estimates, almost a million of the Russian-speaking minority had left the country by 2006. Part of these migratory trends were also connected to Russia’s relative economic prosperity and accessibility continuing to be a powerful magnet for many workers from Uzbekistan. 

The repressive regime took a particularly bloody turn in 2005 during and following the Andijan massacre. Hundreds of unarmed people protesting in the eastern city of Andijan, perhaps as many as 750, were killed on 13 May 2005 by Uzbek government forces. The protest started when a group of armed people freed a group of 23 local businessmen accused of Islamic extremism and took officials hostage in the local government building. The protest then grew into a rally of thousands of mostly unarmed people who voiced their anger against government corruption, repression and growing poverty in the region. The massacre led to widespread condemnations – including European Union sanctions in 2005 – though these still seem surprisingly muted given the massive numbers of unarmed civilians, including women and children, who were killed by security forces. 

The aftermath of the massacre saw further crackdowns on civil freedoms and in particular a tightening of the country’s repressive religion policy. In addition to members of the Tajik minority, many of whom were tagged as ‘fundamentalists’, religious minorities such as Hare Krishna, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Protestants in Karakalpakstan (where all activities of this latter minority have been banned) faced an increase in restrictions and prohibitions. 

Karimov’s rule continued until his death in 2016 and was characterized by severe human rights abuses, repression and limited civil freedoms, with particular implications for the country’s minorities. There has been little sign of improvement since his successor, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev, took power. 

Environment

The Republic of Uzbekistan borders Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the south-east, Turkmenistan to the south-west and Afghanistan to the south. North-western Uzbekistan consists of the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic (165,600 square kilometres), which includes part of the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan borders Kazakhstan to the north and west. 

Governance

The government of Uzbekistan is an authoritarian regime with one of the world’s worst human rights records. While there are in theory a series of provisions in the Constitution and other legislation guaranteeing human rights, the practice has been generally repressive towards opposition figures, the independent media and non-governmental organizations. 

Torture and other abuses appear widespread, and the government deals particularly severely with those whom it suspects are linked with the banned Party of Islamic Liberation (Hizb ut-Tahrir). It is in this context of control and oppression that minorities are also tightly controlled, with the state-directed Assembly of Peoples of Uzbekistan created at least partially for this purpose. 

Sokh is a small pocket of Uzbek territory almost completely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan’s Batken province in the Ferghana Valley. It is home to an estimated 60,000 people, with the vast majority belonging to ethnic Tajik and other minorities. Ethnic tensions have simmered in the small region amid border disputes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have a strong security presence and strict border checks. Territorial disputes have hampered local development and the region remains one of the poorest areas in Kyrgyzstan. The Sokh enclave has been targeted by the Uzbek authorities as a suspected breeding ground for Islamic extremism. As a result, large numbers of residents have emigrated, particularly to Russia. 

Uzbekistan introduced laws placing strict limitations on mosque activity and public displays of faith in 1998 and has been using the global war on terror as an alibi for wide-ranging religious repression since then. 

General

• Center for Studies on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
• Ezgulik Human Rights Society
• Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan

Koreans

• Association of Korean Cultural Centres

Meskhetian Turks

• ‘Vatan’ International Society of the Meskhetian Turks, Russian Federation

Jews

• National Coalition Supporting Eurasian Jewry
• Jewish Community Center and Jewish Community of Uzbekistan