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Peoples under Threat 2017

Killings in the no-access zone

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Peoples under Threat 2017: Killings in the no-access zone

Vulnerable peoples are living at deadly risk in a growing number of no-go zones around the world. The 2017 release of *Peoples under Threat* highlights how lack of access from the outside world allows killing to be perpetrated unchecked in disputed territories, militarized enclaves and, in some cases, whole countries.

This is the 12th year that the *Peoples under Threat* index has identified those country situations around the world where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing or systematic violent repression. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources (see ‘How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?’), the index provides early warning of potential future mass atrocities.

In June 2017 the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights reiterated his alarm at the refusal of several states to grant access to his staff or the UN human rights mechanisms. Many of the states that he has criticized for impeding international scrutiny in recent months feature on the list of major risers in the *Peoples under Threat* index this year, including Nigeria, Burundi, Eritrea and Turkey. Many others sit at or near the top of the index – Syria, Myanmar, Iran and Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory – or were major risers last year, including Ukraine (Crimea), Egypt, North Korea and Venezuela.

In the methodology behind the construction of the *Peoples under Threat* index, lack of international openness is an important risk factor. Relative international isolation and low trade openness insulate a country from international public opinion and from the influence of international human rights standards. This describes the situation of some of the states that feature high on the index, but certainly not all. The denial of access to international human rights monitors is an additional deliberate strategy to evade scrutiny, and ensuing criticism, over practices which constitute flagrant breaches of international law.

In practice, the UN High Commissioner has specified that refusals of access by states can take many forms, and are often applied to particular parts of a state’s territory. In addition to straight refusals, the phenomenon includes ‘all unreasonable delays, elaborately ritualised and unreasonably prolonged negotiations, and responses to specific requests which fob [the UN] off with inadequate alternatives to real,

fact-based assessment’, as well as ‘claims that insecure conditions make it impossible to give ... access’. In many cases, access delayed – while security operations are ongoing, for example – is access denied.

What is happening in the no-access zone? Where official monitors and investigators cannot enter, local NGOs and civilian activists have nonetheless raised the alarm and published evidence of gross violations: arbitrary detention, torture and, in the case of those country situations at the very top of the index, mass killing. In one situation after another, violations are targeted at communities on ethnic, religious or sectarian grounds.

The most pressing problems of access are described in the commentary below on individual states. But in addition to those we highlight here, it should be noted that the challenge of international access also applies to a number of territories where the overall threat levels may be lower, but where particular populations remain highly vulnerable. This is the case with those living in territories affected by the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ in the South Caucasus, including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Cuba, which enters the index for the first time in 2017, only allowed a visit from one UN rapporteur earlier this year after ten years refusing all requests. And the United States (US) continues to deny the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture for proper access to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

For all governments concerned, as the UN High Commissioner has emphasized, ‘efforts to duck or refuse legitimate scrutiny raise an obvious question: *what, precisely, are you hiding from us?*’.

Rising threats

The list of those countries which rose most significantly in the index in 2017 is headed by **Yemen**. The war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis and allied forces continues to tear the country apart. International intervention by Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries has helped turn what started as a local insurgency in Yemen’s north-west into the focus for a regional sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a. Parties on both sides of the conflict have violated international humanitarian law with impunity. Thousands of civilians have been killed, the majority in the course of coalition airstrikes that are supported and armed by the US and the United Kingdom. With over 3 million internally displaced and 6.8 million ‘on the brink of starvation’,

Major risers 2017

Rank	Rise in rank	Country	Groups	Total
8	3	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	19.069
11	1	Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers; religious targets	17.792
12	1	Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	17.666
16	6	Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	15.026
20	10	Eritrea	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	14.100
23	12	Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	13.100
28	3	Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Bakonzo, Bamba, Basongora, Batwa	12.572
29	5	Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	12.070
32	11	Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners, Bakassi	11.987
48	18	Mozambique	Northerners	10.184
50	8	Bangladesh	Ahmadis, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong Hill Tribes	10.059
63	10	Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans, tribal peoples	9.444

according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the country faces total collapse.

Two-thirds of the country situations in the list of major risers are in Africa.

Libya has been a failed state since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. With rival governments competing for control, armed militias have flourished, and arbitrary detention, torture and kidnapping for ransom are widespread. Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) forces, which were responsible for a series of religious massacres, have lost large parts of the area they formerly controlled in Sirte,

but fighting between ISIS and Libyan and foreign forces continues. Libya's geographical location and trafficking networks, developed during the conflict, have turned the country into a transit zone for tens of thousands of refugees and migrants from other parts of Africa and the Middle East. This has resulted in over 4,500 deaths in attempts to cross the Mediterranean and exploitation at the hands of armed groups and guards at migrant detention facilities, who have forced individuals into forced labour and sexual abuse.

Nigeria has failed to respond to at least 14

outstanding requests to visit from UN mandate-holders. The government has claimed extensive military successes in the war against Boko Haram rebels, but both the Nigerian army and the extensive cadres of local vigilante groups supported by the government have been responsible for widespread abuses. The conflict over land use between Fulani pastoralists and Tiv farmers continued in Benue and has spread, while there are also concerns about the response to the resurgence of separatist ambitions among some of the Igbo population in south-eastern Nigeria.

In **Burundi**, President Nkurunziza's bid for an unconstitutional third term of office sparked widespread protests from 2015. Hundreds of people were killed in a violent clampdown, and mass grave sites have been discovered. The President's response to criticism has been to take significant steps towards withdrawing from the international community. The UN commission of inquiry has been denied entry, as have officials from both the UN and African Union (AU) missions. In October, Nkurunziza signed a decree announcing Burundi's intention to withdraw from the International Criminal Court. The return of the rhetoric of Hutu-Tutsi division into public discourse has been accompanied by violent attacks perpetrated by the *Imbonerakure*, the ruling party's youth league. Burundi is in the grip of 'genocidal dynamics', concluded a November report by the Burundian Human Rights League (ITEKA) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).

Since its independence from neighbouring Ethiopia 25 years ago, **Eritrea** has yet to hold national elections or have a free media presence. In 2016 a UN commission of inquiry – barred from entering the country – concluded that during that time officials in Eritrea have committed crimes against humanity, including enslavement, rape and torture, across the country. Violent border clashes continue with Ethiopia. Of particular concern is the escalation of the autonomy conflict with Afar rebels in the south-east.

In both Angola and Mozambique (see below) the spectre of past wars has returned to haunt the present.

Violence has flared in the run up to 2017 presidential elections in **Angola** and a group of former fighters from the opposition UNITA were tried in March for an attempted coup. UNITA, which drew its support from the majority Ovimbundu, fought the ruling MPLA in a 27-year civil war which ended in 2002. There were also violent incidents related to two

independence struggles, in Cabinda and also related to the Lunda Chokwe movement in the east. The enclave of Cabinda is responsible for half of Angola's oil production and has heavy security.

In **Uganda**, a movement for autonomy by the Bakonzo in Rwenzururu has led both to inter-ethnic clashes between Bakonzo and Bamba and also to a series of alleged violations by government troops sent to quell the unrest. Dissent is increasingly suppressed in the country. President Museveni, celebrating 30 years in power, was re-elected again in 2016; his rival was immediately placed under house arrest.

A failed coup in **Turkey** in July 2016 was followed by a nationwide mass programme of dismissal and arrest of tens of thousands of public officials. Those detained included not just those implicated in the plot but many judges, teachers, journalists and NGO staff. The silencing of dissent is a general feature of President Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian grip on the country, but is particularly dangerous in the context of the ongoing military operations in south-east Turkey targeted at the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Alleged violations include extrajudicial executions, demolitions of civilian homes and villages, and mass displacement. The urgent request of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for 'effective and unfettered access' continues to be denied.

The rise of **Cameroon** in the index this year is influenced by a number of factors. Boko Haram was pushed back in the far north of the country, but remains a potent threat, not least because of its success over the years in recruiting local support. The territory of Bakassi was peacefully handed over to Cameroon from Nigeria ten years ago following a judgment of the International Court of Justice, but protests, and violence, in the peninsula are escalating. Meanwhile, political and economic discrimination against Anglophones continues to be a major issue. The government responded to protests in January 2017 by cutting internet services in the English-speaking regions.

This is the second year running that **Mozambique** has risen in the index. An escalation in the conflict between the FRELIMO-led government and the opposition RENAMO over autonomy and marginalization in the north has led to mass displacement and allegations of extra-judicial executions and mass graves. The government procrastinated over allowing entry to a UN human

Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2016

Rank	Country	Groups	Total
1	Syria	Political targets, Sunnis, Shi'a/Alawites, Yezidis, Christians, Druze, Kurds, Palestinians	27.467
2	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	23.068
3	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	20.913
4	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	20.827
5	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	20.374
6	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	20.145
7	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambuti, other groups	19.468
8	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	19.069
9	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	18.635
10	Burma/ Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	18.324
11	Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers; religious targets	17.792
12	Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	17.666

rights assessment mission.

The government of **Bangladesh** denies that ISIS or al-Qaeda have a presence in the country, blaming the political opposition for an increasing number of attacks targeted at foreigners and religious minorities, including Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs. But it is the scale of the attacks on Hindus that are of most

concern, including a campaign of destruction against Hindu homes and temples. Insecurity affecting indigenous peoples meanwhile persists in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Papua New Guinea has long struggled with inter-tribal attacks and with spikes in violence during elections, such as those taking place in 2017. But the

rise in the threat level also reflects the approach of the referendum scheduled for 2019 on the status of Bougainville, scene of a long secession conflict in the 1990s.

Peoples at greatest risk

Syria heads the Peoples under Threat index again in 2017. UN human rights officials, including the UN Commission of Inquiry, have been granted no access to Syria since the crisis began in 2011. In that time, some 400,000 people have been killed, according to credible estimates recently cited by the UN envoy, Staffan de Mistura. More than 6 million are internally displaced and over 5 million have fled the country to seek refuge abroad. Syria is now effectively divided between Alawite-dominated government areas, rebel-held Sunni Arab areas, and the Kurdish-led territory in the north, although that picture simplifies the complex patchwork of local control on the ground. Aleppo finally fell to forces supporting the Assad government in December 2016, but many towns remain besieged, cut off from humanitarian aid. As the rate of civilian casualties from Syrian-Russian airstrikes has declined in recent months, civilian deaths from US-led coalition airstrikes in the battle for Raqqa have increased.

International attention may have shifted to events elsewhere, but the agony of **Somalia** goes on and its peoples remain at grave threat. Bantu in southern Somalia remain particularly vulnerable, and inter-clan fighting is a persistent feature of the long-running conflict. Al-Shabaab continues to hold large areas of territory, carrying out large numbers of extra-judicial executions, while its claim of being able to transcend clan politics wears thin. Over a million people remain internally displaced and government forces carried out mass forced evictions of tens of thousands of IDPs from the capital Mogadishu. In addition to violations by Al-Shabaab and government forces, civilians were also killed or injured in military operations by Kenyan and other forces, and by the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The US announced it would increase airstrikes. Some 90,000 people were additionally displaced because of fighting between the autonomous regions of Puntland and Galmudug.

Civilian deaths have risen yet again in **Iraq**, in the course of the prolonged battle, beginning in October 2016, to retake the city of Mosul from ISIS. Even if ISIS is finally defeated, however, high casualty rates and mass displacement among the Sunni

Arab population have contributed to an ongoing or renascent Sunni insurgency. Meanwhile, large areas of central and northern Iraq are now under the control of a range of armed militias, mainly but not exclusively Shi'a, operating under the umbrella of the *Hashd al-Shaabi* or popular mobilization. Arbitrary detention and extra-judicial killings perpetrated by the militias enjoy general impunity. The post-ISIS future for Iraq is set to be governed by sectarianism.

Civilian casualties reached a record high in **Afghanistan** in 2016, even as the EU concluded a deal to repatriate tens of thousands of Afghans who had sought safety in Europe. According to the UN, 3,498 civilians were killed and 7,920 wounded, with the Taliban, ISIS and other insurgent groups responsible for 61 per cent of these casualties and pro-government forces causing 23 per cent. The UN noted a significant increase in attacks against schools and hospitals, by both the Taliban and ISIS-affiliated groups, following a US attack on a hospital in Kunduz the year before. Major coordinated attacks on the capital Kabul have increased, and targeted attacks against the Hazara minority continue.

The **Democratic Republic of Congo** is yet again seeing large-scale ethnic massacres. Whole villages have been wiped out and over 40 mass graves found in the Kasai provinces, scene of fighting between government forces and a Luba armed group known as Kamuina Nsapu. Some of the worst atrocities against Luba and Lulua civilians are believed to be the work of Bana Mura, a government-sponsored militia. In addition to the Kasais, Katanga and Kivus have a long history of autonomy conflicts. While the situation improved in Katanga over the last year, the Kivus continue to be scarred by attacks by ethnic militias – including former M23 rebels – and violations by Congolese armed forces.

The threats to the peoples of **Sudan** operate on three major fronts. In Darfur, the UN agreed a cut to bring peace-keeping forces down a third, despite the ongoing conflict and continued attacks by government forces on villages in the north and east. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, extensive population displacement and destruction of crops and infrastructure leave the population at risk of famine this year, particularly in the Nuba mountains. The government has declared a temporary unilateral ceasefire covering all three regions in expectation of a US decision to lift economic sanctions, but few expect it to hold.

South Sudan only gained its independence in 2011 and has spent most of the years since engaged in an inter-ethnic civil war. Following a power struggle in late 2013, both President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar have mobilized forces on an ethnic basis and the result has been a series of atrocities against civilians from both Nuer and Dinka, as well as other peoples. In 2016 South Sudan rose again in the *Peoples under Threat* index despite a peace agreement signed between the main parties. Sadly, the index has proved the better indicator.

In **Myanmar**, violations of human rights in Rakhine state have been 'horrifying in the extreme' according to UN OHCHR, but the government has refused to provide full and unmonitored access. The violations have been mainly targeted at the Rohingya, and include allegations of gang rape and child killings by security forces. The Rohingya, and Muslims throughout Myanmar, remain at serious risk, while the government, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), refuses to acknowledge the severity of the threat. Meanwhile renewed fighting in the context of autonomy conflicts in Shan and Kachin states has displaced tens of thousands of ethnic minorities.

Research by Kirstin Adkison, Nazgol Kafai and Fumiya Nagai.

Minority Rights Group International

54 Commercial Street, London E1 6LT,
United Kingdom

Tel +44 (0)20 7422 4200 **Fax** +44 (0)20 7422 4201

Email minority.rights@mrgmail.org

Website www.minorityrights.org

 www.twitter.com/minorityrights

 www.facebook.com/minorityrights

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How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. This research enabled the identification of those preconditions that were most likely to lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide).

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat* is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools, which focus on violent conflict as such. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities or indigenous peoples may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including

habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. MRG has identified those groups in each state which we believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank; conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the Center for Systemic Peace; data on the flight of refugees, internally-displaced persons and other populations of concern from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the US State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides; and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2017.

Country	Groups	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators			Total	
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law		J. OECD country risk classification
Syria	Political targets, Sunnis, Shi'a/Alawites, Yezidis, Christians, Druze, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.6558	10.0	9.9	-1.849	-2.938	-1.431	7	27.467
Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1	0.2139	9.4	10.0	-2.013	-2.471	-2.337	7	23.068
Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faily Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.1364	9.8	9.6	-1.194	-2.287	-1.459	7	20.913
Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1	0.0978	9.8	10.0	-1.817	-2.174	-1.184	7	20.827
Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	4	2	1	0.1385	8.6	8.6	-1.152	-2.502	-1.593	7	20.374
South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1	0.2289	9.9	9.7	-1.526	-2.361	-1.828	7	20.145
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambuti, other groups	4	2	1	0.0309	9.7	9.8	-1.309	-2.174	-1.551	7	19.468
Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	5	2	0	0.1163	9.5	9.5	-1.494	-2.632	-1.238	7	19.069
Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1	0.0070	9.7	8.9	-0.757	-2.544	-0.788	7	18.635
Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1	0.0178	9.9	8.6	-1.297	-1.170	-1.221	7	18.324
Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers; religious targets	4	2	0	0.0714	8.3	9.4	-1.366	-2.198	-1.688	7	17.792
Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1	0.0147	9.4	9.9	-0.437	-2.071	-1.045	6	17.666
Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0	0.1966	9.3	10.0	-1.323	-2.086	-1.721	7	17.189
Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	1	1	0.0017	8.6	8.3	-1.259	-1.480	-0.435	7	16.132
Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	2	0	0.0435	6.9	8.0	-0.031	-1.933	-0.801	7	15.059
Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	1	1	0.0510	8.1	8.5	-1.272	-1.731	-1.121	7	15.026
State of Palestine	Gazans, Bedouin	5	1	0	0.0228	9.8	8.1	-0.940	-2.128	-0.564	7	14.969
Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'ís; Nubians, Bedouin	5	2	0	0.0003	9.0	8.8	-1.096	-1.343	-0.503	6	14.662
Iran	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'ís, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomen	4	0	1	0.0020	8.8	9.6	-1.538	-0.905	-0.954	6	14.235
Eritrea	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	4	0	0	0.0945	6.6	8.1	-2.042	-0.873	-1.414	7	14.100
Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews, Central Asians, migrants	5	1	1	0.0007	9.0	8.1	-1.067	-1.049	-0.720	4	13.943

Country	Groups	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, Europeans, political/social targets	2	0	1
Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	4	0	1
Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1
Philippines	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1
Lebanon	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0
Mali	Tuareg, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	1	0
Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Bakonzo, Bamba, Basongora, Barwa	4	0	1
Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	2	0
China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	1	1
Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	0	0
Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners, Bakassi	2	1	0
Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1
North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0
Colombia	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1
Sri Lanka	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Armenians	4	0	0
Kenya	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Somalis, Turkana, Endorois, Masai, Ogick, other indigenous groups, Muslims	2	1	0
Tajikistan	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0
Thailand	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern Hill Tribes	5	1	0
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks, Russians	2	0	0
Cambodia	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0
Kosovo	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	0	0
Mozambique	Northerners	4	0	0
Niger	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0

Peoples under Threat 2017

Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
0.0046	7.5	9.8	-1.193	-0.577	-1.349	7	13.423
0.0021	7.7	7.2	-1.186	-0.591	-1.069	6	13.100
0.0003	6.3	8.2	-2.002	-0.190	-1.396	7	12.883
0.0031	8.1	8.0	0.137	-0.838	-0.345	3	12.636
0.0022	8.7	9.3	-0.481	-1.719	-0.786	7	12.633
0.0132	7.9	5.2	-0.242	-1.657	-0.756	7	12.597
0.0049	9.0	8.9	-0.586	-0.862	-0.341	6	12.572
0.0009	9.5	7.6	-0.374	-1.276	-0.060	4	12.070
0.0002	8.1	7.2	-1.579	-0.561	-0.337	2	12.028
0.0087	8.5	9.8	-1.352	-0.986	-1.161	7	12.011
0.0094	8.5	9.4	-0.958	-0.991	-0.961	6	11.987
0.0003	7.9	7.1	-0.853	-1.046	-0.831	4	11.983
0.0001	6.0	8.5	-2.146	-1.223	-1.566	7	11.727
0.1550	7.0	7.6	-0.070	-1.061	-0.307	4	11.422
0.0454	7.0	8.7	-0.113	-0.451	-0.291	7	11.302
0.0086	9.2	8.8	-0.370	-0.030	0.069	6	11.168
0.0010	7.4	8.2	-1.122	-1.007	-1.991	7	11.105
0.0651	6.7	7.9	-1.506	-0.689	-0.603	5	11.008
0.0003	9.1	8.9	-0.178	-1.291	-0.490	6	10.962
0.0003	7.6	8.4	-1.513	-0.867	-1.010	7	10.934
0.0000	9.0	9.7	-0.897	-0.956	-0.106	3	10.701
0.0008	8.6	8.0	-0.473	-0.872	-0.998	7	10.493
0.0008	7.1	8.3	-1.095	-0.098	-0.920	6	10.438
0.0002	7.3	8.8	-1.902	-0.420	-1.065	6	10.323
0.0325	7.8	8.0	-0.178	-0.327	-0.471	7	10.310
0.0175	8.3	9.4	-0.444	-0.861	-0.619	6	10.299
0.0001	5.6	6.9	-0.281	-0.577	-0.867	7	10.184
0.0086	7.7	8.9	-0.253	-0.978	-0.606	7	10.064

Country	Groups	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
Bangladesh	Ahmadi, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong Hill Tribes	3	0	0
Rwanda	Hutu, Tutsi, Barwa	0	0	1
Guinea	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0
El Salvador	Political/social targets	0	2	1
Djibouti	Afars	1	0	0
Vietnam	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1
Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0
Haiti	Political/social targets	0	0	0
Laos	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0
Nepal	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, Janajati, linguistic minorities	2	0	0
Moldova	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0
Mauritania	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0
Guinea Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans, tribal peoples	4	0	0
Georgia	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0
Belarus	Poles	0	0	0
Indonesia	Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, religious minorities	4	0	1
Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0
Guatemala	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1
India	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other Adivasis; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	1	0
Cuba	Political/social targets, Afro-Cubans	2	0	0

Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- **Conflict indicators:** The base data used was from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2016, Heidelberg, HIIK, 2017), Minority Rights Group International, and the Center for Systemic Peace ('Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2016' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017). Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2016 were ranked on a scale of 0-5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed

conflicts were classified as 2=ongoing in late 2016; 1=emerging from conflict since 2012 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.

- **Prior genocide or politicide:** Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.
- **Indicators of Flight and Group Division:** Data for the flight of refugees and IDPs comes from UN High Commissioner for Refugees, total population of concern by country of origin, Mid-Year Trends 2016, as a proportion of total country population (population figures from UN DESA, 2015 revision). Group division

Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
0.0003	8.9	9.6	-0.493	-1.155	-0.700	5	10.059
0.0265	9.1	8.3	-1.131	-0.085	0.071	6	10.059
0.0029	8.8	9.9	-0.887	-0.446	-1.172	7	10.026
0.0107	6.2	4.3	0.127	-0.050	-0.592	5	9.997
0.0019	6.7	7.3	-1.402	-0.448	-0.899	7	9.976
0.0034	6.2	6.9	-1.329	0.011	-0.269	5	9.929
0.0003	6.8	7.8	-2.198	-0.106	-1.391	6	9.882
0.0048	6.7	9.6	-0.836	-0.729	-1.166	7	9.872
0.0011	6.6	8.3	-1.674	0.476	-0.751	7	9.818
0.0006	9.5	8.3	-0.430	-0.925	-0.701	6	9.780
0.0016	7.0	8.3	-0.033	-0.392	-0.402	7	9.768
0.0108	7.2	8.8	-0.907	-0.656	-0.820	7	9.534
0.0019	5.4	9.6	-0.811	-0.444	-1.302	7	9.451
0.0001	6.5	7.1	0.063	-0.597	-0.893	6	9.444
0.0719	8.1	9.1	0.215	-0.397	0.296	6	9.221
0.0006	7.1	8.3	-1.462	-0.002	-0.787	7	9.199
0.0001	7.3	7.0	0.143	-0.596	-0.413	3	9.125
0.0042	6.9	6.7	-0.984	-0.507	-1.045	6	9.094
0.0029	8.2	6.8	-0.417	-0.647	-0.987	4	9.080
0.0000	8.5	7.3	0.389	-0.921	-0.057	3	8.847
0.0009	4.2	7.0	-1.527	0.580	-0.624	7	8.822

indicators are from the Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.

- **Democracy/Governance Indicators:** Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2016.

- **OECD country risk classification:** Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2017.

Data for Kosovo include some indicators relating to Serbia. Data for the State of Palestine include some indicators

relating to both Israel/Palestine; data relating to Palestinian refugees include those under the UNHCR mandate only. Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an approximate equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:
 $(A/2) + (B \times 1.25) + (C \times 2) + (D \times 10) + (E + F) / 6 + (G + H + I) / -1 + (J \times 0.625)$