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Peoples under Threat 2014

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Introduction

The *Peoples under Threat* index identifies those countries around the world where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing or systematic violent repression. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* has been compiled every year since 2005 to provide early warning of potential future mass atrocities. A number of states which rose prominently in the index over the last two years – including South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Pakistan and Syria – subsequently faced episodes of extreme ethnic or sectarian violence.

The 2014 release of *Peoples under Threat* shows that the risk in those states remains critical – but also that threat levels have risen in other states.

Rising threats in 2014

The Middle East and Africa dominate the list of major risers in the index this year.

In January 2014 the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner on Human Rights announced that the difficulty of verifying information had led it to abandon updating death tolls for the conflict in **Syria**, last estimated at over 100,000. The fragmentation of the war, both in terms of the proliferation of armed groups and the complex pattern of shifting control on the ground, creates further problems for determining accountability. It also accompanies a growing sectarianization of the conflict. The Free Syrian Army (FSA), the military wing of the national coalition opposed to the Assad government, steadily lost ground to a number of Islamist militias with a sectarian agenda, including the Nusra Front, the Islamic Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Kurds in the north, long persecuted under Assad, faced repeated attacks in the second half of the year by Islamist groups as well as the FSA, pushing some 50,000 refugees to flee to Iraqi Kurdistan.

Yemen has steadily risen in *Peoples under Threat* eight years in succession and now finds itself in the top ten states in the index. A national dialogue conference concluded in January 2014, with delegates agreeing to extend the term of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi by one year to oversee the drafting of a new constitution before general elections and moves towards

a more federal system of government. But the dialogue process was marked by entrenched disagreements, mirroring conflict on the ground on a number of separate fronts, including between al-Houthi (Shi'a) rebels in the north and Sunni tribes, as well as between the authorities and Southern secessionists. Large-scale attacks and assassinations by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other Islamist groups continued, as did US drone strikes against them.

Egypt has risen a striking 33 places in the index this year, although it remains outside the critical upper reaches of the table. Following the removal of President Muhammad Morsi by the military in July, clashes between Muslim Brotherhood protesters and security forces escalated in August. Over 1,000 people were killed in an army crackdown on protest camps in the Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya squares in Cairo and subsequent clashes across the country, although exact figures remain heavily disputed. Attacks on Coptic Christians and on Coptic churches were blamed on Muslim extremists, but human rights activists also criticized an inadequate response from Egyptian authorities, including in Minya governorate. A new constitution, approved by referendum in January 2014, improved protections for minorities but also entrenched the power of the military. After Morsi's removal, a major military operation was launched against Islamist militants in North Sinai. Sinai Bedouin, long marginalized by Egyptian authorities, fear their communities will suffer most in the escalation of the conflict.

It continues to host the largest UN peace-keeping mission in the world, but the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** rose again in the *Peoples under Threat* index in 2014. Katanga separatism, at the centre of the first Congo crisis in the 1960s, led to resurgent violence and the displacement of up to 200,000 in the province of Katanga last year. In a rare success for government forces, the M23 rebellion in the east was suppressed with the support of UN peace-keepers, but the threat levels in the DRC remain high for at least three related reasons: the proliferation of different armed groups, leading to dozens of separate conflicts, particularly in the east, over ethnicity and natural resources; the track record of neighbouring states in consistently supporting

Major Risers since 2013

Rank	Rise in rank since 2013	Country	Group	Total
3	3	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	21.61
4	4	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	20.98
10	1	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	18.58
12	2	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	17.71
14	3	Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	15.88
17	8	Mali	Tuaregs, Arabs, Maure and others in the north	15.47
23	33	Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'ís; Nubians, Bedouin	14.12
30	6	Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	12.86
40	18	Guinea Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	12.10
60	New entry	Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	10.91

such armed groups; and the repeated practice of integrating former rebels into the Congolese armed forces, who are now often as feared by local communities as the militias from which they came.

When the newly-independent state of **South Sudan** sprang straight near the top of the index two years ago, it seemed that pessimism had prevailed over hope. But events of the last six months have sadly proved the prescience of *Peoples under Threat*. A dispute between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his deputy, Riek Machar, quickly degenerated into open ethnic conflict in December, pitting Dinka forces controlled by the government against ethnic Nuer. The NGO International Crisis Group estimated that up to 10,000 people had been killed by January, and the UN estimated in March that over one million had been displaced.

Recent events in South Sudan have detracted attention from increased violence in the **Republic of Sudan**, particularly in Darfur. Clashes between Sudanese armed forces and rebels in North Darfur, as well as tribal clashes in the centre and south of the region, have led to renewed population displacement and accusations that the authorities are denying humanitarian access to the affected areas.

Last year the joint African Union (AU)-UN mission in Darfur was targeted in a string of armed assaults, resulting in the death of 16 peace-keepers. AU-mediated talks continue between the government and rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, but the government's expressed intention to bring all rebellions in the country to an end by the summer has led to fears of renewed attacks on civilian populations in all three areas.

In the **Central African Republic**, both UN and French officials warned in November of the risk of genocide. The predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel coalition which took power in March 2013 had fallen apart by September, but fighters were responsible for widespread looting and a series of abuses against civilians, leading to the creation of Christian self-defence militias, known as Anti-Balaka, which include supporters of former President Bozizé. Abuses by Anti-Balaka have now left the minority Muslim communities, often accused of supporting Séléka, at the greatest risk of mass killings. The interim president Catherine Samba-Panza has the task of re-establishing the government's authority and halting abuses by its troops, to be aided by a UN peace-keeping force of 12,000 agreed by the Security Council in April.

Despite the successful holding of presidential

elections last year and the return to constitutional government, **Mali** continues to face instability from both Islamist rebels and the Tuareg fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In recent months some 200,000 people have returned to northern Mali after the end of conflict, but the MNLA withdrew from a ceasefire agreed in June and clashes with Islamist fighters continue.

After five coups in the last three decades, hopes that elections in **Guinea-Bissau** this year will bring stability have to be tempered with caution. The country's rise in the index is partly due to declines in governance, as corruption and drug-trafficking have become further entrenched. But politics in Guinea-Bissau is also characterized by strong ethnic allegiances, and memories of a bitter civil war in the 1990s are still fresh.

The new entry of **Ukraine** into the *Peoples under Threat* table is perhaps unsurprising given recent events. Russia's annexation of the Crimea has prompted particular concern for the Crimean Tatars, an indigenous population of some 300,000 who suffered forced displacement under the Soviet regime. In an atmosphere of intimidation, many Tatars did not vote in the March 2014 referendum on joining with Russia organized by the Crimean authorities. The concerns are not limited to Crimea, however. The presence of ethnic nationalists among the protesters who brought down President Viktor Yanukovych and the immediate repeal of minority language legislation after his fall were worrying signals for many of Ukraine's minorities, including ethnic Russians as well as Hungarians and Romanians. Violent protests by pro-Russian protesters in Eastern Ukraine escalated tensions further in April.

A number of parallels exist between the situation in Ukraine and that in **Moldova**, which also entered the *Peoples under Threat* table this year. Ethnic Russian protesters in Moldova's breakaway region of Trans-Dniester have called for annexation by Russia, which has troops stationed there. The Russian authorities are acutely concerned that Moldova will sign an association agreement with the EU later in 2014 – the same process that sparked the Ukraine crisis.

Peoples at greatest risk

Of the countries covered above, Syria, Sudan,

DRC and Yemen are all placed near the head of the *Peoples under Threat* index, in the top ten. For nearly all the countries at this critical level of the index, mass killing is not just a pressing threat: it is already ongoing.

Somalia grimly held on to its place at the head of the *Peoples under Threat* index again this year. The Federal Government of Somalia and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) successfully pushed al-Shabaab rebels out of many towns and cities, but the group continues to control large rural areas – imposing a fundamentalist version of *shari'a* – and repeatedly demonstrated its ability to carry out suicide bombings and other high profile attacks in the capital Mogadishu. Minorities, including the Bantu, remain highly vulnerable, although with control over different parts of south-central Somalia shifting between a range of religious and/or clan-based militias, sometimes allied with Ethiopian or Kenyan troops, almost all Somalis remain at risk of violence.

In **Afghanistan**, overall civilian casualties rose by 14 per cent in 2013, according to the UN assistance mission. Of 2,959 civilian deaths, most were due to indiscriminate bombings and other attacks by the Taliban and anti-government elements, although there was also an increase in the number of civilians killed in the course of operations by pro-government forces. The start of the presidential election campaign in 2014 was marked by a rise in attacks by the Taliban, who have vowed to recapture more of the country after the scheduled departure of international troops by the end of the year. Meanwhile the National Front, a new alliance of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara leaders, has announced its opposition to accommodation with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.

With some 8,000 civilians killed, 2013 was the bloodiest year in **Iraq** since 2007. Operations by the rebel Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant increased in intensity, particularly in Anbar, and car bombings ran at the rate of two a day for much of the year. Both the activities of armed groups and the tense political situation led to a dangerous new rise in Sunni-Shi'a sectarian killing. At the same time, the situation remains precarious for many of Iraq's smaller communities, including Chaldo-Assyrians, Yazidis and Turkmen, particularly in Ninewa, Kirkuk and other disputed areas of northern Iraq.

Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2014

Rank	Country	Group	Total
1	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	23.34
2	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	21.63
3	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	21.61
4	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	20.98
5	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis	20.96
6	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faily Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	20.67
7	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadiyya, Hindus and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	20.49
8	Burma/ Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingya, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	19.69
9	Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	19.18
10	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	18.58

While the deadly conflict in **Pakistan** with Islamist armed groups in the north-west draws most international media attention, the threat of ethnic or sectarian killing reaches across the country. This includes risks from inter-ethnic political violence in Sindh, sectarian clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi militant groups, violent repression of Baluchi activists in Baluchistan, continued persecution of Christians and Ahmadiyya, and an exterminatory campaign against Hazara and other Shi'a across the country waged by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Pakistani Taliban, which claimed the lives of hundreds of victims last year.

The gradual thawing of **Burma/Myanmar's** system of authoritarian government continues, but the country remains stubbornly in the upper reaches of the *Peoples under Threat* index. One reason for this is the growing hostility against minority Muslims. The most serious abuses have occurred against Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine state, but violence has also spread to other parts of the country, stoked by Buddhist extremist rhetoric. At the same time, ceasefire talks continue between the government and a negotiating

coalition of 16 ethnic armed groups. It is too early to predict the outcome of the process, but the last year was marked by continued armed clashes, particularly in Kachin state, leading to mass displacement of local communities.

Visit www.peoplesunderthreat.org – a new online map presenting information from the Peoples under Threat index. View data by year or by country and links to reports, press releases and further information on the communities under threat.

How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, including by Helen Fein and Ted Robert Gurr, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers such as Rudolf Rummel and Matthew Krain pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. Rummel, for example, showed the very strong relationship between concentration of government power and state mass murder; Krain demonstrated the correlation between existing armed conflict or political instability and the onset and severity of mass killing.

Following the early work of the Clinton administration's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention, Professor Barbara Harff, a senior consultant with the US State Failure Task Force, constructed and tested models of the antecedents of genocide and political mass murder and her results were published in 2003 ('Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955', *American Political Science Review* 97, February 2003). Her optimal model identifies six preconditions that make it possible to distinguish, with 74 per cent accuracy, between internal wars and regime collapses in the period 1955 - 1997 that did, and those that did not, lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide). The six preconditions are: political upheaval; previous genocides or politicides; exclusionary ideology of the ruling elite; autocratic nature of the regime; minority character of the ruling elite; and low trade openness.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat* is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools, which focus on violent conflict as such. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. MRG has identified those groups in each state which we believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of

ethnic or sectarian killing.

One indicator that has been tested and discarded by a number of studies is the general level of ethnic or cultural diversity in a society. Krain did not find any correlation between 'ethnic fractionalization' and the onset of genocide or political mass killing. Similarly, neither of the patterns of ethnic diversity tested by Harff had any effect on the likelihood of mass killing (although she did find the minority character of the ruling elite to be significant). These findings are supported by research on the relationship between diversity and conflict.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank, conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research



and the Center for Systemic Peace, indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and political mass killings, and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2014.


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Country	Group	Conflict indicators			Indicators of group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1	10.0	9.3	10.0	-2.233	-2.894	-2.450	7	23.34
Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1	10.0	10.0	10.0	-1.784	-2.267	-1.208	7	21.63
Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1	9.5	9.3	9.2	-1.789	-2.688	-1.101	7	21.61
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	4	2	1	10.0	9.4	9.5	-1.516	-2.118	-1.653	7	20.98
Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis	4	2	1	9.2	9.2	9.4	-1.317	-2.420	-1.723	7	20.96
Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'is, Palestinians	5	2	1	8.8	10.0	9.6	-1.134	-1.932	-1.497	7	20.67
Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadiyya, Hindus and other religious minorities: Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1	9.1	9.7	9.2	-0.868	-2.682	-0.910	7	20.49
Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingya, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1	8.5	9.0	8.6	-1.647	-0.962	-1.354	7	19.69
Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	2	1	8.7	8.6	8.7	-1.277	-1.535	-0.656	7	19.18
Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	4	2	0	9.2	9.0	9.5	-1.394	-2.431	-1.265	7	18.58
Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1	6.6	9.8	9.4	-0.727	-2.053	-1.181	5	18.39
South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1	10.0	10.0	9.8	-1.264	-1.217	-1.387	7	17.71
Iran	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'is, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkmen	4	0	1	7.3	8.8	9.4	-1.574	-1.321	-0.901	7	16.42
Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0	9.8	8.5	9.1	-1.261	-1.869	-1.446	7	16.02
Israel/OPT	Palestinians in Gaza/West Bank, Israeli Palestinians, Bedouin	5	1	0	7.4	9.8	8.1	-1.021	-1.936	-0.456	7	15.74
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, white Zimbabweans, political/social targets	2	0	1	8.7	8.4	9.7	-1.445	-0.785	-1.618	7	15.69
Mali	Tuaregs, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	2	0	7.6	7.6	5.0	-0.547	-1.977	-0.693	7	15.47
Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	1	0	9.7	8.8	9.5	-1.328	-1.065	-1.454	7	15.13
Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews	5	2	1	5.3	8.2	8.0	-0.965	-0.822	-0.821	3	15.07
Cote d'Ivoire	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	1	0	9.3	9.0	9.4	-0.793	-1.261	-1.109	7	14.90
Philippines	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1	6.5	7.9	8.0	-0.042	-1.160	-0.546	3	14.36
Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1	8.8	8.1	7.9	-0.933	-1.683	-1.089	7	14.21

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		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'is; Nubians, Bedouin	5	1	0	6.5	8.5	8.7	-0.738	-1.481	-0.452	6	14.12
Lebanon	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0	8.5	8.5	9.2	-0.415	-1.648	-0.752	7	13.81
Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	2	1	0	5.4	7.4	8.0	-0.937	-1.561	-1.148	7	13.74
Sri Lanka	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1	8.4	9.5	9.3	-0.598	-0.706	-0.108	6	13.69
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks, Russians	2	1	0	5.6	8.4	8.0	-0.639	-0.889	-1.151	7	12.96
Kenya	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo, Muslims, Turkana, Endorois, Maasai, Ogiek, other indigenous groups	2	1	0	8.7	9.0	9.0	-0.299	-1.293	-0.865	6	12.91
Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1	7.0	7.8	7.3	-0.914	-1.341	-0.795	3	12.86
Turkey	Kurds, Alevs, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	2	0	7.4	9.0	7.3	-0.241	-1.192	0.035	4	12.86
Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1	3.3	6.6	8.2	-1.874	0.207	-1.263	7	12.82
Thailand	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern hill tribes	5	2	0	6.4	8.1	8.8	-0.342	-1.205	-0.172	3	12.48
Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	2	0	1	7.2	6.8	7.3	-1.083	-0.378	-1.276	5	12.41
Nepal	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, Janajati, linguistic minorities	2	0	0	7.7	9.0	8.2	-0.697	-1.384	-0.790	7	12.39
Guinea	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0	8.2	7.6	8.9	-1.083	-1.281	-1.437	7	12.29
Eritrea	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	0	0	0	7.4	6.1	8.1	-2.153	-0.691	-1.364	7	12.19
Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Basongora, Batwa	1	0	1	8.4	8.0	8.6	-0.494	-0.890	-0.358	6	12.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1	6.8	7.7	8.7	-0.140	-0.536	-0.230	7	12.15
Rwanda	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1	7.9	8.2	8.2	-1.238	-0.212	-0.263	7	12.14
Guinea Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0	7.8	5.7	9.7	-1.408	-0.926	-1.520	7	12.10
Kosovo	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0	6.6	8.0	8.0	-0.220	-1.146	-0.563	7	12.07
Bangladesh	Ahmadiyya, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong hill tribes	3	0	0	7.3	8.6	8.9	-0.416	-1.351	-0.908	6	12.05
Tajikistan	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0	5.3	6.7	8.3	-1.373	-1.162	-1.176	7	11.97
China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	0	1	6.1	8.3	7.2	-1.578	-0.544	-0.489	2	11.96
Colombia	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0	8.3	7.5	7.7	-0.111	-1.403	-0.392	4	11.83
Niger	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0	7.9	7.8	8.9	-0.395	-1.173	-0.738	7	11.78
Uzbekistan	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0	6.0	7.5	8.7	-1.984	-0.522	-1.267	6	11.73
Azerbaijan	Armenians	4	0	0	7.9	6.9	7.8	-1.261	-0.687	-0.805	5	11.65
Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners	2	0	0	7.3	7.8	9.2	-1.029	-0.575	-1.021	6	11.42
Haiti	Political/social targets	0	0	0	8.6	7.0	9.0	-0.797	-0.791	-1.344	7	11.41

Country	Group	Conflict indicators			Indicators of group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
Djibouti	Afars	3	0	0	7.2	6.2	7.5	-1.417	0.167	-0.777	7	11.38
Cambodia	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1	6.2	7.0	8.0	-0.975	-0.136	-0.965	6	11.36
Mauritania	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0	8.3	7.2	8.2	-0.942	-1.127	-0.872	7	11.27
India	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other Adivasis; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	2	0	5.2	8.2	6.8	0.353	-1.246	-0.105	3	11.24
North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0	5.0	6.6	7.7	-2.175	-0.099	-1.253	7	11.12
Laos	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0	5.8	6.1	8.3	-1.576	0.035	-0.828	7	11.10
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0	4.8	6.4	7.3	-0.925	-0.991	-1.686	7	11.07
Ecuador	Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	0	0	5.7	7.2	8.2	-0.332	-0.602	-1.160	7	10.98
Serbia	Bosniaks, Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma	2	0	1	6.6	8.0	8.0	0.167	-0.225	-0.386	6	10.96
Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	0	0	3.2	5.9	8.0	-0.288	-0.099	-0.795	7	10.91
Vietnam	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1	4.7	5.7	6.9	-1.379	0.251	-0.504	5	10.65
Georgia	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0	7.5	8.0	9.4	-0.017	-0.672	-0.029	6	10.61
Guatemala	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1	6.0	7.3	6.0	-0.391	-0.652	-1.097	5	10.48
Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0	8.0	6.0	6.7	-1.156	-0.478	-1.117	6	10.45
Indonesia	Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, religious minorities	4	0	1	6.0	7.3	7.0	0.028	-0.573	-0.597	3	10.40
Liberia	Dan, Krahn, Ma, other groups	0	0	0	9.2	6.5	8.3	-0.360	-0.475	-0.920	7	10.13
Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0	3.9	6.7	7.7	-2.210	0.351	-1.375	6	10.03
Togo	Ewe, Kabre	0	0	0	7.1	4.8	7.5	-1.019	-0.419	-0.918	7	9.96
Belarus	Poles	0	0	0	3.6	6.8	8.3	-1.540	0.024	-0.921	7	9.94
Moldova	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0	5.0	6.0	7.7	-0.087	0.024	-0.359	7	9.91

Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- *Conflict indicators:* The base data used was Monty G Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2013' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014) and, for self-determination conflicts, Monty G Marshall and Ted R Gurr, 'Peace and Conflict 2005' (CIDCM, University of Maryland, 2005) updated for 2013-4 using figures from Center for Systemic Peace, MRG and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2013,

Heidelberg, HIIK, 2014).

Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2014 were ranked on a scale of 0-5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed conflicts were classified as 2=ongoing in late 2013; 1=emerging from conflict since 2009 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.

- *Prior genocide or politicide:* Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.

- *Indicators of Group Division:* Failed States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.
- *Democracy/Governance Indicators:* Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2013.
- *OECD country risk classification:* Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2014.

Data for Kosovo include some indicators relating to Serbia. Where separate indicators are available for

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the latter have been used.

Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:

$$(A/2) + (B \times 1.25) + (C \times 2) + (D+E+F)/6 + (G+H+I)/-1 + (J \times 0.625)$$