

**Evaluation  
Of the  
Preventing Inter-Community  
Conflicts in East Africa:  
“A Foundation to Build On”**



*Commissioned by MRG*

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## 1. Acronyms

ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
AICM	African International Christian Ministry
AP	Administration Police (Kenya)
ATM	African Traditional Mechanism of Resolving Conflict
AYPI	African Youth Peace Initiatives
BCRD-Uganda	Biodiversity Conservation for Rural Development-Uganda
BCYA	Bor County Youth Association
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDRN	The Community Development Resource Network
CECORE	Center for Conflict Resolution
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CIWOCH	Centre for Indigenous Women and Children organisation
CODEF	Community Development and Empowerment Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DPC	District Peace Committee
EWC	Endorois Welfare Council
EWS	Early Warning System
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FIDO	Families in Development Organisation
IEC	Information Education Communication
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
KADDENET	Kasese District Development Network
KARMA	Kaputir Resources Management Association
LIHOCE	Living Hope Center
LOKADO	Lokichoggio, Oropoi & Kakuma Development Organization
MPIDO	Mukogodo Pastoralist Integrated Development Organization
MRG	Minority Rights Group
NAFODU	National Foundation For Democracy And Human Rights In Uganda
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NKIPA	Northern Kenya Indigenous Pastoralist Alliance
NPC	Nuer Peace Council
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management
NSCDA	Ngariam Sub-County Development Association
NZCCCT	Ndugu Zangu Christian Community Charitable Trust
PDA	Pibor Development Association
PMs	Peace Monitors
OPDP	Ogiek Peoples Development Program
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapon
SWEEDO	Samburu Women for Education & Environment Development Organization
TIP	Teso Initiative for Peace
TIPDI	Tomwo Integrated Pastoralist Development Initiatives
TUDOF	Turkana Development Organizations Forum

## 2. Executive summary

### Background context to the Project

The overall objective of the “Preventing Inter-Community Conflicts in East Africa” is to contribute to effective conflict-prevention strategies to address inter-community tensions around natural resources in East Africa. It has been implemented across three countries in the East Africa region; in Kenya in the Districts of Baringo, Koibatek and East Mau, in Uganda in the regions of Karamoja, Teso, Kabale, Kasese and Kisoro and in South Sudan in Jonglei State. Competition over natural resources is an increasing and chronic source of conflict across East Africa. This state of affairs has been exacerbated in recent times with variable weather patterns negatively affecting crop yields, creating different patterns of water availability and grazing in pastoralist rangelands. These changes increase pressure on livelihoods and result in increased tensions over access, use and ownership of natural resources. Furthermore these tensions can easily tap into existing conflict ‘fault lines’ between different communities and be triggered by the most minor of incidents. Those who live in marginal lands are the most affected by this situation. They are simultaneously the least close to the centres of power and least likely to be able to raise their voices to the government to challenge decisions, policies, and unjust actions that do not take their perspectives, livelihoods or at worst their fundamental human rights into account. Minority communities in the three countries have suffered consistently from unfavorable Government policies and even development interventions aimed at assisting them do not take into account the local context and dynamics between different groups. At worst such humanitarian or development actions can do harm and increase or create conflict through a thoughtless distribution of resources to needy communities that may be perceived to have benefited unfairly and at the expense of desperate neighbours. Conflicts can be between minority communities themselves or among minorities and majorities. It is MRG’s perspective that taking a minority rights approach will empower all the groups involved to obtain solutions that consider all of them equally.

### Program Response

The Specific objective of the project therefore was to enhance the operational capacities of Civil Society Organisations in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda to effectively prevent / manage intercommunity tensions and to engage with national, regional and international institutions on peace building issues with the following expected results:

1. Improved knowledge and skills of CSOs to engage in conflict management and prevention, including practical experience in successfully tackling local level conflicts.
2. Improved early warning information on local-level conflicts made available and disseminated to civil society actors, national and international decision-makers.
3. Increased engagement, coordination and exchanges between CSOs and national-level decision makers, donor governments and IGOs.

To achieve these results, three types of activity took place. Firstly Capacity Building activities targeting peace-building practitioners, both men and women, from CSOs, MRG partner organizations and 18 local CBOs. These activities included trainings, experience sharing seminars and pilot

projects. Secondly field based analyses undertaken by partners with support from experienced research practitioners to produce early warning conflict briefings, and a broader regional report on land and water rights issues. Thirdly there were advocacy activities targeting international and national decision-makers at national advocacy roundtable events as well as a roundtable event in Brussels (with a special focus on EU institutions and members). Decision-makers at the local level were also [intended to be] a focus of the advocacy activities.

The project has been implemented over a three year period utilising a budget of EUR 854,742 which was intended to benefit the following minority communities; the Endorois, Ogiek, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu and Somali refugees in Kenya, as well as the Batwa, Basongora, Karamojong and Iteso in Uganda; and the Murle, Anuak, Dinka, Nuer and Toposa in South Sudan.

### **The Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation**

The purpose of this final program evaluation is not only to assess the impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the project in achieving its objectives, but also ***to identify learnings and make recommendations that could form the basis for continuing the work in the sector and that could inform the design of follow-up work.*** To this end, as well as the standard evaluation questions on efficiency, effectiveness and impact, the evaluation also looked at the program in terms of the successes and limitations surrounding the capacity building element of the program and its sustainability as well as considering whether there had been any unintended negative consequences to the activities that could be mitigated in the future.

The evaluation took an inclusive, participatory approach mainly using semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and national experts, combined with focus group discussion methodologies at the grass-roots level with a range of stakeholders on both/all sides of a conflict from leaders, women, and youth. The findings were triangulated wherever possible with information from key informants and other credible sources.

### **Major findings on Programme Efficiency and Effectiveness**

The sub-title of this evaluation report is 'A foundation to Build On' as the project has initiated a large number of interesting activities and research in the field of conflict prevention in East Africa. The project overall has been efficient achieving what it set out to do at a reasonable quality, although the publication of reports was little rushed towards the end, with the project experiencing difficulties of timeliness, and this constrained their effective use by partners within the project period and also limits their use afterwards unless resources are available from other sources to maximise advocacy efforts.

The project has developed a set of field based analyses on conflict early warning that do indeed shine the light on both neglected conflicts affecting marginalised minorities as well as also considering broader more strategic conflicts that risk developing and spreading if not addressed.

It has successfully tapped into the enormous energy of grass-roots CBOs and supported a range of small-scale activities aimed at preventing conflict and addressing inter-community tensions at the community level. This has enabled these nascent organisations to consider their particular situations, design an intervention based on some initial training in conflict management principles and then implement it, thereby practising their skills.

The project has excelled in much of its advocacy work with its main partners obtaining strong and extensive media coverage and amplifying the voice of minority groups. Partners have also exploited their networks of relationships with various national stakeholders, particularly in the respective governments of the three countries to good effect ensuring that messages reached the right ears.

Capacity Building activities outlined in the proposal were undertaken and were appreciated by participants. They were reported to have contributed to organisational strengthening of partners and to those civil society actors that have participated in the project.

### **Impact of Project Activities**

This is always a far more difficult area to assess, especially in the complex multi-causal and nebulous fields of advocacy, conflict prevention and management and capacity building of civil society. In my opinion the project has probably had some short-term positive impact at the community level. The evaluator visited a sample of the pilot project activities, and evidence of changes cited by communities visited on both sides of conflicts as well as reports from local government officials interviewed about the situations, suggested that these activities have indeed contributed to the prevention of some conflict - in conjunction with contributions from other actors. This was a very heartening start but if not followed up it is likely that progress will be a temporary, ethereal, calm before external factors conspire to reignite the conflicts and manifest them in a different form or location.

The modest nature of these gains from the project are only to be expected given that it was very ambitious in scope and has been attempting to grapple with complex, chronic issues that require sustained input over a long period of time to effect change of a sustainable nature. The program was also not intended to focus on addressing the root causes of the conflicts and without an integrated, serious multi-stakeholder effort long term impact will remain elusive. Nevertheless communities now have improved capacity to manage tensions with other groups as a result of the program.

### **Major recommendations**

In the opinion of the evaluator MRG is now faced with a series of strategic questions that emerge from the experience and lessons of this project. The essential and deliberately succinct recommendations in the executive summary are in two major areas. Firstly those based on the stated assumption in the evaluation objectives that MRG wishes to undertake more work in this sector and is looking for the best way forward and secondly recommendations that MRG reviews its approach to achieving change and how it measures and demonstrates its impact.

#### ***Area One – Future work in Peace-building and Conflict Management***

- 1. In designing future work in the peace-building and conflict prevention, management, and reduction field, MRG should ensure that**
  - a. it adopts a sustained long term approach to the work it chooses to address**
  - b. It focuses its efforts on comprehensively addressing one specific conflict system and its inter-related conflicts in an integrated way. This means working with all stakeholders affected to increase the potential for impact and simultaneously avoid overstretching.**

- c. It chooses a conflict system that allows it to extrapolate experiences, research and exploration of the issues to continue to illuminate the fundamental problems and relationships between natural resource scarcity, conflict, the policy arena and minorities. In other words one that best draws on MRG's core skills while allowing it to develop further expertise in this sector.
- d. Its capacity building efforts in such work should also reflect the same characteristics as those that it should apply to a conflict system. They should still continue to focus on sustained long term partnership, while simultaneously developing a more integrated and rigorous approach to addressing capacity development, as well as the development of a cadre of networked, mutually supporting organisations working on the same issues from different perspectives.

### *Area Two – Development of MRG's institutional strategic approaches*

1. In implementing its core work around research and advocacy MRG should start to develop the following:
  - a. **Appropriate Monitoring Tools** that track the results and impact of their advocacy work more systematically over the long term to demonstrate change (or not) that affects what happens on the ground and can attribute them to MRG's work
  - b. **Concrete strategies and approaches** that bridge the divide between the production of policy and implementation recommendations that emerge from MRG research, and the next step of their practical application that results in real change on the ground for the lives of beneficiaries
  - c. **Consider how it best utilises its field presence in conjunction with its London office resources in a more integrated and complementary approach to maximise support for partners and add value**

## **3. Background**

### **Context**

The overall objective of the "Preventing Inter-Community Conflicts in East Africa" is to contribute to effective conflict-prevention strategies to address inter-community tensions around natural resources in East Africa. It has been implemented across three countries in the East Africa region Kenya, Uganda and in South Sudan.

Competition over natural resources is a chronic source of conflict across East Africa. It is very difficult to say whether or not conflict is on the rise or not in the region. It is certainly true that in certain areas (eg Jonglei) there is increased conflict but the causes are multiple and natural resources is only one of the structural causes. The situation for pastoralists living in arid and semi-arid lands in particular though, has been exacerbated in recent times with variable weather patterns negatively affecting grazing in pastoralist rangelands, crop yields for agro-pastoralists and creating different patterns of water availability. These changes increase pressure on livelihoods and result in increased tensions over access, use and ownership of natural resources especially during times of drought. Furthermore these tensions can easily tap into existing conflict 'fault lines' between different communities and be triggered by the most minor of incidents. Those who live in marginal

lands are the most affected by this situation. They are simultaneously the least close to the centres of power and least likely to be able to raise their voices to the government to challenge decisions, policies, and unjust actions that do not take their perspectives, livelihoods or at worst their fundamental human rights into account.

Minority communities in the three countries have suffered consistently from unfavorable Government policies and even development interventions aimed at assisting them often do not take into account the local conflict context and dynamics between different groups. At worst such humanitarian or development actions can do harm and increase or create conflict through a thoughtless distribution of resources to needy communities that may be perceived to have benefited some unfairly and at the expense of desperate neighbours. Conflicts can be between minority communities themselves or among minorities and majorities. It is MRG's perspective that taking a minority rights approach will empower all the groups involved to obtain solutions that consider all of them equally.

The three countries covered in the project are at different stages in their political maturity as well as in their willingness and capacity to address the conflicts besetting their citizens.

South Sudan is the newest country in the world and not surprisingly its security and governance institutions, after 22 years of debilitating civil war are only nascent. This situation is exacerbated by the broader lack of management and governance capacity in society, resulting from a combination of very low education levels coupled with little experience in civil administration and an embryonic civil society sector that has not yet enjoyed much space to grow either during Sudanese rule, or during the civil war under the SPLM/A. Traditional conflict management mechanisms do exist but the complexity and scope of the current conflicts is beyond their ability to address. This has come about due to the erosion of traditional values, the deep disruption of society and tribal cohesion from the war, with communities being split across North-South conflict lines and manipulated by the two major warring protagonists. At the same time modern governance systems are so weak that institutions such as the police, judiciary and formal military struggle at the most levels to perform their mandated tasks. This leaves communities increasingly vulnerable to escalating violence as the drivers of conflict, be they historical, 'traditional', politically motivated, or more usually a combination of factors cannot be contained.

Uganda has been beset by a variety of conflicts across its land for many years. Most recently this has been most prevalent around the border regions as other regional dynamics have spilled over or influenced the interior. Thus in the north of the country the Lord Resistance Army has been running a brutal insurrection against the government, terrorizing civilians and communities through abductions and mutilations, with a very nebulous agenda for many years, rumoured to have been supported by the Sudan government. This has largely halted as the LRA is now no longer within Ugandan borders having moved to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and more recently to the Central African Republic as well as Darfur<sup>1</sup>. At its height it was influencing even the Teso region of Uganda in the East bordering the Karamoja, with the establishment of large camps where communities lived for their protection. The Karamoja region bordering Kenya and Sudan has been a conflict zone for centuries with pastoralist tribes and communities engaged in traditional cattle raiding and cultural practices around rites of passage, competition over natural resources such

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/29330>

as water, pasture and salt licks. The nature of these conflicts has changed over the years with the proliferation of small arms from wars in Sudan and Somalia (via Kenya) infusing the conflicts as well as issues of land use and tenure, lack of development and other factors have come into play. The cross-border nature of the conflicts has also made them harder to manage. The Ugandan government has generally approached the management of these conflicts in a traditional military manner, employing soldiers on the ground to try and contain them (sometimes rather brutally). The military has not been particularly successful in its endeavors while operating with little empathy for the people or understanding of the context. Despite this a recent disarmament exercise in the region has had considerable success and conflict has been reduced dramatically<sup>2</sup> such that many cross-line activities can now take place and movement and economic activity across the region has improved with the increased security. The policy environment for peace is advanced compared to South Sudan but still lacking. Activists are hopeful that national peace-building and conflict management policies will be developed in the near future. Traditional conflict management mechanisms like Sudan have also been eroded with no sufficiently strong modern mechanism to replace them or act as a substitute. This means that here too a combination of approaches combining government and civil society efforts is needed to make headway against conflict in this large poverty-stricken area.

Kenya, of the three countries, has the probably had the greatest levels of investment in the management of its internal conflicts as well as the most developed policy arena and institutions aimed at tackling conflict. There are a multitude of different conflicts prevalent across the country but the majority of the most active ones are primarily to be found in the semi-arid and arid lands inhabited by pastoralist groups. These areas are also the most marginalized politically and developmentally. The structural causes are similar to those described in South Sudan and Uganda with marginalization, competition over natural resources, political manipulation and the proliferation of small arms to name just a few. Here however 'blended' institutions such as peace committees developed by civil society and now formalized in many places in government structures such as the Provincial Peace Committee and District Peace Committees have had some success in preventing conflict or resolving disputes. Nevertheless, with little hard data to support any claims of broad or long term success, it is also difficult to make any analyses regarding trends within the sector let alone attribute any success to these mechanisms in addressing these chronic issues. At the national level there is a National Steering Committee under the president's office which is tasked with setting the agenda regarding the progression of institutionalizing formal and informal conflict management mechanisms in the government. Most recently Kenya was shocked at the broader prevalence of community violence that erupted following the 2009 elections reflecting deep latent conflict flaws (regarding land tenure and distribution as well as political and economic marginalization and other issues) within society that have been festering and fundamentally remain unaddressed.

Thus the conflict and natural resources situations within the three countries have many similarities and related sets of chronic issues that inform and underlay the conflict dynamics besetting the affected groups. It is within these contexts that the program has attempted to make a positive

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<sup>2</sup> See the photos throughout the text associated with the Ugandan situation – eg movement of trucks across the Teso – Karamajong lines and market activity associated with brewing between Teso and Karamajong women.

contribution to strengthen the ability of communities to prevent and manage some of these conflicts.

## **Description of the Project**

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The Specific objective of the project was to enhance the operational capacities of Civil Society Organisations in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda to effectively prevent / manage intercommunity tensions and to engage with national, regional and international institutions on peace building issues with the following expected results:

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To achieve these results, three types of activity took place. Firstly Capacity Building activities targeting peace-building practitioners, both men and women, from CSOs, MRG partner organizations and 18 local CBOs. These activities included trainings, experience sharing seminars and pilot projects. Secondly field based analyses undertaken by partners with support from experienced research practitioners to produce early warning conflict briefings, and a broader regional report on land and water rights issues. Thirdly there are advocacy activities targeting international and national decision-makers at national advocacy roundtable events as well as a roundtable event in Brussels (with a special focus on EU institutions and members). Decision-makers at the local level will also be a focus of the advocacy activities.

The project has been implemented over a three year period utilising a budget of EUR 854,742 which is intended to benefit the following minority communities; the Endorois, Ogiek, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu and Somali refugees in Kenya, as well as the Batwa, Basongora, Karamojong and Iteso in Uganda; and the Murle, Anuak, Dinka, Nuer and Toposa in South Sudan.

Assumptions and risks associated with the project logic, were articulating concerns around two areas. Firstly regarding there not being unmanageable levels of insecurity in each country context that might prevent activities taking place. Secondly that government and other policy makers and decision-makers were open to discussing the issues around conflict and minorities besetting their countries. In other words there would be both access and a willingness to listen to enable successful

advocacy to take place. Fortunately in neither case were these issues a constraint to successful implementation.

## 4. The Evaluation:

### Main stakeholders of the evaluation

The stakeholders for this evaluation are the donor; the European Commission, Minority Rights Group International, and the main Civil Society Organisation partners of the project in each of the countries.

### Main Features of the Evaluation

The objective of this final program evaluation is not only to assess the impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the project in achieving its objectives, but also to identify learning s and make recommendations that could form the basis for continuing the work in the sector and that could inform the design of follow-up work. To this end, as well as the standard evaluation questions on efficiency, effectiveness and impact, the evaluation also looked at the program in terms of the successes and limitations surrounding the capacity building element of the program and its sustainability as well as considering whether there had been any unintended negative consequences to the activities that could be mitigated in the future. MRG highlighted the following questions that were of particular interest to them. In terms of this report I have attempted to respond to these issues within the relevant sections where findings and discussion of the issues is undertaken.

- 1. Partner Capacity.** What effect has the project had (if any) on partners' capacities to understand and intervene in conflict situations? Detail progresses made in capacity building as well as identify gaps or constraints that are still impeding progress. What input have other organisations or individuals had in supporting and developing partners' capacity in addition to or alongside MRG's input? Assess the MRG contribution to any capacity gains Vis a Vis the work of other. Assess to what extent the project has made good decisions in deciding which aspects of capacity building to prioritise. Which capacity building methods worked best and why? Which capacity building methods were less effective and why? Are any gains in partners' capacity sustainable over the longer term? What sort of partnership relationship has developed between MRG and the partners? What aspects of this have been more or less helpful? To what extent have any improvements in partner capacity translated into benefits for the community on the ground?
- 2. Sudanese Capacity:** Partners and other participating organisations in Southern Sudan have been less active in this project than originally planned and we feel that their capacity was more limited than we originally hoped. The evaluation should investigate and report on the reasons for this. What impact has this had, if any, in terms of building the capacity to prevent conflict in South Sudan (or not). Could MRG have handled this better? What other lessons could be learned from this?
- 3. Publications:** Were the publications produced in this project timely and relevant? How successful were they at identifying potential escalations? Did they address ongoing tensions? Were they disseminated appropriately and if so, did they prove useful to those who received them?

4. **Gender:** Did MRG and partners incorporate women's issues and gender in the way envisaged? If not, why not? If yes, how was this achieved? What can MRG learn from this in the future for similar programs?
5. **Adaptability:** It would be useful to have comments on how MRG and partners have monitored, kept track of and reacted to changes in circumstances? Have the reactions and changes in project implementation been based on a sound analysis? Have they proven to be good decisions? Have any critical external context changes slipped under the radar or been picked up too late and, if so, has this impacted on the effectiveness of the work?
6. **Equitable distribution of project benefits:** To what extent have different local areas and subgroups within the partners' community benefited from the project? Have the benefits been reasonably balanced between different areas and groups e.g. women, men, young and older people? Has the project contributed to or detracted from cooperation and harmony within the community?
7. **International Advocacy:** How have MRG and the partners used the partnership to do international advocacy work (including media work)? Were community members involved in this/any such work? How were community members informed of these/any such efforts? What are their views about them? If possible make a judgement about what, if any, difference any such work has made on the ground?
8. **Lessons Learned:** MRG is particularly interested to learn from it, lessons that we can apply in continuing with the work and in designing a new future phase of work on this issue; we would also be keen to check whether there have been any unforeseen negative consequences to date and how we can avoid, minimise or mitigate these in future.

This evaluation has also focused more on providing practical programming suggestions for the way forward rather than repeating the same points that have been made in three previous relevant evaluations. These three evaluations also look at various aspects of the work that MRG has been undertaking in East Africa most of which overlap with this project. It is strongly recommended that the interested stakeholders also read these three documents to gain a broader more comprehensive picture of the work that has been done through support to MRG and its partners:

1. Fay Warrilow, IrishAID 2009-2011 Evaluation Final Report
2. Jacqui Zalcborg, 'Interim Evaluation for Minority Rights Group: Project to support implementation of the Endorois Case of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights', MRG March 2011
3. David Hampson, "'Job well done. Much more to do": Gender-Based Discrimination / Violence Against Women (VAW) evaluation in Batwa communities of Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, 2007- 2010', MRG 2011

The full terms of reference for this evaluation can be found in appendix one.

## Methodology

The methodology employed in the evaluation consisted firstly of a review of the project literature, reports and materials produced by the organisations participating in the programme. In conjunction with this literature review relevant grey literature from the sector was also considered. Secondly broad, participatory field visits to Kenya and Uganda were conducted to discuss firsthand the pilot

projects with the implementing organisations and their beneficiary communities. Visits were also made to MRG's main partners in those countries and discussions held with partners' staff.

Field visits were made to a sample of eight different communities who were targeted as beneficiaries by the project. At the community level itself, it had originally been envisaged that a set of consistent participatory activities would be conducted across all community groups, but due to the enormous diversity of activities undertaken by the pilot project partner CBOs this was not feasible and would not have yielded useful outcomes so these activities were replaced with semi-structured interviews which were conducted with focus groups drawn from the geographic areas where activities had been implemented. These groups consisted of a selection of elders, women, and youth. Interviews were also conducted with key stakeholders such as government and other non-state organisations working in the same sector in the project areas. Interviewees were also encouraged to provide anecdotes and stories that reflected changes in the context, behaviours, and attitudes that they believed were attributable to the project. These stated changes were then 'interrogated' for evidence of linkages with the project, triangulated with other stakeholders where possible and explored to draw out the nuance of change.

At the national level, semi-structured interviews were also conducted with key informants in the peace sector in those two countries as well as with MRG staff in both the London office and the Kampala office.

### **Limitations of the Evaluation**

There were a number of limitations to the evaluation that constrain the findings outlined below. These limitations consisted of the following:

- (a) The third country covered by the programme, South Sudan was not visited properly during the evaluation and so communities and stakeholders in that country were not interviewed in depth and activity areas were not visited.
- (b) Only a sample of the CBOs implementing pilot projects was visited in Kenya and Uganda rather than all of them, which would have been the ideal. While the sample consisted of four CBOs in Kenya (out of seven), and four in Uganda (out of eight) it is significant that two important geographic areas did not get assessed, Turkana in Kenya and the West in Uganda. This means that findings should not necessarily be applied universally across the program as the situation may have been different in those areas<sup>3</sup>. Having said that, MRG staff have visited the West of Uganda and there was also an evaluation conducted by IrishAID that did visit the partners in that area (Warrilow 2011).
- (c) The nature, diversity and varying length of time of the activities across the program also means that the reader should necessarily be very cautious in terms of applying the conclusions generically across the program. In this regard the evaluation findings should be seen more in the light of common observations from program participants and beneficiaries about their experience as well as observations from the evaluator.

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<sup>1</sup>See other the accompanying evaluations cited earlier in the text for details and background on areas not visited during this assignment.

## 5. Findings

### Main findings

#### Project Design: Relevance and Appropriateness

##### Program design

The program logic and design is sound with a strong rationale and theory of change presented within the logical framework. This is a professionally designed project to be lauded and MRG have proposed a relevant, appropriate and rational set of activities in response to the contextual and social analysis offered. The strong conceptual design though is partially undermined by some of the choices that the project makes, in terms of its implementation, follow-through of activities, balance between results expected within the program and the overall scope of the program. These issues are explored further under the relevant sections.

##### Objectives of the Project

There is a clear need for work on the issues surrounding minority rights and conflict over natural resources and the clarity and useful simplicity of the project design in terms of its single objective is very appropriate and indeed refreshing. The objective is in keeping with the needs of both the ultimate beneficiaries and the CBOs working on the project that purport to represent these communities.

The rationale for the choice of which minorities to work with, and where to work, is less clear than the overall program logic. It appears to be based, to a certain extent, on past experience of working with certain groups, so there is a relatively strong historical relationship that can be built upon and the case is made by thematic linking of all groups with their respective issues over natural resources. Nevertheless a combination of their geographic spread and the diversity of groups present problems for the cohesion of the project and affect the potential for impact. On the one hand the diversity potentially enables a wide range of learning to be garnered over the course of the project and also provides for opportunities of cross-fertilisation both between countries as well as the respective minority groups and organisations. On the other the relevance and sustainability of the relationships created is questionable and the usefulness of the pilot projects in terms of impact is minimised. It also presents difficulties for the management, monitoring of the projects as well as physically limiting interactions between project participants.

Despite this, there was an effort to 'cluster' with respect to geography and the main livelihoods of the groups chosen. Thus in Uganda there is a Western cluster reflecting issues for the Batwa and the Basongora and an Eastern cluster in the Karamoja mainly reflecting pastoralist issues. In Kenya the majority of groups participating are pastoralists but the additional choice of working with Somali refugees in particular is a little unclear. The need is there, but there are also many other minority groups who would also warrant attention on the basis of these two factors (being a minority, having a main livelihood in common. Geography is slightly less relevant given the enormous areas of land and distances even within the 'cluster').

Lessons from the experience of the project point to the need for a refinement of the strategic decisions making process for choosing where to engage and focus efforts. So for instance a number of other clustering approaches, while still having minority groups at their focal point, in future are worth exploring to see if they are more useful and yield improved potential for impact on conflict and conflict transformation and importantly enabled achievement of the project objective in a deeper more sustainable manner. For instance:

- Minority groups affected within a particular conflict system. It would make more sense to work with all the stakeholders in a set of inter-related conflicts rather than work with single organisations on one side of large range of conflicts. For instance in Kenya the project focused on the issues of the Ogiek to the exclusion of working with all the stakeholders involved in the fundamental issues and who are in conflict with the Ogiek. Or alternatively in Uganda – working with the Ik rather than more deeply with the Jie, Dodoth or the Turkana involved in that conflict dynamic<sup>4</sup>. Note that in both these cases the other stakeholders are virtually all minorities too who are also affected.
- Consideration of conflicts involving minorities that have a regional or cross-border dynamic, rather than a set of conflicts that are set in the region.
- Or an alternative strategy could have been employed that looked at criteria around which conflicts have the potential to expand and affect more people if not addressed.
- Only work with a few of the main groups that MRG is already engaged with so that potential solutions and opportunities for prevention and success are extended through a deeper engagement. For instance choosing only either the west of Uganda and utilising the resources to deepen existing work or the Karamajong cluster in the East.

Thus a strong recommendation for MRG in taking this work forward is to tighten up the strategic focus of their efforts and support in terms of community selection so as to increase impact and reduce the ‘scattergun’ approach that was a hallmark of this program. It should be acknowledged that a potential positive consequence of the ‘scatter-gun’ approach is that it could yield a large range of different experiences to be drawn from, although the evaluator is not convinced that this is the case for the preventing Inter-community conflicts in East Africa project.

**Recommendation: Ensure the design of the project has a narrower and more defined strategic Focus for initiatives in terms of addressing conflict.**

### Internal and External Policy Coherence

The project objectives are very much in accord with MRG policies and strategic themes as outlined in the proposal document. It also builds on their previous work undertaken in the field of conflict. In particular it is based on the foundational document by Baldwin, Chapman, and Grey - Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention - as well as internal documents outlining approaches to partnership.

The external coherence of the project objective, with government, other civil society actors and other donors’ policies is reasonable. Policy coherence is complicated though by the large number of stakeholders in the region working in this sector, as well as the varying ‘topography’ and sectoral ecosystems operating in each of the countries where the project has been working. In many ways the objective itself recognises the failure of state systems to be able to address the complexity of these issues by themselves. Given the objective focuses attention mainly on civil society it can be seen that the tolerance level of the different countries for active civil society is also varied and could have an impact on the success of the program. The objective also reflects the need for greater coherence between grass-roots activities and perspectives and the national institutions that should be tackling these fault lines in society. The three countries of Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan, are fairly tolerant of and respecting of the need for civil society at the theoretical level, while being

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<sup>4</sup> It is acknowledged that in the Early Warning Briefs some work was undertaken with these groups.

mixed in their willingness to provide space for them to operate and influence policy . Any issues at the operational level are more a function of the sub-regional or state level relationships between the government and the people.

National Policies concerning minorities, peace, conflict and natural resource management in East Africa are at different stages of evolution. Relevant policies to the project may also be under the guise of broader sectoral, livelihood (eg land, pastoralist or agricultural policies) or national poverty approaches and documents (eg Poverty reduction strategy papers or MDG type policies) as well as sometimes geographic approaches (eg those associated with the development of arid and semi-arid land policies). This also means that the institutional 'houses' and mandates of those who are responsible for policy implementation and development for these aspects are often overlapping and confused. There are in addition broader regional policies and mechanisms that are of relevance under bodies such as the AU, EAC, COMESA, and IGAD. It would be useful for MRG and its partners to undertake a policy mapping exercise. This would enable defined advocacy strategies and plans to be developed that could target coherence, policy contradictions emerging from the different documents as well as provide leverage to hold governments to account over these issues. It would also enable training and awareness-raising to be conducted with affected groups over these issues. MRG has undertaken some of this work in Uganda in particular looking at the policy environment and minorities as well as scoping of relevant government initiatives in Karamoja but a comprehensive exercise conducted at both the regional as well as national levels of these countries would yield opportunities for further work in influencing their development. There appears to be no contradiction between the project and the policy environment that I know of, but this aspect deserves deeper and specific research.

What is clearer is that the main partners in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan appear to be well linked in to national level civil society coordination mechanisms and alliances. As well as this, in Kenya and Uganda the main partners, OPDP and CECORE both have strong connections with relevant government departments and key individuals. That being said in the case of OPDP it is understandably limited to their specific issues.

The program could improve on its connectivity with these higher national bodies though. In Kenya there are two in particular that have relevance at this point in time and are particularly strategic if MRG is intending to develop this work further. The first is the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC) under the office of the President which has the mandate to coordinate peace work nationally and to that end has a strategy for the period of 2010-2014 on the establishment of peace committees at the Provincial and District, Division and Locality levels. While the model grew out of the Arid and Semi-Arid lands of the pastoralist Northern areas of Kenya, this work has gained momentum as its relevance was apparent following the election violence of 2008. There is in fact a draft of a national peace policy but it has never been ratified.

Secondly the recently voted in new constitution has provisions regarding minorities and representation in local government. The main issue is that at the lower levels of governance there is the creation of new conflict dynamics and new minorities, both at county level - where the position of Governor is seen as a big prize and at sub-county level. Electoral boundaries at parliamentary constituency and ward level have not yet been set and this work is ongoing. The National Cohesion Commission (NCC) is monitoring the issue of new minorities and they are also

the guardians of the National Cohesion Act which outlaws discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. It also provides a public complaint mechanism and suggests that no public authority should employ more than 30% of one tribe. NCC have conducted an initial audit of national ministries but they are also supposed to be reviewing and supporting government to redress the balance. While these initiatives are mainly considering the numerically larger minorities and devolution they do have relevance for the smaller minorities such as the Ogiek for example who are keen to obtain their own district. These issues deserve significant attention from MRG as the increasing politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya has both positive and negative dimensions for minorities as well as the expression of conflict.

**Recommendation:**

- 1. MRG to undertake a policy mapping exercise across East Africa to identify and analyse relevant policies, for gaps and contradictions on the issues of natural resources, minorities and peace.**
- 2. MRG researches and explores the issues of minorities, conflict and the new Kenya constitution to frame a program addressing conflict prevention and devolution.**
- 3. MRG more deliberately address connectivity of activities and policy work with current national initiatives.**

In Uganda there are no national structures or policies addressing peace yet, although Ugandan agencies involved in CEWARN are looking at and working on the possibility of creating and developing a similar institution to the NSC in Kenya but adapted for the needs of Uganda. They are also considering the creation of a national policy on peace building for Uganda. CECORE is well connected to both the CEWARN representative in Uganda – Centre for Basic Research – as well as the CEWERU based in UNDP at present and so is well placed both to track progress on this front as well as influence its direction should the processes come to anything.

The policy environment for minorities in Uganda has been explored, to a certain extent by MRG within the context of the Poverty Reduction strategy and other policies. There has also been an increasing amount of attention paid to this previously underserved region of Uganda by the Government of Uganda, for instance a Ministry of Karamoja has been created headed by the President's wife and Karamoja is included in the Peace Recovery Development Plan (PRDP). There are several large scale development initiatives being undertaken in Karamoja by the government of Uganda and its partners at the moment aimed at improving the chronic poverty and underdevelopment situation. The most relevant initiative though that has a direct bearing on the MRG project being evaluated has been the recently concluded Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and development Programme. This has had a significant and positive impact on the security situation in the Karamoja.

South Sudan is a very new country indeed (in fact the newest in the world) and while peace work on the ground has been undertaken for a number of years at the grass-roots level, and the South Sudan Peace Commission at the national level has in the past been mandated to take forward the peace agenda<sup>5</sup> and has received support to build the institution itself, there is a very limited policy environment. This does provide an opportunity for MRG to build a useful program that can

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<sup>5</sup> I am not sure that this is the case now as this has changed recently I think.

contribute in this area. That being said, South Sudan is a very difficult operating environment and requires resources and painstaking time on the ground to make progress.

### **The baseline documents**

The baseline documents produced for each country, according to the proposal, were expected to provide one of the reference points for assessing whether or not change had occurred as a result of the project. Each of the country baseline documents has collated a mass of useful information on the situations that can provide a broad base for understanding the context as well as knowing who some of the actors are and the issues affecting the target communities. There are some useful lessons to be learned here for the next project in this sector. Baseline assessments are notoriously difficult to undertake in a way that enables the project outcomes to be measured as it is difficult to know before the project what information you need to collect so that at the end of the project you can refer back to the beginning. The baseline assessments for this project were successful as helpful broad reference documents and an entry point into the issues besetting the different communities and are more of a situational analysis rather than a rigorous baseline. The quality of the documents is varied across the countries, which is also reflected in the content matter itself, such that it appears as though each country was working from a different brief. In fact the objectives stated in the documents for Kenya and Uganda are different from each other while the Sudan document does not note the objectives of the study at all.

Part of the source of the challenges encountered was again a consequence of the selection of communities to be targeted which made it harder to produce cohesive documents. In Kenya the number of selected minority communities being tackled, their geographic range and the diversity of issues that are confronting them in terms of conflict is very broad. This was also a difficulty in Uganda and South Sudan. In each country, the exercise and its interpretation was undertaken by different people and this is reflected in the products. In Kenya a consultant undertook the exercise, in Uganda the main MRG partner undertook the exercise and in Sudan a troika of independent consultants.

The lesson for MRG here to be applied to similar future exercises and maximise the utility of documents is to emphasise consistency across the different countries. For instance:

- Structure the baseline around a common ‘template’ and methodology across the countries so that they can more easily produce a set of *consistent* sets of information. This would also allow MRG to augment the information by undertaking further work on these topics in neighbouring communities and thus compare apples with apples.
- Increased depth of information concerning the stakeholder ‘mapping’ component could create a useful ‘database’ of community organisations that could be used as the basis for coordination, collaboration or additional resources or partners to be supported.
- MRG, rather than consultants, might want to take the lead in the baseline research across each country with, either partners alongside them, or alternatively members of some of the communities. This would enhance the institutional knowledge of MRG and also ensure greater control and quality if a capacity building element was more deliberately incorporated into this exercise.

- Alternatively empower a competent partner such as Cecore to undertake all of the baselines thereby enhancing their knowledge and understanding of the different issues across the region for a broader benefit to the sector rather than perhaps investing in individual consultants<sup>6</sup>.
- Narrow the focus of the document contents to enhance the accessibility of the information and its pertinence to a narrower range of stakeholders. The partners, when questioned, confessed that that they had not referred back to the baseline document or used it for any purpose during the lifetime of the project after it was undertaken.
- MRG might also want to consider taking a very different and possibly more innovative approach to the production of baseline assessments through empowering the community to undertake the baselines instead 'externals' be they consultants or the core partners. This could be undertaken through a series of facilitated participatory conflict analyses with each community so as to deepen their understanding of the issues, reach more of a consensus understanding on the issues at stake and start to explore possible solutions. This could result in a series of documents for more specific audiences who are interested in a narrower emphasis<sup>7</sup>.
- To supplement the fundamental baseline in future work it is suggested that mapping the specific natural resources where there are current conflicts, potential conflicts, future conflicts expected and why (eg in-migration, population, industry etc,) would serve as a useful entry point into addressing them.

The baseline documents do provide some broad useful information on the overarching situations but in future MRG would be well advised to address the lack of rigour underpinning the inception of the exercise which would improve their usefulness in the next phase of the project.

### **In-country training workshops**

The Peace-Building and Conflict Management and Resolution manual that was compiled for the in-country training workshops was entirely appropriate in its basic content and approach. The workshop approach was also very suitable for the target audience with a participatory and interactive style that was much appreciated. The broader approach of using the training as the jump-off point for the design of interventions and infusing and informing activities with a stronger theoretical understanding was excellent. The participants who attended the in-country training workshops that were questioned by the evaluator appreciated the workshop and found it useful.

When discussing the workshop with the CBOs and pilot projects visited though, many of them had not been able to attend this meeting because of the timing of their applications and so had not had the positive benefit of the training to inform their activities. While this does not seem to have hampered the success of the activities undertaken, the cycle of activity approval needs to take the training needs of the participants into account. It may not have been practical on the ground perhaps but in future an option might be to structure the pilot project cycle so that each set of new CSO partners receives the training once they have been identified as potential recipients. A mini-

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<sup>6</sup> Although of course the task could have been assigned to a consultant with the brief of using this exercise as a capacity building exercise, ect

<sup>7</sup> For instance the Turkana may be interested in issues affecting Somali refugees but probably this might be of a secondary priority to tackling their own issues.

training session could be provided by the main partner in each country at the start of that cycle for the next set of partners undertaking activities.

However in providing capacity building with enhanced value across such a large geographic area and diverse set of partners, the logistical difficulties were highlighted as the trainings absorbed a lot of energy to organise for a 'once-off' input. The adult education literature and experience suggest that more of an ongoing incremental, approach to adult education is required, with a greater number of inputs. MRG has however already put the foundations for this approach in place by linking the training provided directly to practical application thus bridging the theoretical and the practical and then developing the experiential dimension through the pilot project. This design now needs to be honed for the future based on the learning emerging from this project.

### **Knowledge and experience sharing seminars**

There were two Knowledge and Experience sharing seminars during the program; one at the beginning and one at the end. The first workshop was held with 24 participants (including 3 MRG staff) representing 13 CSOs (including MRG) in Kampala. The main partners from each of the countries were present with additional expertise being brought in through the participation of peace-building practitioners and those with a background in Land issues. A number of the main partners appreciated this exercise but feedback from the Ugandan and Kenyan participants was that as a sharing exercise they felt that it was too early for such an approach as they were all new partners and suggested that the content of the workshop could have been structured to take this into account. On reflection this situation may have been exacerbated by a number of factors; (a) the baseline surveys had been delayed in two of the countries (b) the agenda for the workshop could have been a little clearer in its objectives – laudably attempting to make best use of the opportunity it set out to identify conflict issues (also a task for the baseline surveys), as well as being a discussion of the way forward but falling a little short of committing itself to a fully participatory design process.

The partners also reported that a more comprehensive and inclusive design process for the project <sup>8</sup> would in future guarantee greater clarity of their roles in the project for them. The partners suggested that for the next project, a workshop early on to clarify roles and expectations, addressing the following sorts of questions and statements would improve the potential for success of the project:

- Were we supposed to be mentoring the pilot project CBOs?
- Why weren't we consulted during the programme design process?
- We did not really have any interaction with anyone, MRG or anyone else, for long periods of time during the project – why was this?

The workshop was conducted therefore mainly with partners who were not actually going to participate in the design of pilots and were not directly implementing projects aside from research and advocacy, and this led to the questioning. The resource organisations who participated were also not actually going to undertake any work on the project except for some of them in a consulting

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<sup>8</sup> despite the fact that this workshop had a large element of foundational design within it and perhaps would have been better named explicitly as being part of a design process)

role. This suggested one interpretation to a partner that the purpose of the workshop was briefing MRG rather than the project participants.

The second experience sharing held in Nakuru with 36 participants (including 2 MRG staff) representing 28 CSOs at the end of the project was welcomed and unanimously appreciated by all those who attended it. Feedback from participants was very positive indeed. The final formal report is still in the process of being formulated although an initial report of the proceedings is available. The success can be attributed to two main factors; firstly the different organisations had rich and varied experiences to share emerging from practical activities that had been supported by MRG and the project. Secondly many of the organisations that were participating were relatively inexperienced being from small CBOs, and so benefitted tremendously from this relatively rare opportunity for them to learn and share with others from a variety of contexts.

This is a strong start to learning, however the next time MRG could use the same methodology underlying the overall program to further good use. In other words providing CBOs opportunities for increasing knowledge and learning through their pilots, and then identifying the applicable aspects from other experiences to their own contexts and provide them the opportunity to develop action plans and develop the next small activity to test its relevance.

Participants all expressed their greatly increased awareness of the different types of activity that are possible to address conflicted communities, but they do need assistance and facilitation to identify firstly (and more exactly) what they have learned and secondly how to then apply their learnings to future work. In interviews participants acknowledged that they would struggle, without more assistance and discussion, to turn the knowledge presented at the sharing event into practical programming. The timing of the sharing event at the end of the project presented a paradox for participants. On the one hand there was much to share because activities continued to be undertaken right to the end, but on the other hand as was rapidly coming to a complete close there was no opportunity to apply that learning in a follow-up activity in the project.

Suggestions to build on this positive and foundational experience in future could include the following to maximise the benefit of the approach:

- A smaller annual learning event that allows for reflection, possible improvements or additions to successful approaches, discussion and design of additional supplementary activities that could be undertaken.
- Following identification of useful activities that might be transferable to another country or within a country that could be tested; specific pairing or mentoring of the two CBOs who are using that approach, the 'experienced' one assisting the 'neophyte' with design, implementation and reflection. This would then apply the learning while adding to it and developing the methodology further, as well as simultaneously creating a stronger set of relationships between specific organisations for longer term networking. The idea being to ensure that great learning events do lead to benefits for more people and, that new relationships are supported and maintained through the application of the new 'learned' knowledge.
- The development of a 'cluster' approach that supports CBOs working together on the same conflict dynamics (see program design section) would also enable small networks of support

groups to be developed and peer support/mentoring to occur rather than a large number of small isolated interventions in more of a scatter-gun approach. Greater practical application of the conflict transformation approaches espoused by practitioner theoreticians like J.P. Lederach cited in the proposal as being the basis for the project, would also be supported in this way. In other words if 'cross-line' clusters for this type of activity were the basis for the clustering they would be contributing directly to (a) a common understanding between protagonists and a vision for the future in terms of conflict resolution and transformation (b) modelling practical mutual tolerance and understanding, as well as most importantly working together, to their respective constituents. This breaks down the polarising effect of chronic conflict.

## **Pilot projects**

The pilot projects have been one of the major successes of the project. They have managed to tap into the energy of CBOs and their relationships with the community to effect some positive change. This is not an easy type of program to implement as it is very labour intensive (confirming the need for more human resources for the project) and difficult to undertake from a distance. With low capacity in proposal writing, having English as second language and poor communications infrastructure in some of the more remote locations, this process was a challenge for all stakeholders. A quick reading of the assessment notes and comments from the MRG staff receiving and reviewing the proposals demonstrates the thoroughness, and objectivity with which they approached the task. This is probably a factor in the success of these small activities. They have been subjected to a rigorous review process that scrutinises the project logic and attempts to assist the organisations to clarify and present what it is that they are trying to do. The projects cover a range of different types of activity that are suitable for nascent CBOs to undertake. While they are all 'well practised' activities that have been implemented by community groups over the past ten years or so, they have not necessarily been applied before in all the project geographic areas, so there is still an element of experimental testing to the process. MRG has managed to skilfully find the balance between the CBO level of capacity, the scope of the activity and the hoped for impact, that meant that no one appeared out of their depths in implementation and they also learned as they were going along.



Figure 1 Pokot Elders waiting for the new monthly meeting with Samburu elders to prevent conflict and discuss shared natural resource use

## Publications

The publications were generally of a very high quality overall and were relevant to the project, the context and contributed to the body of research and documentation concerning the relationship between natural resource management and conflict. The intent of the early warning briefings and the report on land rights is to improve the information available to decision-makers in the conflict, humanitarian, human rights and development fields, regarding on-going or potential conflicts over natural resources. In this regard MRG and its partners have succeeded in producing some strong reports on the topics noted below in Box 2. There are choices to be made in consideration of the topics that are investigated and MRG has succeeded in identifying a good balance between neglected conflicts and more strategic ones that risk destabilising larger areas or populations. Thus on the one hand there is a document illustrating the plight of the Ik - a classic example regarding a little-known or neglected conflict which has rightly been placed in the spotlight through this work. In this case there is little chance for broader destabilisation to occur. A more likely outcome is that the Ik will continue to be neglected by government with a continuous drip-drip of casualties that will slowly erode their

### Box 2: Topics covered by Early Warning Briefs

- **Kenya:** Report on the conflict early warning among the Somali, Turkana, Maasai, Samburu, Ogiek and Endorois communities of Kenya
- **Kenya:** Report on the Dynamics of conflicts in Mau Forest Complex towards an early warning and monitoring system
- **Kenya:** Drought and Conflict among Pastoral Communities in East Africa
- **Uganda:** Conflict Early Warning: The Basongara Pastoralists and Bakonzo Cultivators in Kasese
- **Uganda:** Preventing Conflict in Karamoja. Early Warning, Security and Development.
- **Uganda:** The Ik of Kaabong District
- **South Sudan:** Climate change and inter-community conflict over natural resources in Jonglei State, South Sudan.
- **South Sudan:** Community Perspectives on the Lou Nuer / Murle conflict in South Sudan
- **South Sudan:** Southern Sudan: The Role of Minority Rights in Building a New Nation

position even further. This state of affairs is in contrast to the very strong piece of work describing and exploring the Dynamics of conflicts in the Mau Forest Complex. This example could easily end up destabilising the surrounding region, sitting as it does on the various fault lines from growing populations, unstable relationships between the various tribes in the region competing over these resources as well as multiple complex political dynamics. Inevitably given the richness of the land and the importance of this area it is also at great risk of falling prey to these political dynamics and a manipulation of the situation. Should MRG continue to develop its work in the conflict sector it will continually be faced with the tension between choosing work to support and protect small minorities and focusing on, debatably, more important conflicts that have the possibility of destabilisation a larger population. In the majority of places in Africa this will always be a balancing act, but for MRG the development of some internal guidelines may be helpful in approaching these issues. In the Mau forest complex for instance virtually all of the stakeholders at the community level are from minority tribes; the Ogiek (who are obviously the 'hosts' and so have particular needs in this case), Maasai, Kalenjin, and the Kipsigis. This is a good example though of the need for approaching a conflict situation from a systems approach rather than simply one minority's perspective.

**Access to the Documents:** The degree to which they are accessed and utilised remains to be seen and it would be useful if they were available on the web with a 'counter' registering how often they are accessed and downloaded. While this does not indicate whether they are used or not, it does give an indication of the reach in terms of dissemination of the information. The concern though is that they will not reach the people that are possibly most interested in them and whom would be most empowered by accessing the information. Increasingly with widespread access to the internet, research documents or briefings are available to those who want to inform themselves of the relevant issues when designing interventions.

The partners all noted though that there were several constraints that might affect the utility of the documents: Firstly the late publication and slow production of the documents in general meant that they were not always available for distribution at the launches and for public events, nor were copies on hand and available even in the libraries of the main program partners (I asked for copies and not only were the regional documents not available but often the home produced ones were not either). Secondly partners noted that there were significant issues with translation into relevant languages. Often the minority audiences that most wanted access to the information contained in them and for whom the documents purport to support would be unable to read them in their own language and unlikely to be able to read English (or the main national languages like Kiswahili etc). Thirdly, hard copies of these documents are still very relevant in the more remote areas of the respective countries with few people having access to computers, the internet and other modern media devices and there was a significant shortage of hard copies available as noted.

In fact, while in many cases these documents have in fact been distributed to various stakeholders, nevertheless almost 100% of communities as well as all of the CBOs that I met had not seen or read any of the early warning briefing documents from the project, neither had local government officials. This is disappointing and in future greater effort needs to be invested in the dissemination of the documents to key stakeholders. It is also important that innovative methodologies be considered for use in the dissemination of the information to illiterate communities – written documents are of

limited value. The use of radio broadcasts, community theatre or other methods could be helpful for these key stakeholders.

**Recommendation: That MRG explore and utilise additional dissemination methodologies aimed at key stakeholder community audiences who might not be literate or who might access information through oral or other traditions.**

**Utilisation of the documents:** The Early Warning Policy Briefs are documents of a generally very high quality with strongly researched information and sensible, practical recommendations for various stakeholders. There was no evidence that emerged during the evaluation or that was presented to the evaluator that the publications were successful at identifying potential escalations. It is very fair to say that they all accurately represent key conflict issues and ongoing tensions in the region but these issues have all been present for a long period of time and have (mostly) been fluctuating in intensity within their own 'wave pattern'. As a result the documents are more a resource for the long term.

The bigger concern however, is whether or not the rich treasure of information inside the documents will be translated into actions to change these situations. In this regard more attention needs to be invested in not only raising the issues, although this is a necessary and important first step, but working on strategies to translate the initial advocacy into both policy and practice for them to be other than simple even if excellent academic documentation of situations that will end up as yet another report on a shelf. This is particularly the case for the traditional early warning mechanisms that have been researched. Partners noted that the information was very interesting but almost impossible to apply in a meaningful manner given the form that it was reported. If a follow-up phase does take place then it is suggested that MRG design a pilot to test the application of this 'new' knowledge. This will entail linking the information to an early warning and response mechanism at the community level. In this regard MRG needs to develop more practical strategies for this conflict transformation to occur. While this was not articulated in the proposal and so strictly speaking is not within the parameters of the project it is a significant aspect that deserves attention, particularly as it appears to be of critical importance more widely to MRG's global work. This evaluation report will return to this point under the advocacy section.

**Timeliness of publication:** The publication of the documents was less successful in terms of timeliness. Partners noted that they were all produced very late in the project period. The intent was to publish one per year per country as well as the Land and water regional paper, but in reality they became 'clumped' near the end of the project. This meant that proper advocacy around the topics and recommendations, was constrained both at the time of publication and more importantly though, for follow-up work to create pressure on advocacy target institutions. This has meant that in some cases this critical follow-up will not take place within the project period for some of the publications. This has financial implications for partners as well as influencing the acuteness of partner commitment to pursue their issues. Finding funds to travel to Nairobi for instance may be a disincentive to consistent action. The lateness of publications also impacted on their distribution due to the fact that translation was delayed in some cases and they were not always available for key publicity events such as the report launches.

**Report on Land and water issues**

The report entitled “*Land, Livelihoods and Identities: Inter-Community Conflicts in East Africa*” authored by Laura Young and Korir Sing’Oei aimed to address issues in the three countries more broadly and look at mid- and long-term approaches to reducing natural resource conflicts. In this it succeeds. The report is very well written and does a sound job in trying to find the right balance between breadths of topic, meaningful detail, bringing together and illustrating cases from the very diverse different minority groups participating in this project and making recommendations. The potential impact of the report is let down by two aspects; firstly the fact that it does not seem to have been disseminated very widely and no one outside of the project seemed to know of its existence<sup>9</sup>. Secondly the recommendations section does not appear to do the report justice. In the opinion of the evaluator they struggle to provide clear parameters for change. Some of the recommendations are effectively un-implementable and others are extremely unrealistic given the audience that they are aimed at. Others are more than optimistic in their expectations of the target stakeholder or perhaps might be better placed in an alternative category. This section highlights one of the challenges for an organisation such as MRG; how to assist in the practical application of the research learnings and analysis undertaken by them and their partners. Putting aside whether or not the recommendations are sensible, it would be interesting for MRG to undertake an evaluation of its past work and analyse the extent to which any of the recommendations made in its reports have been taken up by any of the target stakeholders. Furthermore when activities have indeed been undertaken by stakeholders it would be interesting to know whether or not the documented recommendations in the reports were a contributing factor in their initiation.

MRG operates on the assumption that these recommendations are there for anyone to draw on and that in fact they do influence policy makers. I would suggest that this assumption needs to be tested.

### Outputs and implementation processes: elements of efficiency

The project suffered from numerous delays in all aspects of implementation as reported in the annual project reports to the EU. There were numerous reasons for these delays and they did combine to constrain the overall efficiency of the program. They also did reduce the effectiveness of some of the activities, most notably the advocacy elements where the partners had significantly reduced time to maximise the use of the publications and lobby for change.

**Table 1 Comparison of Planned Outputs against Actual Outputs**

Planned Outputs	Actual Outputs	Comments
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>		
1 baseline assessment report	3 baseline reports – one per country	Achieved
1 final evaluation Report.	1 final evaluation Report	Achieved

<sup>9</sup> Since the writing of the draft of this report, this distribution aspect has reportedly been addressed to a certain extent in Kampala, Uganda.

<b>Advocacy Events</b>		
6 in country roundtable events organised	3 in Sudan 3 in Uganda 3 in Kenya	Achieved
1 international roundtable event organised	Brussels event	Achieved
<b>Publications</b>		
1 training manual,	1 Training Manual	Achieved
1 briefing on key lessons learnt and innovative practices		Achieved
9 early warning briefings	9 early warning briefings	Achieved
1 report on land rights and water issues	1 Report on Land Rights and Water Issues	Achieved
<b>Field work</b>		
18 pilot projects implemented	26 Pilot projects implemented	More than Achieved
<b>Trainings /Trainees</b>		
93 practitioners, members of national and local CSO, better aware of best practices.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 36 practitioners attended 2<sup>nd</sup> experience sharing</li> <li>• 24 the first (although a handful overlap ca 5)</li> </ul> Total 60 practitioners	Mainly Achieved
72 practitioners, members of national and local CSO, trained in conflict resolution and peace-building;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 28 participants Kenya</li> <li>• 24 Uganda</li> <li>• 22 Sudan</li> </ul> Total: 73 practitioners	Achieved

## Implementation mechanisms:

### Internal institutional arrangements

The internal institutional arrangements were aimed at cost efficiency and effectiveness and there is no doubt that in this respect costs attributed to this aspect of the project were low by comparison with other INGOs. As always though there are balances to be struck depending on the type of project that is being implemented and the levels of staffing that are needed for the implementation methodologies chosen.

In this regard the experience from the project raises a number of questions for MRG to consider in future staffing of projects and perhaps more significantly in where they are located and the costs associated with their location. Fundamentally this will depend on the strategic direction that the organisation chooses to take. For instance three close variations of the basic MRG partnership model will serve to illustrate the choices with respect to the staffing issues emerging from this

project. Firstly MRG could take a greater role in direct implementation of activities alongside partners or with a closer 'hands-on' coordination of activities. Secondly it could work through partners but with a more a 'hands-off' approach through the provision of larger levels of funding and thirdly still through partners but with more mentoring (my personal choice as I believe that this is the best way for MRG to provide capacity building support). The project had at its core, capacity building with partners and CBOs at varying ends of the spectrum with respect to capacity. In the light of hindsight a more hands-on supportive role from MRG staff on the ground would have been helpful, particularly for the CBOs.

In the case of this project, MRG had staff based in London both providing technical support as well as administrative back-stopping. There is also a regional office based in Uganda and a program officer based in Kenya (although the latter was not involved in this particular project). There appeared to be some confusion from the MRG Uganda office as well as the main partners with respect to their roles on the project but it is not clear whether this is because of poor internal communications concerning the respective roles between Kampala and London or inadequate resources within the project budget to support staffing costs in the field. This also exacerbated confusion regarding the role of the partners too. Aside from direct feedback this situation was apparent from the following: CECORE appeared to take an informal role in deciding on, contacting and communicating with CBOs. While a specific decision-making role was understood not to be their role, advice was sought relatively often. This resulted in questions such as (a) Why wasn't MRG Uganda taking this role? And (b) Why was the communication coming directly from London rather than the Kampala office? A second example is given by the role of MRG staff in the project (rather than their absence in the previous example). Media support from MRG was very much appreciated by CECORE for report launches and the Kampala office communications officer, played an important role in networking, ensuring their presence and therefore the strong success and profiles that were achieved in the press regarding issues covered. Additional support could have been provided more consistently with field and monitoring trips, greater mentoring through the project cycle of partners and improved communications had this been through the Kampala office. The Kampala office (and in the case of Kenya the program officer) could also play a greater role in the administration of the project. For instance the provision of support re financial reporting and narrative report writing could in future be made more efficient than via email direct to London which can be problematic for some of the smaller CBOs located in remote areas with poor communications. Similarly CBOs reported significant administrative burdens with collecting multiple quotations for small services, as well as having to photocopy or scan every single receipt and then send them to the London office. While this may be a donor requirement, if it isn't, it would make more sense in future to have a program officer inspect all the documents at the offices and take a set of copies, or the originals and keep them in the Kampala or Nairobi offices. This would serve several purposes at once; a field visit, an accountable check on partner financial management systems and the opportunity of rectifying errors, explaining what is needed, mentoring and assisting in general through direct relationships. This would also provide welcome relief for partners who are not located with good internet.

Peace-building and conflict programming are particularly time intensive and require a greater degree of project human resources to be allocated if they are to be successful. This is because they are inherently complex in their nature and they also essentially require the building of relationships at their foundation. It is easy for mistakes to be made, which in the worst case can result in doing harm

and even people dying, if weak partners are insufficiently supported. In this project, while there was little danger of that occurring thankfully, greater support on the ground would have been useful.

The conclusion is that, in the future for a similar project design, staffing ratios need to be greater to achieve optimum outcomes and all staff involved should have a clearer understanding of their roles.

Partners consistently fed back a difference between the period before and after responsibility for the pilot projects was delegated to the Conflict Projects Assistant. Prior to this all communication with partners was being fed through one post (Head of Conflict) and this post was considered to be overstretched and unable to provide a timely response to communications. The gaps in communication which resulted caused lapses in momentum for the project. This was despite the fact that prior to this reorganisation the Conflict Projects Assistant was working on the project but had had much more limited and less substantive direct contact with the partners.

**Recommendation: For future peace-building and conflict prevention, management and resolution programming an improved ratio of MRG staff to partners is a strong and necessary investment to secure improved outcomes in terms of quality of program.**

### **External Institutional arrangements**

The partnership approach adopted by MRG in this project is a very suitable and appropriate one for work in the two areas of work – conflict prevention and advocacy. In the case of the latter, it is always more effective to have representation work undertaken by those affected who can speak from their own experience<sup>10</sup>. The provision of support to CBOs was also entirely in keeping with the capacity building focus of the project, reinforcing the principle of endogenous solutions to conflict issues, as well as encouraging actors closer to the communities with a deep knowledge of the dynamics to be involved in supporting positive approaches to relationships with their neighbouring communities. The danger in this situation though is that there is a risk of the CSO being representative of only a certain section of the community. This can influence the choices made concerning how to tackle the issues or who should be tackling the issues. While the evaluator saw or heard no evidence of this risk being realised, and the danger was minimal with such small and short term activities, nevertheless it is not entirely clear how this risk was managed in a systematic manner. While the main partners were requested to vet the CBOs in some cases, or suggest possible partners, in future greater involvement from MRG staff in the field could be the way forward. The development of criteria and a due diligence process may be worth investing in for longer term partnerships.

**Recommendation: For future partnership programs MRG should invest in the development of an appropriate due diligence process to manage risk associated with choosing partners for conflict programs in unknown environments.**

From the perspective of the main partners there were a number of aspects that emerged in discussion with respect to their relationship with MRG which are summarised below.

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<sup>10</sup> In fact there was one strange situation with the launch of the Early Warning Brief on the Ik, where the room was filled with people – the media, representatives from government, including members of parliament from the district, civil society, donors and other stakeholders, but there was not a single Ik person there even though they were the focus of the event and everyone was speaking on their behalf! It is recognised that this is unusual for an MRG supported event of this nature.

## Communications and Technical Support

The following feedback was provided by partners on the views regarding the nature of the support and relationship with MRG:

- There is enormous respect for the London staff from the partners and this was a major positive feature. Partners appreciated the technical expertise, flexibility, adaptability, and accommodation to changing circumstances dictated by conditions in the field.
- Partners also appreciated the wisdom and support that was offered through discussion from the London office.
- There were a couple of very long gaps (several months) between communications with MRG London which were attributed to the fact that the program manager was overstretched. This meant that issues, mainly administrative ones with the majority being small, were not addressed in a timely fashion. In some

cases though this was more significant, for instance in the transfer of funds through to the partners.

- There were also questions and frustrations that rose over the ‘incessant’ to-ing and fro-ing over the preparation of documents for publication such as the early warning briefings. This is obviously tricky as quality is critically important as this is information for public consumption that is hoped to be a quality resource for many years to come. However, the question has to be asked as to whether there is a more intensive and effective process for this quality control to occur. The partners noted that the whole process took a very long time which meant momentum and enthusiasm was lost. In addition the majority of the papers were released very late in the project which was problematic.



The demand for the local brew in Karamoja has actually created linkages between the women on both sides of the conflict (the brewers) as they now work with each other to produce it

## Adaptability

In terms of adaptability, it is useful to consider what sort of changes would have impacted on the program and which stakeholders. The major activities of the project were not too dependent on the context: capacity building, production of reports, and advocacy. At the community level, the CBOs that were visited had programs that were relatively small in scope and there were no particular issues that arose that necessitated changes in program design. There were issues around access (due to rains) and security that meant there were delays in implementation and scope but that did not impinge on the overall project. In these cases MRG was flexible and understanding of the need to recognise that activities in the project areas are subject to emerging conditions. The major partner’s activities were more aimed at advocacy and capacity building and there were not obvious changes in circumstance or missed opportunities that impacted on the program effectiveness.

The ToR does ask for observations on tracking and monitoring mechanisms, and the evaluator was not aware of the existence of any formal tracking mechanisms with respect to the project. For the

majority of the program activities this was not significant but for the future if MRG is to continue working in the conflict sector then it is worth considering how to institutionalise monitoring of the relevant conflict dynamics they might be working on. This is most important in the conflict field where responsiveness to outbreaks of violence and other issues have the most significance. Fortunately this was not the case for the project.

### **Cost and funding of the Operation**

The cost of the project was modest when compared to the spread of work, partners, activities and geographic coverage. It was also extremely cost efficient with MRG staffing costs being approximately half of the costs required by a large INGO to run such a project. A quick rough and ready calculation would suggest that the human resource costs for MRG were approximately 15% of the total direct, project costs compared to expected Human resource costs of approximately ca 30% of the direct costs. This suggests that the project was extremely cost effective in terms of cost benefit, but in the experience of the evaluator greater benefits and outcomes would accrue from investing more in personnel on the ground to mentor and support partners where they needed it as well as keep an eye on risk management and accountability. A further observation (opinion) would be that within a similar program in the future, the small funding pool for CBO pilot activities could be expanded to enable either slightly larger levels of funding to be awarded where appropriate, or to adopt a 'string of pearls' approach with a series of consecutive awards to the same partner to enable additional follow-up activities to be implemented that might be aimed at enhancing sustainability or investments. It is acknowledged that some CBOs did implement two pilot activities from the project and assuming that a due diligence process has been put in place, this is also cost effective in terms of energy and expended by the project in assessing partners.

In terms of overall levels of funding, the evaluator is unsure of the limitations on the availability of funds from the donor for the project. In this case though, if up against the funding ceiling, cost benefit ratios would, in my opinion, be maintained or even enhanced were geographic spread reduced and the freed up resources applied to additional human resources, increasing the funding pool to enable more partner activities to take place, investing in more systematic capacity building and skills trainings, as well as exchanges and exposure trips to each other, and support to further follow-up advocacy activities. .

## **6. Results and Impact**

I have combined these two aspects as for many of the activities it is too early to consider impact and indeed the scope of the activities mean that impact is difficult to measure and may be transitory in nature. Outcomes and results are therefore discussed simultaneously. When considering the *impact* of this project over the past three years it is important to bear in mind the following issues and constraints that have a bearing on the measurement of impact and conclusions drawn.

- **The Multi-causal nature of conflict issues and the multitude of stakeholders involved.**
- **The Intangible elements of peace-building:** It is difficult to measure intangible elements such as reconciliation, peace.
- **The incompatibility of conflict cycles and the normal project cycle.** Conflict issues do not fit neatly into normal project cycles. They may occasionally follow some seasonal and cultural

patterns in pastoralist societies but generally the ebb and flow of conflict issues are not constant which means that both donor funding and programming patterns may not always be a good fit.

- **Peace building as a process and an end point:** Development activities are often simultaneously considered a process as well as an end point and for success and impact to be 'measured' in traditional ways and terms is difficult if one views conflict prevention and management fall within the 'process' part of the spectrum.
- **Conflict systems:** Many aspects of the sector are interlinked within broader societal systems and failure to address conflict prevention at the system level may mean that investment in activities with a small focus may not be effective. This because impact on the system may not necessarily be reflected one set of relationships. So activities may actually result in a negative impact of increased insecurity within another set of relationships that are conditional on the first set, but not being considered within the program.
- **The timing of when you consider impact:** The non-linear nature of complex social change means that an evaluation will provide a snapshot at that particular time, but still may not necessarily adequately reflect the impact of the program as this may emerge (both positively or negatively) later. Indeed stakeholder perceptions of the impact of program activities may also fluctuate depending on when they are questioned or reflecting on the situation. For instance, opinions immediately after a community peace conference will probably be different if canvassed six months later (which may depend on how many follow-up activities or commitments have been fulfilled), which in turn may be different a year later as well. This is because the importance and role that an event may play changes with hindsight, time and reflection. As well as this the timing of outside factors may skew data results (e.g., an annual survey which happens to be scheduled just after a drought may produce results not necessarily indicative of program success and progress as there are 'masking' factors).
- **Attributing perceived positive impacts to the program:** Direct impact attribution to program activities is an ongoing challenge given the multi-causal and multifaceted nature of the sector. It is usual, as well that there may be many actors working on the conflict issues simultaneously and so any positive impact is most likely shared with contributions from the different actors and threads underway.
- **Diversity of activities:** For MRG the diversity of program activities within the region provides a challenge to consideration of impact at a higher level than the most basic micro-activity CBO activities undertaken and will be very qualitative in nature.
- **Geographic spread of activities:** Similarly activities spread over a broad geographic area, coupled with insufficient staffing levels, stretches the system and exacerbates the challenges of measuring impact

For these reasons, while MRG has outlined the expected impact indicators in the project document (and listed below), the evaluator adopted more of an 'outcome mapping' approach in considering the impacts of the larger overall project and in particular the 'pilot projects'. An outcome mapping approach shifts the emphasis of assessment from just the products of a program to focus more on the changes in behaviour, relationships, actions, and activities in the people, groups, and organizations that were being assessed.

Figure 2 the key to successful conflict prevention - good communication. A Karamojong woman involved in early warning is in close contact with the authorities and colleagues on the Teso side of the conflict

It also acknowledges that the activities are being undertaken within an ecosystem of other interventions and factors that are influencing the same sector, and therefore does not seek to attribute success any of the project activities alone, but rather proposes that the project has made a *contribution*, along with others, to any change that has occurred.



to

### **Impact and Outcomes at the Individual Activity Level (in particular the Pilot Projects)**

The pilot projects implemented by small nascent CBOs were made possible through the provision of very modest support for pilot activity implementation. The brief of the CBOs was to design an intervention aimed at conflict prevention and inter-community tensions at the community level following staff having participated in a conflict resolution training workshop. The majority of the interventions that were visited (see table below) were indeed aimed at conflict prevention broadly speaking and had positive outcomes and impacts. In many ways, these pilot projects were far more successful and managed to effect far greater change than one might expect 'hitting well above their weight'. In this respect the cost benefit ratio is extraordinary with the efficacy of activities surprisingly high! There often were, however, many factors involved in the achievements and outcomes identified below and attributed to these activities and so it is important to note the activities made a *contribution* to the impact but everything cannot be attributed solely to the project activities. Nevertheless these activities often played an initiating or catalytic role that means the results may well not have been achieved without their input. It is also important to note a caveat too, made in this report elsewhere, regarding sustainability of these outcomes. They are unlikely to be sustained without additional resources and a continued momentum. It is also important to note the enormous contextual change in the Karamoja following the recent government disarmament programs. This has reduced the security issues significantly which also makes it very difficult to ascribe any changes in security to the pilot project activities directly. The impact is really at the trust-building levels where these activities have started to make a contribution.

Table of CBOs and Pilot activities visited by the evaluator <sup>11</sup>			
Country	Organisation	Key Activity	Summary Outcome / Impact
Kenya	OPDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research</li> <li>• Publications</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information from the research on early warning was used and communicated at public 'Barazzas'</li> <li>• The reports were used by the media extensively but not apparently by the government</li> <li>• The project work has <i>contributed</i> to a greater recognition of the tribe and Ogiek people with people wanting to know more (eg TV programs on Ogiek)</li> <li>• Tribes bordering the Ogiek better understand the signs and significant omens re conflict that affect them</li> <li>• The Ogiek reported that they had helped contain some violence by supporting the peace committee and participating in negotiations and dispute resolution<sup>12</sup></li> <li>• Empowered staff</li> <li>• Deeper relationship with EWC</li> <li>• Unintended outcome – tensions with the Kipsigis and the Kalenjin have increased as they are seen to be supporters of the government. The Ogiek are trying to diffuse the issue</li> <li>• The government noted that there had been an increase in tensions due to the increased 'voice' and confidence of the Ogiek</li> <li>• Some increased internal political conflict amongst the Ogiek but also increased cohesion as a people and brought them together</li> </ul>
Kenya	EWC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research</li> <li>• Conflict Training</li> <li>• Publications</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The drought and conflict early warning briefing report was considered to have raised considerable awareness amongst stakeholders</li> <li>• The publications provided an opportunity for EWC to interact with INGOs and government</li> <li>• Relationships with the media have gained strength and were successful</li> <li>• Series of foundation training programs from MRG have built capacity in the organisation considerably<sup>13</sup></li> </ul>
Kenya	CODEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Football for Peace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relationships between the Kikuyu and the Endorois in particular are now better than they were before the election</li> <li>• Can see Endorois people from Baringo at the market doing business with the Kikuyu (previously this was not the case)</li> </ul>

<sup>11</sup> For the full list of pilot projects see Annex 4

<sup>12</sup> This was reported but not triangulated with all stakeholders however

<sup>13</sup> Not completely clear how many of these trainings were under this project

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Men from Baringo can come and drink beer here until late in the evening (previously not possible due to security concerns)</li> <li>• Shared transport routes and joint use of matatus. Previously those owned by Kalenjins were only used by the Kalenjins and so on. This meant that some routes were to destinations were not useable by some tribes. They had to use alternate routes.<sup>14</sup></li> <li>• Women are able to go to the 'shamba' to farm now, without men accompanying them.</li> </ul>
Kenya	SWEEDO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict analysis meetings with youth and women</li> <li>• Develop a film documentary</li> <li>• Stakeholder dialogue meetings</li> <li>• Conflict Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased understanding of stakeholders (particularly women) of the conflict dynamics</li> <li>• Increased confidence of women to participate in meetings</li> <li>• Increased interest from donors in the issues affecting the Samburu due to the film documentary</li> <li>• Communications between Pokot and Samburu improved dramatically with scheduled monthly meetings between elders to ensure conflict does not break out.</li> <li>• Also less formal meetings at market days between elders increased for shared communications – elders now phone each other 'cross-line'</li> <li>• One year of peace so far in previous conflict area (The 'war' in this area had been ongoing for the last 6 years)</li> <li>• Raiding reduced to criminal perpetrators with livestock being returned when possible, by elders.</li> <li>• Pokot and Samburu share grazing and water in this area again</li> <li>• Children can take livestock to the grazing areas safely by themselves now without adult supervision as security has improved.</li> <li>• Women sometimes sleep over cross-line<sup>15</sup></li> </ul>
Kenya	CIWOCH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict Training</li> <li>• Peace committee formation</li> <li>• Land Ranch committee formations</li> <li>• Pastoralist Cross-border meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The peace committee reformed with greater inclusiveness of women, youth and other stakeholders</li> <li>• Improved functioning of the peace committee who are more active and now understand their role</li> <li>• Communications between conflicting Maasai</li> </ul>

<sup>14</sup> All agreed on this and while it cannot be completely and solely attributed to the project activities, these certainly contributed significantly.

<sup>15</sup> Note that (a) Sweedo were not the only agency working on this issue – but they made a good contribution (b) this is an area where the Pokot and the Samburu are the only stakeholders. In other areas (notably in Isiolo and also further to the west) Pokot and Samburu are still very much at war and the conflict dynamics are very different, more complex and with multiple stakeholders (eg Somalis, Borana, Rendille and others) as well as perceived government involvement and manipulation of the dynamics.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security monitoring</li> </ul>	<p>clans improved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased agreement and negotiation between groups <i>before</i> moving their animals or crossing boundaries which has reduced tensions and outbreaks of conflict</li> <li>• Local women are better informed about the issues of conflict as well as politics and are more active in their involvement in tackling and preventing it</li> <li>• Communities now speak out against conflict at 'Barazzas' – when previously it was only the politicians and leaders. This gives the messages more credence</li> <li>• Improved communications and checking of information by clans before taking violent action</li> <li>• Improved communication between the police and the communities regarding conflict issues which has prevented some violence as well as non-violent conflicts (eg prevention of access to water or grazing for some groups by others)</li> </ul>
Kenya	Ndugu Zangu Christian Community Charitable Trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace committee formation</li> <li>• Community Dialogues</li> <li>• Leaders meetings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pokot and Samburu now share grazing and jointly re-opened a 'defunct' livestock market at Morowak without the need for a police presence</li> <li>• Reduction in cattle rustling</li> <li>• Both sides will now return stolen livestock</li> <li>• Greater trust between the two sides and efforts increased by elders to reduce the negative or false rumours that circulate increasing the chance of conflict</li> <li>• Have trained 9 members from each clan on conflict management</li> <li>• Improved peace committee capacity<sup>16</sup></li> </ul>
Uganda	CECORE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research</li> <li>• Publications</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased awareness of the plight of the Ik in government and more broadly in the public domain as a neglected issue with previously few people knowing their situation</li> <li>• Improved skills in conflict management in the CSO community</li> </ul>
	Tip-Teso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stakeholder Dialogues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved cooperation and collaboration between faith-based organisations working on peace issues</li> <li>• Improved understanding of church communities of the need for peace with the Karamoja</li> <li>• Altered language and behaviours from community and political leaders. A reduction in the use of insensitive language</li> <li>• Women in the targeted communities have now increased their participation in</li> </ul>

<sup>16</sup> Note that in this case I only spoke with the NGO staff and this was not formally triangulated in the field. However this is also the area where Sweedo were working, and they worked together on one activity together, so I was able to speak with the same communities and they bore out the basic features described here.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>meetings and voice their needs and thoughts</li> <li>Improved communications between Iteso and Karamoja district local governments</li> </ul>
	<b>NSCDA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Radio Talk shows</li> <li>De-silting a dam</li> <li>Stakeholder Consultations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is now smooth movement between Karamoja and Teso with the Karamajong bringing cattle to market in Teso.</li> <li>Cattle-raiding has reduced to individual criminal acts now</li> <li>Communications between the security forces and communities has improved (eg with business people in Teso informing security people when there is a raid who then track suspects)</li> </ul>
	<b>Living Hope</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Meetings</li> <li>Radio Talk shows</li> <li>Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved and increased communications between the communities and the security forces when a raid is planned or has occurred with peace monitors</li> <li>Improved trust, tolerance and inclusive behaviour from the Iteso communities towards Karamajong families living in Teso</li> <li>Greater awareness and understanding from Iteso communities of the issues between the Iteso and Karamajong</li> </ul>
	<b>FIDO</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Consultations</li> <li>Training</li> <li>Community Dialogues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved and increased communications between the communities and the security forces when a raid is planned or has occurred with peace monitors</li> <li>Greater awareness and understanding from Iteso communities of the issues between the Iteso and Karamajong</li> </ul>

However, realistically, long term sustainable change and impact from these activities, despite success at the community level, is very doubtful as the energy is likely to dissipate without further momentum and change fuelling the process to become a virtuous cycle (see more under sustainability section).

As well as positive change there is always the risk of activities creating some unintended negative consequences. There were no glaring examples that came to light during the evaluation, although a District Commissioner in Kenya from Nakuru did note that he felt that there had been an increase in verbal confrontations and problems between Ogiek and other groups since the Ogiek have found their voice. He believed that this had emerged due to the increased expectations from the Ogiek about the return of their traditional lands and the resolution of the land title issues already been given out by the government. He also noted that as a result of the advocacy work the Ogiek had been able to get a ward of their own even though their population is smaller than would normally warrant its provision<sup>17</sup>. The Ogiek elders also noted that there has been a divisive internal split within their community as a result of differing views on the way forward now. If managed well this is not necessarily a negative consequence and could lead to a more positive position. This type of

<sup>17</sup> This is a tremendous area of potential interesting research for MRG in the future as Kenya is a fertile ground for exploring the continuing politicisation of ethnicity. This has major positive and negative potential effects on the fate of minorities that deserve to be documented and analysed.

outcome is only to be expected when sensitive issues such as this first come to light before the internal debates hopefully lead to greater consensus and the community can make up their minds.

### Impact at the Meta level

It is difficult to say anything much about the sum impact of all the different activities that have been undertaken in the course of this project because firstly activities have spanned a huge range of issues from the very specific to the generic. Geographically activities have also been scattered over such a diverse and massive area that they are effectively both siloed in their respective countries and within the country deliberate connectedness between activities and CSO / CBO partners has not been well facilitated by MRG or their main partners. This also means that even if they are tackling some of the same conflict systems they are not working sufficiently collaboratively<sup>18</sup>. The best that one can say is that together all of the activities; pilot projects, research, capacity building, advocacy and experience sharing have made a contribution (along with other activities in the sector undertaken by other actors) to a deeper understanding of conflict prevention, and the relationship between conflict, natural resources and minorities.

Comparison of stated Impact Indicators with field based inquiries		
The project Impact indicators		Comment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leaders in at least 1 community per target country reports that the intervention of local CSOs has been successful in solving conflicts in a non violent way by 2011</li> </ul>	Partially achieved	<p><b>Kenya:</b> This was certainly the case in Kenya where the efforts of two groups visited; Sweedo and Ndugu Zangu Christian Community Charitable Trust had effectively prevented conflict occurring between two communities – the Samburu and the Pokot along one conflict line. They had also successfully introduced a mechanism to contain the conflict with regular meetings scheduled between Pokot and Samburu elders (see photo).</p> <p><b>Uganda:</b> In Uganda the nature of the CSO activities was around conflict prevention rather than interventions to solve conflicts per se.</p> <p><b>Sudan:</b> Not visited.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2012, studies demonstrate that potential conflicts have been contained / prevented in at least 3 instances involving minority communities in East Africa</li> </ul>	More than Achieved	<p><b>Kenya:</b> Codef, managed to contain a potential conflict between the Kikuyu community and the Enderois by building trust and relationships between the two communities. Ndugu Zangu reduced cattle rustling significantly. SWEEDO managed to reduce open conflict between the Samburu and the Pokot on one 'frontline'. CIWOCH also was able to improve negotiated access to grazing lands between groups on community ranches.</p> <p><b>Uganda:</b> Activities were not a good fit with the way that this indicator is articulated, however what can be said is that positive relationship building was significant between conflicting parties with improved trust, communication and cross-line mobility. These changes imply that the possibility of conflict erupting has been reduced (hence contained).</p> <p><b>Sudan:</b> Not visited</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior officials in decision maker institutions (especially EU institutions) report better coordination and exchange with</li> </ul>	Mainly Achieved	<p>Officials in government in Uganda and Kenya that I spoke to were mainly at the lower levels of the 'decision-maker' institutions but they all did report strong improved communications and coordination with CSOs. The disappointing aspect was the relationships with EU in all three countries which had not developed well. In Kenya the main partners reported that they had not had interactions with the EU, in Sudan the EU</p>

<sup>18</sup> Small caveat – as I did not visit the west of Uganda, it is possible that this is happening in that part of the country.

national peace-building CSOs by the end of 2011		representative did not recall having met with the partners despite having attended two launches. In Uganda the coordination and communication with the EU was much more positive and regular – not least as CECORE is based in Kampala while in other countries they are very distant geographically from the EU offices and capital cities.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2012, innovative field-based strategies have been adopted to tackle intercommunity tensions in East Africa</li> </ul>	<b>Achieved</b>	A very broad range of successful field based strategies were adopted to tackle inter-community tensions in East Africa. The activities, while appropriate and sound, were not particularly innovative as all the projects visited and a quick review of the activities in the proposals of those not visited, reveal that there is not a single activity there that has not been undertaken regularly in East Africa for the last ten years or so. That being said these activities were often 'new' in the areas that they were implemented by partners
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By the end of 2011, sub-contractors implement at least 15 successful project / advocacy campaigns in the target countries</li> </ul>	<b>More than Achieved</b>	CBOs conducted 26 such successful activities in the target countries of which the evaluator visited 10 of these projects.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partners meet with national / international decision makers in country at least twice during the year following the end of the intervention</li> </ul>	<b>Partially Achieved</b>	Partners all met with national and international decision makers in all three countries at the very least twice and often many more times during the course of the project. With respect to the probability of partners extending advocacy efforts, around issues initiated during the project, but after it has ended; while speculative (as there was no evidence seen) , it is likely that the main partners with longer term agendas – such as OPDP, and EWC in particular, and possibly CECORE will continue in their advocacy efforts. It is considerably less likely that the CBOs will do so, although at least two (SWEEDO and CIWOCH) provided some indication that there are issues they will continue to lobby about.

## 7. Cross cutting issues

### Capacity development and Partnership

Capacity development was a key results area of the program and therefore received appropriate levels of attention. The specific targets for capacity building efforts were the main partners, the CBOs and their staff.

In considering the impacts on capacity development of the community and nascent civil society organisations<sup>19</sup> participating in the project, there are six main elements to look at - outlined in the diagram below. For the main partners, the project made efforts to address aspects in the majority of areas.

1. Governance Structures and enhanced Core Management competencies
2. Access to resources including financial and continuing education or knowledge resource.
3. Access to secretariat and administration support
4. Communication networks or systems to ensure data collection and full information relating to process and results

<sup>19</sup> Which I have assumed to be extremely close to the community – which may be a false assumption as it is very difficult to assess the extent to which the organisations genuinely represent the community in such a short visit.

5. Linkages to Policy Development Forums and Bodies or Advocacy for change initiated from community aspiration
6. Technical Skills enhancement and improved competencies

There were some blurred edges though as the three main partners visited were unable to distinguish clearly whether or not inputs had been received under this project or under other MRG project support running simultaneously (eg EWC had a strategic planning meeting supported by MRG). While MRG does have a capacity building tool the overall feedback from the partners was that capacity building was very welcome and appreciated but that it was somewhat ad hoc in nature, with it not really being clear who had had training and who had not. Trainings that were mentioned and appreciated by partners included (corresponding to the 6 areas above) such as financial management, monitoring and evaluation, advocacy, and media, resource mobilisation.

The CBOs had not received any training except for some participants in the conflict management workshop with staff members benefitting. This was as had been planned in the project but in the light of hindsight they needed some additional inputs to increase the possibility of sustainability.

Requests for more support from the majority of the participants<sup>20</sup>, particularly the CBOs were consistently in the following areas:


- Strategic Planning
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Strategic Advocacy planning
- Report writing
- Resource Mobilisation
- Proposal Writing

In the opinion of the evaluator it would also be useful to have some support in the following areas:

- Gender
- Internal governance
- Fund-raising strategy
- Strengths Based approaches
- Advocacy monitoring frameworks
- Advanced research skills

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<sup>20</sup> Some partners have received all of these trainings and some have received only some of them



**Capacity to understand and intervene in conflict situations:**

**The Main Partners:** The project has made some progress on the capacity building results area. In line with the Terms of Reference, the most important facet is to assess, what effect has the project had (if any) on partners’ capacities to understand and intervene in conflict situations. This has more relevant for the CBOs participating rather than the main partners. This is because their roles and mandates are not so much to intervene directly in conflicts themselves. OPDP has a specific constituency and is not set up to be an organisation servicing other constituents where conflict may be more active at present. The conflicts that beset the Ogiek are largely ‘relatively’ latent at the moment. EWC is also focussed on its own constituency’s issues and while it has an organisational strategy document this does not identify conflict and peace-building specifically, although it could be squeezed into sustainable development. While CECORE’s main business is Conflict Resolution the bulk of their work is facilitation and empowerment through capacity building and training. So the project has not really supplemented their skills and abilities even though in these three cases it has expanded their understanding of the conflicts and minority groups outside of their existing knowledge base. CECORE undertook a major role in the development of the manual used for training as this is already a core skill. So it has to be acknowledged that little has changed on this level and there also appeared to be little appetite for taking a more active role in intervening. Exploration of the partners’ role in this field should be explored further by MRG if the work is to continue with these organisations in this sector addressing the basic questions: Does the organisation wish to undertake work in this sector? What role is appropriate for the organisation in conflict prevention? What are the skills necessary and gaps in their abilities to undertake this role

(whether it be a role in facilitation, active involvement, provision of the information needs such as conflict analysis etc)? How can MRG support them to pursue their aims in the sector?

The lack of clarity and depth in direction for the partners is more of a reflection of two factors: Insufficient participatory planning with the partners in the design process of the project and linked with this was the lack of clarity over the role of the partners in the project, noted earlier, and their expected role in the peace-building sector over the long term beyond the project life-time (aside from CECORE).

**The CBOs:** At the CBO level the impact of the project on capacity building has been most positively marked with organisations not only receiving some useful training inputs but also being able to undertake a few activities based on the trainings received and the resources for the small pilot activities. It has enabled some CBOs to better understand the conflict situations that they are situated in and it has certainly increased their confidence to intervene and in most cases increased the respect that they have earned from communities. The impact though has to be qualified on several levels. Firstly not all CBOs that I visited had received the training so in their cases the increased capacity was gained more through the experiential practice of running the 'pilot'. In some cases they also received the benefit of some mentoring and support from other organisations also working in the sector. Secondly this capacity has a limited shelf life for some of those who benefited at this stage. I



CBOs are close to the people

mean by this that without application of the skills gained the efficacy of the training will have little impact. The ability to continue to grow in capacity in this sector, to some extent, requires continued access to resources for the CBOs. It is likely that many of the CBOs will disappear or they will change their profile by having new staff as others move on through. Equally the majority of the CBOs are rather dependent on external resources and this means that they are susceptible to being donor driven. If a donor (or intermediary such as MRG) has funds for livelihood work, then they will design interventions for livelihoods in order to access these resources both for themselves as well as the community. At best there will be an infusion of conflict awareness within the new project. The assumption underlying the building of trainings is that the skills will travel with the people too, but in practice this is not necessarily true, it depends on what they end up doing. This does not mean at all that these trainings are not worth doing – they are extremely worthwhile – as they serve a variety of purposes being networking events, sources for personal development that will be incrementally built. One should simply be realistic about their long term impact and the need for continued training, refreshers and opportunities to apply their training. A 'once-off' will have limited value.

**The Community:** At the community level, the pilot activities were the main vehicle for increasing capacity as well as the 'flow-on' from the foundational training in conflict management that the CBOs received from MRG partners translated into actions on the ground. The feedback from focus group discussions with those that were visited appears to have empowered those community members involved. Confidence levels of those participating, increased levels of 'purposeful

engagement’, relationships between stakeholders and attitudinal change have all occurred<sup>21</sup> which is very positive and constitute the first steps in conflict transformation. The critical difficulty is how to sustain their interest and participation. This is the crux of all community development and equally true for the peace-building sector. If they do not see the value in maintaining efforts and do not see visible benefits then initiatives will peter out without external inputs – and as soon as communities start to ask for per diems, or resources for their ‘jobs’ (except perhaps capital inputs like bicycles) then one is on a slippery slope. It is recognised that the issues being discussed here are way beyond the scope of the project and intent for the community and CBOs (and will be explored further in the sustainability section) but the experience of MRG and partners through this project points towards a need for a more focussed but strategic and holistic empowerment approach to conflict transformation. Conflict Prevention is an important but single aspect within a bundle of necessary threads for change which requires deeper analysis and understanding of the relationships between and within the groups affected by the stakeholders that can then be translated into a commitment for change that emerges and is expressed and supported by the community.

**Government:** While it is recognised that this project was aimed at civil society, there were missed opportunities in training government officials at the local levels in conflict management and skills. This is perhaps an important area that could be remedied in the future as the capacity of government across the projects areas, in this sector, is very varied and on a couple of occasions there were requests made to the evaluator for assistance in future also to be provided to a broader range of stakeholders in addition to civil society actors - particularly the local government as well as peace committees (in Kenya) at the district level in terms of capacity building.

### Other Dimensions of Capacity

The relationship between MRG and the partners is highly valued, not simply a conduit for resources. MRG should determine how best to build on it, play to strengths and develop the weaker aspects. Thus one critical element of the relationship is the mentoring component. As noted elsewhere in the report, certain individuals were considered strong and critical resources for partners (media, legal support, broader general support). How can MRG best institutionalise the transfer of skills? Where and should the stronger relationships be located and utilised more deliberately? Or would a more rigorous analytical approach risk losing the elements that make it a success?

The Current Relationship between MRG and its Partners	
Strengths	Frustrations
Flexibility and understanding of field constraints on activities	Perceived nit-picking over reporting and administration aspects
Provision of Technical support	Unrealistic expectations of ‘accountability’ without the support to fulfil them
	Need for improved policies on exchange rates, the ‘80% funding rule’
Mentoring from some individuals	Inconsistent Communication – all or nothing

<sup>21</sup> These are qualitative changes of course that I did not attempt to quantify given the scope and modest nature of the interventions, although if MRG were to decide to focus on one or two specific conflict arenas then I suggest that as part of the M+E framework self-assessment journals or compilation indices are used to document changes in these dimensions.

Recognition of key support issues more broadly	Never-ending backwards and forwards over documents
A supportive 'shoulder to lean on'	Lack of clarity over the role of field based staff and London staff
	Partners would like more field visits from MRG
	Insufficient guidance for reporting and fulfilling financial donor accounting procedures

**Recommendation:** A partners meeting be held that specifically explores the nature of partnership with MRG from all angles, determines a shared vision and identifies the best means to achieve it given resource constraints.



Maasai villagers waiting their turn at the water point in Magadi illustrating the people's reliance on constrained natural resources in extreme conditions

A further dimension to be explored in the domain of partnership is whether or not a more 'networked' approach and clustering of partners would yield improved results in the capacity building dimension. As suggested elsewhere in the

report rather than undertaking capacity building on an organisation by organisation basis, instead select a group of actors – possibly associated with a conflict system – and work with them as a group. This would more easily allow for additional added value activities to be undertaken such as peer monitoring, peer reviewing of proposals or research, joint research activities, shared human resources and policy development approaches, joint activities where appropriate, peer mentoring, joint advocacy and so on, which would also serve the purpose of reducing reliance on external actors like MRG on a piecemeal basis.

While other organisations have supported some of the main partners in this project, the level of support in terms of capacity building was low and non-existent in some cases. Across the board as noted previously MRG's support was highly valued.

### Experiential Research

Part of the sound idea of MRG in its capacity building approach was to provide opportunities for partners and CBOs to learn how to conduct field-based political analysis and research on issues that are important to the African organizations. In the case of CECORE the process clearly progressed, with the first early warning brief that they produced, involving an external consultant who essentially taught their staff 'on the job' and then the following two reports were undertaken by CECORE staff themselves. This built capacity and confidence while ensuring quality control of the product. In Kenya the process was not quite so smooth with one of the research consultants when interviewed, agreeing that the process in theory made sense but that it needs far more investment in terms of time and effort in mentoring the local organizations to be able to undertake the exercise themselves at a strong standard. He also believed though that this principle should be extended to other organizations who understand the issues at the grass-roots level but are not able to voice the issues in a way that reaches decision-makers' ears. Other suggestions for further improving this

successful approach and technique in future programs including producing the same information obtained from the research in various forms for different audiences:

- (a) A more academic form (eg the OPDP Report on the Dynamics of conflicts in Mau Forest Complex towards an early warning and monitoring system) for some audiences.
- (b) A second shorter document that suggests ways to move from the theory of the early warning indicators to the practise of actualising them and linking the indicators to working early warning mechanisms that also help to connect the District Peace Committees, with the Administrative Peace Corps, to community peace monitors.
- (c) Thirdly a small pamphlet or flyer that could be disseminated to grass-roots organisations, peace committees and stakeholders.

#### Recommendations:

1. **That MRG take a more structured and deliberate approach and process with their capacity building support to partners and sub-partners with all stakeholders understanding the parameters, their roles, and expectations and responsibilities around capacity building. This should include a participatory, facilitated self-assessment process and inputs that are in direct support of the organisational mandate and achievement of the organisations' strategic plan.<sup>22</sup>**
2. **That MRG consider a longer term more sustained and 'networked' or clustered approach to their capacity building and support of civil society.**

## Sustainability

Peace-building and conflict management require consistent sustained inputs for longer term success and sustainability and without this the progress that has been gained through these small steps risks being lost. In this respect, the CBOs have had their capacity built in the area of peace-building and are organisationally stronger to be able to compete for funds from other donors. In fact a positive unintended effect of the project was that SWEEDO and CIWOCH reported that they had already had some success in this regard being able to access funds from other sources and attributing this to their success in working with MRG (although in the case of CIWOCH this is a result of a longer term relationship not specifically an outcome of this project alone). They also reported having more confidence and being able to interact with donors following this project. With such small organisations though there is always a tension between the needs of individuals, their relationship with communities and the need to make a living. This does mean that CBOs are vulnerable to being donor driven and drifting in the winds of undertaking activities where there is available funding. The activities of the program have had a positive impact on conflict prevention as well as building trust between communities. The expectation of the project in terms of sustainability with the "...stabilization of a community's relationship with its land and water..." is unlikely to materialize in this project period. This is partly because the activities that were undertaken did not end up addressing these particular issues at the level to create a sustainable outcome. Such an approach would require deep long term investment in addressing the structural issues underlying

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<sup>22</sup> Where they have one and if they don't then this is the start of the process around which to build and prioritise inputs.

communities' interaction with their environment and each other. The activities were deliberately of a pilot nature and that necessarily constrained the long term outcomes.

### **Institutional level**

The project was very ambitious in this area. For instance the proposal states that “the conflict management capacity of civil society in the three countries will be *significantly* strengthened, an impact that will continue long after the end of the program”. It should be recognized that there are multiple conflicts in various parts of each these three countries, some of which are very serious involving many deaths and are chronic in nature having been continuing for many years. The majority of these conflicts are also extremely complex, often interlinked with each other and with deep structural causes. There is no doubt that the analysis and intent of the project is correct in its recognition that communities and civil society have a larger part to play in managing these conflicts (alongside and in conjunction with government). The project has managed to create a few structures that will allow activities to continue into the future after the end of the project. There has also been ‘ownership’ of outcomes to a certain extent. The evaluator is conscious of giving a mixed message in this report at this stage. On the one hand the impact at the community level has been high, on the other hand in comparison to the needs it has been a very modest contribution. In this respect and in the light of long regional experience, NGO inputs in the area of peace-building have had limited long term sustainability at the institutional level without continued sustained funding coupled with work on integrating them into emerging government structures (in Kenya). In Uganda and Sudan the government role in peace-building is limited to the security forces but the development of more sophisticated joint civil society government mechanisms could be an important area for MRG to focus its advocacy work.

The proposal also notes that “the action will aim to gain institutional sustainability by strengthening the capacity of intergovernmental actors in the region to address conflicts over land and water (such as the European Commission, IGAD, CEWARN and AU), by providing high quality research, analysis and policy recommendations.” For this aspect to gain any traction realistically it requires a more strategic, detailed and rigorous advocacy plan and actions, than was possible within this project, that targets these institutions and people within them. At face value it does beg the question of how many people in these institutions at this time has received, read or engaged with these issues? How have they accessed the report? Who within the institutions has been approached by MRG or its partners? This is a very worthwhile aim but remains, in my opinion, in the ‘to do’ pile for MRG.

### **Policy level**

At the policy level the project has made a good start with the documentation of relevant issues through the early warning briefs and the research conducted with their associated recommendations. The next steps for future project activities require the application of this knowledge and research to be incorporated into relevant policy documents of the countries. At this stage there is a gap between the work and whether or not these messages will find their way in some form into national or local policies. To this end it is suggested that MRG should engage in (a) a mapping of relevant policies (b) an analysis of these documents with respect to the issues being considered around conflict, minorities and natural resources (c) development of a strategy to more actively influence stakeholders which might include partnerships with other actors who have the political and institutional capacity to gain a seat at policy dialogues and policy formulation processes. What are the opportunities for interventions or influencing these processes? Who are the other

stakeholders that are advocating similar change? Some of MRG's partners in this project are already involved with coalitions such as the Land Alliance (in Kenya). In future programs, a lesson learned from this project is that a more deliberate collaboration with such bodies at the national level may be helpful in developing a more strategic approach to policy change.

## Gender

The proposal notes that MRG will make "efforts ... to target organisations working with women". Unfortunately at the moment there are still few organisations that are working directly with women in the target areas. Despite valiant and industrious efforts, the project struggled to gain traction with women's issues in the way that was perhaps originally envisaged. As noted in the constraints section the evaluator did not visit the West of Uganda so these comments do not include that area. The Kenyan tribes and communities as well as the Ugandan tribes within the project areas are still deeply conservative in their perspectives on male and female roles in society and this means that change is and will continue to be hard incremental work. In pastoralist societies in East Africa women are not yet participating fully in the development of their communities despite being extraordinarily strong. This situation is slowly changing though and some of the CBO partners did their best to push harder in this area. In particular, Sweedo and Ciwoch involved women strongly in their interventions (which was why they were chosen as partners). This was partly because the leaders of these two organisations are strong and charismatic women leaders in their own right.

Some organisations admitted their relative weakness on this front and noted that they had not really focused their work on women and had not invested sufficiently in including them. In Uganda, the partners that the evaluator visited had also tried to include women more substantially in their interventions. In many cases women did take a lead role (see photo 3 – a very active Karamajong community peace worker) and are contributing strongly to change in this area.

Overall MRG has made a modest contribution within the constraints of the cultural contexts in which the project was operating. In the future, on the basis of this project though, MRG could adopt a few different strategies in continuing to push hard on this front:

- Support some specific women's peace programs (rather than only broader community based ones) that empower and provide opportunities for women to take a lead on addressing conflict or community issues. This could include 'women to women' initiatives cross-line such as joint economic activities in conjunction with peace work.
- Continue to support the inclusion of women in broader community initiatives while simultaneously providing training to women that is aimed at increasing their confidence and self-esteem. Thus MRG could explore and develop innovative ways to conduct trainings for peace committees or on conflict resolution and management in 'three parts'. Some exercises and capacity building targeting women alone, some with men alone as well as joint activities. This is so that women will participate more fully rather than sitting quietly within training. This sort of workshop could also explore women's role in conflict promotion as well as peace building and encourage women to develop and articulate action plans that address these aspects.
- Provide specific and deep gender trainings to all CBOs and partners
- Explore and develop innovative ways for women to take a role in promoting advocacy issues that MRG takes onboard. For instance are there activities where women from the

communities target women leaders, where are women's (and more broadly gender) perspectives in MRG's policy briefs<sup>23</sup>? How can women's voices and issues *within* the broader issues be drawn out and enhanced. Is there a possible women's campaign that could be developed around some of these issues?

## Advocacy

MRG has a tremendous record in the field of advocacy and this project has created plenty of opportunities for minority groups to raise their voices about the issues that are important to them with a variety of stakeholders. This area of MRG and its partners' work illustrates all the elements of advocacy at its best. The early warning briefs themselves have enabled Minorities to participate in setting the agenda by raising significant issues that affect them. They have opened up the space for public debate, questioned the way that policy and legal justice have been administered, propose policy solutions, and targeted the political systems because they are not responding to people's needs.

The media coverage of the issues covered in the early warning briefs in the three countries was extensive and positive. This was not simply because media can be desperate for material at any cost! Rather it is a reflection of the following aspects: (a) the professional way that the report launches were organised and run (b) the access to and networks with, the media that MRG staff on the ground and their partners enjoy and (c) the quality of the reports and the research that was conducted providing the foundation for the points and recommendations that MRG partners were trying to make.

In future advocacy campaigns there are still some ways that MRG and its partners can hone their skills even further by addressing some of the following small issues obtained from direct observations and from interviews with donor stakeholders in particular:

- The Ik report launch that the evaluator attended appeared to be 'preaching to the converted' as all those who attended were already supportive of the issue and knew some of the facets of the problem. However, there was no one from the institutions that need to change or hear these messages such as the security forces, the military, government departments that could provide services, etc<sup>24</sup>
- Furthermore there were no Ik at the launch itself speaking for themselves and articulate their issues.
- While all the partners were clear about what advocacy is none of them had a structured advocacy strategy and associated work plan. The plea was that a lot of advocacy work is opportunistic. While this is undoubtedly true, a strategy does not prevent opportunistic work from being undertaken as well. The advantages of taking a more deliberate and structured approach are that one can identify strategic occasions or events to be targeted in the future on a short term, medium and long term basis. One can also ensure that targets for advocacy will not be omitted by mistake or because they are harder to meet. A plan enables the campaign to stay on track and for the organisation to hold itself to account.

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<sup>23</sup> It is acknowledged that the MRG published 'Land, Livelihoods and Identities: Inter-Community conflicts in East Africa' report by Young and Sing'Oei addresses this factor comprehensively

<sup>24</sup> To be fair CECORE had actually invited the police but they had not turned up. Nevertheless this points to the need for a more holistic advocacy plan to be developed for each campaign.

### **Targets for Advocacy:**

Generally speaking the partners have a clear idea of the advocacy targets that they are aiming for and good access to them. Government stakeholder and donor feedback at both the local and the national levels was positive regarding the quality of the work and the quality of relationships cultivated. Interviews with local government officials in Kenya and in Uganda both illustrated the positive relationships between the CSOs and government. This is an incremental and positive process and the project has made a contribution to the slow breaking down of traditionally suspicious attitudes from government regarding the role of civil society. The fact that relationships are collaborative and positive around the relatively sensitive topics chosen by MRG and that there are increasingly shared responsibilities through 'negotiated democracy' around issues affecting the people on the ground is a sound and positive impact that has also been contributed to by MRG and its partners.

**Long term change and Impacts:** There are only a few areas where MRG and its partners can bring about some improvement in their advocacy work and hone it a little further as outlined above, the big challenge for MRG though, which it has to decide whether or not to take up in future programs is how to translate these raised voices, into actual changes in (a) policy (b) legislation (c) practice and implementation of the proposed changes.

### **Recommendations:**

- 1. Develop a more structured advocacy strategy and associated work plan for MRG and partner advocacy campaigns.**
- 2. Develop and apply an advocacy tracking tool to understand how MRG's advocacy work is influencing change.**
- 3. Develop concrete strategies and approaches that bridge the divide between the production of policy and implementation recommendations that emerge from MRG research, and the next step of their practical application that results in real change in national policy documents, legislation and on the ground for the lives of beneficiaries**

### **In-Country roundtable advocacy meetings**

Unfortunately In country meetings did not occur in the way that they were originally envisaged with decision-makers having direct access to CSO activists working at the grassroots level, to hear about concrete information about conflicts, and be able to share ideas with CSO staff about short, mid and long-term approaches to peace-building. Interactions, with the EU offices in country were disappointing. In Kenya the partners did not meet with the EU at all, in Uganda they did but only at the report launches and in South Sudan the EU were at the report launches but don't remember the occasions. It is not clear why the partners did not take advantage of the opportunities for meeting with the donor. When questioned in Kenya the partners' response was an embarrassed "well it did not happen". Their priorities for meetings were the Kenya government offices that may be able to play a role in turning the landmark decisions on cases at the Africa Human Rights commission in Gambia into reality on the ground.

### **Advocacy roundtable event in Brussels**

The visit to Brussels by partners made a big impression on all the partners who took part in the enterprise. They reported that it made a significant difference to their confidence in representing

themselves and their issues. It was difficult for partners to explain what impact the visit had though. It reportedly made a difference to all parties' awareness of the issues and created momentary connections but some partners felt that the opportunity was not maximised and that were the chance to repeat itself then they would like to see the following:

- More time together before meeting with EU offices and their members to prepare their own particular messages
- Greater harmonisation in the views from Africa as messages were contradictory and muddled
- More time to be spent in Brussels with meetings spread over more time so that the group was not rushing madly from one meeting to the next with no pause for reflection between them.
- That while in Europe it would have made sense also to go to the UK and deepen advocacy work with MRG and the British government as well as perhaps other advocacy targets.
- That one of the purposes of the visit was also to take advantage to mobilise resources, but it appeared that the opportunities from the EU were back at the field level.

The evaluator did not contact those visited in the EU Brussels to obtain feedback from their perspectives, but perhaps MRG staff may be able to take advantage of their proximity to see how this sort of visit might be improved from the donor perspective. MRG considered the visit to be extremely useful and a big event which also generated media interest.

In general the advocacy work appears to be made up of two significant threads: Firstly the raising of awareness of issues mainly through the media. This is very successful (for instance the DfID conflict advisor in based in Nairobi, Kenya noted that they had seen article after article on the situation and cases of the Ogiek and the Enderois in the Kenyan press but he had never received a single visit<sup>25</sup>) at raising awareness. The second thread has been the extraordinary success of the legal advocacy cases within the Africa Human Rights Commission in Gambia (not part of this project) which has made two rulings in favour of these two peoples over the Kenyan government rulings and positions.

The piece that seems to be missing is the transformation of awareness into actual change, however small, and the incorporation of positions, principles and perspectives into national and regional policy documents.

## **8. Conclusions and recommendations**

Minority Rights Group International has achieved the majority of the outcomes and results that it set out to in this project although with some time slippage that has constrained some of the advocacy work. It has contributed towards the prevention of some conflicts and also made contributions to the capacity of civil society to address these issues in the future through trainings, some practical actions and experience sharing. There is certainly a strong contribution to the documentation of early warning issues particularly those drawing on traditional indicators and mechanisms. Information is now available although work is still needed to disseminate this information to the key

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<sup>25</sup> It is acknowledged that MRG did visit the DfID governance adviser – but as there is a very close link between the two areas of work it is worth trying to meet with both in future.

stakeholders. There has also been some increased engagement between civil society groups and national-level decision makers, as well as with donor institutions and governments.

In terms of impact though, the situation is less clear. A lot of useful activities have been conducted and some excellent documents produced, but to what extent these have really changed anything is not easy to say. At the community level several of the pilot projects visited have clearly made a contribution to the prevention of conflict and improved relationships. In the case of SWEEDO and NZCCCT (in conjunction with other actors) managed to assist in putting in place a relatively sustainable mechanism to maintain the peace on that particular front.

The key Issues for the future for MRG are if they decide to continue in this sector, how to turn these early initiatives into long term change that will actually address the root causes of the conflicts rather than only raising awareness around them. In other words how can MRG move to the transformative part of the equation rather than starting and then stopping at the first stage of initiating some small conflict preventative measures that drop away?

MRG is a strong research and advocacy organisation but the issues that it has engaged with here require long term support and investment if they are not to fall into the same traps that NGOs and indeed donors fall into over and over again; that of starting initiatives aimed at peace-building that raise some expectations but that fail to deliver in the end because they peter out either due to lack of sustained support and the stakeholders are defeated by the complexity of the issues at stake. The same question is basically behind their advocacy work. Production of Reports and raising awareness about an issue is the first step and MRG and its partners have excelled at getting media coverage on these important and often neglected issues. That is all well and good, but I believe that if MRG wants to make a real and demonstrable difference then waiting for others to act and waiting for 'decision-makers' to access the information and then possibly use it to include in legislation or policy formulation or in practical activities is not sufficient and it needs to explore and create new strategies and mechanisms for the that next transformative step to occur.

The major recommendations (For a list of all recommendations see appendix 5) emerging from this evaluation are therefore:

***Area One – Future work:***

- 1. In designing future work in the peace-building and conflict prevention, management, and reduction field, MRG should ensure that**
  - a. it adopts a sustained long term approach to the work it chooses to address**
  - b. It focuses its efforts on comprehensively addressing one specific conflict system and its inter-related conflicts in an integrated way. This means working with all stakeholders affected to increase the potential for impact and simultaneously avoid overstretching.**
  - c. It chooses a conflict system that allows it to extrapolate experiences, research and exploration of the issues to continue to illuminate the fundamental problems and relationships between natural resource scarcity, conflict, the policy arena and minorities. In other words one that best draws on MRG's core skills while allowing it to develop further expertise in this sector.**

- d. Its capacity building efforts in such work should also reflect the same characteristics as those that it should apply to a conflict system. They should still continue to focus on sustained long term partnership, while simultaneously developing a more integrated and rigorous approach to addressing capacity development, as well as the development of a cadre of networked, mutually supporting organisations working on the same issues from different perspectives.

***Area Two – Development of MRG’s institutional strategic approaches***

1. In implementing its core work around research and advocacy MRG should consider the development of the following:
  - a. Tools that track the results and impact of their advocacy work more systematically over the long term to demonstrate change (or not) that affects what happens on the ground and can attribute them to MRG’s work
  - b. Concrete strategies and approaches that bridge the divide between the production of policy and implementation recommendations that emerge from MRG research, and the next step of their practical application that results in real change on the ground for the lives of beneficiaries
  - c. How it best utilises its field presence in conjunction with its London office resources in a more integrated and complementary approach to maximise support for partners and add value



Truck returning to Moroto carrying Karamajong people from the market on the Teso side - previously cross-line travel was not possible due to insecurity

## 9. Annexes:

### Annex 1. Terms of Reference

# Evaluation expert - Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa 2009 – 2011

Minority Rights Group has been working with partners in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda to build the capacity of local organizations to understand the causes of and intervene in local level conflicts – particularly those linked to limited or increasingly pressurised resources; land and water. Expected results of the programme included:

1. Improved knowledge and skills of CSOs to engage in conflict management and prevention, including practical experience in successfully tackling local level conflicts.
2. Improved early warning information on local-level conflicts made available and disseminated to civil society actors, national and international decision-makers.
3. Increased engagement, coordination and exchanges between CSOs and national-level decision makers, donor governments and IGOs.

The partners/communities on the project are:

#### **Partner(s):**

Endorois Welfare Council (EWC); Ogiek Peoples' Development Programme (OPDP); Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE); Boma Development Initiative (BDI)

#### **Target group(s):**

72 peace-building practitioners from CSOs (no less than 40% men / women); 21 peace building experts and members of partner organizations; 18 local NGOs/CBOs; 2000 international and national decision-makers

#### **Final beneficiaries:**

Minority communities -including

#### **Kenya:**

Endorois (60,000), Ogiek (20,000), Maasai (453,000), Turkana (340,000), Samburu (147,000), and Somali refugees (174,000) in Kenya;

#### **Uganda:**

Twa (533,000), Basongora (25,000),

Karamojong (370,000) and Iteso (1,000,000)

**Sudan:**

Murle (1.2m), Anuak (52,000), Dinka (2.2m), Nuer (2.8m) and Toposa (2.5m) in Sudan.

Decision-makers in local and national governments, and international institutions, with a special focus on EU institutions.

We now want to commission an external expert to carry out a final evaluation of the work to date - the project will come to an end in December 2011.

As well as the standard evaluation questions on efficiency, effectiveness and impact, MRG is interested to find out:

1. What effect has the project had (if any) on partners' capacities to understand and intervene in conflict situations? Detail progress made but equally identify gaps or constraints that are still impeding progress. What input have other organisations or individuals had in supporting and developing partners' capacity in addition to or alongside MRG's input? Assess the MRG contribution to any capacity gains vis a vis the work of other. Assess to what extent the project has made good decisions in deciding which aspects of capacity building to prioritise. Which capacity building methods worked best and why? Which capacity building methods were less effective and why? Are any gains in partners' capacity sustainable over the longer term? What sort of partnership relationship has developed between MRG and the partners? What aspects of this have been more or less helpful? To what extent have any improvements in partner capacity translated into benefits for the community on the ground?
2. Partners and other participating organisations in Southern Sudan have been less active in this project than originally planned and we feel that their capacity was more limited than we originally hoped. The evaluation should investigate and report on the reasons for this. What impact has this had, if any, in terms of building the capacity to prevent conflict in South Sudan (or not). Could MRG have handled this better? What other lessons could be learned from this?
3. Were the publications produced in this project timely and relevant? How successful were they at identifying potential escalations? Did they address ongoing tensions? Were they disseminated appropriately and if so, did they prove useful to those who received them?
4. Did MRG and partners incorporate women' issues and gender in the way envisaged? If not, why not? If yes, how was this achieved? What can MRG learn from this in the future in similar programmes?
5. It would be useful to have comments on how MRG and partners have monitored, kept track of and reacted to changes in circumstances? Have the reactions and changes in project implementation been based on a sound analysis? Have they proven to be good decisions? Have any critical external context changes slipped under the radar or been picked up too late and, if so, has this impacted on the effectiveness of the work?
6. To what extent have different local areas and subgroups within the partners' community benefited from the project? Have the benefits been reasonably balanced between different areas and groups e.g. women, men, young and older people? Has the project contributed to or detracted from cooperation and harmony within the community?
7. How have MRG and the partners used the partnership to do international advocacy work (including media work)? Were community members involved in this/any such work? How were community members informed of these/any such efforts. What are their views about

them? If possible make a judgement about what, if any, difference any such work has made on the ground?

In our view, to complete this exercise successfully, the external expert (or team of experts) will need experience of both capacity building, community development and conflict prevention. Combined with this, the expert/team of experts will need a good knowledge of minority rights/indigenous rights and a good working knowledge of the current political and socio-economic and cultural climate/context of Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda where the work is being carried out. The expert will also need to be independent of MRG (and any of its current work in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda), any partner organisation and any funders currently contributing to this work (including Ireland Aid and the European Commission).

Although the project ends on 31st December 2011, and most of the evaluation work would take place after this date, an experience sharing seminar involving partners and implementers of pilot projects is planned during the week of the 8th to 12th of November in Kenya (almost certainly Nakuru) and preference will be given to an evaluation team who could send a team member to part of this event (although we appreciate that this is short notice). We would expect a final report to be submitted to MRG in around April or May 2012.

At this stage, we would envisage that the evaluation would need to comprise at least:

1. A review of all project documentation
2. Visit to partners in Kenya and Uganda to meet with and talk to relevant staff.
3. A decision will need to be taken as to the usefulness of visiting South Sudan given the security situation at the time. If South Sudan is included the fee available will be slightly higher.
4. Visits to a sample of 6 communities who have been targeted as beneficiaries by the project. 3 visits to be organised by the partners, 3 visits to be selected and independently organised by the evaluator.
5. Conversations or meetings with around 12 independent sources (4 per country) to gauge opinion about the project. These should normally be decision makers or experts. 6 to be selected from a list provided by MRG and 6 to be independently identified and selected by the evaluation team.
6. Conversations and meetings with relevant MRG staff in London and Kampala (including at least a visit or skype conversation to agree methods and scope of the evaluation and to discuss the fundamentals of the intervention logic of the programme, another at the draft report stage to discuss any issues that may have arisen that are unclear and another to present the evaluation findings and discuss them with programme staff and, if there are wider lessons to be learned, with a larger staff group).

MRG is particularly interested to learn from it, lessons that we can apply in continuing with the work and in designing a new future phase of work on this issue; we would also be keen to check whether there have been any unforeseen negative consequences to date and how we can avoid, minimise or mitigate these in future.

## **Annex 2. List of People interviewed, or consulted during the evaluation**

The following is a list of people that the evaluator was able to meet with although there were a large number of other contacts and some short discussions by phone with various stakeholders which did not result in specific meetings and deep interviews.

### **Kenya**

- Susan Njuguna - consultant (Centre for Conflict Resolution – Kenya)
- Simon O. Ojumba – District Commissioner Njoro
- Charles Cherirot Rono - Councillor, Nakuru Town Council (Ogiek)
- Paul Lesuagei – Councillor on Nakuru Town Council (Ogiek)
- Christopher KipKones – Ogiek Elder
- Joseph Lesingo – Assistant Chief Njoro district
- Paul Nessit – Councillor, Njoro district
- Daniel Kobei – Executive Director Ogiek People’s Development Program
- Peter Kiplangat Cherirot, OPDP
- Kipkazi Wilson – Program coordinator and Executive Secretary Enderois Welfare Council
- Obara (assistant) Enderois Welfare Council
- Christine Kadic (Finance) Enderois Welfare Council
- Christine Chebii (administrative officer) Enderois Welfare Council
- Carson Kiburo (IT officer) Enderois Welfare Council
- Gerald Koi Vice Chairman (CODEF)
- Chairman of CODEF
- June Yiegon (CODEF)
- Patrick Kamarei – Area Chief, Mochongoi location, Kabel Town
- Samuel Waseges – Area Chief, Chebinying location, Kabel Town
- Jane Meriwas – Coordinator Sweedo
- Dominic Leparmarai – Advocacy Officer Sweedo
- Johnathan Lahgas – Monitoring and Evaluation Officer - Sweedo
- Ann Tome – Gender Officer - Sweedo
- Elizabeth Kipish – Office Assistant Sweedo
- Ruto Dominic Pkalya – Arid Lands and consultant
- Albert Lemasulani – Administrator Ndugu Zangu Christian Community Charitable Trust
- Julius Juan – Senior Research Officer - National Cohesion and Integration Commission
- Sellah Nasimiyu Kingoro – Senior Research Officer - National Cohesion and Integration Commission
- Esther Somoire – CEO – CIWOCH
- Joel K Sayianka - Senior Chief – Magadi location
- Dan Silvey – Dfid Conflict and Governance Advisor Kenya
- Abraham Sinoie – USAID Conflict Advisor, Kenya
- Giulia Pietrangeli Macroeconomics, Governance and Private Sector Development Section EU Delegation (email contact but did not meet)

## Community Meetings Kenya

- 11 Maasai community members Magadi (including Assistant chief and 1 women group leader, total 6 female and 5 male)
- 19 male elders of the Samburu Lenguruma – Kipsing Ward
- 6 Female members of the Samburu Tribe
- 22 male community elders of the Pokot (at Demunyekundu, Sanangui Lorora)
- 4 Community Members – Ogiek
- 3 Enderois Community Members
- 9 Kikuyu Community Members –CODEF
- 5 Samburu Moran (warriors)

## Uganda

- Albert Gomes-Mugumya – Project Co-ordinator, Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)
- NASDA – Philip Onyeke
- Joseph Omoding - Program Coordinator, Living Hope
- Emoruoit - Moaritz Silver Chairperson of the Kaddan NGO Network
- Ouma Tobias Pius – Field Project Facilitator Fido
- Akemo Keri – Field Assistant Officer
- Akwil Sofia – Field Project Facilitator
- Wusak – sub-county (9 community members – peace promoters including 5 women) (Fido)
- Odeke Michael – Director TIP
- Makumbi Stephen – Prog coordinator TIP
- Doreen Deborah Elaju – Coordinator Terelepar
- Okiror Ben Boitam – Prog Officer SocaJapic
- Imede Catherine – Human Rights Officer – Socadido
- Joe Burua – Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons / Conflict Early Warning And Response Unit – Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Martin Mwondha – Chief Executive, Community Development Resource Network (CDRN)
- Rashid Mwesigwa – Program Officer, Community Development Resource Network (CDRN)
- Sayson Rosette Meya – Operations Officer Human Rights, Conflict and Gender
- Lina Zedriga – Director Women, Peace and Security Regional Associates for Community Initiatives (RACI)
- Joseph Muhumuza – Country coordinator, The conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

## Minority Rights Group International

- Jolly Kemigabo MRG Kampala
- Chris Chapman MRG London
- Evelin Verhas MRG London
- Uganda based Capacity Building officer

## Community Meetings Uganda

- 10 Community Members (4 women, including peace promoters) Iriir sub-county, Katakwi (Iteso)
- 15 Community Members (4 Women including a councillor, and vice-chair person, elders, farmers, ) Ngariam Sub-County, Olilin Parish (Iteso)
- 9 Community Members (including 2women, Peace-promoters, PI chief, councillor, chairperson LC1) Odoot Parish, Akwaradada Village (Iteso)
- 12 Community Members (6 women, 6 men) Ongonjoja Sub-County, Okuda Parish (Karamajong)

## **South Sudan**

- Peter Welling EU representative

### Annex 3. Table of Pilot Projects undertaken

Partner	Project	Target Groups	Geographic Location	Visited
<b>Kenya</b>				
<b>CODEF</b>	Using Football To Promote Peace Building Project	Endorois, Ilchamus, Pokot, Turkana, Nubi and Tugen, Kikuyu	Mochongoi and Ng'arua Divisions in Mid Rift Valley	Yes
<b>KARMA</b>	Turkana South –Pokot Conflict Mitigation Project, Inter-Community Dialogues and Peace Crusades	Turkana, Pokot	Kainuk and Sigor, Katilu Divisions in Turkana	No
<b>SWEEDO</b>	Application of participatory indigenous peace building and conflict prevention approaches for mitigating cross border conflicts in Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu Districts	Samburu, Pokot	Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu Districts	Yes
<b>CODEF</b>	Using Football To Promote Peace Building Project	Endorois, Ilchamus, Pokot, Turkana, Nubi and Tugen, Kikuyu	Mochongoi, Marigat and Mukutani Divisions in Mid Rift Valley	Yes
<b>NZCCCT</b>	Community Peace Dialogues and Leaders Meetings	Samburu, Pokot	Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu Districts	Yes
<b>NKIPA</b>	Strengthening the capacity of local pastoralist assembly (Naapo) to fully participate in the peace-building & conflict resolution	Samburu, Pokot	Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu Districts	Not specifically (but did speak with consortium member SWEEDO on this project)
<b>KARMA</b>	Capacity building of local peace committees and women groups in Pokot Turkana Peace corridor	Pokot, Turkana	Kainuk, Turkana	No
<b>TIPDI</b>	Peace Conference between Bukusu and	Bukusu, Pokot	Trans-Nzoia County	No

	Pokot community in Trans-Nzoia			
<b>CIWOCH</b>	Identify and document existing and potential conflict in group ranches, increase the number and participation of women in their management. Train community committees on conflict and peace building to avert potential conflict.	Maasai	Kajiado District, Marigat	Yes
<b>NKIPA</b>	Improving the participation of youth in conflict prevention and resolution processes by use of traditional art	Samburu, Il Ngwesi Maasai clan, Turkana	Sananguri Laikipia, Makurian location in Laikipia, Isiolo, Samburu	Not specifically (but did speak with consortium member SWEEDO on this project)
<b>TUDOF</b>	Strengthen early warning and conflict prevention capacity increase sustainable sharing of pasture and water and enhance peace.	Dodoch-Turkana communities	Kaabong and cross-border districts between the Karamajo and Kenya.	No
<b>Uganda</b>				
<b>KADDENET</b>	Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Kasese District through training, sensitization and radio talk shows	Basongora, Bakonzo	Katholhu, Nyakatonzi, Kinyamaseke, Ibuga, Kamuruli, Kabirizi, Muhokya in Kasese District	No
<b>NAFODU</b>	Sensitise communities and raise the level of human rights awareness among the Batwa, lobby Local Government leaders in Kabale to include them in decision making processes, and making of Sub-County and District local government plans	Batwa	Kabale District	No
<b>NSCDA</b>	Promote peaceful co-existence and basic human rights for vulnerable groups and help transform attitudes through radio	Iteso, Karamajong	Ngariam Sub-County in Katakwi District	Yes

	talk shows and de-silting of a water pan			
<b>KADDENET</b>	Follow-on for the promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Kasese District through capacity building of mediation committees, research and lobbying on improved land use.	Basongora, Bakonzo	Katholhu, Nyakatonzi, Kinyamaseke, Ibuga, Kamuruli, Kabirizi, Muhokya in Kasese District	No
<b>BCRD</b>	Promote harmony in forest adjacent communities, through building stakeholder capacity. Initiate dialogue and form conflict resolution task forces to negotiate on equitable benefit sharing and Batwa resettlement	Echuya Batwa	Muhindura, Kagezi parishes of Kanaba Sub-county and Chibumba Parish of Murora Sub-county in <b>Kisoro District</b>	No
<b>CDRN</b>	Training in conflict management practices and development of an action plan to be implemented to reduce conflict	Tepeth, Pokot and Ik	Napak, Amudat and Kaabong Districts	Discussed in CDRN project offices
<b>FIDO</b>	Promoting peaceful coexistence among the Iteso and Karimojong through stakeholder meetings and training of peace monitors	Iteso, Karimojong	Ongongoja sub county, Katakwi District	Yes
<b>LIHOCE</b>	Promoting peaceful coexistence among the Iteso and Karimojong through stakeholder meetings, training of peace monitors and radio talk shows	Iteso, Karimojong	The sub counties of Lokopo, Irirri in Napak District and the sub counties of Palam, Ongongoja and gariam in Katakwi District	Yes
<b>KADDENET</b>	Advocacy for alternative conflict resolution and resource management through radio talk shows, training of mediators and paralegals and dialogues	Basongora, Bakonzo	Katholhu, Nyakatonzi, Kinyamaseke, Ibuga, Kamuruli, Kabirizi, Muhokya in Kasese District	No
<b>TIP</b>	Promotion of peaceful co-existence of groups in Kobulin and enabling of settlers there to participate in resolving border conflicts through a series of stakeholder dialogues	Iteso, Karimojong, Thur	Kobulin	Discussed in TIP project offices
<b>AICM</b>	Preventing and ending inter-community/ethnic conflicts through training of peace committees and	Batwa	Muko, Bufundi, Butanda and Ikumba sub counties in Kabale District	No

	community dialogues			
<b>AYPI</b>	Strengthen existing community peace forums with mediation, conflict analysis, negotiation, conflict early warning and prevention skills and methods and sensitize local communities with peace education messages	Banyoro, Bafuruki	Kibaale District	No
<b>South Sudan</b>				
<b>BCYA</b>	Bor and Mundari Peace and Reconciliation Meeting	Bor Dinka, Mundari	Terekeka County, Central Equatoria	No
<b>PDA</b>	Peace Meeting	Murle, Jie, Kachipo, Toposa	Boma County, Kapoeta	No
<b>NPC</b>	Youth empowerment through training in peace, brick-making and carpentry	Dinka, Nuer	Akobo County, Jonglei	No

## **Annex 4. Complete List of Recommendations**

### ***Area One – Future work in Peace-building, Conflict Management and advocacy***

- 1. In designing future work in the peace-building and conflict prevention, management, and reduction field, MRG should ensure that**
  - a. it adopts a sustained long term approach to the work it chooses to address**
  - b. It focuses its efforts on comprehensively addressing one specific conflict system and its inter-related conflicts in an integrated way. This means working with all stakeholders affected to increase the potential for impact and simultaneously avoid overstretching.**
  - c. It chooses a conflict system that allows it to extrapolate experiences, research and exploration of the issues to continue to illuminate the fundamental problems and relationships between natural resource scarcity, conflict, the policy arena and minorities. In other words one that best draws on MRG’s core skills while allowing it to develop further expertise in this sector.**
  - d. Its capacity building efforts in such work should also reflect the same characteristics as those that it should apply to a conflict system. They should still continue to focus on sustained long term partnership, while simultaneously developing a more integrated and rigorous approach to addressing capacity development, as well as the development of a cadre of networked, mutually supporting organisations working on the same issues from different perspectives.**
  - e. The design of the project has a narrower and more defined strategic Focus for initiatives in terms of addressing conflict.**
  - f. It undertakes a policy mapping exercise across East Africa to identify and analyse relevant policies, for gaps and contradictions on the issues of natural resources, minorities and peace.**
  - g. In Kenya that MRG researches and explores the issues of minorities, conflict and the new constitution to frame a program addressing conflict prevention and devolution**
  - h. It more deliberately address connectivity of activities and policy work with current national initiatives.**
  - i. It explores and utilises additional dissemination methodologies aimed at key stakeholder community audiences who might not be literate or who might access information through oral or other traditions.**

### ***Area Two – Development of MRG’s institutional strategic approaches***

- 1. In implementing its core work around research and advocacy MRG should start to develop the following:**
  - a. Comprehensive Monitoring Tools that track the results and impact of their advocacy work more systematically over the long term to demonstrate change (or not) that affects what happens on the ground and can attribute them to MRG’s work**
  - b. Concrete strategies and approaches that bridge the divide between the production of policy and implementation recommendations that emerge from MRG research, and the next step of their practical application that results in real change on the ground for the lives of beneficiaries**

- c. Consider how it best utilises its field presence in conjunction with its London office resources in a more integrated and complementary approach to maximise support for partners and add value
- d. That MRG take a more structured and deliberate approach and process with their capacity building support to partners and sub-partners with all stakeholders understanding the parameters, their roles, and expectations and responsibilities around capacity building. This should include a participatory, facilitated self-assessment process and inputs that are in direct support of the organisational mandate and achievement of the organisations' strategic plan.<sup>26</sup>
- e. That MRG consider a longer term more sustained and 'networked' or clustered approach to their capacity building and support of civil society.

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<sup>26</sup> Where they have one and if they don't then this is the start of the process around which to build and prioritise inputs.