Pakistan is at a critical juncture. As the Pakistani government prepares for the return of millions of those displaced by fighting between its military and the Taliban, authorities must ensure that this process meets international standards and is accompanied by reconstruction and development. The nature of the response to a massive displacement among its Pashtun minority will play a key role in determining whether the country can emerge from a history of social fragmentation. Addressing both the short- and long-term needs of internally displaced people (IDPs) will do much to gain support from a minority population that has long felt alienated from the state. If Pakistan, along with the international community, fails to do this, groups such as the Taliban will exploit disenchantment among IDPs, and the cycle of violence will continue and likely worsen. However, there is a window of opportunity now for the Pakistani government to make lasting change by addressing the needs of Pashtuns and other minorities living in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Pashtun civilians are caught in a battle between Taliban insurgents, who have gained strength over the last few years, and the Pakistani military, which is fighting to reclaim territory from those groups. More than any other community in Pakistan, Pashtuns, who make up 15.4 per cent of Pakistan's population, have borne the brunt of the most recent violence. Other religious and ethnic minorities have been displaced in smaller numbers.

IDPs told Minority Rights Group International (MRG) that they were weary of the constant instability that accompanied the rise of Taliban groups; some said they supported the military campaign because they hoped it...
would bring stability, security and development. Indeed, the situation for Pakistan’s Pashtun minority is part of a global pattern, as highlighted in MRG’s 2009 People’s Under Threat survey, of civilian populations caught up in the fighting in countries on the frontline of the war against terrorism.5

The Pakistani government must now follow through on promises to launch a massive reconstruction operation in areas affected by fighting.4 As it encourages IDPs to return to their homes in Swat district, the source of much of the recent displacement, the government must ensure that these returns are both voluntary and safe. Just as importantly, reconstruction in war-torn areas must begin immediately, otherwise there is a clear risk that returning IDPs cannot re-establish themselves and may become displaced again. A source of particular concern for farmers is that the displacement occurred during a crucial time in the cultivation season. Mine clearance must also be a central component of such reconstruction.

Moreover, the government must put more resources into long-term development in Pashtun areas, which have been neglected in the past. If the government fails to maintain the support of its Pashtun population, and if the IDP crisis is allowed to continue, the military campaign against the Taliban will backfire. Even during the relatively early days of the crisis there was evidence of anger and frustration among IDPs with whom MRG has met. There is therefore a high risk that rising resentment among Pashtuns will actually strengthen militant groups.

The Pakistani authorities have recently declared that it is now possible for IDPs to return, and by the end of July 2009 the UN and the Pakistani authorities were estimating that nearly half a million people had returned to Swat.5 Nevertheless, many observers predict that the number and size of IDP camps may still expand. Among the estimated 2.5 million IDPs, only about 235,000 were staying in camps, according to a 9 June 2009 statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).6 The majority have been living with relatives, or sometimes complete strangers who opened their homes, as well as staying in public buildings such as schools where they have been surviving on donations collected largely from individuals. Helen Caux, a UNHCR spokesperson in Peshawar, noted that ‘the generosity of the Pakistani community has been tremendous.’ She added, however, ‘We fear also that there will be fatigue from host families, so these people might be coming to camps if they cannot go back to their homes. That’s why we need more funding to be able to expand the camps, to be able to set up the [new] camps.’7 While continuing military operations are expected to displace more people, there is also concern that IDPs who have found refuge elsewhere will have to relocate to camps.

Aside from addressing the needs of IDPs, the Pakistani government must ensure that it takes all possible measures to minimize the risk to civilians during its military operations. Given the strong ties between Pashtuns on either side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the United States and its allies must show the same restraint while engaging in fighting with insurgents in Afghanistan. The killing of civilians in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, as well as by Predator drone attacks in Pakistan, has already stoked resentment among Pashtuns in both countries.8

The Pakistani government must pay particular attention to the rights and needs of Pashtun women, especially those who are displaced. It is well-known from other situations of mass displacement that displaced women are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous individual security officials, camp supervisors, traders and others.9

Bringing a human rights and minority rights perspective to bear on the situation in the NWFP also entails upholding the rights of other minorities, including Ahmaddiyas, Christians, Hindus, Isma’ils, the Kalash, Shi’as, Sikhs and other communities. Attention must be paid to the particular situation and rights of women belonging to these minorities. While members of some of these populations have been displaced, few have gone to the camps in the NWFP, but instead to other locations. MRG met, for example, with Christians displaced in Peshawar and Sikhs displaced at the Gurdwara Sri Panja Sahib in Hasan Abdal. Given the clear risk that these communities may be targeted by the Taliban, the Pakistani government must do its utmost to ensure their protection.

**Background to the conflict**

The Taliban have drawn on historical grievances stretching back to 1893, when the British negotiated a border with Afghanistan that cut through the Pashtun homeland, dividing the population between Afghanistan and what was then part of the British Empire, and in 1947 became independent Pakistan. As they continue to do in Afghanistan, the Taliban exploit the dissatisfaction, widespread among Pakistani Pashtuns, with the country’s central government and feudal power structure. Hashim Mohmand, a member of a prominent family from Mardan district, which borders Swat, has been involved in raising private donations to assist IDPs. He said the Taliban recruited poor men by promising to redistribute land owned by local elites. He said, ‘It is in many ways a proletarian revolution. Many of the peasants, tenants on the land, basically revolted because the Taliban was supposedly giving them more rights.’10

While land reform is a key issue in Swat and many other regions of the country, the government has also failed to invest resources to develop the economy. Musarrat Hilali, vice-chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), sketched a portrait of the average Taliban recruit: ‘A poor man who had no job, nothing, suddenly gets sophisticated weapons, a car, a mobile [phone] and cash.’11 In addition, Ms. Hilali suggested the government had failed to provide the basics of civil society, notably education and the rule of law, saying that ‘People are crying out for justice… When citizens’ rights aren’t
protected, how can we say minority rights are protected?12

The Taliban have also used terror tactics to intimidate residents into supporting them. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on 10 May 2009 Taliban militants dragged an imam into the town square, where they shot and killed him after he and other residents objected to the stockpiling of arms and the laying of landmines in Mingora, the capital of Swat district.13 In addition to public executions and floggings, the Taliban have distributed videos of violent acts, such as beheadings, committed against civilians, according to many sources including Ms. Hilali of the HRCP. She said:

Why was everyone supporting the Taliban? This was because of terror. They would slaughter people and make videos and distribute these things to the people.14

Analysis by the BBC’s Urdu service, released 13 May 2009, estimated that the Taliban then controlled 62 per cent of northwestern Pakistan.15 During the past few years, the Taliban has been battling the Pakistani military, particularly in the Swat district of the NWFP. After failing to dislodge the militants, the government offered a truce, practically ceding Swat to Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a group affiliated with other Taliban organizations.16 In doing so, the Pakistani government apparently turned its back on women and smaller, non-Pashtun minorities, who risked being targeted under Taliban control.

The impact on women

In Afghanistan under Taliban rule, women were prevented from working or attending school.17 The Pakistani Taliban imposed the same restrictions, according to a Christian schoolteacher from Swat who was living in a makeshift IDP camp at a vocational training institute run by the Peshawar Diocese in Mardan. She and other staff members received threatening letters saying that girls should not be educated and that the school should be closed down. Frightened by the threats, staff shut down the school in early 2008. She said, ‘They closed the school because of that bad situation. They had to do that. People don’t want to kill their kids.’18

Indeed, by January 2009, Pakistani education officials estimated that over 130 schools in the Swat district had been destroyed by the Taliban, and most of these had been serving girls. Moreover, the enrolment of girls in the area had plummeted from 120,000 in 2007 to 50,000 by the beginning of 2009.19 At the end of 2008, local Taliban leaders called on all girls in Swat to stop attending school.20

On 6 May 2009, under international pressure, Pakistan switched strategies and launched an offensive to take back Taliban-controlled territory. More than 2.5 million people fled the fighting, according to the UN.22 Those who could not escape were trapped as Taliban fighters made their final stand against a barrage of bombs and heavy artillery. The military released no figures of civilian casualties and did not allow journalists or independent monitors into the conflict zone. But given the heavy-handed military tactics, there is a risk that many people were killed and injured. The military has expanded operations against the Taliban. On 13 June 2009, it struck Taliban targets in Waziristan just hours after Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, pledged to wage war against the Taliban ‘until the end.’23 The UN estimates that fighting in Waziristan will displace an additional 500,000 people.24

The fighting has created the largest internal displacement of people in Pakistan’s history. But despite the heavy toll, the military garnered much public support, riding a wave of anti-Taliban sentiment that was evident before the start of its operations. A poll conducted in December 2008 by Gallup indicated that 47 per cent of Pakistanis believed the Taliban had a negative influence, while only 14 per cent said it had a positive influence, and 39 per cent said they did not know or refused to answer.25 The poll covered the country, excluding the FATA and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. In the NWFP, 49 per cent of the residents surveyed told Gallup that the Taliban had a negative influence. Only 10 per cent were in favor of the Taliban, while 41 per cent did not know or would not say.26

Even people displaced by the fighting told MRG that they supported military operations against the Taliban. An elder from Mingora, who had taken refuge in the Kacha Ghari camp in Peshawar, said the Taliban’s presence had destabilized his town to the point that the economy eventually ground to a halt. Although he said he was not opposed to the Taliban’s philosophy, he looked forward to the stability promised by the Pakistani government once the Taliban were driven out. He said, ‘We support the military operation. It should have been done before, but we are very happy with that. Everybody’s supporting that. As a result of this operation, we will be able to go back to our own home villages.’27

It is of the utmost importance that the Pakistani government and the international community do not squander the faith of IDPs such as this Mingora elder, or Himayatullula Mayar, district head of Mardan, which borders Swat and has absorbed the largest number of IDPs, who said:

The displaced persons are rendering sacrifices for the whole country, for the whole international community, because the fight against terrorism has started in their area. And as a result of that war against terrorism they have been displaced.28
Little help from the international community

Despite such sacrifices, international donors have been slow to respond to calls for funding to avert a humanitarian disaster, perhaps due to the misdistribution of past aid. Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani author and journalist, writes that, ‘Ninety per cent of the $10 billion in aid that the United States has provided Pakistan with since 9/11 has gone to the military rather than to development.’

If more of that funding had been put into development, especially in areas vulnerable to the Taliban, the group would not have found such fertile ground for recruits. Neither the Pakistani government nor the international community can afford to repeat similar mistakes and yet major agencies are struggling to raise funds. On 22 May 2009 UNHCR called for $105 million to fund its assistance to IDPs as part of a wider UN appeal, but by 15 June it had received $28.5 million. The UN’s wider appeal for $543 million to help IDPs had received only about a quarter of that by 9 June.

Unless resources are provided to rebuild areas destroyed by fighting, many IDPs will find themselves unable to return home, in a state of limbo, and living in camps semi-permanently.

Miserable conditions

While humanitarian agencies are working to provide basic services in the camps, IDPs said conditions were miserable. Gul Bibi, who was living at Kacha Ghari camp, said she felt like she had no options because camp life was terrible, yet she had nothing to go home to. ‘We have now no future plans, no future hope. We don’t have our businesses there, our houses, so what is going on here?’ she asked. She then added, ‘In the camps we are thinking, “Why did we leave there?” It is better to have death there than a difficult life in the camp.’

The IDPs at Kacha Ghari had basic services, including communal kitchens and toilets. The tents had only dirt floors and many of the IDPs, who are used to cooler temperatures in their mountain homes, complained about the heat. The tents are also vulnerable to wind and rain storms. On June 3, while MRG was conducting an interview in a tent with a camp official, a wind storm blew in and the tent began to collapse.

If the IDP crisis continues, such discontent will only become more widespread, and the camps could become a recruitment ground for militants. Even during the relatively early days of the crisis there was evidence of this risk. Two days after MRG visited Kacha Ghari, seven men were arrested there, having been allegedly making vests to be used in suicide bombings, according to Zaibullah (many Pakistanis use one name), an inspector with the Peshawar police.

MRG’s visit to Kacha Ghari camp suggested that people in the camp were living in a state of fear and trauma. Yasir Ihtesham, a doctor at the camp’s medical centre said, ‘Psychologically they are not sound, so you have to be very gentle with them. They’re very agitated, they’re very irritated.’

As he was speaking, a number of other men began excitedly making comments. They accused him of being a spy: some said for the government, while others said al Qaeda. This environment of fear is psychologically unsettling for the IDPs, and it is yet another reason that the IDPs should be helped to return to their homes as soon as possible.

A global issue

A prolonged IDP crisis has security implications not just for Pakistan, but for the entire region, and indeed the world. Recent history has shown that militants have emerged from areas under Taliban control to carry out attacks within Pakistan and Afghanistan, and elsewhere. After the attacks on New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001, the administration of US President George W. Bush launched its ‘global war on terror,’ striking first at the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had harboured al Qaeda. The UN sanctioned the invasion of Afghanistan, and many countries contributed troops to a continuing military presence in that country. But while the Taliban was driven from power in Afghanistan, it did not disappear. In fact, the Afghan Taliban has gained strength and the US and its allies are now fighting a full-fledged insurgency.

While the histories of the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan are intrinsically linked, it is only recently that the war has spilled over emphatically into Pakistan. Taliban fighters in Afghanistan have been crossing back and forth across the border since the Afghan regime was overthrown in 2001, but during the past couple of years Taliban groups have emerged in strength to challenge the Pakistani government’s hold over its own territory.

Delinking the Taliban from Pashtuns

While the Taliban draws its fighters mainly from the Pashtun community, this does not mean that the majority...
of Pashtuns support the insurgency. But Pashtuns living in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan now find themselves at the locus of a global conflict. As a result, ‘the association of the Taliban with Pashtuns and its publicity by the national and international media has created a lot of negative perception about Pashtuns,’ as a commentator recently noted.\(^{38}\) In fact, there has been strong resistance against the Taliban, which is notorious for carrying out draconian punishments against those who do not follow its strict conception of Islam, or do not support its methods. In other instances, opposition has sprung up due to the fact that the Taliban are seen as an outside influence, imposing control through force. For example, hundreds of tribesmen in the Upper Dir district of the NWFP organized militias to fight the Taliban after a bombing at a mosque in the district killed 38 people on 5 June 2009.\(^{39}\)

It is vital that Pashtuns are not automatically perceived to be in support of the Taliban. Otherwise, there is a considerable risk that Pashtuns will face discrimination and abuse. According to a 2 July 2009 statement by Amnesty International, there is evidence that such attitudes are already emerging towards displaced people who have left the NWFP.\(^{40}\) Amnesty has documented over 20 cases of displaced Pashtuns who have been told that they cannot rent property, receive health care or place their children in schools without security clearance.\(^{41}\) Such demands are difficult for IDPs, who may have left their identity documents behind, and are especially problematic for Pashtun women who would have been prevented from obtaining identity documents if they had been living under Taliban control.

**The impact on other minorities**

In addition to the impact of the conflict on Pashtuns, the Taliban has targeted religious minorities, sometimes imposing \textit{jizya}, a tax on non-Muslims. Ms. Hilali of the HRCP said that the Taliban demanded \textit{jizya} from Sikhs living in Bara, a town in the Khyber Agency of the FATA.\(^{42}\) According to media reports, Taliban in Orakzai Agency demanded \textit{jizya} from 40 Sikh families living there; they also seized a member of the Sikh community and demanded a ransom. He was released after the Sikh community paid half the ransom before fleeing the area. In the process, the Taliban destroyed 11 Sikh homes.\(^{43}\) \textit{jizya} has been imposed in other towns and on other communities as well.

Christians have suffered under Taliban rule. Churches have been destroyed, according to Ashar Dean, Assistant Director of development programs for the Peshawar Diocese. In one incident, a church in Bannu was vandalized on 11 May 2009. The intruders burned Bibles as well as the altar, and smashed windows and fans.\(^{44}\) Individuals have also been targeted, said Mr. Dean, who pointed to the 7 December 2007 kidnapping of Dr. Reginald Humayun, the general secretary of the Church of Pakistan who worked at a Christian-run hospital in Bannu.

Mr. Dean said the Church was able to secure his release two months later, but these and other incidents sowed fear amongst Christians in the area.\(^{45}\) The Taliban’s increasing influence in Swat also spread fear among the Christians living there. Mr. Dean said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The Christians, they are vulnerable, they are poor, socially and economically. And they are dependent on the majority community for their livelihoods. And when this whole Talibanization started in the Swat valley they started to dress like the majority community. They tried to hide themselves among the majority community so that they could be ignored.}\(^{46}\)
\end{quote}

**Minorities under threat nationwide**

While the prospect of life under Taliban rule is alarming for minorities, the situation is far from ideal in Pakistan in general. Ghulam Panjwani, executive officer of Focus Humanitarian Assistance, an Agha Khan Foundation affiliate, said simply, ‘The minorities do not have freedom here.’\(^{47}\) He pointed as an example to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, contained in the Pakistan Penal Code, which have been used to target non-Muslims. In one instance, two Christians, Asif Masih and Amjad Masih (no relation), were sentenced to life imprisonment after being wrongly accused of burning a copy of the Qur’an. They said police falsified the charges after they refused to pay bribes. Their sentences were overturned and the two men were released in 2006 after seven years in prison.\(^{48}\)

‘Pakistan’s inability to forge a national identity has led to an intensification of ethnic, linguistic and regional nationalism, which has splintered and fragmented the country,’ writes Ahmed Rashid.\(^{49}\) It was not supposed to be that way, Mr. Rashid points out, quoting Pakistan’s founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah in his 1947 speech: ‘You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state.’\(^{50}\)

Mr. Jinnah died the following year, and Pakistan’s rulers have since implemented policies and laws that discriminate against non-Muslims. Extremists have exploited deep divisions in Pakistani society. Ahmed Salim, of the South Asia Research Centre, called on the government to do more to promote equality. He said, ‘Religious harmony is not workable until you create equal status between Muslims and non-Muslims in Pakistan.’\(^{51}\)

There is hope for change, however. The hospitality and care shown by many Pakistanis to IDPs is a positive sign. Interviews conducted by MRG also suggest that a future free of such tension is conceivable. For example, Indaraj Maqool, one of about 3,000 Sikhs from Swat and Buner who took refuge at the Gurdwara Sri Panja Sahib in Hasan Abdal, said that even the Taliban takeover of Swat did not affect relations with her Muslim neighbours. She said, ‘Even now that we are here, Muslims are taking care of our houses there. They call us to tell us that our houses are safe.’\(^{52}\)
Conclusions and Recommendations

With the current crisis having resulted in well over 2 million IDPs, the challenges to Pakistan are monumental. But if the Pakistani government and the international community act swiftly, a new humanitarian catastrophe in the NWFP and the FATA can be avoided. There is also an opportunity to do more here than simply mitigate the tragedy. If enough resources are targeted at both addressing short-term needs and creating long-term solutions, with a focus on its minorities, Pakistan could take a large step toward stability. MRG recommends that the following steps should urgently be taken:

• Donor countries should respond to calls for humanitarian assistance to fund relief efforts for IDPs.

• The Pakistani government must ensure that all IDP returns are safe, voluntary and dignified. Particular attention must be given to the needs of potentially vulnerable groups including single women, female single heads of household, children, the elderly, persons with physical or mental disabilities, as well as those who are injured or seriously ill.

• In order to meet international standards, IDPs should have access to impartial information concerning the prevailing security situation in their home communities and the possibility for their return.

• In order to facilitate such returns, the Pakistani government must make mine clearance an urgent priority.

• Reconstruction must begin immediately after military operations are over in order to ensure that IDP returns are sustainable; otherwise, there is a clear risk that returning IDPs will be displaced again.

• Funding must be made available for reconstruction.

• Abuses perpetrated in Taliban-controlled areas should be considered criminal acts and investigated and prosecuted as such.

• The military’s conduct during its campaign against Taliban insurgents must be reviewed, especially in light of the fact that no independent monitors or journalists were allowed into Swat during the height of operations. Any violations of human rights or international humanitarian law should be impartially investigated.

• The Pakistani government, donor countries and the UN should draw up a long-term plan to put the NWFP and the FATA on the path to stability. This should be based on the needs of Pashtuns and other minorities, after consultations with those communities. The plan should focus on education, legal reform and economic development. Special consideration should be taken in all aspects of the plan to address issues affecting minorities.

• Military action by Pakistani and US and international forces should strictly adhere to international humanitarian law. Attacks should always be directed at specific military objectives, and never at civilians. Furthermore, attacks should not be indiscriminate or cause disproportionate damage to civilians or civilian infrastructure.

• The government must reform laws and policies to end discrimination against minorities and women. Security officers and law enforcement personnel should be sensitized and trained to implement and enforce such changes.

Many of the humanitarian workers, analysts and IDPs interviewed by MRG echoed each other when asked how to create a stable Pakistan. A few of their responses:

‘Education, education, education; development, development, development – do these things and people will start to think differently.’ – Ghulam Panjwani, Focus Humanitarian Assistance.

‘I would pray for Pakistan, for a better future for a proper country. And I would ask the government to do more in these areas, to build new colleges, new schools. And the most important thing is to establish an independent judiciary and speedy justice.’ – Yasir Jamal, Centre for Excellence in Rural Development.

‘They should be focusing more on development programmes than this type of clearing away of extremists through weapons.’ – Ahmed Salim, coordinator at the South Asia Research Centre.

‘I want to go back because I have a very nice house there and I have a very beautiful valley, and I want to start my education there again. I want to be a doctor in my future.’ – Ekta Maqool, aged 7, IDP from Swat.
Notes


UNCR accessed 14 June 2009.
8 MRG interview, Peshawar, Helen Caux, 4 June 2009.
11 MRG interview, Islamabad, Hashim Mohmand, 2 June 2009. MRG interview, Islamabad, by telephone to Peshawar, Musarat Hilali, 6 June 2009.
12 Ibid.
14 MRG interview, Islamabad by telephone to Peshawar, Musarat Hilali, 6 June 2009.
17 MRG interview, Peshawar, 3 June 2009, the interviewee wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.
20 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, 3 June 2009, the interviewee wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.
24 MRG interview, Peshawar, Ashar Dean, 4 June 2009.
29 MRG interview, Gurdwara Sri Panja Sahib in Hasan Abdal, Indaraj, Maqool, 5 June 2009.
30 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, Yasir Intehash, 3 June 2009.
31 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, Gul Bibi, 3 June 2009.
32 MRG interview, Islamabad, Yasir Jamal, 3 June 2009.
34 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, Yasir Jamal, 3 June 2009.
35 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, Yasir Jamal, 3 June 2009.
36 MRG interview, Islamabad, Yasir Intehash, 3 June 2009.
37 MRG interview, Islamabad, Yasir Jamal, 3 June 2009.
39 Ibid.
40 MRG interview, Islamabad by telephone to Peshawar, Musarat Hilali, 6 June 2009.
42 The incident was described by Ashar Dean during an MRG interview, Peshawar, 3 June 2009, the interviewee wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.
45 MRG interview, Peshawar, Ashar Dean, 4 June 2009.
46 MRG interview, Islamabad, Gulam Panjwani, 8 June 2009.
51 Ibid, p. 35.
52 MRG interview, Islamabad, Ahmed Salim, 5 June 2009.
53 MRG interview, Gurdwara Sri Panja Sahib in Hasan Abdal, Indaraj, Maqool, 5 June 2009.
54 MRG interview, Kacha Ghari Camp, Peshawar, Yasir Jamal, 3 June 2009.
56 MRG interview, Gurdwara Sri Panja Sahib in Hasan Abdal, Ekta Maqool, 5 June 2009.
working to secure the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples