INEQUALITIES IN ZIMBABWE

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- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world.

- To help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised, are very difficult to resolve; and

- To foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.

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# INEQUALITIES IN ZIMBABWE

by Christopher Hitchens and David Stephen  
with a foreword by Garfield Todd

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From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948:

**Article 1**
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

**Article 2**
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

**Article 10**
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

**Article 19**
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

**Article 20**
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Acknowledgements

Part I of this Report, although actually written by one author, is in many ways the work of many hands. I have found indispensable the work of the Catholic Institute of International Relations in London, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Salisbury.

Their combination of dispassionate research with a clear commitment to principle was not enough to shake my agnosticism, but put me lastingly in their debt all the same. It may be invidious to name names, but the work of Roger Riddell, Tim Sheehy, Judith Acton and Mr and Mrs John Deary has been of exceptional value. I should also like to thank, in Salisbury, Professor Marshal Murphree of the University and Mrs Joan May of the Centre for Inter-racial Studies at that institution. Garfield Todd gave me the benefit of a lifetime's involvement in his country's affairs. Many other Rhodesians of all races were free with help and guidance but prefer not to be named. Xan Smiley, editor of Africa Confidential, and Godwin Matatu of Africa magazine made some extremely helpful comments on the text, as did Professor Claire Palley of the University of Kent and Dr David Caute. My thanks to all these individuals can in no sense implicate them in the tenor or the conclusions of this report.

I should say finally that while this pamphlet replaces the one written for MRG by the late Mr G.C. (Jack) Grant at the beginning of this decade, I have seldom had a harder job than living up to the standard which he set.

November 1979

Christopher Hitchens.

FOREWORD by GARFIELD TODD

Even the most sympathetic person could not comprehend the devastation which has engulfed people and villages in Zimbabwe during the past seven years of war. The thousands of men, women and children who have been killed are only a fraction of the price which is being paid for freedom. Thousands more have been wounded and those who have been crippled will have to be supported through all the years ahead.

Hundreds of thousands of our seven million population, peace-loving people, have had their homes destroyed, their schools, hospitals and clinics closed. They have had to abandon fields and cattle and seek refuge in towns, some with relatives, some sheltering under plastic sheets, owning nothing and utterly dependent upon the Churches and the Red Cross for a bare existence. Great numbers are still in the "protected villages" into which they were herded by the Government in its strategy to denude a countryside so that the guerrillas would be denied the food, shelter and protection of the villages. Nearly a quarter of a million people fled from the war and live destitute in refugee camps in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique.

A vast programme must be launched to rehabilitate the people and the countryside: to rebuild homes and schools, to restore the villages with cattle, goats and even chickens. Much can never be healed or restored. There are little children in the refugee camps who do not know the villages which were their homes. Hundreds of young men and girls too, have been shot as they fled the country, or killed in battle when they returned. They lie in unmarked graves in the bush: many were not given burial and the fate of thousands will be forever unknown to their families.

I believe, however, that the spirit which has brought to nothing the plans behind the Illegal Declaration of Independence of 1965 which was designed to launch "a thousand years of white rule", is stronger than ever. The people will face the future with courage and determination and I hope to see vast aid-programmes supported by our friends in the international community.

Zimbabwe faces serious social, political and economic problems but the people have demonstrated their courage and determination in war and they have the vision required to win the peace.

Hokonui Ranch
Dadaya
Zimbabwe
November 1979
PART I: THE INHERITANCE FROM RHODESIA
by Christopher Hitchens

INTRODUCTION

The British colony of Southern Rhodesia has been in illegal rebellion against the crown for the past fourteen years. For eight of these years the colony has been waging a full scale racial war inside its own borders, which has often spilled over into the territory of neighbouring states. In the last two years, and most notably since the government of Mr Ian Smith conceded that majority rule could not be postponed forever, the conflict has taken on a more tribal and sectarian character, with different African factions competing for power. At the time of writing, the nature and extent of this war overshadow all other considerations, and sometimes make the collection of even ordinary data very difficult.

However, no real doubt exists about the origins of the conflict. These are now admitted even by the Rhodesian government to lie in the structures of racial privilege which led to both the rebellion and the subsequent war. Although the white settler minority considered it vital for many years to deny Africans the franchise in order to retain their supremacy, this 'one to one' correlation between political and social discrimination is no longer tenable. All adult Africans now enjoy the right to vote, and formal racial discrimination has been removed from the statute books. In addition, the emigration of very many Europeans as a result of the fighting has necessitated the promotion of Africans to positions from which they were once strictly excluded.

Nevertheless, these amendments to the UDI system of racist government show no sign of bringing the conflict to an end. And the war in the countryside has imposed fresh and cruel burdens upon African life. All attempts at reaching a settlement still founder on the issue of racial inequality and the consequent power struggles within the fabric of Rhodesian society itself. The argument over political rights has now become a fight over equal shares. The ultra right-wing Salisbury monthly Property and Finance put it succinctly in the summer of 1976, when the 'majority rule' argument was on the verge of being won:

Let us suppose for a moment that the African is our mental, intellectual and moral equal, that three generations of contact has (sic) given him a belief in the moral Christian imperatives of our civilisation. The assumption is ludicrous, of course, but let us make it. Let us further suppose that his moral right to reap where he has not sowed were undoubted. It would still remain for us to ask ourselves whether it is in our interests, as whites, to give him a share greater than he has today in what we have created.

The answer given by Property and Finance to its own question can be easily guessed at, but need not detain us here. Its statement of the problem, and of the racial attitudes which surround it, is succinct and topical enough.

The question of racial equality is, of course, at the heart of the dispute over a constitutional settlement. As long as 'white guarantees' are insisted upon as supreme, and protected as they must be by political entrenchment, the decisive African guerrilla forces will not agree to lay down their arms. And the large number of educated and qualified Africans within the country will continue to feel alienated from the system which relegates them, and protects whites who are in very many cases not even Rhodesian. (40% of Europeans in Rhodesia settled in the country after Mr Smith's illegal declaration of independence in 1965; 132,000 white immigrants, though not all of them permanent.)

* * * *

The present Report attempts to anatomize the social and economic predicament of the Africans in Zimbabwe*, in the context of an exceptionally (and unnecessarily) painful and prolonged transition from Rhodesia* to Zimbabwe. The relevant headings are:

1) Political and military background
2) Tribal and federal background
3) Land and land ownership
4) Employment
5) Wages and poverty
6) Discrimination, advancement and promotion
7) Civil and political liberty
8) Health
9) Education
10) The position of women

1) Political and military background

One reason for the length and bitterness of the transition to independence in Rhodesia* must undoubtedly be the complexity and jealousy of local politics. Most of the leading political figures have been on the scene for very many years, and become used to bargaining and bickering with one another. Even Mr Ian Smith's tightly-knit Rhodesian Front party, which was disciplined by the exercise of power and by the feeling of international ostracism for many years, has suffered damaging splits and secessions as well as individual defections. As a result of Mr Smith's acquiescence in the principle of eventual majority rule, which followed the Kissinger plan of 1976, he was deserted by many of his former supporters in Parliament, many of whom combined to set up the Rhodesian Action Party (RAP) and oppose him at the polls especially over his amendment of the Land Tenure Act. RAP never achieved any substantial success among white voters, most of whom have chosen to follow the RF in whatever course it chooses, but as events approach their climax the threat of a 'settler backlash', though very slight, deserves to be borne in mind.

The National Unifying Force (NUF) also merits a place in the record because despite its extremely limited support and very low membership it has a reputation for 'anticipating the next concession'. Its thankless role over the years, and under a variety of titles, has been to speak for loyalist British opinion against the forces of UDI.

Although most of its members would be Conservative voters in British terms, and many incline to a strong monarchist allegiance, the NUF has opposed racial discrimination and pointed out the futility of any programme based on white absolutism. As a consequence, some of its spokesmen are listened to by African opinion especially where any constitutional matter is concerned.

* or Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, parsim
The political situation among Africans, both in Rhodesia and amongst the 250,000 strong emigration which divides itself between refuges in Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, is infinitely more tense and convoluted. Nationalist agitation really began in Rhodesia in the nineteen fifties, though there are those who point to an unbroken resistance since 1896, and a literature to go with it. The veteran of the movement is beyond doubt Joshua Nkomo, who after a period of activity as a trade union organizer and civil rights leader set up the African National Congress in 1957 and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1961. Within two years a rival organization had been set up by the Reverend Ndebevingi Sithole, called the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). It was, in fact, this organization which claimed to have inaugurated the strategy of 'armed struggle'. Both Nkomo and Sithole were placed in detention camps, under harsh conditions and without trial, by Ian Smith some time before UDI in 1965.

The nationalist movement continued to experience sharp competition for leadership and direction, and in 1971 a third group was set up under the name of FROLIZI, or Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe. Its cadres came from both ZANU and ZAPU but its leaders were James Chikerema, who had been acting president of ZAPU during Nkomo's prolonged detention, and George Nyandoro. Both men are now leading figures in the 'internal settlement' politics of the country, though Mr Chikerema has fallen out with what he considers to be the tribal regime of Bishop Muzorewa. During the early seventies, too, the ZANU leadership in prison deposed the Reverend Sithole as leader and replaced him with Robert Mugabe. Mr Mugabe now commands a political and military force, based in Mozambique since the revolution of that country against Portuguese colonial rule, and this force is joined with Nkomo's ZAPU under the umbrella known as the 'Patriotic Front'.

For a brief period after December 1974 all these factions came together under the chairmanship of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and the Organisation of African Unity even went so far as to recognize his African National Council, which had mobilized opinion against the Goodman-Douglas-Home proposals, later found by the Pearce Commission to be 'unacceptable' to African opinion, as the legitimate liberation movement. By the time of the Geneva conference in 1976, however, the old party and personal splits had reasserted themselves.

Crudely, it could be said that the ZAPU and ZANU factions were both experienced in armed struggle and toughened by detention and repression, while the supporters of the Bishop were not. This would approximate to the truth, but it should be remembered that the UANC (as the Bishop's party became known) did send some youngsters for guerrilla training, and that Sithole, Chikerema and Nyandoro all have records as guerrillas leaders. The bulk of nationalist human and material fighting power, however, still rests with the Patriotic Front.

The 1979 elections in the country, where for the first time there was an exercise of universal adult suffrage, was a contest almost entirely between those rival black forces who had accepted the 3 March deal. This was because the whites had already voted (returning the Rhodesian Front candidate in every seat) and had also approved, in a referendum of their own, the constitution under which the election was held. This constitution provided for the protection of white seats in Parliament, for the entrenchment of white privilege in other fields, and for continued white control over the armed forces, for a period of at least ten years. The fact that many Africans voted with enthusiasm, and that all the parties in the election supported the terms of the constitution, was held by many (notably Mrs Margaret Thatcher's personal envoy Lord Boyd) to vindicate the constitutional settlement and the May elections which followed it. (For a forceful account of the contrary view, see Zimbabwe—Rhodesia. Should the present government be recognized? Dr Claire Palley. Published by the Minority Rights Group and the Catholic Institute for International Relations. 50p)

Bishop Muzorewa's party survived allegations of intimidation, vote rigging, electoral fraud and bribery to emerge a clear winner, trouncing the Reverend Sithole's party (still named ZANU in opposition to Robert Mugabe's leadership) and eliminating the representation of Chief Jeremiah Chirau, whose ZUPO organization had long been seen as an African poodle of Mr Smith's. The United National Federal Party of Matabeleland made a respectable showing (see next section). Since the election a new party, the Zimbabwe Democratic Party, has emerged as a breakaway from the MPs of the UANC. Led by Mr James Chikerema, and supported by nationalist veterans such as Professor Stanlake Samkange, the ZDP is tribally-based and has never had to fight an election; but it successfully won a court case to enable it to take its seats in Parliament as an independent party.

Despite initial optimism in Salisbury, it seems highly dubious that the new government will succeed in its professed objective of ending the war and rapidly advancing the status of Africans. It is too much in debt financially, and too dependent on white economic and military hegemony to do the second, and it may be simply too late for anybody to do the first. What may be said for the moment is that Bishop Muzorewa's promise, that the guerrillas would surrender when he was elected, has proved to be false.

The neighbouring countries which support the guerrilla movement, chiefly Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania, are feeling the strain on their own economies and societies and would dearly like the war to end. But they feel they can hardly do this while so much of the colonial character of Rhodesian society remains intact. Meanwhile, a new generation of young black Rhodesians is growing up in the camps and refugee centres. This large group, which has never been involved in any of the internal 'consultative' procedures, can also be expected to fight for the final removal of white settler power. The link, then, between social and political conditions in Rhodesia and the achievement of peace is very obvious. (This new Report by MRG is necessitated by the fact that the guerrilla war began in earnest only in 1972, a year after the last pamphlet was published.)
2) Tribal and federal background

Rhodesia is the product of two colonial conquests by Rhodes and his allies and colleagues: that of Matabeleland in 1893, and of Mashonaland in 1897. The Mashona-based population, more usually referred to as the Shona, constitute 78% of the population, and the Matabele, usually referred to as the Ndebele, 19%. The two language groups are markedly different, and the populations have other cultural demarcations between them.

The following map is a reasonably fair picture of the distribution and proportions of the tribal and language situation.

THE MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPINGS IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WITH APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN POPULATION

There are two historically-based fears which arise from this complex pattern. The first is that the Shona peoples have a memory of 'minority rule' by the then better-equipped and more military Ndebele. The second is that Ndebele people have a fear of being swamped and subordinated by a 'majority rule' Shona system. Within the Shona, too, there are tribal divisions. The Zimbabwe Democratic Party of Mr Chikerema, for instance, is wholly based on the Zvishavane tribe and resents the apparent partiality with which Bishop Muzorewa regards his 'home state' of Manicaland.

These tensions have long provided the white racist parties with opportunities for propaganda, and with a means of dividing and weakening the nationalist movement. The nationalist movement itself is plagued by the division. It is very roughly true to say that ZAPU is an Ndebele party and ZANU a Shona one, though both Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe repudiate tribalism, and many of Mr Nkomo's most loyal and formidable supporters are Shona (as some of Mr Mugabe's are Ndebele).

Recently, and most noticeably in the May elections of 1979, this problem has led to suggestions of a federal solution. The United National Federal Party did unexpectedly well at the polls, although in Matabeleland generally the vote was very much lower than in Mashonaland due to the enduring prestige of Mr Nkomo. Indeed, it has been suggested that the UNFP won votes by quietly indicating that it stood for the Nkomo policy pro ten.

Chief Kaisa Ndiweni, the leader of the UNFP, is at pains to point out that elsewhere in Africa the drawing of colonial boundaries has little or no reference to real economy, demography or cultural affinity. He suggests that the same is true of the amalgam named 'Rhodesia'. The map makes it clear that the tribal (or national as many Africans prefer to put it) division more or less bisects the country. The policy of the UNFP is to draw up a federal constitution, with a supreme parliament having a fifty-fifty representation from each of the two areas. Beyond the question of the army, which would remain united, there would be wide autonomy of local government and finance. It is clear that in Matabeleland such ideas have a definite following (though they form no real part of the ZAPU programme). It is equally clear that the Shona majority does not hold with the scheme. Thus 'ar, Bishop Muzorewa has done little to integrate Ndebele people into his cabinet or his party.

It must be owned that the tribal character of African affairs in Rhodesia has not been transcended. As the war has intensified, and as security and confidence have ebbed, there has been a tendency for many traditional attitudes to revive. The reappearance in the rural areas of belief in the ancestral spirit mediums of the country, who played such a large part in the wars and rebellions of the 1890s, is only one indication of this trend.

In the rather feverish atmosphere of Salisbury politics, where those who have bet on the survival of the 'internal settlement' are nervous about the outcome and jealously about the division of the spoils, a swift way to political eminence is to adopt a tribal posture, and a safe way to preference is to cultivate a network of professionals linked by tribal loyalty. It is a factor which looks set to grow rather than decline in its influence. There is, however, one note of reconciliation to
be struck. Many on both sides of the guerrilla war are related by tribal and village connections to one another. The existence of this ‘bridge’ – very marked in the case of Mr Mugabe’s party and the party of Bishop Muzorewa – may help to mitigate reprisals and even, given helpful international conditions, to assist in bringing about a reconciliation. However, even if Rhodesia does succeed in making a transition to full independence, the tribal and national factor will continue to be important for many years to come.

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In the light of this political, racial and tribal background, it is necessary to sketch in the other unresolved questions which have so far obstructed the development of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. As far as possible, these topics will be discussed in objective isolation from the more dramatic and dangerous questions which have been mentioned above.

3) Land and land ownership

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the land question in Zimbabwe is the single most decisive one. The white settlers have regarded it for decades as the crucial axis of both economic and political power. For Africans of all classes, the loss of their land to colonial conquest has always been a strong emotional and political factor. The bulk of the guerrilla operations in the country have been directed at farms and ranches owned by Europeans and worked by Africans.

In repeated negotiations down the years between the British government, the nationalists and the Rhodesian Front, the various acts governing Land Tenure and Land Apportionment have been a stumbling block. It was a racial issue long before 1965; indeed it was in 1930 that racial division of landholding was first made law. But the 1969 Land Tenure Act confirmed and reiterated the division in what was intended to be a permanent fashion. Under the terms of this act, 45,000,000 acres were reserved for the exclusive use of Europeans, and almost exactly the same acreage was designated either as ‘tribal trust land’ or as ‘African purchase area’. There has not been a census in the country for some years, but the 1971 figures showed 5,220,000 Africans, 249,000 Europeans, 9,300 Indians and 16,900 Coloureds (mixed race).*

It is safe to say that since that last official count the only racial group to show a decline in numbers has been the European; much affected by emigration as a result of the war, and inclined in any case to raise smaller families. The tendency of whites to desert the land, and indeed the country, played its part in the amendment to the Land Tenure Act which contributed to the 3 March 1978 agreement between Smith and Muzorewa. Under the terms of this amendment, all rural and urban property is now available to be bought on a non-racial basis. Excepted from this provision is the ‘tribal trust land’ which remains inviolate from any white purchase.

Since these lands are notoriously inferior in yield and quality to those held by Europeans partly because of overpopulation and lack of capital as well as natural disadvantages, the exemption is not a burdensome one. It was calculated in 1978 that the average income in a tribal trust land was $14 Rhodesian a month (about £10).

Additionally, African farmers outnumber European farmers by almost one hundred to one, from which it may be gauged that the disparity in the size and value of farms is very considerable. It can also be deduced that the ‘land hunger’ among Africans is very great, and the extent of rural unemployment very considerable. Which is not to say that there is not a great ‘employment effect’ from white farming. The vast majority of the population in the white areas is African, and the 6,682 European farmers who were present at the end of 1976 were employing 332,000 African labourers. (This fact, more than any other, leads to the conviction held by “internal” African spokesmen that a precipitate white withdrawal would be disastrous for African interests, nor should Africans employed as domestic servants or in white-owned industry be ignored.)

However, the dependence of the country on white commercial farmers is greatly accentuated by the policy of over-crowding and overworking the subsistence agriculture of the tribal trust lands. In mid-1979 Mr George Nyandoro, Minister of Land and Natural Resources in the government, said that his information revealed some areas which were carrying up to eight times the number of persons and livestock which could be theoretically supported by them. The new government’s Integrated Plan for Rural Development is designed to address this problem by setting up a fund of just $110m Rhodesian, nearly 80% of which is to be spent on acquiring some of the large tracts of underutilized land in the white areas. This is hoped to alleviate the terrible over-crowding of the TTLs (and bear in mind that an estimated three million acres of white farming land is not being used at all). The plan falls some way short of being dramatic. It has been calculated that only 3% of TTL farmers will be benefited by the scheme over a period of ten years, raising their net income to perhaps $67 per month. In any case, the problem of available unused land is only tangential to the major problem, which is underutilization of the good quality (usually European) farms and overworking of the poor quality (generally African) areas.

The preferred alternative of the present government, which is to abolish formal race discrimination in land, and to try and extend the idea of individual tenure to the TTLs while promoting more experienced African farmers to underused or abandoned white land, does not tackle the central inequality. As a result, the land crisis directly spills over into the related problems of homelessness and unemployment (see subsequent sections) because so many Africans are still being forced to desert the tribal trust areas in search of work and even food, as well as to escape the rigours of war.

The position of the African Purchase Areas is not quite as tense and severe as that prevailing in the tribal trust lands. Here the dominant system is that of individual African freehold, allowed to those African farmers who can demonstrate proficiency and qualifications in agriculture. However, the technical level of these areas

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* A 1976 projection of the 1969 Census found 6,110,000 Africans, 278,000 ‘Europeans’ (whites), 20,900 Coloureds, and 10,000 Indians.
is low, and access to modern methods and equipment more restricted. There is evidence here, too, of considerable underutilization and land vacancy. Since only 1% of African farmers actually live in these areas, they can hardly provide much by way of a 'model' in any case. At best, they play a role ancillary to the highly sophisticated export-oriented European sector, which has been able to generate high yields and income partly from the easy availability of cheap labour and partly from generous state subsidies.

Given the favourable climate and the vast areas of land in relation to white population as well, the success of the Rhodesian farmer is not all that difficult to comprehend. Recent developments, however, have made the confidence and security of this system much more precarious. The revolution in Mozambique has cut Rhodesian farmers off from the sea. Mr Eddie Cross, chief economist of the Agricultural Marketing Board, also points out that the war inside the country has led (quite apart from its political repercussions) to the most damaging disruptions. Tick-borne cattle diseases, for instance, often resulting from the closure of dip-tanks by guerrilla forces, are thought to have reduced the national cattle in the tribal trust lands by up to one third. Malnutrition, closely related to the dismal situation of the tribal trust farmers and their soil, has also taken a toll, as have mutilation by guerrilla forces and reprisals by the army. Cattle rustling, not all of it related to the war, is said to be costing $1m a month. This has led to an even greater disparity between the standards of living in the TTRs and elsewhere, and has brought a warning from Mr Nyandoro that there may be a general battle to come between the haves and have-nots on the land question alone. The attached map of land holdings, which although some years old is still accurate, gives the background to the related problems of wastage and infertility; themselves the counterparts of a racist allocation of the soil.

(N.B. Figures on abandoned white farms are classified for reasons of security and morale.)

**LAND DIVISIONS BY RACE IN RHODESIA**

4) Employment

It was recently calculated by the Whitsun Foundation (a research organization sponsored by Rhodesian business interests hopeful of an end to the crisis) that the level of wage employment among blacks in June 1979 was 25,000 below what it had been in 1975. Bearing in mind that some 300,000 young Africans have come onto the labour market since that time, the dimensions of the unemployment problem can at least be guessed at.

Given that nearly three-quarters of all African families in the country are dependent on wage labour for survival (or at any rate subsistence) the problem is clearly an acute one. Rhodesia does share with many African and many Third World societies a tremendous threat of unemployment especially among the young. But there are specifically man-made features of the Rhodesian system which have contributed to the problem being either ignored or mishandled.

There is a somewhat casual attitude to the unemployment question among official Rhodesian departments and spokesmen. In the past, ministers have even been heard to say that the problem does not exist. It is certainly very hard to elucidate a total from the official evidence. The picture is further complicated by the number of Africans who are semi-employed in the agricultural sector, who are employed on short weeks in the urban industrial sector, or who are squatters and refugees living on the extended family. Still, some outline points can be made, and it is already clear that the long-term trends are ominous.

They can be stated as a disjunction between the growing thrust for paid employment, the growing population pressure upon it, and the actual supply of places in work for Africans whether unqualified or qualified. The situation is a grim one; between 1969 and 1975 some 578,000 Africans were added to the labour force, only 210,000 of them finding jobs in formal employment. And the total number in formal employment actually fell in the next two years 1975-77, by a total of 13,000. Meanwhile the number of those seeking work rose by a further 14,000.

For instance, it has been calculated that between 1969 and 1975 the net addition to potential adult male labour supply was over 250,000. And this is merely to speak of demographic change and growth. At least partly owing to the situation in the tribal trust lands which was outlined above, there are an estimated quarter of a million people who have flooded into the rural shanty areas in the last eighteen months. Admittedly, not all of these are of employable age, but they undoubtedly increase the pressure of unemployment on Rhodesian society.

There is, at the time of writing, no system of unemployment insurance for the country, and no old age pension arrangement for Africans. The extended family—now under severe strain in any case as a result of war and refugees—is expected to care for the old. As a result, many Africans of retirement age are unwilling to leave their occupations and make room for fresh recruits.

Another factor which has tended to sharpen the employment crisis is the increasing isolation of the country from its black African neighbours. The effective scaling of the borders with every country but South Africa has led to a situation where labour can no longer be exported and where even contract labour arrangements with the Republic of South Africa have declined somewhat in the past few years.

Of course, unemployment is a function of generalized economic decline, and of population growth, and of the effects of a ghastly war. But its nature and extent is such as to inhibit progress in many other areas - not least education and wages.

5) Wages and poverty

There is at present an absolute decline in the standard of living of Rhodesian Africans. A study done by the University of Rhodesia, which was first carried out in 1974 and then updated in the summer of 1979, shows that urban blacks in the country are paying half as much again for the basic necessities as they did five years ago, with very few commensurate rises in income. The studies both postulated a 'poverty datum line', which was defined as the minimum level of income at which African families could maintain 'physical health and social decency'.

In Salisbury in the last five years, the cost of this minimum has risen by 45%. In two other main towns, Bulawayo and Fort Victoria, it showed an even more alarming deterioration. Here, the increases were 63% and 58% respectively, which though alarming enough were already gathering momentum by the time the report was published. For instance, the price of meat had risen by 11% in the month which separated the collection of the figures and the publication of the report.

In Salisbury, a family of two needs an income of about $40 to escape destitution, while for a family of eight the figure would be nearer $100. Government figures indicate that the average monthly wage in manufacturing is about $55 and in commerce about $30. The survey notes that these comparisons take no account of additional factors - such as the increasing number of African families who are having to support refugee relatives.

The survey also noted that the racial structure of the country made the collection of certain data very difficult. Residential and service facilities, for instance, such as education and health, show great cost differences based on the official unspoken assumption that Africans need rather less than other racial groups.

Again in the case of housing, it was harder to quantify the research because the housing shortage makes it impossible to define a minimum house size for a specific family and to cost it accordingly. Houses are simply allocated as they become available - it is by no means uncommon to find cases of Africans who have waited well over a decade - and do not take into account the size or the needs of the family concerned who will usually accept the first house they are offered rather than prolong the wait any further. The poverty datum line study, then, had no choice but to take a rough average when calculating this input.

The conclusion of the report is that most urban African families must be considered as living on or below the poverty line, and that this poverty line is itself not calculated very generously.

A few days after this report was published, Mr David Smith presented the first national budget of the new multi-racial regime. Almost the entire budget was devoted to conducting the war and maintaining the economic position of white farmers. To the amazement of many supporters of Bishop Muzorewa, there was no mention made of the situation in the townships or of the great effect inflation was having on the urban poor. The chief concession made in the budget speech was one which increased the holiday allowances which those taking a vacation abroad might take with them. This concession by its very nature was primarily directed at reassuring and rewarding the white population and offsetting the temptation to emigrate.

Indeed, on his inauguration day as Prime Minister, Bishop Muzorewa had addressed a large crowd of supporters and told them that his election promises of 'the fat of the land and sufficient money' would have to be postponed. He told them, 'I know you are hungry, I know you are thirsty, I know you are suffering'. But, nevertheless, he had been in consultation with the employers of labour, and they had told him that any rise in wages could only lead to a sharp and sudden increase in unemployment.

Within six months from the original costing of the report, the price of bread had risen by 10%, of milk by 8%, and of mealie meal by 8%. Petrol price increases range also having a general inflationary effect and, as ever, it is the low income groups who feel the results of this increase in staple prices most keenly. In Rhodesia, that means the Africans.

In agriculture, the wage and poverty problem is even more acute. Of the 38% of Africans in formal employment who work for European farmers, perhaps 85% are paid less than $20 per month, and in the prevailing conditions the gap between white and black wages is actually getting wider. This was the situation as it was calculated in 1977. The figures show monthly wages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average White Wage</th>
<th>Average Black Wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures only cover those lucky enough to be in regular work. There are no real findings or totals to cover those who lead transient lives of homelessness and unemployment, but the number of these is undoubtedly growing fast. On the outskirts of Salisbury in particular there is an increasing number of squatter camps, whose inhabitants live by mendicancy of various kinds. One very regrettable side-effect has been the cutting-down, illegally, of a large number of trees to provide firewood for the cooking of the mealie porridge which forms the basic diet. The effect of this on the soil has been considerable in some places.
There are, however, some figures on the number of refugees, whose plight provides a major depressing effect on the living standards and conditions of Africans in general. In December 1978 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that there were at least 100,000 in UN camps in Mozambique, 18,000 in Botswana and 44,500 in Zambia. This in itself gives an idea of the size of the problem, and the flow of people over the borders has by no means dried up since then. Their condition in the camps is extremely poor, and the condition of others in camps not administered by the UN can only be guessed at. Within the country itself the situation is hardly less harsh.

The Community Services Department of Umntali reckoned that in 1978 it had about 30,000 refugees living in the two townships of Sakubva and Dangamvura. Bulawayo has about 10,000 refugees. The capital, Salisbury, has at least 70,000, with 7,000 in the Harare township alone. Estimates of up to seven times this figure have been made, but are not easily substantiated. These people are, if they are lucky, living in lean-to shelters made of tin or plastic or even cardboard, and paying one dollar a week for communal water and latrines. Thousands of others are sleeping rough and throwing themselves on the mercy of the Red Cross, whose limited staff perform prodigies of work against the background of a problem whose dimensions are increasing literally every day.

6) Discrimination, advancement and promotion

Formal discrimination on grounds of race, whether occupational or residential, has now been abolished in Rhodesia for the most part. This was necessitated by the desire on the part of the ancien régime to come to terms with African aspirations at last, and to secure international recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions by so doing.

It cannot be denied that the change in the law marked a step towards ridding Rhodesia of the racist mentality which had plunged it into war. But, just as not many black African farmers can take advantage of a law which allows them now to buy land in European areas, so there are few blacks in other occupations who are able to rise, as yet, to their full height simply because of a new measure. Nonetheless the basic concession has been made and cannot be unmade.

The main area in which formal discrimination persists is in the political system. Here, although the actual details are still being discussed by a constitutional summit, it is understood that certain parliamentary seats and certain positions in the government service will be reserved for Europeans de facto. The relevant clause in the case of the Public Service Board, for instance, states that a majority of its members (who meet in order to make all significant public appointments) must have held a post no less senior than under-secretary in the civil service for at least five years. This, and similar constitutional safeguards do represent small victories in the tenacious rearguard action fought by the Rhodesian Front. They were, on paper, swept away by the Lancaster House agreements.

Certain changes strike the eye very forcibly. Property transfers in housing are estimated to be 30% from white to black — often resulting from European families selling up in haste. There are not many Africans who can afford the $5,000 minimum income which is calculated to be necessary to move into a ‘white’ area, but those who can afford it are doing so fast.

Since 1969, almost one eighth of the white population has deserted Rhodesia. Total figures for 1978 showed a net loss of 13,709, which was an increase of 26% on the previous year. Many other applications to leave are 'in the pipeline'. This exodus results from a multiplicity of reasons, but almost all of them, from lower expectations of wealth increase to fears about education of white children, are in some way war-related. The importance of mentioning it is that such an exodus does mean a greater number of vacancies for Africans in jobs that would have been denied to them until a very few years ago. As a result, the number of black faces in prominent positions has shown a certain tendency to increase; whether it is reading the news on the television or holding a post in the civil service. Key jobs, such as that of Cabinet Secretary, are still given to experienced Rhodesian Front whites. But the African appetite for promotion has been whetted more in the last twelve months than in the previous twelve years.

Progress has not been invariably smooth. Mr Byron Hove, a distinguished black lawyer, returned in 1978 from exile in London to take up a post as co-Minister of Justice and Law and Order. He relinquished it after a short spell in office because he became convinced that the new government was not serious enough about advancing Africans to positions of responsibility, and because of the resistance he encountered from white politicians and officials to his own proposals for change. At about the same time, two Africans resigned from the posts they had recently taken up at the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation, saying that they had been deceived into believing that it would no longer be a mouthpiece for government propaganda. Other examples of this kind can be multiplied.

Nonetheless, the long-term trend is against white supremacy being able to reproduce or perpetuate itself. Partly, this is because so few of the Europeans, relatively speaking, are Rhodesians. At least 40% of them arrived in the country after Mr Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, and many of these had fled from another doomed colonization in former Portuguese territories. It will not be possible for much longer to maintain the fiction that the ‘special skills’ of these people are an absolute necessity which requires the preservation of colour privilege. Even between March 1978 and July 1979, black posts in the established civil service rose by 679, and white posts fell by 667.

A vexed question closely allied to that of racial discrimination is that of conscription. Perhaps the most dramatic single result of the abolition of formal racial criteria has been the insistence, particularly by white members of the government and the bureaucracy, that Africans should be liable for call up into the armed forces; a call-up from which they were hitherto exempt. (The call-up now, owing to the extreme severity of the war, applies to all whites, coloureds and Asians between the ages of 18 and 25.) For Africans, the
requirement is limited to those between 18 and 25 who have at least three years secondary education. This order, which came into force in December 1978, has not been met with unmixed delight by its recipients. Many have been arrested for demonstrating against it, and many others have fled the country or gone into hiding rather than be inducted.

Enrolment at the multi-racial University of Rhodesia, for example, has been cut by nearly 50%, according to its Vice-Chancellor, as a result of the call-up. This indicates that a fair number of Africans are obeying the order to join the army (a fact that can be confirmed by other findings as well). But it also suggests that the abolition of the colour bar in the army is not an entirely beneficial thing for African advancement. The officer corps of the Rhodesian Security Forces, at any rate, shows no sign of altering its white and professional character, though the new government would like to advance African officer material.

Rhodesia is more fortunate than many of its neighbours in having a large number of educated and qualified Africans, many of them having gone abroad and attended university on their own initiative in order to escape the racist system of education at home. The crucial test for any new government or system in Rhodesia will be the extent to which it can employ the skills and capacities of these people in the work of reconstruction.

7) Civil and political liberty

Prior to the seizure of power by Smith and his backers in 1965, Rhodesia was a self-governing colony debating the conditions for full independence. Racialism and racial discrimination were of course widespread and a battery of potentially repressive legislation was on the books, but there was a certain amount of liberty for the subject and safeguards for the individual. UDI brought with it a state of emergency, the virtual abolition of habeas corpus, the start of extensive political interference in the judiciary, the imposition of rigid press and broadcasting censorship, detention without trial, secret courts and executions—all the paraphernalia of dictatorship. Though this apparatus was chiefly designed to choke and break any movement towards African majority rule, it was also used to silence and, on rare occasions, to punish any white Rhodesian who expressed dissatisfaction or disagreement. For the African prisoner, torture and maltreatment were commonplace, and confinement was often in a remote camp far from any outside contact.

Since 1972, with a developing nationalist war against this state of affairs, and especially since 1975 when Mozambique changed its allegiance, the government has found it necessary to impose even more stringent measures of 'security'. In the autumn of 1978, a state of martial law was proclaimed in the Umtali, Melsetter and Bindura districts. This was followed by further proclamations covering numerous tribal trust lands and purchase areas, and then a second wave of martial law orders extending the system to Wankie, Victoria Falls and Chipinge. By Christmas half the country was under martial law, and by the time of the 1979 elections nearly 90%. For practical purposes, all but the area immediately around Salisbury is now governed by martial law.

The core of the martial law system is very simple. 'Executive officers of the government, the military forces and other security forces of the government and its other servants employed to assist the government are hereby invested with full and complete powers and authority.' It is a system of military and police absolutism which cannot really be challenged. It is interesting to bear in mind what was said by Mr Desmond Lardner-Burke when he was Minister of Justice in September 1974: 'Martial law only comes into existence when the civil powers have lost control and they hand over to the army to maintain the law and order position of the country.'

Both Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Sithole at different times signed orders committing areas to martial law.

The system is backed up by a network of 'keeps' and 'protected villages' where the armed forces confine entire local populations behind wire and subject them to curfews which can extend up to 22 hours. An idea of the scale of this operation can be gleaned from the fact that, when in September last year the government decided to open up some of the protected villages around Mtoko and Mount Darwin, some 200,000 people were affected. They found, when they returned to their villages and farms, that many of them had been burned and destroyed in order to deny food to the guerrillas, and in order to prevent them from taking shelter in abandoned huts. This sort of exigency is held to justify practically any act committed by any member of the security forces.

In case it does not, there is an extraordinary piece of legislation called the Indemnity and Compensation Act, which confers immunity in advance on any soldier or policeman in the exercise of his duty. Despite protests from the late Sir Robert Tugendhat, formerly Chief Justice of the Central African Federation, the bill became law and has been used ever since to prevent any exposure of security force atrocities or any prosecution or punishment of those who are responsible. In the few minor cases that do reach the courts, chiefly those involving members of the black 'Guard Force', even a defendant who admits his crime may be discharged if it is held that he was 'on duty' at the material time. Some punishments have, however, been meted out to individuals.

The official figure for deaths in the war is 30 people killed every day. Other unofficial tallies put it nearer one hundred. The daily announcements speak of a dozen or so 'collaborators' shot and perhaps another dozen 'killed in crossfire' (this last mishap never seems to befall Europeans). Any effort to secure clarification is refused on 'security grounds'.

In April 1979, the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia succeeded in getting the High Court to grant a stay of martial law executions, which are usually carried out by secret court martial in the field, being conducted without a right of appeal. The government itself appealed against the High Court decision and succeeded, in the Appellate Division, in getting the Justice and Peace motion set aside. Since that time, it has been indicated that the President will exercise his prerogative as the final court of appeal, but in the prevailing secrecy imposed by the martial law system it is difficult to imagine this being exercised very often. It is also still impossible to establish whether hangings
for "terrorist offences", normally heard in secret courts, and then despatched on a secret gallows, still take place as they used to, without the next-of-kin even being informed. But former warders in Salisbury prison have said that this gruesome policy persists.

There is, therefore, almost no redress for the individual citizen if the government should take a dislike to him or his village. The war has established a totalitarian code in this respect, and the savage behaviour of some guerrilla detachments has ensured, together with relentless propaganda, that there is little outcry against it.

As far as political liberty and freedom of expression are concerned, the situation is little better. The two oldest African nationalist parties, ZAPU and ZANU, both of them corresponding to external guerrilla forces but having a long history of open political activity, are both banned. It is forbidden for any newspaper, or any publication, or any radio or television programme, to mention their existence, or to print the names of their leaders. The Zimbabwe Times, a large-circulation daily which was the only paper to print any views critical of the internal settlement, was closed by the Muzorewa government and only pro-administration papers may now be sold. It is not possible to be strictly accurate about the number of political detainees in Rhodesia, but the International Defence and Aid fund have a list of some hundreds whose names are known. Many people have simply 'disappeared'; a method of repression which came to wide public notice in the case of Dr Edson Sithole, publicity secretary to Bishop Muzorewa's own party, who vanished in the hands of the Special Branch in 1975, before the transitional government was set up.

Even the supporters of the Reverend Sithole's ZANU, which does itself accept the internal settlement, are subjected to frequent raids, arrests and harassment by the police when they utter any criticism. And, although it would be fair to say that the behaviour of Sithole's armed supporters has often been appalling, the government has yet to provide any convincing explanation for shooting nearly two hundred of them in July 1979.

The author of this Report recently had the opportunity to ask Bishop Muzorewa why his security forces had failed to open a prisoner of war camp during eight years of conflict. There was no direct reply. It remains the case that, in its "search and destroy" operations, the Rhodesian armed forces have a standing order that anything moving can be shot. This applies even to petty infringements such as curfew-breaking; the punishment of which by death on the spot has repeatedly been defended by government spokesmen in the Parliament and outside.

The Rhodesian war, then, is fought on recognizably classical colonial lines. It need only be added that the policy of reprisal and collective punishment, which extends from crop burning to the shooting of cattle and the destruction of whole villages, has its reverberations, through the refugees and the growing threat of famine, unemployment and disease, in every other section of this pamphlet. It has been calculated that agricultural output in the tribal trust lands, for instance, has declined by 1.4% every year for the past five years as a result of the depredations of the war. And that index is only one amongst many.

Currently, the government is conducting an amnesty programme, which is designed to appeal to guerrillas wishing to defect. It differs from previous amnesty campaigns in that it does not threaten those who fail to return with death and destruction. Instead, the official line, backed up with mass leaflet drops, "sky-shout" broadcasts from the air and other printed and verbal inducements, seeks to persuade the guerrilla fighters that full majority rule now exists, and that no valid reason for protracting the war can be advanced. There is some doubt about the sincerity of this campaign. The leaflets (which are printed in Shona and Sindebele as well as English) carry telephone numbers which can be rung by those wishing to give themselves up. The normally conformist Rhodesia Herald, renamed the Herald in 1979, got one of its reporters to call the numbers. Almost none of them answered.

8) Health

The situation regarding health and medicine in Rhodesia shows an unusually marked division between the countryside and the towns. In the very recent past, with the return of traditional diseases such as sleeping sickness which had been nearly eradicated, the effect of the war has been felt particularly harshly in the rural districts. Yet even before this, the racial pattern of Rhodesian development had been felt in this most basic service facility.

The differences in health and health care closely match the striking disparities in income, employment, land ownership and housing discussed in other sections. To take one index which bears directly on health: in African areas of Salisbury (the town in which it might be said general standards were the highest in the country) less than half of those Africans lucky enough to have homes also have electricity. Living conditions are very cramped, with most houses having three rooms or less and sustaining an average family of six at the least.

Many single males are required to live in cheerless 'hostels'.

In the countryside the number of African households with access to electricity is 2%. Running or purified water is very rare indeed, and wages, whether for formal or seasonal workers are very low (see above p. 8). Even without the pressure of the war, the position as regards malnutrition is very alarming, because Africans tend to be packed into tribal trust lands with poor soil and little capacity for producing more than subsistence food.

It has been said by Mr Eddie Cross, chief economist of the Agricultural Marketing Authority, that the average annual maize intake in the tribal trust lands has fallen to 231 pounds per annum, where 385 is the recommended annual total, which is to say there has been a drop in basic nutritional requirements of very nearly 40%.

* In September 1979 the International Defence and Aid Fund reckoned that there were 1,503 people serving prison terms for political offences; 196 people detained on an indefinite basis under emergency regulations without charge or trial; 152 persons sentenced to death on political grounds since the introduction of secret hangings in 1975; and over 7,000 people detained without charge under the martial law regulations. On 22 November the Government announced an amnesty for 1,377 political prisoners and 70 detainees.
Over and above all this, there is a population explosion of the kind often associated with underdeveloped societies experiencing very high infant mortality. Efforts by the authorities to discourage this are seen as racist in inspiration because they are not linked to any broader effort at improving the chances of Africans. As long as it remains the case that most Africans are outside the social security system and very vulnerable to unemployment, large families will seem a logical form of insurance against premature death or abandoned old age. (Infant mortality, incidentally, is reckoned at 122 per thousand for blacks and 17 per thousand for whites.)

The ensuing growth of the black population, and the extreme youth of its average age, is yet another powerful pressure on existing natural resources and upon existing social relations.

In 1973, J.H.M. Axtion conducted a survey which analysed the paediatric admissions to Harare hospital in Salisbury. It was then published in the Central African Journal of Medicine. The survey showed that of children admitted, the large majority were found to be underweight for their age, and that malnutrition and deficiency disease was usually the first, second or third diagnosis for around one third of all children admitted. It was also noticed that the incidence of malnutrition rose noticeably in periods of the year when agricultural work was hard to come by.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that health here is more than a simple question of desegregating hospitals. And, keeping in mind that Harare hospital is one of the harder hospitals for rural families to reach (adding the cost and difficulty of travel to the existing charge levied on Africans for treatment) it might be concluded that the extent of protein deficiency disease is much more widespread in the countryside than even these depressing figures might suggest.

Other common and disabling ailments among Africans, notably trachoma and typhoid, are directly associated with poor hygiene and sanitary facilities. These dangers, too, have been enhanced by the military conflict which has reduced the number of rural doctors and clinics dramatically. Apart from the ordinary depredations of war, some hospitals have been ordered to close because they are suspected of having treated wounded guerrillas or are suspected of being able to do so. Guerrilla action has also forced some clinics to close their doors. As a result, the number of those dying from untreated injuries, or illnesses for which no preventive or immediate remedial treatment exists, is rising all the time and is superimposed on a population whose standard of health care was never very much better than precarious.

Adding to the spiral of misery is the extent of disease among cattle, now once again subject to foot and mouth disease, which has further harmed the nutrition of farmers and peasants. All clinics and foreign relief organisations record a sharp rise in hunger diseases such as kwashiorcor.

The Rhodesian Ministry of Health, which can boast some fine hospitals and some excellent and dedicated individuals and staffs, sees its function in all this as a curative one. The 1978/9 estimates show an allocation of spending on curative services of 86.7% and on preventative medicine of 9%. There is an additional bias in the form of a huge share in the health budget absorbed by Salisbury. While it contains barely 9% of the population it takes almost 30% of the annual expenditure. These prejudices — towards white urban residents and against preventive medicine in the mainy African rural districts — convict the Rhodesian health services of something approaching neglect. They have chosen to reproduce the colonial character of the country rather than seek, as other health services in the world have sought, to compensate for them.

Despite the abolition of formal racial discrimination in hospital beds, the pre-existing depth of discrimination will take a considerable time to overcome. For years, the situation has been one where the state provided one hospital bed for every 255 whites and one for every 1,261 Africans. Expenditure per admitted patient and (perhaps significantly) expenditure on maternity care were even more disparate than this. And, long before the war might have been deemed to make it necessary, there was a great concentration of new hospital building in the prosperous urban centres and districts. It might be fair to say that the previous profile of racial discrimination is now slowly being replaced by a system based on class; a species of rationing by price.

Much the same can be said of the availability of medical personnel. They, too, respond to market pressures, which in this case means racial ones. At the last accurate count Rhodesia had 855 doctors, or roughly one doctor per 8,000 head of population. But 280 of these are only engaged in curing the members of white medical societies. This is to say that there is one doctor per 830 white Rhodesians. For rural Africans the most pessimistic interpretation of the figures is one doctor per 100,000, though some say the real ratio is one per 45,500. It is necessary to add that emigration has hit the medical profession disproportionately hard, with doctors clearly finding less difficulty in marketing their skills abroad. The total of 855 has been reduced to 735 since the end of 1977, and a further downward trend may be expected. In view of the increased demand for clinics generated by the war and the famine, Rhodesia’s health situation must be judged as chronic. and the situation for many African villagers little short of desperate.

9) Education

The profile of Rhodesia’s education system can be stated fairly simply. The best mnemonic for it has been stated before and holds approximately true. It is that almost the same amount in total is spent on primary education for whites as is spent for the entire black primary school population. Bearing in mind the disparity in population, this fact alone gives an impression of the problem.

This was the position in 1975; a position which has not altered substantially since. More importantly, perhaps, it is not intended that it should alter. A large element in the white determination to maintain control over public service commissions is to keep hold of the education system. And, since nothing would more stimulate a white emigration than the dilution of ‘white standards’ in education, the Muzorewa government has so far made little move to redress inequality.
To this need only be added the fact that white enrolment per head of the population is rather higher than African (142 per thousand as against 133 at primary level, and 106 per thousand as against 6 per thousand at secondary level). There are correspondingly more 'drop-outs' in the African system as well, and less remedial help for those in this situation. Education for white children is free at Sixth Form secondary level, and compulsory and 'comprehensive' up to the age of sixteen. Education for blacks is selective and competitive and fee-paying. As a result, the education system, though not now formally segregated, is highly stratified on racial and social lines which militate against Africans, and provides a classic case of 'socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor'.

10) The position of women

The visit of the Pearce Commission to Rhodesia was the occasion for an unprecedented civil resistance by the African population, which did much to dispel the Rhodesian Front's myth of the 'happy African'. The demonstration of opinion was sufficient to convince the Pearce Commissioners that no test of acceptability could lead to a fair implementation of the proposals. A sentence in the report which received little attention at the time ran as follows: 'Women on the whole showed a deep sense of responsibility and appeared to grasp more intensely the extent of the proposals on their families, and were aware of the burden they as wives, mothers and money earners would be carrying.'

As the Rhodesian drama has unfolded, and as tribal and other sorts of traditional pattern have been eroding under the strain, women have begun to scent emancipation, and to take initiatives. Whatever may be thought, for instance, of the 1979 elections and their validity, most observers were struck by the great enthusiasm shown by women during the public events of that time, and their determination to take a lead. The vulnerability of women in wartime, and the widespread rape and pillage of young women and girls by armed detachments throughout the country, is of course a critical factor in mobilizing female opinion for an end to the conflict, and for the social and family benefits which they hope 'peace' may bring.

Side by side with this process has been a demand for women to be emancipated in their own right. As matters stand at the moment, they have very few rights of any kind, being considered minors in the eyes of the law, and being subject to numerous tribal disadvantages as well. A woman, for instance, cannot leave home or seek work without the permission of a guardian. Nor can she marry, whatever her age, or open a bank account without leave. If divorced or widowed, she cannot become legal guardian of her children, which belong to her husband's family. It is common practice, sanctified by both colonial law and tribal observance, but of dubious origin legally, for men to arrive and collect the pay packets of their working wives. One head matron at a large hospital recently put her foot down and ended this practice. Despite grumbles, she suffered no other repercussions and other offices have been said to follow suit.

The basis of the subordination of women is 'lobola' or bride wealth, paid by the wife-receiving family to the wife-providing family. It is usually paid in cattle or cash or both, though one case was found of a bride-wealth being paid as five hoes! Bernie Goldin and Michael Gelfand, in their *African Law and Custom in Rhodesia*, say of lobola that 'it is the basis of marriage, family obligations, dissolution of marriage and other consequences of a marriage contract. It is also a paramount aspect of the economic and social structure of tribal society.'

As society has developed the system has become, if anything, even more rigorous. Fathers will tend to demand higher bride-wealth for educated daughters, for instance, in order to compensate for the cost of education. And money spent on lobola by men already working who are expected to find their own whereabouts, would obviously be far better spent on setting up the matrimonial home. The system does, it might be argued, provide a measure of protection for women, because if a wife is terribly maltreated she may return to those who paid for her, and they may demand the money back. In practice this expedient is of little value, and among the Ndebele in fact no bridal gift is returnable anyway.

The legal position is complicated by the fact that there are two legal codes in Rhodesia, the Law of Rhodesia and African Customary Law. The Law of Rhodesia is based on Roman Dutch Law, imported from the Cape at the time of the occupation but since modified by statute. African Customary Law is only applicable in civil matters, and the minority status of women does not protect them if they are accused of a criminal offence. From the female point of view, then, Rhodesian society represents a combination of some of the most rigid European code and some of the most traditional tribal code. (This metaphor, too, might hold true for other areas of Rhodesian society.) The enfranchisement of women has only served to make this position even more absurd and anomalous, and as the social turbulence of the country increases it will be astonishing if women do not pay an even more active part -- as some of them already do in the external nationalist organizations.

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THE FINAL STAGE

With the exception of Namibia, Rhodesia is the last significant colony in Africa. Its 'transition to independence' from Great Britain has involved an unprecedented constitutional midwifery, which has continued over fourteen years and defeated a succession of British Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers.
The boldest and most crucial of such initiatives — given point by a general recognition that it was 'the very last chance' — began in August 1979. The incoming Conservative government, which had endorsed the results of the 'internal' elections in Rhodesia, and which had promised an early move to restore the colony to legality, made an abrupt change of tack at the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, Zambia. Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington agreed to a policy of revising the constitution to remove most of the entrenched white protective clauses, to the supervision of fresh elections on an all-party basis, and to discussion of control over the armed forces.

A conference of all parties was convened in London at Lancaster House, scene of so many post-colonial settlements, in September 1979. Business at first was conducted very expeditiously, with the government of Bishop Muzorewa agreeing to new elections and to a constitution which did not give such weight to the interests of the white minority.

This agreement was not entirely smooth, involving as it did the fierce opposition of Mr Ian Smith, who was a member of the Salisbury delegation. However, it emerged that he was in a minority of one, and that the Muzorewa team in general were prepared to make large concessions on constitutional matters.

In the country itself, the government made what seemed a much greater effort to meet and satisfy African aspirations. The amount spent on rural development for Africans was projected as $11,146m for 1979/80, compared with $4,115m for the preceding year. Figures for African housing expenditure rose by $683.7m in the same period of comparison. Large sums were also announced as becoming available to help the lowest-paid government employees. The least ambitious heading is that of credits for small African farms, where half a million dollars (R) were set aside.

In education, too, some efforts have been made to reduce the pattern of discrimination described earlier. The disparity in salaries paid to teachers as against white ones — a disparity which partly underlies the startling differences in expenditure between white and black education — has begun to be tackled. A five-year plan for education is in existence on paper — though it is very doubtful whether the expense and exigency of the war will allow it to be implemented short of a settlement.

But the Lancaster House summit was not without its shoals and reefs. The first major difficulty was over land, as might have been anticipated. The Patriotic Front, especially its ZANU wing, was adamant that a new independent government in Salisbury should be able to take over the large latifundia without having to pay 'excessive' compensation. The British government took the view that compensation was essential in order to impose gradualism on the transition, and in order to retain the confidence of white farmers. A breakdown was averted by the proposal to set up a Fund (or Bank as some prefer to call it) with international backing, which would ensure that the new Zimbabwe was not saddled at the outset with the debts of the old.

The second major difficulty was concerned with the control of the security forces. The Patriotic Front insisted that the old 'machinery of repression' be dismantled and replaced by their own forces. The Salisbury side indicated that this was their absolute sticking point, and brought General Peter Walls to London to advise them on this very point. (General Walls, the head of Combined Operations, is variously analysed as being a 'moderate', a 'hardliner' and the preferred candidate of both the United Kingdom and South Africa.)

At all events, this question, with the related question of control over the transitional period to independence, was renegotiated and resulted in new proposals being tabled by the British chairman. These were:

1. The British government to appoint a governor for the colony under an Order in Council conferring executive and legislative authority.

2. The governor to be assisted by a deputy-governor with military, police, legal and political advisors, with supporting staff.

3. Enabling legislation to be submitted to the House 'as a matter of urgency'.

4. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues not to 'exercise ministerial functions'.

5. Day-to-day administration to be conducted through the existing public service, and law and order maintained by existing police answerable to the governor.

6. 'Free and impartial elections' to be held, and an advisory election council to be chaired by a British commissioner with all-party representation.

7. Commonwealth governments to be invited to send observers.

8. Machinery to be negotiated 'on which the military commanders on both sides will be represented to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire'.

9. The interim period — earlier set at two months by the British — not to be 'excessively protracted'.

10. An unspecified number of British policemen to be provided, in order to ensure some law and order element not implicated in the previous disputes in the country.

The last three points represent concessions to the Patriotic Front point of view. This had been that Britain was trying to scuttle as fast as possible, and avoid the embarrassment of renewing sanctions. They also suspected that the Carrington constitution was designed 'to Balkanize' African parties and lead to a deadlock in the assembly where Rhodesian Front members would hold the key by virtue of their solidarity. References to the British abandonment of Palestine, and to the abortive Cyprus constitution of 1960, were frequently made by the Front's constitutional experts.

The new British proposals met with the warmest response of any up to that time. Bishop Muzorewa accepted them in principle and the Patriotic Front softened their opposition on the question of controls over security.

The transition of Southern Rhodesia into the fully independent state of Zimbabwe still has a long way to go. The foregoing pages are intended to give a sketch of the magnitude of the problems which any new government will face.
The role of South Africa

Overshadowing the whole process of negotiating towards a ceasefire has been the presence of South Africa. Although direct South African military and police participation in the war was formally ended some years ago, reports have persisted of 'volunteer detachments' operating from the Republic inside the country, and a South African journalist named Dion Duplessis was prosecuted under his country's Official Secrets Act for attempting to investigate the extent of this commitment. It has also been reliably reported that with the rise in the world price of gold the South Africans have been able to pay almost the whole cost of the war (about £30,000,000 each month) without any undue strain.

The South African leadership has made it plain and public that no outcome which favoured the forces of the Patriotic Front (in particular those of Mr Mugabe) would be acceptable to it. The post-Muldergat hardline, already in evidence in Namibia, lends weight to the view that it has decided on buffer states rather than compromise. This consideration makes political settlement of the Zimbabwe war even more urgent than before.

And that is only the internal dimension. The war has also destabilized the economies of Zimbabwe's neighbours, some of them also recovering from the effects of colonial wars and extremely anxious to recuperate in peace. It has driven a generation of black Rhodesian youth into exile, and set tribe against tribe. It has taken lives on an awesome scale, many in circumstances so brutal and repugnant as to lead to lasting rancour. In consequence, Zimbabwe has become a source of conflict far beyond its own borders, and has reached a point where the superpowers themselves, and their immediate proxies, are threatening to become directly involved on a military scale. If Zimbabwe is considered as a diplomatic problem for the international community, for Britain as legally responsible power, for the United Nations, for the Organization of African Unity, it cannot be said that any of these powers emerges from the saga with much credit. In particular, Britain's standing in Africa has been greatly damaged by her failure to bring the rebellion to an end, and by her breach of oil sanctions regulations which she insisted, through the UN, should be imposed on everybody else.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

In 1968, when the rebellion of the Rhodesian Front was still in its infancy, the former Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Robert Tredgold, had this to say:

'The cumulative effect of the security laws was to turn Rhodesia into a police state. The word has an emotional context and many white Rhodesians become very angry if it is used of their country. Yet, as I understand it, a "police state" is a state in which the police and the executive are given or assume complete control over all political activity. In this sense it is manifestly true of the Rhodesia of today.'

Since that time, it has become ever clearer that the issues of political liberty and social justice are inextricably bound up together. The effect of the effort to suppress African nationalist organizations and aspirations by force, and thereby to maintain the degree of inequality outlined above, has been to plunge the country into the violence and division which the opponents of UDI feared from the start. A country with tremendous fertility and great resources has been brought to the verge of ruin because of the unwillingness of a minority to concede even a place in the sun to the majority. As a result, it seems improbable that good race relations will be possible for some time to come - if indeed many whites consent to remain Zimbabweans on terms of reasonable equality.

It becomes obvious, in considering any aspect of unequal shares in Zimbabwe, whether it be health, land distribution, unemployment or civil rights, that further progress on any front is impossible without a prior political settlement. The war, borne out of the non-resolution of these problems, has now begun to multiply and to intensify them.
PART II: THE POSITION IN 1981
by David Stephen

Christopher Hitchens' report, written in 1979, outlined both the complex political situation prevailing in Rhodesia at the time, and the daunting tasks which any incoming Zimbabwean government would have to face in order to redress the issues of inequality and discrimination. The report was published in 1979 and it was attended by delegations led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and by Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Robert Mugabe, and spent over three months discussing an independence constitution, pre-independence arrangements and a ceasefire. In the early stages of the conference it seemed unlikely that agreement could be reached on several major constitutional issues, including the role of the armed forces and the police, and above all, the issue of land redistribution and resettlement. But by mid-October the joint 'Patriotic Front' delegation had agreed on the independence constitution, and the remaining weeks were taken up with discussions about the implementation of the constitution, in particular during the interim period, and the arrangements for elections. In the final stages there were complex negotiations about cease-fire arrangements. The Conference Report and Ceasefire Agreement was finally signed by all parties on 21 December 1979.

The land issue was crucial to the agreement. It appears that the Patriotic Front agreed to accept Section 16 of the constitution which provided, 'inter alia', that no land should be taken over without fair compensation being paid to the landowner - only on the understanding that British and other aid would be available to assist an incoming government with land purchase. It is clear from a report from David Martin and Colin Legum in the Observer on 21 October 1979 that the talks nearly broke down over this issue; indeed, according to the report, the collapse of the Lancaster House conference was only averted when Mr. Cyrus Vance, the then United States Secretary of State, had formally confirmed that the United States administration would be prepared to help with the financing of a land purchase programme. Under previous settlement plans for Rhodesia, the land question had always been central. Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his attempts to secure a settlement to the question in 1975-6, is generally assumed to have planned a scheme to 'buy out' white farmers; the abortive Anglo-American proposals, published in April 1977, included a proposal for a Zimbabwe Development Fund, one of whose objects was to have been the financing of land development and settlement. In the end, agreement on the constitution was reached after Lord Carrington, the leader of the British delegation, had issued a statement saying that the British Government recognised the importance of the land issue to a future Zimbabwe and would be 'prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources, to help'. Lord Carrington's statement also made it clear that the British Government was 'ready to support the efforts of the Government of independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes'. The importance of these undertakings will become clear later.

Lord Soames had been appointed Governor of Rhodesia during the final stages of the Lancaster House conference and took up his post on 12 December, when sanctions were lifted and legality restored, thus ending fourteen years of rebellion and paving the way for majority rule elections and independence. It was announced that elections would take place on 14 February 1980 for the 20 white seats in the House of Assembly, and on 27-29 February for the 80 black seats. Eleven parties formally notified the authorities of their intention to contest the elections. The two parties of the Patriotic Front decided to contest the elections separately, Mr. Nkomo's ZAPU under the name 'Patriotic Front' and Mr. Mugabe's ZANU under the name 'ZANU-PF'. By 4 January 12,000 Patriotic Front military personnel had reported to assembly points; by 15 January the number had risen to 21,370. By 25 February a programme for the repatriation of refugees under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had seen the return of 35,430 refugees, mostly from Botswana and Mozambique. There had been a number of serious breaches of the ceasefire: the Ceasefire Commission considered in all 207 breaches. During the interim period martial law and the state of emergency remained in force. In a memorandum submitted to the Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames, in January, Amnesty International criticized the continued detention of political prisoners under the emergency regulations and the continuing refusal to grant access to prisoners, even to the Red Cross. Amnesty sought a public assurance that repressive legislation would not be used under British authority. British spokesmen were reported as saying that progress on meeting Amnesty's requests depended on the progress of the ceasefire.

540 British policemen were recruited to act as supervisors at rural polling stations, but although there was heavy rainfall in some areas, and allegations of intimidation, polling went off without incident. A total of 2.7 million people voted; nearly 63% voted for Mr. Mugabe's ZANU-PF party, 24% for Mr. Nkomo's Patriotic Front Party, and 8.2% for Bishop Muzorewa's UANC. ZANU-PF won 57 seats, giving them, to the surprise of most observers, in overall majority in the House of Assembly: the PF won 20 seats, and the UANC 3. Mr. Mugabe became Prime Minister and appointed 23 ministers, including 4 members of the PF party, and two Europeans (at Agriculture and Commerce and Industry respectively). On 21 March martial law was terminated and an amnesty decreed for all political offences committed up to 1 March 1980. On 11 April the Rev. Canaan Banana was declared president-elect, and Mr. Garfield Todd (the author of the Foreword to this report) was nominated Senator by Mr. Mugabe. On 15 April the British Government announced that it would commit £75m. of aid to Zimbabwe over a three-year period. On 18 April 1980 Zimbabwe became an independent state within the Commonwealth.

Despite the remarkable achievements of Lancaster House, and the subsequent peaceful transition to majority rule and independence, the legacy of the long years of racialist rule has not disappeared overnight. Indeed, while the basic situation described by Christopher Hitchens (see '3 Land and land ownership', p.6) remains much the same, the political pressure on the incoming government is immense. Mr. Mugabe's party fought the war, and contested the elections, on the basis of pledges to return
the land to the people; but, in addition, it was the African farming areas which bore the brunt of the war and whose infrastructure was largely destroyed. While a number of white farmers fled during the course of the war — leaving large tracts of fertile land unfarmed — population pressure in the so-called 'tribal trust lands' increased. The new government's approach was summarized in a document prepared for submission to an international donors' conference held in Salisbury in March 1981:

Gross disparity in incomes and quality of life persists today, which the new Government is determined to correct. Government's policies are based on socialist, egalitarian and democratic principles. The central objectives are to foster rapid economic growth, full employment, dynamic efficiency in resource allocation and an equitable distribution of the ensuing benefits. In particular Government intends to re-establish justice and equity in the ownership of land, which should be a common heritage for Zimbabweans of all races. Measures imposed by previous regimes to uphold the inequitable social order, such as education and manpower practices and restrictions on population movements, have been abolished. Certain historic imbalances remain, and to redress these, Government intends to expand productive employment, improve and extend basic economic infrastructure and social services, and achieve a greater and more equitable degree of ownership by Zimbabweans and the state of means of production, including land. Strategies are directed primarily to the amelioration of the quality of life for the rural population who are the majority and have suffered the greatest discrimination and endured the lowest standard of income and service.

The 'Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development', or ZIMCORD, held in Salisbury in March 1981, was attended by a large number of national and multilateral aid donors and agencies. The Zimbabwe Government had previously been highly critical of the British Government for what it considered to be inadequate levels of British aid, but the ZIMCORD brought in aid, and pledges of aid, totalling Z$1,281,821,000. Britain — on whose behalf Lord Soames announced an increase in British aid of £25m. — remained the largest national donor (with aid, including debt write-offs, totalling Z$177m.) with the United States (Z$120m.) not far behind. Of multilateral aid agencies, the World Bank pledged Z$287m. In his summing-up address to ZIMCORD, President Banana described the conference as a 'resounding success' and hoped that Zimbabwe would soon be in a position to become a 'proud and generous giver'.

The three major challenges faced by the Zimbabwe Government were the resettlement of refugees, the reconstruction of rural infrastructure destroyed during the war, and the longer-term restructuring of the economy described in the ZIMCORD documentation. The first task is mainly overt: the second under way. The need to repair bridges and interrupted water supplies, to replace cattle-dips, and clear mine-fields is immense, and no less importance is attached to the need to upgrade the 'tribal trust lands' and raise the level of agricultural husbandry there to above subsistence level. But the purchase of land and its planned resettlement, remains the politically and socially most important task facing Mr. Mugabe's government.

According to the ZIMCORD documentation, the Zimbabwe Government is planning to acquire 2m. hectares of commercial farming land over the next three years for resettlement: 15,000 families had already been resettled and a total of 1.7m. hectares were on offer to the government. It has been calculated that about half of the total European or 'commercial' farming land could be taken over for resettlement without endangering commercial agricultural output. Since the British Government remains, even after ZIMCORD, the only donor prepared to finance land purchase as such, and since the Government's plans involve the planning of a full economic and social infrastructure in the areas to be resettled, progress is not likely to be as fast as some Zimbabweans may hope. But the programme on any grounds is large and ambitious: it has been calculated that the initial three-year programme in itself is twice as extensive as the programme introduced in Kenya between 1961 and 1965. Large amounts of international aid have, of course, been pledged for development projects in the rural areas, both for the upgrading of the existing 'tribal trust lands' and for the development of infrastructure in the areas to be resettled.

Just as the Government has to steer a careful path between, on the one hand, the need to maintain a profitable and productive commercial agriculture and the need to secure an equitable distribution of land, so it has to balance rural and urban income levels in such a way as to prevent a massive exodus from the land and the creation of urban slums. By giving priority to rural development and resettlement the Government is clearly aiming to enhance the attractiveness of farming as an option for the rural population. But while facing justified demands for better wages from the urban African population, it has to ensure that urban wages are not disproportionately higher than rural incomes (indeed, in the past, as rural impoverishment and the dislocation of rural life accelerated during the war, large numbers of rural families came to depend for their survival on cash remittances sent to them from members of the family working in the cities).

In September 1980 Mr. Mugabe asked Roger Riddell, a British economist who had previously worked with the Catholic Institute of International Relations, to head a Commission of Inquiry into prices and incomes. The Riddell Commission report, which appeared in June 1981, recommended raising taxes on the higher-paid and reducing income differentials by allowing only the wages of the lowest-paid to rise. Over the next three years the Commission recommended that minimum wages should be increased gradually until they reach 90% of the poverty datum line. This, according to some reports, would involve wage rises, after inflation, of 30% a year for urban workers and more than 40% a year for rural workers. The Zimbabwe Government is not committed to accept the Riddell Commission proposals, on which the Economist (27 June 1981) commented that the proposals will 'harm those they are intended to benefit' and create unemployment.

The Mugabe Government is also pledged to bring about a recorrelation between the races in Zimbabwe. Until independence virtually all of the key posts in Zimbabwe had been held by whites. Thousands of army and police personnel emigrated after independence, mainly to

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South Africa: a total of about 10,000 whites left the country permanently in 1980, but although some crucial categories of white artisans - such as railway engineers and telephone engineers - have created gaps in the labour force, white emigration has not reached the levels which were being predicted before Mr. Mugabe came to power. The number of white farmers, in fact, rose slightly in 1980, and hundreds of teachers recruited by the government from Britain, Australia and Canada have entered Zimbabwe, not as expatriates, but as immigrants for settlement. Africanisation is gradually altering the previous white bias in national institutions, from parliament to television, to the university and the civil service: the Anglican church announced in May 1981 that Bishop Peter Hatendi would take over as Bishop of Mashonaland from the veteran Bishop Burroughs. But whites are still needed in crucial positions, the government strongly favouring immigration rather than expatriate secondment. One indication of the change in attitude of significant numbers of white Zimbabweans - who had voted in 20 Rhodesian Front M.P.s in the February elections - was the decision of increasing numbers of them to join Mr. Mugabe's ZANU-PF party.

Perhaps the most difficult of all the political challenges facing the Mugabe Government has been the security situation. The integration of the former guerrilla armies with the former Rhodesian security forces to form a Zimbabwe National Army was in any case a difficult and complex exercise: but the fact that ZANLA, owing allegiance to Mr. Nkomo's PF party, was a conventional army based mainly on the Ndebele-speaking people while the former ZIPRA, the military wing of Mr. Mugabe's ZANU-PF party, was both a guerrilla army, trained in a political and military role as well as being fundamentally based on the Shona-speaking people, has greatly complicated the security issue. It would have been complicated enough if the task had merely been to disarm thousands of men who hoped for a continuing role in the new national army.

In April 1981 Emmerson Mnangagwa, Minister of State for security matters, announced that 15 battalions of the Zimbabwe National Army had been formed: the target was for 36 battalions (37,000 men) by September 1981. The Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Rhodesian Special Air Services (S.A.S. regiment) and the Selous Scouts have been disbanded.

Three hundred people at least were killed in skirmishes between former ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas in February 1981 in Bulawayo. Although some observers saw in the skirmishes the beginnings of an Ndebele/Kalanga uprising against the Mugabe government - and it is true that the Ndebele/Kalanga minority, who represent just under 20% of the total population of the country, feel discriminated against - the firm way in which the troubles were handled may, paradoxically, have increased national unity and accelerated the process of disarmament. It was announced at the end of June 1981 that the Government was to disarm a further 30,000 men. But while many white Zimbabwean observers predicted a 'tribal' war in Zimbabwe, the Mugabe Government remained united and cohesive. One writer, John Day of the University of Leicester, in an article entitled 'The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe Rhodesia' (published in the Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, March 1980 - see Bibliography) argues that 'The notion that the Shona in modern politics are re-living an historical antipathy to the Ndebele is, therefore, based on a misleadingly simplistic version of African history'. Having, however, succeeded to a remarkable degree in reassuring, and bringing about reconciliation with, the white population of Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Mugabe still faces a formidable task in bringing into the national community those social and ethnic groups which have hitherto been excluded or ignored.
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(2) Historiography


Christopher Hitchens, born in 1949, is Foreign Editor of the New Statesman and re-visited Zimbabwe in 1979 to write this Report.

Garfield Todd, born in 1908, was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 1953-58, and has lived there since 1934.

David Stephen, who visited Zimbabwe most recently in 1981, is the editor of International Affairs.

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