THE MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP
is an international research and information unit
registered in Britain as an educational charity under
the Charities Act of 1960. Its principal aims are —

- To secure justice for minority or majority groups
  suffering discrimination, by investigating their
  situation and publicising the facts as widely as
  possible, to educate and alert public opinion
  throughout the world.

- To help prevent, through publicity about
  violations of human rights, such problems from
  developing into dangerous and destructive
  conflicts which, when polarised, are very
difficult to resolve; and

- To foster, by its research findings, international
  understanding of the factors which create
  prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus
  helping to promote the growth of a world
  conscience regarding human rights.

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The report that follows has been commissioned, and is published, by the Minority Rights Group as a contribution to public understanding of the problem which forms its subject. It does not necessarily represent, in every detail and in all its aspects, the collective view of the Group.

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The cover photo shows a young Hungarian girl in Transylvania
Credit: Adrian Jenmal/David Thompson
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

This universal declaration of human rights is a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly before their eyes, shoulc strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection and equal treatment in law without any discrimination. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted herein.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled to full equality in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion or political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 11. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to protection against such interference and attacks.

Article 12. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

Article 13. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 14. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 15. Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
PREFACE

In December 1989 László Tokes, a Hungarian non-Conformist pastor in the Romanian city of Timișoara, defied the dreaded Securitate forces who came to evict him. His Hungarian supporters surrounded the church and were joined by ethnic Romanians. Although László Tokes was taken by the Securitate, demonstrations continued in Timișoara, and despite brutal suppression, spread to other cities in Transylvania and then to Bucharest. It was the beginning of the Romanian Revolution, which lead to the overthrow of Europe's most brutal leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu. It had been members of the Hungarian minority who had defied the tyrant and inspired others to overthrow his repressive system.

This report shows how the Hungarian minority and many others had reached their final breaking point and could endure no more. The dawn of democracy was breaking in Eastern Europe and yet in Romania repression continued. The report describes the violations of human rights of individuals, who were imprisoned and tortured, of minority groups denied public recognition of their language, culture, education and religion, and of whole communities threatened by mass eviction and demolition of villages. It also describes the changes since the revolution and hopes for the future.

The Minority Rights Group published the first edition of this report on the Hungarians of Romania by George Schöpflin in August 1978, at a time when many Western governments were courting the Romanian government and admiring its independence from Soviet policies. In the same year the UK government awarded Nicolae Ceaușescu an Honorary Knighthood, while attempting to build further trade links with Romania. The subervience of authoritarian Communist Party leaderships in the other states of Eastern Europe to the USSR under Brezhnev, gave the nationalist Ceaușescu regime a legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. The regime never possessed this legitimacy or admiration in the eyes of its own people.

Throughout the 1980s MRG's report continued to be used as a basic reference work on the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and was praised for its detailed research and objective approach. By exploring the perceptions of history as seen by both Romanian and Hungarian nationalists, it exposed the historic roots of present tensions. It had the merit of being disliked not only by the Romanian government and extreme Romanian nationalist exile organizations, but also by extreme Hungarian nationalist groups. But the large majority of those who were concerned with human rights, both of the ethnic minorities and of the Romanian majority, appreciated the value of the report.

Following the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 the situation changed completely. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution there is a desire in many communities to learn from the mistakes of the past and to create a truly multi-ethnic and pluralist society. This goodwill needs to be captured through dialogue and reconciliation between communities based on full human rights and freedoms for all. There is a danger that in a period of political instability, national prejudices and religious intolerance will be exploited; indeed already there is disturbing evidence of growing anti-semitism.

Consequently, MRG is publishing a new edition of this report to provide a constructive analysis of the position of the Hungarian and other minorities in Romania. It is intended to contribute towards an understanding of the root causes of minority conflicts, how they have been exacerbated and conversely how these conflicts may be ameliorated. The report may be of help elsewhere in Europe, where new democracies are seeking ways of enabling minorities to participate fully in the democratic process, while showing how minorities and states can retain strength in ethnic diversity. Furthermore there are salutary lessons for those governments who sought to promote their relationships with the Romanian government, while remaining oblivious to the gross violations of human rights that were being inflicted on the people of Romania.

This edition of Romania's Ethnic Hungarians published in April 1990, contains most of the material by George Schöpflin, published in the previous edition, which MRG believes is essential for understanding the background and immediate past. The sections on the situation in the 1980s, the Revolution and ensuing events — about one third of the report — is new material and has been written by Hugh Poulton, author of MRG's report Minorities in the Balkans. Together they give a balanced, detailed and scholarly account of the situation for the Hungarian and other minority groups in Romania over the last two decades identifying language and culture, education, religious and political issues, and the gross abuses of human rights that has occurred. It looks at the commitments and declarations made by the National Salvation Front after the Revolution and at the emerging policies of the newly-formed minority organizations. It also explores the ramifications of inter-state relations, especially those between Romania and Hungary and the questions of refugees and emigration.

As one of the largest national minorities in Europe the Hungarians of Transylvania naturally occupy the largest section of this report. However there are other groups also of concern. The numbers of the German minority have halved in little more than a decade due to emigration and they are rapidly losing their viability as a community. Smaller minorities, such as the Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbians and Turks, face the same problems as all relatively isolated groups of how to maintain their language and culture while continuing to play an equal part in majority society, whereas the Romani Gypsy people face even greater prejudice than in most European states.

Nationality issues and racism towards minorities pose two of the greatest threats to peace and security in Europe in the 1990s. This report is one of several that the Minority Rights Group will publish on minorities in Eastern Europe and the USSR, as a contribution to finding peaceful solutions of minority conflicts.

Alan Phillips,
Executive Director, MRG
April 1990
OVERVIEW

Romania is in southeast Europe, bounded by the USSR to the east and north, Hungary and Yugoslavia to the west, Bulgaria to the south and with a seaboard along the Black Sea in the east. Its total area is 237,500 square kilometres and it has a population of approximately 23 million, about half of whom are urban dwellers.

Romanians and Hungarians are the two major non-Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, Romanian being a Romance language with some similarities to Italian, and Hungarian a non-Indo-European language of the Finno-Ugrian group of the Uralic family. The vast majority of the Romanian population — in the region of 85% — are ethnic Romanians. Ethnic Romanians are also found outside the borders of Romania, most notably in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia of the USSR where 3.3 million of the 4.3 million population are ethnic Romanians. There are much smaller communities in Yugoslavia (55,000) and Hungary (25,000). There are 22 ethnic minorities in Romania, of whom the Hungarians are the largest, followed by Roman Gypsies and Germans.

Population figures given by official Romanian sources, especially those relating to ethnic minorities, are not always reliable; indeed most experts regard the last accurate census as that taken in 1966. The main minority groups in Romania and some indication of their numbers are outlined below:

**Hungarians:** As a result of the disintegration of the old Kingdom of Hungary in 1918-1920, somewhere over three million ethnic Hungarians — Magyars — were assigned to the successor states of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The provisions of the Paris Peace Settlement were confirmed by the 1947 Peace Treaties, with the result that these three states plus the USSR, which had annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia and thereby added a small number of Hungarians to the multi-national Soviet empire, retained their sovereignty over about one third of the Hungarian nation as all ethnic Hungarians. Today there are approximately 590,000 ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia (3.8% of the Czechoslovak population), 427,000 in Yugoslavia, predominantly in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, and 171,000 in the USSR.

The largest single group of Hungarians outside the Hungarian state were and remain the Hungarians of Romania, the subject of this report. With a population of perhaps 2 million, concentrated in the area known as Transylvania, the Hungarians of Romania are one of the largest national minorities in Europe.

**Romani Gypsies:** The Roma of Romania are part of the diverse Romani peoples who may total six million throughout Eastern and Western Europe, Turkey and the USSR. There are large discrepancies in the estimates for the number of Romanis in Romania. The 1977 census gives a figure of 230,000 while the official figure from 1980 was 260,000. When the World Romani Congress approached the Romanian government seeking figures for the Romani population a representative was informed that Romania had no Gypsy population.2 Unofficial estimates place the number over 750,000, over 3% of the population, although some maintain that the true figure is one million or above.

As in most European countries Romani Gypsies are subject to both official harassment and widespread prejudice by the non-Roma population. The Roma are arguably the most deprived minority in Romania and while other minorities have at least been recognized and granted facilities, however minimal, few of these advantages have accrued to the Roma. It was only in 1985 that the first Rom organization for over 50 years, a cultural organization Phralipe (Brotherhood) was established with official approval. Unlike Bulgaria or the USSR, there are no laws against nomadism in Romania but travelling Roma meet much intolerance. Perhaps 10% of Romanis are travelling at any one time although during the harsh winters they are likely to attach themselves to the quarters of the settled Roma.3 It has only been since the overthrow of Ceaucescu that the Roma have received recognition as a major nationality and a measure of representation in government.

**Germans:** There are a two major German communities in Romania, known as Saxons and Swabians. The Saxons (Sachsen) settled in Transylvania in the 12th century at the invitation of King Geza II and have played an economically and culturally important role since then. The Swabians (Schwaben) arrived in the 18th century from southern Germany. There is a small group of Landler, Protestants who left Austria in the 18th century.

In the mid 1970s the German minority probably totalled around 400,000. Since then the numbers have dropped by almost half to perhaps 210,000 and all the indications are that they will fall further over the next decade. There has been extensive emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany throughout the 1980s where ethnic Germans have automatically been given German citizenship. This has been part of a greater movement of ethnic Germans from East Germany (German Democratic Republic), the USSR and other Eastern European countries to West Germany, numbers which have increased from 40,000 in 1986 to 200,000 in 1988, 350,000 in 1989 and possibly half a million or more in 1990. In the 1980s over 140,000 ethnic Germans emigrated from Romania to the FRG, allegedly in exchange for unofficial payments between their governments. The majority of the immigrants were economically active people; the German minority is an ageing one and is likely to decline with further emigration.

As with the Hungarians the Germans have experienced a decline in their human rights as a minority group, in German language publications and education, although they have not faced such harsh repression as the Hungarians.

**Other minority groups:** The remaining minorities are much smaller in number and reliable information is not always easy to obtain. None of these groups poses any political threat to any Romanian government. According to the 1977 census there were 55,000 Ukrainians, mainly in the Maramureş and Suceava areas, 34,000 Serbs, mainly in areas near the Yugoslav border, 22,000 Slovaks, 23,000 Turks, 10,000 Bulgarians and small numbers of Czechs, Poles and Russians. There were also 26,000 Jews, although by 1990 their numbers were much smaller, perhaps 15,000. This is a small remnant of the strong Jewish community which existed in Romania before World War II.
The area of Transylvania

The area which is presently referred to as Transylvania is the western third of Romania. Historic Transylvania was rather smaller in area. It was the historic province, the heartland of the independent principality of Transylvania, which was ruled by a Hungarian nobility, together with Saxons and Szekler local administrations until the 19th century. For the purposes of this report, Transylvania is used to include the historic province, plus the Banat, the Crișana and the Maramureș regions, in other words all the areas which the Romanian state took over from the Kingdom of Hungary after 1918.

Geographically, this area is bounded by the Carpathian mountains to the east and the south, by the Subcarpathian oblast (province) of the USSR to the north, by the Hungarian frontier to the west and the Yugoslav frontier to the southwest.

Physically, the area is one of enormous variety. There are alpine meadows in the High Carpathians, the woodlands of the central plateau and in the western area, the Crișana and the Banat, the country is very low lying, being in effect an extension of the Great Hungarian Plain. Despite the relatively mountainous character of the area, it has fairly easy and well established communications to both east and west. The Carpathians are traversed by several high passes and the river Olt actually cuts through the mountains towards the south; the river Mureș provides a means of access to the west, as does the main route from Cluj westwards, the Piatra Craiului.

The German (Saxon) settlers brought in by the Kings of Hungary in the medieval period, founded a number of towns which have retained their importance ever since. Cluj, Brașov and Sibiu are the chief of these; other important urban centres are Oradea, Timișoara and Arad, which have a somewhat different settlement pattern, in that they grew up as Austrian garrisons or Hungarian market towns.

The Population

The population pattern of Transylvania is extremely complex. Its total population is around seven million, the majority of which — around three fifths — is Romanian. The bulk of the remainder is Hungarian (around two million); there is a German minority of perhaps 210,000 and there are small minorities of Serbs, Ukrainians and other much smaller groups of Slovaks, Czechs, Bulgarians and until relatively recently, there were thought to be several thousand Armenians. There is also an unspecified number of Romani Gypsies.

Many of the population concentrations are ethnically mixed and there are comparatively few communes which do not contain a minority population of at least one nationality. All urban settlements are mixed and the dynamic of urbanization has ensured that the composition of several towns and cities has undergone changes over the last thirty years. Bilingualism is common and this includes many members of the Romanian majority. In the Banat, individuals sometimes grow up speaking all three major languages — Romanian, Hungarian and German.

Numbers and Distribution

One of the problems with censuses in areas of mixed population with competing claims is that their returns are never fully trusted by either majority or minority. Returns fluctuate strongly and all parties suspect falsification. The results of the different censuses since 1918 are shown in Table 1 following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hungarian Population</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,704,851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,426,500</td>
<td>−19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,587,675</td>
<td>+11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,619,592</td>
<td>+2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,705,810</td>
<td>+5.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these changes are more readily explained than others. The drop between the 1910 and 1930 censuses is the result of the departure of Hungarian officials who left Romania after the incorporation of Transylvania into Romania and of the reassimilation of a certain proportion of bilinguals to the majority nation. The increase between 1930 and 1956 is very substantial, given war losses and major demographic movements in the intercensal period. This makes the very small increase in the two subsequent intercensal periods — both well below the Romanian national average — even harder to account for.

In fact, the actual method of assessing the size of a nationality can result in over or under-enumeration. A simple request to state one's nationality, the usual question, may not yield the necessary information about an individual's national self-identification in nationally mixed areas, in that he may feel himself under pressure or may choose to participate in both ambient cultures. The 1956 Romanian census provided an interesting indication of this, in that it returned 1.58 million Hungarians by nationality and 1.65 million Hungarians by mother tongue. No sociological work on the ramifications of this problem in the context of Transylvania has yet been published, but in any event it is clear that the Romanian state and the Hungarians assess the size of the minority differently.

Most experts regard the last accurate census as that of 1966. The population breakdown by major ethnic group in Transylvania at that time is summarized in Table 2 on page 7.

The census of 5 January 1977 returned 1,705,810 Hungarians and a further 1,604 Szeklers (figures for the whole of Romania). The total population of Romania was 21,559,416, according to Széchényi, 14 June 1977.

Hungarian sources, on the other hand, argued that there are around 2 million Hungarians. George Lazar's samizdat report and the estimate made by the Budapest statistician, Zoltán Dávid, both make this claim. Another way of arriving at this figure is from the official figures on church attendance, as given in the publication The Hungarian Nationality in Romania. This booklet gives 1.45 million Hungarians as attending the main cults (ie. Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Unitarian). This would represent 85% of all Hungarians, a highly unlikely proportion in a communist society; nor is it clear who the figure of 1.45 million includes, eg. small children. If one assumed that only two-thirds of Hungarians were church-goers and accepted the figure of 1.45 million, this would then provide a total of 2.17 million Hungarians.

On the other hand, it is generally accepted that the proportion of Hungarians in both Transylvania and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of County</th>
<th>Romanian pop.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Hungarian pop.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>German pop.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alba</td>
<td>339,545</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>26,989</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12,823</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>344,302</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>75,445</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>43,874</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihor</td>
<td>377,837</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>192,948</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bistrița-Nasaud</td>
<td>236,789</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>22,358</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brașov</td>
<td>331,007</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>65,326</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>40,857</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraș-Severin</td>
<td>205,879</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>9,175</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>23,882</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluj</td>
<td>457,169</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>164,768</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covasna</td>
<td>34,999</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>140,472</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harghita</td>
<td>31,272</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>248,886</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunedoara</td>
<td>423,128</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>40,047</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6,671</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maramureș</td>
<td>339,984</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>53,563</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2,993</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mureș</td>
<td>278,386</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>249,657</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>20,625</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salcă Mare</td>
<td>203,386</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>147,504</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>4,427</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sălaj</td>
<td>194,790</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>63,850</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibiu</td>
<td>293,282</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>20,109</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>96,880</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timiș</td>
<td>378,183</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>76,183</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>109,315</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Romania as a whole has been declining. This is the result of high Romanians birth-rates and, in the case of Transylvania, of Romanians in-migration and some Hungarian out-migration.

The distribution of the Hungarians is uneven. The overwhelming majority continue to live in Transylvania, but their number in the Regat (ie. the old Romanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia) has been increasing. Bucharest is thought to have a Hungarian population of 200,000 and there are Hungarians in other Regatean settlements as well; some of the Hungarians in towns like Galați and Ploiești may be seasonal workers – *Gastarbeiters*. Furthermore, there have been long established Hungarian settlements on the eastern foothills of the Carpathians, particularly in the areas around Buciu.

The Transylvanian settlements are, on the whole, concentrated in the areas marching with Hungary, Crișana, and also in the Szekler counties (Covasna, Harghita and Mureș). The latter are compact, solidly Hungarian areas, where the proportion of Hungarians may reach 90%. In addition, there are smaller islands, like the Câlara, (the hinterland of Cluj), the Jiu Valley and parts of the Banat. The towns of Cluj, Oradea, Tirgu Mureș and Satu Mare all have substantial Hungarian populations, probably not far short of a majority in each case. Brașov, Timișoara and Arad also have Hungarian populations, mixed with Romanians and Germans.

The Szeklers

The Szeklers (*Seică* in Romanian, *Szekley* in Hungarian) are an ethnographically distinct part of the minority, but are nevertheless to be reckoned in with the Hungarian national group as a whole. There has been some evidence that the Romanian authorities would not have objected to the Szeklers detaching themselves from the main body of Hungarians. In the 1977 census, respondents were given the opportunity of returning their nationality as ‘Szekler’, but only a very few did so. This argues that as a body, the Szeklers – around 100,000-200,000 strong – are conscious of their Hungarian nationhood and that their mobilization into the Hungarian nation is irreversible.  

The Szeklers speak Hungarian, and given the minimal dialect differences in Hungarian, there are no problems of mutual intelligibility with other Hungarians. Historically, they were settled in the bend of the Carpathians as guardians of the eastern marches of the Kingdom of Hungary. From the earliest period, they enjoyed a measure of feudal autonomy and were not serfs. Some consciousness of this separate status has existed among the Szeklers and has survived into the present period. The Hungarians do actually make a distinction between themselves and the Szeklers, but the essence of this is that they regard them as the best of the Hungarian nation. It is still widely accepted among Hungarian intellectuals, of Budapest as well as of Transylvania, that the purest and most attractive form of Hungarian is spoken by the Szeklers. The distinctiveness of the Szeklers is also maintained by their religion – the majority of them are Calvinist or Unitarian.

The Romanian state under Ceausescu would obviously have gained from detaching about a third of the Hungarians from in the national allegiance and establishing them as a separate national group. There have been parallels for this in the communist world. Indeed, it can be justly argued that one of the most original contributions made by communist policy makers to national questions in Europe was the creation of new nations. In the case of Soviet Moldavia, this device has been employed against the Romanian nation, in that the Romanian population of Bessarabia (the Moldavian SSR) was, until recently, denied the right to identify itself as Romanian and was constrained to declare itself ‘Moldavian’, an entirely artificial construct which appears to have little genuine support. On the other hand, in Yugoslavia the same device has been used successfully in the case of Macedonia,
the population of which identified itself as Bulgarian or Serbian or (by religion) Orthodox before the war. In order to deter potential Bulgarian irredentist claims, the Yugoslav communists decided to establish an autonomous Macedonian nation and this nationhood now apparently commands the loyalty of the majority of Yugoslav Macedonians.7

History
The central problem of the history of Transylvania is that there are separate Romanian and Hungarian histories, both firmly articulated and neither acceptable in its national version to the other. A sense of history is a basic component of any community and from the 19th Century onwards, there has been a well established tradition of nationalistic history writing, that is the writing of an ideologically committed variant of the history of a community, which serves the national cohesion of that community. As far as both Romanians and Hungarians are concerned, Transylvania (Transilvania or Ardeal in Romanian; Erdély in Hungarian; and Siebenbürgen in German)8 has been invested with a mystical role as having been the region which ensured the survival of the nation and its separate existence over the centuries.

In other words, for both national ideologies Transylvania plays a role quite separate from the physical, geographic, demographic, territorial and economic factors that are involved. Figuratively, Transylvania is the ark of the covenant and for national ideologists, the ideal homeland of the nation is unacceptable without the province being part of the state territory. Thus in practical terms, neither Romanian nor Hungarian nationalists can accept that Transylvania should be part of the other state’s territory and both accept a nationalist imperative that it should belong to them. In this kind of emotionally charged atmosphere, the rights of minorities are easily ignored and, indeed, their articulation may be treated as evidence of irredentism.9

The Romanian nationalist version of the history of Transylvania is as follows. The inhabitants of the province in the first and second centuries AD, the Dacians, were conquered by the Roman Empire and annexed to it. There followed a rapid fusion of Dacian and Latin cultures, the result of which was the birth of the Romanian national culture. After the withdrawal of the Roman legions, the Dacians or, more properly Daco-Romans, withdrew to their Transylvanian mountain fastnesses and remained there, conserving their Latin language and culture. Transylvania remained the safe haven of the Romanian nation ever after, despite waves of foreign invaders and conquerors — Avars, Sceytians, Turks, Hungarians — the Romanian substance remained safe, protected by the mountainous geography of the province. This is known as the Daco-Roman continuity theory.10

From virtually the earliest times, the dominant imperative of Romanian history was to unify the three Romanian lands — Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. Unification, Romanian historians go out of their way to stress, was the objective of every major ruler and it was achieved by Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazu) in 1599-1600, albeit it only lasted a year. The age-old striving was finally crowned with success when in 1918 the Kingdom of Hungary collapsed and the representatives of the Romanian people declared the unification of Transylvania with the Regat at Alba Iulia. Thereafter, with the exception of the partition of Transylvania 1940-1944, the province has been inalienably ruled by the Romanian nation.11

The Hungarian version of this story is rather different. Hungarian historians reject the Daco-Roman continuity theory and argue that when the Hungarian conquest of the central Danube basin took place at the end of the 9th century AD, Transylvania was terra incognita — at best, it was sparsely inhabited by Slavonic tribes. The Hungarian Kingdom gradually extended its organization over the region, settling the Szeklers and the Saxons colonists to strengthen its economic development. The county (pamnâga) system was introduced only into certain regions and elsewhere, there was local autonomy through a system of ‘seats’ (szeô). The presence of a Romanian population is accounted for by immigration. Hungarians argue that nomadic Romanian shepherds, practising transhumance just as the Kutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia12 continue to do so to this day, crossed the Carpathian passes from the 13th century onwards and were given the right to settle by the Hungarian rulers of the province.

The mixed character of Transylvania was recognized very early by the so-called Union of Three Nations (1437 reaffirmed in 1542). The three nations, properly nationes, represented the nobility against the other classes and should in no sense be regarded as nations in the modern usage; in the Transylvanian case they were the Magyars, the Saxons and the Szeklers. After the destruction of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary by the Ottoman Empire, following on the Battle of Mohács (1526), Transylvania retained a precarious autonomy between Hapsburgs and Ottomans. At times, it acted as an independent state and signed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War, in that capacity. The different nature of Transylvania was recognized after the expulsion of the Turks by its separate incorporation into the Hapsburg domains as a Principality apart from Hungary proper.

In 1848-49, the Transylvanian diet, which was controlled by the Hungarian nobility, opted for union with Hungary, despite the hostility of both Romanians and Saxons and after the 1857 Ausgleich (compromise) this was implemented. The Hungarians thereafter promoted a policy of rapid Magyarization — this was ineffective in the countryside and only partly successful in the towns at least as far as the Romanians were concerned — so that all the nationalities turned against the Hungarian state in 1918.13

By the Treaty of Trianon, historic Transylvania, together with the other Romanian-inhabited lands (Banat, Crișana, Maramureș) — a larger area than Hungary itself — were assigned to Romania, despite the substantial number of Hungarians who lived there. In 1940, after the forced cession of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, Hungary put in its claim to Transylvania and a somewhat reluctant Germany and Italy agreed that Hungary could annex northern Transylvania, about two-fifths of the territories lost in 1918 and with a Hungarian majority. Southern Transylvania remained a part of Romania.

After Romania’s change of sides in the war in August 1944, Transylvania was fairly rapidly overrun by the Soviet and Romanian armies, but after the depredations of the newly
arriving Romanian administration, the local Soviet commanders decided to establish what was a de facto autonomous communist state of Northern Transylvania, under the joint Hungarian-Romanian MADOSZ administration. This was not wound up until March 1945, since when Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania has been complete.14

From the Hungarian national standpoint, the significance of Transylvania is that it is regarded as the entity that guaranteed the historic continuity of the Hungarian state and ensured its survival despite the submergence of the Kingdom either through Ottoman or Hapsburg conquest. The loss of Transylvania has been made all the more difficult to assimilate in the light of the continued existence of large numbers of Hungarians there. In this way, an ideological norm—Transylvania as the guarantor of the continuity of Hungarian statehood—has become fused with a lower level political problem—perceptions of the treatment of the minority.

Thus, both Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals, who have historically formulated the nationalist ideologies of their respective nations, are conscious of their separately identified and directly conflicting histories of Transylvania. A mythicized concept of Transylvania, which may have little to do with existing realities, plays a central role in the national consciousness of both nations, mostly particularly in that it is seen as having safeguarded the survival of the nation in the most critical epoch of its history. Furthermore, the frequently arcane debates about Daco-Roman continuity have had a contemporary importance, in that the right of prior occupation can be used to justify the treatment of the minority or the claim for possession of the province.15

Religion

Whilst the primary badge of loyalty and national self-identification is linguistic and cultural, religion does play an important reinforcing role in the Transylvanian context and is perceived in this fashion. The overwhelming majority of Romanians are Orthodox, while Hungarians and Germans are Catholic and Protestant. This division is further complicated by the problem of the Uniates, eastern rite Catholics. In 1699 an Act of Union between the (Romanian) Orthodox Churches and Rome was proclaimed and the overwhelming majority of Orthodox priests accepted it. However, the Orthodox Church remained in being and the majority of the Romanian believers continue to give it their loyalty; the proportional strength of the two churches was about two-to-one in favour of the Orthodox. While the majority of Uniates are ethnic Romanians the Uniate church also serves many Hungarians and Ukrainians in Romania. In 1948, the entire problem was ended with a stroke of the pen, when the Uniate church was forcibly incorporated into the Orthodox church. Since then, there have been occasional indications that some Romanian Uniates have preferred to attend Latin Rite masses, rather than accept their incorporation into Orthodoxy. Following the downfall of Ceausescu, decree no. 358 of 1 December 1948 which had outlawed the Romanian Uniate Church was annulled by the new authorities on 31 December 1989 and although there remains the question of disputed property, the Uniate Church is expected to revive.

Roman Catholics in Transylvania are almost entirely Hungarians and Germans; in the case of the Germans, it is the Schmiden of the Banat who are Catholic. Bishop Aron Marton of Alba Iulia, a Hungarian, was the senior Roman Catholic bishop; he was succeeded by Antal Jakab. All members of the Calvinist church are Hungarian, just as virtually all Lutherans are German of the Saxony community. In addition, there are small Unitarian and other free church communities. The Unitarians are Hungarian, but the Baptists, for example, have attracted Romanian believers.

Historically Transylvania was the scene of the first post-Reformation experiment in religious tolerance. The Edict of Turda (1568) recognized the mixed religious character of the province and marked an acceptance of it at a time when religious wars were at their height elsewhere in Europe. By this edict, the four 'recognized' religions were Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran and Unitarian. The Orthodox church was merely 'tolerated'.

This unusual religious dispensation has meant that religious adherence has come to be identified with national and cultural loyalties, that churches have tended to be regarded as national institutions which have helped to underpin national cultures and that attacks on religious life have been interpreted in national as much as in religious terms.

Nationalities Policy under the Communists

The general principle according to which communist states have treated their national minorities derives from the belief in the primacy of class over nation. In strict terms, the interests of a Hungarian worker were congruent with those of a Romanian worker and any differences between them arising from self-perceptions were merely the result of a false consciousness instilled in the working class by the bourgeoisie. Consequently communist governments have found it very simple to issue proclamations to end national discrimination and to establish a situation in which life is to be 'national in form and socialist in content'. In other words, according to this Leninist maxim, the language in which a particular set of ideas or concepts was expressed was immaterial, as long as what was expressed was socialist.

In the Romanian case, the Leninist maxim was initially interpreted as providing the Hungarian minority with extensive facilities of its own. In the immediate post-war period, for example, a separate Hungarian-language university, the Bolyai University, was established at Cluj and a Medical Pharmaceutical Faculty at Targu Mures. On the other hand, from the outset it was made evident that the Hungarian-language educational network was to teach a Romanian communist culture in Hungarian. As early as 1948, history textbooks were being revised in the direction of stressing the Romanian as against the Hungarian versions of the history of Transylvania.16 In other words, while care was taken to maintain the external facade ('national in form'), the Romanian authorities were from the outset determined not to permit the continuation of an autonomous Hungarian culture, whether socialist in content or not.

This method of dealing with the nationalities which applied equally to the Germans and the smaller minorities may, therefore, be summed up as being based on a claim that the 'co-inhabiting' nationalities enjoyed full rights in all areas of Romanian life. On the other hand this was interpreted in practice as being Romanian not merely in terms of the state but also of national culture. There appeared to be no serious distinction made between citizenship of the Romanian state and membership of the Romanian nation, a central distinction that is best clarified by the German terms Staatsangehörigkeit and Volkszugehörigkeit.
The Official Position

On paper the provision made by the Communist Romanian state for the minorities looked generous and sensible. There was a battery of legislation providing for all manner of minority facilities. Article 17 of the 1965 Constitution states:

The citizens of the Socialist Republic of Romania, irrespective of their nationality, race, sex or religion shall have equal rights in all fields of economic, political, juridical, social and cultural life... Any attempt at establishing restrictions [on the rights of minorities], at nationalist-chauvinist propaganda and at a fomentation of racial or national hatred shall be punished by law.

To that should be added Article 22:

In the Socialist Republic of Romania the co-inhabiting nationalities shall be assured the free use of their mother tongue as well as books, newspapers, periodicals, theatres and education at all levels in their own languages. In territorial-administrative units also inhabited by population of non-Romanian nationality, all the bodies and institutions shall use in speech and in writing the language of the nationality concerned and shall appoint officials from its ranks or from among other citizens who know the language and way of life of the local population.

These constitutional provisions were reinforced by a battery of other laws and decrees, governing minority rights on the proportion of deputies elected to the Grand National Assembly (Law 67/1974); administrative organization (Law 2/1968); the operation and organization of local councils (Law 57/1958); the running of state socialist units (Law 11/1971); the Labour Code (Article 2); education (Law 11/1968); the press law (Article 4) and other items of legislation. There was also provision for the use of minority languages in the courts, the publication of the Official Bulletin in Hungarian and similar guarantees in the administration of justice.¹⁷

These formal statements of social policy on the rights of minorities should be regarded as further supplemented by Communist Party documents and by high level statements from politicians, in the Romanian instance deriving exclusively from the party leader and head of state, Nicolae Ceausescu, who remained in power from 1965 to his violent overthrow at the end of 1989.

‘Our party and state are faced with the duty to take conscientious action to provide every one of our citizens with the sort of conditions under which the nation and the nationalities can fulfill themselves and, at the same time, make it possible for national differences to diminish and gradually to disappear under communism...’

The inference from this was that the disappearance of national differences would be hastened by whatever measures the Romanian party and state choose to employ. In general, despite the existence of a large number of legal regulations it appeared that the Romanian Communist Party's policy was to satisfy the minorities through industrialization — the basic thrust of the country's policy of modernization — and that demands for other rights by the minorities were subordinate to the economic programme.

In any case the entire panoply of legal rights had to be interpreted against the political doctrine of the leading role of the party, which in practice voided them of direct applicability. Another factor of relevance, which was common to all communist societies, was the existence of internal regulations, usually kept secret, which directly contradicted the formal rights entrenched in the Constitution. In Romania these internal regulations (disposizioni interne) were widely employed in the field of nationalities policy.¹⁸

Post-war developments

Immediately after the return of the Romanian administration in northern Transylvania in 1945 a process of re-Romanianization was undertaken.¹⁹ This involved the creation of new Romanian institutions and the elimination or downgrading of Hungarian ones. However, rather more significant for the long term was that the spirit of genuine cooperation which existed during the MADOSZ period was terminated and both the left and the right used the minority question as a focus and as an instrument of political mobilization. The right used anti-Hungarian propaganda as a nationalist lever while the left courted the support of the Hungarians and offered it guarantees for its cultural and national existence. In fact the bulk of the Hungarians, particularly the left-leaning intelligentsia, supported the left in the genuine belief that for the first time in the history of Transylvania, a form of coexistence between Romanians and Hungarians would be made possible.

This phase ended with the consolidation of power by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej after 1949. In the wake of the Raik trials in Hungary, Dej moved against the Hungarian People’s Alliance (Magyar Népi Szocialista) and had many of its leaders arrested; this was probably as much a step against an autonomous political organization with genuine grassroots support as an anti-Hungarian, nationalist decision. The culmination of this power-struggle was the successful elimination of the Muscovites from the Romanian leadership among them the Hungarian Vasile Luca (Laszló Luka in Hungarian). Petru Groza, the Magyarrowph Romanian prime minister, whom many Hungarians regarded as a guarantor of their rights, lost his post at around the same time. The widespread use of police terror, the hallmark of the Stalinist period, was deployed as much against the Hungarians as against the Romanians, but the arrests and deportations of large numbers of Hungarian intellectuals was a harder blow for the minority than for the majority, given the difference in their sizes.

At the same time, the Romanian government established the Hungarian Autonomous Province, consisting of the Szekler counties, based on the Soviet model of autonomous territorial organization. This move was a good illustration of the two-fold nature of Romanian policy; that of accompanying internal repression with external concessions. In retrospect, the statement made by Dej in January 1953 that the national question had been solved for good in Romania proved to be one of the true landmarks in the post-war history of Transylvania. Thereafter, the Romanian authorities used this declaration as a pretext for rejecting any public discussion of the problem on the grounds that to do so would be chauvinism.

The facade quality of apparent Romanian concessions was further shown by the act that the Hungarian Autonomous Province was autonomous in name only. Its organization differed in no way from the country's other provinces and it was never even given a statute. On the other hand, its existence was used as a pretext for not opening Hungarian cultural facilities elsewhere, with the result that it acquired the reputation of being a Hungarian ghetto. The Hungarian People’s Alliance was dissolved and with it there disappeared the last collective institution charged with the protection of Hungarian interests. This had the result in practice that minority rights became enforceable only individually and not collectively, which made them void for all practical purposes.

Simultaneously, the minority’s links with Hungary were being severed (subscriptions to Hungarian journals were banned, newspapers were no longer sold in public, travel to Hungary was made almost completely impossible); this in a situation where there was hardly a family in Transylvania...
Percentage ratios of Hungarians in Transylvania in 1977 (from census data)


without relatives or friends in Hungary. Thus the pressure to force Hungarian culture and Hungarian life into private had already begun by the mid-1950s. Hungarians were, furthermore, dismissed from all the important nationwide institutions (the Ministry of Interior, Foreign Ministry, officers’ corps) except where the facade had to be maintained, eg. the Politburo or the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

However, during this period, the Hungarians were by no means the worst affected among the nationalities. The Serbian minority was expelled en masse from the Banat to Baraşgan plain and was constrained to live in appalling conditions; the Germans had been stripped of their property and many had been deported to the Soviet Union as ‘prisoners-of-war’; and there was a strong anti-Semitic campaign disguised as anti-Zionism. Also by definition, the Romanian majority of all social classes suffered from the excesses of the Stalinist period, notably the measures taken against the old ruling classes and the dislocation caused by rapid industrialization, backed by secret police terror.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, later crushed by Soviet forces with huge loss of life, not only enjoyed the support of the Hungarians of Transylvania, but also affected the Romanians. There were joint Hungarian-Romanian student demonstrations in Cluj and elsewhere in early 1957, the Romanian secret police, the Securitate announced the successful liquidation of two illegal, anti-state organisations with eight Romanian and six Hungarian accused. This was followed by a wave of arrests - one that affected Romanians too, among them Paul Goma - and culminated in the liquidation of the separate Hungarian educational network, above all, the Bolyai University which was technically merged with the Romanian-language Babeş University, but it was evident that this merger was, again, a facade and that the quantity, let alone the quality, of Hungarian-language teaching was to diminish steadily. The elimination of the secondary school network followed through the unification of Hungarian and Romanian schools and the creation of Hungarian-language sections, enabling the authorities to exercise better supervision over them. The principle of unification of Hungarian and Romanian institutions was extended to include houses of culture, theatres, folklore groups etc.

The Hungarian Autonomous Province was reorganized in 1960 in such a way as to lose its overwhelmingly Hungarian-inhabited territories and the adding of purely Romanian ones. To set the seal on this change it was renamed Mureş-Hungarian Autonomous Province. When the Province was abolished completely eight years later, the authorities initially promised that the entire Szeklerland would be united into a single, strong Hungarian country (judet); in fact, the area was split three ways, with the creation of two weak Hungarian counties (Covasna and Harghita) and a mixed Hungarian-Romanian one (Mureş).

The next turning point was 1968 and the ‘Prague Spring’. By this stage there was considerable dissatisfaction among the minority and the Romanian leadership felt that this could give the Soviet Union a pretext for intervention in Romanian affairs in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia (in which Romania had not participated) particularly as Hungary’s attitude to Romania had grown increasingly
Hostile over Romania's independent foreign policy. Thereafter, Romania's policy towards the minority, while not abandoning its long-term objective of removing it as an obstacle in the way of a unitary Romanian national state, became more subtle. The essence of this revised policy was to make concessions, as far as possible in areas of secondary importance, and to withdraw them subsequently. This had the added advantage of creating a climate of uncertainty in which the Hungarians could be persuaded that perhaps something could be gained from cooperation with the regime.

The setting up of the Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality (CWHN) was a typical measure of this kind. It provided for the appearance of a body to represent Hungarian interests, but it was in practice a weak shadow of the powers and its recommendations, in so far as it made any, were ignored. In 1967-68 the publication network was reorganized and several new Hungarian-language newspapers were launched - one for each county with a substantial number of Hungarian inhabitants. In 1974, using paper shortage as the pretext, both Romanian and Hungarian papers were cut in size and circulation; the Romanian papers were later restored to their original size and print, the Hungarian ones were not. The cuts in size were accompanied by reductions in the number of journalists who were not reemployed; and this was then followed by stricter control over the contents of these papers. Until around 1974, there were reasonably clean guidelines as to what was permitted and what was not; thereafter the principle of uncertainty was introduced, articles were permitted or banned in an entirely unpredictable fashion and the result was that the Hungarian-language press became completely formalistic and empty of interesting material.

From the mid-1970s onwards, a growing number of Hungarian intellectuals came to feel that the situation was less and less tenable. In particular, they were forced to the conclusion that, whatever the declared or undeclared aim of the Romanian leadership might be, the possibility of leading a Hungarian life in Romania was shrinking. It was this conscious or unconscious conclusion that marked the relations between the Hungarians and the Romanian state which continued throughout the Ceausescu regime.

Hungarian intellectuals, together with the intelligentsias of every East European state, took stock of the potential for international action, notably in the framework of the Helsinki Summit Final Act 1975 which specifically safeguarded nationality rights; other developments abroad, like the Ohrid seminar on national minorities and the upsurge of minority action in Western Europe were also influential; contacts with Hungary no doubt also played a part in persuading members of the minority to put pressure on the Romanian state by publicity in the West. This coincided with the favourable reception of the concept of 'human rights' in the West and with the recognition of samizdat (publications produced informally and often illegally by individuals and organizations outside the official structure) as a legitimate and reliable means of communication. In the Romanian context, Hungarians must also have been aware of the leverage provided by unfavourable publicity for a state that, overtly at any rate, made its independent foreign policy contingent on Western approval.

The result of this was an increase in the amount of information about the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and consequent pressure on the Romanian leadership to account for its treatment of the minority. Intellectuals within Romania began to speak out, despite the personal dangers of doing so in the increasingly repressive Romanian state. The Lazar memorandum, the letters of protest by Károly Király and the memorandum by Lajos Takács all fall into this category.  

Main grievances

Education

The existence of an autonomous educational network, through which the minority can safeguard its cultural existence and reproduce its intellectual leadership in each generation, is regarded as an essential right. In the case of the Hungarians of Transylvania, the minority had had a long tradition of a high level of education - notably through the religious schools - and had a well educated intelligentsia and skilled working classes.

Immediately after the war, the full educational network, taking in nursery, primary, secondary and tertiary (i.e. university) levels, was organized. Hungarian-language schools were opened throughout Transylvania where there was a substantial Hungarian population and even in the Regat - in the Hungarian-inhabited areas of Moldavia - there were 72 Hungarian-language schools in 1958 (there was not one in the mid-1970s). The pinnacle of the system was the Hungarian-language university network, consisting of the Bolyai University at Cluj, the Medical Pharmaceutical Faculty at Targu Mureş and an agricultural college in Cluj. In other words, discounting the pressure that weighed equally on all the inhabitants of Romania that could be regarded as inherent in the authoritarianism of the 1950s, it was possible to receive a Hungarian-language education.

In the aftermath of 1956, however, a decision was taken to dismantle this structure. As a general principle, the dismantling of the Hungarian-language educational network took place in two stages. First, Hungarian schools were merged with Romanian ones and functioned as sections; and subsequently, the two sections were de facto merged, so that in practical terms it became a privilege to receive an education in Hungarian. The merging of the Bolyai University with the Romanian Babeş University in 1959 was the most public aspect of this process. It took place at a meeting presided over by Ceausescu and surrounded by the secret police; yet it was given the aspect of a voluntary decision by both institutions. The subsequent suicide of the last Rector of the Bolyai University, László Szabédi, who had been personally piloted by Ceausescu somewhat detracted from this idyllic picture.

The net result of the merger was that university education in Hungarian shrank drastically. The subjects taught in Hungarian were determined by a party resolution of 1971 as being philosophy, history, economics, psychology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, geography and geology, plus medicine and pharmacy. In other words, none of the applied sciences was taught in Hungarian, which meant that Hungarians were by and large restricted to medicine and teaching (careers in the public administration were occasionally possible). The picture was further complicated by the constantly fluctuating number of courses given in Hungarian in each subject. In addition some of the Hungarian-language courses that were given in some of the faculties, in chemistry for example, were actually ideological, i.e. Marxism-Leninism courses and not technical ones.

The downgrading of the Hungarian element at the Babeş-Bolyai University emerged from the statistics given in Table 3 overleaf.

According to the memorandum prepared by Lajos Takács, a former pro-Rector of the university, one-time Nationalities Minister, and an old communist, in the session 1957-58 (i.e. the last before the merger of the two universities), the total number of Hungarian undergraduates following full-time courses in Romania was about 5500. Of these 4082 were
### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality Breakdown of the academic staff at Babeș-Bolyai University (Cluj).</th>
<th>1958-1959</th>
<th>1976-1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemistry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mathematics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History and Philosophy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from data in the Memorandum by Lajos Takács, 1977, in samizdat.

studying through the Hungarian language and the remainder in Romanian; the total number of undergraduates in the country was 51,094, so that Hungarians formed around 10.75% of all undergraduates. By the year 1974-75, the total number of undergraduates in Romania had more than doubled to 198,750. However, the number of Hungarian undergraduates had risen to 688 or declined proportionately to 5.7%. The proportion appears to have remained constant in the year 1977-78, according to calculations based on the figures given in the official booklet Full Harmony and Equality. It should be noted that these percentages referred to all Hungarian students, in other words to those who study in Romanian as well as those who study in Hungarian. The proportion of Hungarians in the total population according to the official figures of the 1977 census was 7.91%, thus this refers to 1.7 million Hungarians and not the estimated 2 million.

The principal method used for this downgrading was the *dispozitia interne*. So, for example, an internal regulation prescribed that in each year in each subject, study groups could be established as long as they had a minimum of 15 students. If, for example, in chemistry, there were 60 students in the first year, that could form the basis of four study groups; if there were at least 15 Hungarians, one study group could be held in Hungarian, but if there were only 14 Hungarians, then all four would be held in Romanian. Often this could be ensured by admissions policy, with never more than a dozen Hungarians being accepted.

A generally similar policy was followed with regard to secondary and primary education. Here the effective law was to be Law No. 278/1973, which stipulated that at the primary level, there had to be a minimum of 25 applicants every year before a class giving instruction in the minority language was opened for that year; at the secondary level, the minimum number of applicants was 36. Thus under the 1973 law, if there were only 24 Hungarian (or, for that matter, German) applicants no class would be opened for them and the children were obliged to go to a Romanian-language class.

It is significant here that the settlement pattern of Transylvania made it difficult to raise the required quota of pupils, given that the average size of villages is between 500-1,000. By contrast, there is no restriction on Romanian pupils. "Romanian language sections or classes shall be organized regardless of the number of pupils", stated the 1973 law. The significance was that when 25 Hungarian school children failed to turn up in any one year, even in purely Hungarian villages, they had to be educated in Romanian. For a while, parents attempted to resolve the problem after the 1973 decree law by bussing children to the nearest large village, where a Hungarian school still existed, but the authorities banned this on the pretext of insufficient petrol (although Romania was the largest producer of oil in Europe). Parallel with the closing down of Hungarian-language classes was the dismissal of Hungarian teachers.

The story of secondary schooling in Huedin, the centre of the predominantly Hungarian Călărași district, is instructive in this context. After the 1948 school reform, there was one school in the town of seven classes, teaching in both Romanian and Hungarian; shortly thereafter, the Romanian section was upgraded to an eleven-class school, but the Hungarian remained at the seven-class level until 1955, when the Hungarian section was also upgraded to take pupils until school leaving age. In 1976, the schooling needs of the town were reassessed and the decision was taken to create three Romanian sections teaching the last three secondary years in the humanities and one Hungarian; in addition, technical subjects were taught in one Romanian and one Hungarian section each. On the basis of the number of applicants, the number of classes that could be filled was two Romanian humanities and one Romanian technical, while there were enough Hungarians for another Hungarian section in the humanities. In other words, there would have been a 2:2 proportion in the humanities and 1:1 in the technical subjects. But there was no question of this; instead, the extra Hungarians were squeezed into the existing classes or parents were dissuaded by pressure from sending their children to Hungarian classes.

An area of particular concern to the Hungarians was the way in which the Romanian authorities were determined to keep Hungarian-language technical or vocational education to a minimum. By finishing four years at a technical school (*liceal tehnic*) a pupil could gain skilled qualifications in various trades and hope to go on to the tertiary level. The significance of technical education in a rapidly industrializing society is self-evident — it is one of the principal avenues of advancement. The picture in Cluj county, where in 1966 Hungarians formed 26.1% of the population, was the following: in the mid-1970s at the opening of the 1973-74 school year, there were 174 Romanian-language classes for the first year of technical schooling as against two Hungarian. The Hungarian-language classes were textile technology and building; the range in the Romanian classes was much broader (pedagogy, health, agriculture, mechanical and electrical engineering, applied chemistry and information technology among others). By 1976-77 the situation had changed somewhat, in that Romanian-language classes had increased to 192, while Hungarian ones had risen to nine (one in agriculture and the rest in various industrial branches, including mechanical and electrical engineering and iron foundry).

The general aim of the 1973 education law was to transform the Romanian education system by making it two-thirds technical and one-third humanities in keeping with the policy of rapid industrialisation. Concern at the impact of this on the minority was openly expressed in the Cluj Hungarian-language journal Korunk. The article asked whether Hungarians educated in Romanian would be able to retain their mother tongue and it suggested that the Romanian state would itself lose by the deracination of the newly-educated minority intelligentsia if it lost its mother tongue and therefore contact with the Hungarian masses.

"The emergence of a superficial, assimilationist type of man is
not in the interests of our socialist state which is based on equal rights.1

The overall picture for secondary education in the mid-1970s was that in 1974-1975, only 5.5% of the school population was in Hungarian-language schooling (as against 8% in 1955-56) and on the technical side the figure was a mere 1.4% (as against 6.1% in 1955-56). There was later some improvement. For the year 1977-78, the Ministry of Education planned 163 technical and 106 humanities classes for the whole of Romania.24 It was reported that after the publicizing of the minority issue in the West and at the March 1978 plenum of the Hungarian National Council, Ceausescu promised that a thorough investigation of the system would be undertaken.

The net result of this very slow development of the Hungarian-language educational network was that a substantial proportion of Hungarian schoolchildren were not educated in their mother tongue. According to Árpád Debrezci, head of the Nationalities Department of the Ministry of Education, in the year 1971-72 about one fifth of Hungarian schoolchildren were not receiving their education in their mother tongue.25 Calculations based on other Romanian statements indicate that this proportion remained constant in later years. Indeed Lazar’s document argued that this figure understated the real proportion of Hungarians in the Romanian language network and the proportion was anything from 30% to 50%. One scholar adds that a certain proportion of Hungarian parents may have genuinely preferred to send their children to Romanian-language schools for reasons of social mobility, but the proportions involved were too high to be accounted for by natural assimilation.

Finally, even in Hungarian schools a large proportion of what was taught was in Romanian. Great emphasis was placed on the learning of the Romanian language (which is not unreasonable) — indeed, one article in the Romanian press described it as ‘a patriotic duty’ and this was taught in Romanian; so were history, geography and literature, as well as technical subjects. Extra-curricular activities, such as literary circles, excursions, artistic programmes, reunions and other activities, were organized jointly with the Romanian section of the school and were regarded as an instrument of teaching Romanian. One of the speakers at the March 1978 joint plenum of Hungarian and German National Councils, referring to German schools, stated that military education, ‘training in the field of trade’ and the ‘organization of the enterprise and economic legislation’ were also taught in Romanian; presumably the same pattern applied to Hungarian schools as well.26

Cultural provisions

Hungarian complaints in this area concentrated on two points — shortages of materials and increasing control of Hungarian institutions by non-Hungarian speaking Romanians. For example, after the merger of the Hungarian theatre 'Tîrgu Mureş, a new Romanian director was appointed who knew no Hungarian. Meetings of the Hungarian section of the Cluj branch of the Romanian Writers’ Union were held in Romanian, because of the presence of monoglot Romanian writers.27

Shortages were regularly used to curtail Hungarian activities. After the expansion of Hungarian-language newspaper publishing in the late 1960s, there was a cut-back in 1973. Some daily newspapers were issued only three times per week or the number of their pages was reduced. The pretext was a paper shortage. The same fate befell local Romanian papers also, but not long after the move, the Romanian papers were returned to their original size, while the Hungarian ones were not. There was a persistent shortage of books in libraries; local libraries often found it extremely difficult to stock up with Hungarian-language books and their stocks often included a large proportion of Romanian-language material, which no one wanted to read.

In one small village in the Szekler country, a farmer complained that the only agricultural text in the local library in Hungarian was about buffalo breeding — in an area where no one had seen a buffalo for generations.28 Takács argued in his memorandum that while the activities of three of the publishing houses with a Hungarian output were satisfactory (these were Kriterion, Politika and Dacia), the activities of the others were not. There were particular shortcomings in scientific and technical literature and in children’s and young people’s literature. Takács also pleaded for a special Transylvanian radio and television station, which would be able to devote more time to Hungarian (and German) output than the existing system. He made a particular point of arguing for the founding of a scientific journal.

Another area which gave rise to complaints was that of archives and museum collections. The 1974 law on National Cultural patrimony (no. 63/1974) and the Decree on National Archives (207/1974) summarily nationalized all materials over thirty years old in private or institutional possession. The pretext was protection of the national cultural patrimony, but the legislation was used against the Hungarian churches in a confiscatory manner. Takács reckoned that the archive of the Roman Catholic bishopric of Oradea was removed from the specially constructed building to the castle where conditions for the preservation of documents were poor. The archive of the bishopric of Satu Mare was simply destroyed. Serious damage was done to the archives and collections of the Roman Catholic school at Oradea and the Calvinist schools at Orăştie, Sighet and Satu Mare. As Takács commented, all these materials were of great significance in the broad sense of fostering a sense of history in community. According to another report, the archives of over 200 churches and deaneries were removed, with the result that the material was disorganized and useless for research. Takács called for the training of archivists for the proper cataloguing and preservation of their collections; since the war, there had been no training of archivists in Romania, for Romanian language material as well as Hungarian and German.29

One of the most hurtful features of Romanian policy from the standpoint of the Hungarians has been the rewriting of the history of Transylvania in such a way as to exclude them completely. In effect, Romanian history writing virtually denied the Hungarian presence in the province, even in cases where the principle of Hungarian-Romanian class cooperation would actually suggest the opposite. An example is the treatment of the defeat of the Turks by Mihai Viteazul at the Battles of Călăraşi and Giurgiu in 1595. Mihai’s army was a joint Romanian-Hungarian one and the Hungarian contingents from Transylvania played a significant role in the defeat of the Turks. This was played down to the point of exclusion in the bulk of Romanian writing about the event, an example being the French language monograph Les pays roumains à l’époque de Michel le Brave by Ştefan Olteanu. The school history textbooks, whether in Hungarian or in Romanian, were concerned exclusively with the Roman history of Transylvania. They were generally concerned to minimize the Hungarian and German contribution to the history of Transylvania — for example, there was no mention whatever of the Edict of Turda — and to emphasize only events in which Romanians were involved.30

In an analogous fashion, the physical presence of Hungarians in Transylvania was largely eliminated. Bilingual signs all but disappeared with the exception of a few places in the
Szekler country; some reports later spoke of the re-installation of Hungarian-language inscriptions in that region. Many Romanians do not see the importance of minority language signs, such as Hungarian inscriptions in Cluj, where at least 40% of the population is Hungarian.

**Place Names**

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Hungarians also complained (although perhaps this is an example of oversensitivity) that whenever urban renewal takes place, it was buildings with Hungarian associations that were demolished and replaced by modern blocks. Certainly, the physical aspect of Transylvanian towns is very different from the Regat. The centre of Brașov and the old town of Sighișoara suggest medieval Germany (which is, of course, their origin). The centre of Cluj is similar to other late nineteenth-century Hungarian towns; the same is true of Oradea. Romanians are conscious of this and evidently did not object if traces of the Hungarian presence disappeared during re-building. There have even been reports that this attitude was extended to cemeteries, in that sometimes when tombstones were given a facelift, their deceased Hungarian occupants were turned into Romanians,11 a practice that recalls Mussolini’s Italy or Zhivkov’s Bulgaria.

**Economics and employment**

Hungarians were also highly suspicious of one of the main planks of official policy, that of increasing investment in the nationality areas as a way of levelling out different levels of development. The Szekler country has traditionally been an under-developed area — this was also true when the region was part of Hungary — and in the 1970s the Romanian state invested considerable sums there. A number of factories were built (twenty two in Covasna and Harghita between 1966 and 1975), but the managerial and skilled positions too often went to Romanians, even when qualified Hungarians were available. On the other hand, Romanians from the Regat were offered special incentives (eg. in housing) to take up jobs in the new factories. Again, it was a matter of policy that in all plants, including areas where the population was overwhelmingly Hungarian, the language of the plant was exclusively Romanian.

In fact, the problem of language in factories was a genuine one which was perhaps under-rated by Hungarians. While bilingualism in administration or education is relatively straightforward to implement, it is much more difficult to organize an enterprise on that basis. It adds considerably to costs, it confuses chains of command, it makes for problems in contacts with the planners and ministries at the centre, as well as laterally with other enterprises, and it can give rise to potentially dangerous situations, as, for example, in an emergency when an engineer and his workforce may not understand one another. The Romanian state felt that it could not afford the luxury of making certain enterprises predominantly Hungarian in character, a move which would have cut them off from the mainstream of Romania’s industrial development and made it impossible for them to employ non-Hungarian speakers.

In broader terms, any such solution would have been seen by the government as gravely damaging the unitary quality of Romanian society, on which was predicated the right of any citizen of Romania being able to take up employment in any part of the country. From a nationalist standpoint, the creation of islands of employment reserved for Hungarians — a Romanian equivalent of affirmative action — would have been seen as an intolerable provocation.

On the other hand, there was merit in the Hungarian argument that all educated Hungarians today do speak Romanian and that this places them in a favourable position to mediate between the Romanian state and the Hungarian community as a whole and in the economic context. In practice, the employment of Hungarian engineers in factories with large numbers of Hungarians on the shopfloor would be of advantage to society as a whole, in that it would ease the communication problem, it could be the basis for a measure of de facto bilingualism and it would remove a serious grievance. In practice, however, there appeared to be a conscious effort to settle Romanians in Hungarian areas and to appoint them to jobs that Hungarians could have done equally well.

Hungarians argue that those who did succeed in completing an education in Hungarian faced great difficulties in finding employment in Transylvania and looked for work in the Regat. This has had a twofold impact: on the one hand, it broke the links between the Hungarian intelligentsia and the remainder of the community, particularly the workers, with the result that upward mobility within the Hungarian community as such was obstructed and ambitious Hungarian workers or peasants tended to look towards the Romanian majority for advancement. On the other hand, it assisted the assimilation of the Hungarian professional class, in as much as the children of those settled in the Regat were unlikely to be brought up in the Hungarian culture. The policy also lead to absurd situations, as, for example, in medicine, where Romanian doctors were forced to communicate with their Hungarian patients through interpreters, even as equally qualified Hungarian doctors might never see a Hungarian patient from one year to the next. This problem was publicly recognized by Ceausescu, in his speech to the Nationality Councils in March 1978: ‘Generally speaking, we must take action to direct graduates — especially educational cadres (ie, teachers), but also medical and agricultural cadres — to their native localities, thus avoiding sending them from one part of the country to another, or from one part of the county to another.’

However, there are many other statements by Ceausescu which gave a different view. These statements should be read in conjunction with Decrees nos. 24 or 25 (1976) which in effect gave the Romanian authorities the powers to direct labour and to order Romanian citizens to take employment wherever directed; this was in violation of every labour convention signed by Romania.
Politics and administration

Under Ceausescu political expression by the Hungarian community was made extremely difficult by the interlocking principles of centralism and nationalism professed by the Romanian state. The Hungarian argument started from the principle that it was possible to be a good communist citizen of Romania without being a member of the Romanian nation. The Hungarians, Takács argued, were a community with their own history and their own perspective for the future — this did not make them in any way disloyal — and that should be the basis of policy towards them. This meant that the Romanian state should recognize the collective existence of Hungarians and make provision for it as a ‘separately identifiable social category’.

In this connection, there was the question of Hungarian ‘cadres’, i.e. officials. There seemed to be general agreement that the actual number of Hungarian officials should be equal to the proportion of Hungarians in the population. Hungarian representation in the higher Communist Party organs, such as the Central Committee, in some of the committees and in the Grand National Assembly or in the People’s Councils was maintained to the proclaimed level. However, these were largely facade institutions, with no real powers, and Hungarians were often entirely excluded from the real policy making organs, such as the local party bureaus. Thus in the mid-1970s, there were no Hungarians on the party bureaus in the counties (judeţe) of Timiș, Arad and Maramureș, all of which contained sizeable Hungarian populations.

The alternative was to appoint ‘facade’ Hungarians, individuals who, in effect, accepted Romanianization and who were so seen by Hungarians. Many local officials felt themselves exposed and were reluctant even to speak Hungarian. Király noted in his letter to Ilie Verdet that some Hungarian officials did this when communicating with their co-nationals, ‘letting them know in this way that perhaps someone prohibited them from using their mother tongue’.

In general, in Transylvania and to some extent also in the Szekler counties, the local administration did not use Hungarian. This meant that for people with only a minimal knowledge of Romanian, even posting a letter was difficult.

Again, at the national level there were comparatively few Hungarians, with the exceptions noted above. They were excluded completely from employment in a number of important ministries, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. This had the result that there were few if any Hungarians in the Romanian diplomatic service, in the officers’ corps and, above all, the police. No figures were available, but it was clear that the number of Hungarian policemen in Transylvania was minimal. As the policeman was frequently the first point of contact between individual and state, this had serious consequences for that relationship especially when monoglot Romanian policemen resented being addressed in Hungarian.

After 1976, numerous well-founded reports were received by organizations such as Amnesty International that police activity markedly intensified in Transylvania. The top-level meeting between Ceausescu and the then Hungarian leader János Kádár, the strike of miners in the Jiu Valley in 1977 (an area of mixed Hungarian and Romanian population) and the publication of the Király letters in the West in 1978 all contributed to this.

The Romanian secret police, the Securitate, began a campaign of intimidation against Hungarian intellectuals. Jenő Szikszai, a teacher from Brașov, was driven to suicide after repeated beatings at the hands of the police over several days. Sándor Küti, another Brașov teacher, also died, although it is not clear whether he was killed or died as a result of beatings he received. Zoltán Zsuffa, a teacher from Covasna, gave a written testimony that he was beaten by the Securitate, was subjected to a house search and was repeatedly interrogated. There were also reports of workers and peasants who were the victims of police provocations. One of these concerned a Hungarian peasant from the Câlata, who invited two ‘tourists’ from a car with Hungarian registration plates into his house; the latter asked him various questions about Romanian-Hungarian relations and subsequently the conversation was used against the peasant, in that his visitors turned out to be members of the secret police who had taped the entire discussion.

The Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality, which was paralleled by a similar body for the Germans, was a typical facade institution. It was supposedly an organ for the minority, but its existence was largely confined to occasional plenary sessions, at which various figurehead individuals sang the praises of Romania’s nationalities policy. The late István Peterfi, the chairman of the council until his death in the spring of 1978, was typical of this genre. According to Király, the Council had no headquarters, no office hours, its deliberations were censored and its resolutions were empty formalities.

Takács made the point that the Council could have become an important institution for improving communication between the Hungarians and the party leadership, but it was unable to do this because of the ‘formalistic’ nature of its activities. Takács also put forward a number of proposals for reforming the political and administrative structure of nationality representation. Firstly, the Nationality Council should be transformed into a mass organization, which should operate at the local level, wherever the number of Hungarians would justify this. Second, the Grand National Assembly should establish a permanent commission for the nationalities, a body which existed in Slovakia for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. A new Nationalities Statute updating the one issued in 1945 and which had fallen into desuetude, should be agreed, providing for detailed regulation of the rights and duties of the authorities in the concrete implementation of nationalities policy. The existing nationalities secretariats in the Ministries of Culture and of Education should be transformed into bodies with executive powers. Nationalities cadres should no longer be scattered all over the country, but should be appointed to localities where the nationalities lived and where they could use their mother tongue. Finally, in counties and localities where the proportion of non-Romanian nationalities reached 15%, the language of the nationality should be introduced into state administration, announcements, inscriptions and placards, in addition to Romanian.
Deterioration during the 1980s

The 1980s saw the overall situation in Romania progressively deteriorate. Ceausescu had decided in 1981 to repay all the country’s foreign debts, estimated at around $10 billion, as quickly as possible regardless of the social and economic costs to the Romanian population. A massive squeeze on consumption ensued, accompanied by intensified repression. As the decade went on the possibilities for any form of autonomy became progressively reduced as Ceausescu attempted to control all aspects of life and eradicate all vestiges of alternative value systems. In such an atmosphere of attempted totalitarian homogenization the position of minorities, by definition distinct from the majority culture, became increasingly under pressure.

Education: The number of Hungarian pupils being educated in their mother tongue steadily decreased throughout the 1980s as shown in Table 4.

| Number and proportion of Hungarian school students in grades 1-8 educated in Hungarian and Romanian |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Total pupils                                    | 1976            | 1980            | 1986            |
|                                                 | 3,019,776       | 3,308,462       | 3,030,666       |
| Hungarian students (est.)                       | 271,000         | 297,000         | 272,000         |
| Hungarian students educated in Hungarian        | 171,924         | 179,669         | 60,613          |
| (% of Hungarian total)                          | 63%             | 60%             | 23%             |
| Hungarian students educated in Romanian         | 99,026          | 117,431         | 211,387         |
| (% of Hungarian total)                          | 37%             | 40%             | 77%             |

Source: Figures for total pupil numbers from Annual Statistics at RSR, 1986; figures for those learning in Hungarian on reports from the Transylvanian Hungarian News Agency – published in Hungarian Minority in Romania, Bekesi et al., p.29.

Parallel with the closing down of Hungarian-language classes were the declining numbers of teachers, as many of those who did succeed in completing an education in Hungarian, along with others of Hungarian origin, were sent to non-Hungarian parts of Romania, thus severing their links with the minority. Such transfers were reported to occur even before members of the minority reached working age. Beginning in the 1988-9 school year, the Budapest based Hungarian Press of Transylvania reported that over 4500 Hungarian students from three Transylvanian counties were forced to attend schools outside Transylvania, and were required to sign five-year labour contracts with enterprises outside the area. Also Hungarians were reportedly barred from immigrating to Brașov, Cluj and Târgu Mureș while ethnic Romanians received positive incentives – 15,000 lei and guaranteed housing – to do so.33

Cultural provisions: In December 1984 Romanian television discontinued Hungarian broadcasts and radio stations in Cluj and Târgu Mureș also ceased Hungarian broadcasts. The last remaining Hungarian radio programme broadcast from Bucharest was first limited to 60 minutes per day and then halved. Many Hungarian newspapers became mere translations of their Romanian counterparts and were obliged to repeat polemics against Hungary. Their print runs were also reduced.34

On 2 April 1988 Hungarian language publications were required to refer to the country’s place names in Romanian, Hungarian personal names without Romanian equivalents were also banned. Subscriptions to publications from Hungary practically ceased by 1985. Most Hungarian publications, including the Hungarian Communist Party’s daily paper, were banned and copies confiscated at the border.35

Intellectual Opposition: Until the end of the 1970s the ethnic Hungarian intellectual opposition had come mainly from the political left and had placed its hopes in the possibility of cooperation with the Romanians on the basis of left-wing ideas but this changed in the 1980s. Protesters now saw the implementation of human rights as a basic principle.

At the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 an unofficial Hungarian language publication Ellenpromok (Counterpoints) appeared in Oradea. This was founded by a young group of ethnic Hungarian intellectuals to report objectively, in the oppositional spirit of the decade, on events in Romania. International opinion was now seen to be as important an agent of change as domestic channels. Nine numbers of Ellenpromok were produced before the editors were arrested, beaten and, after international pressure, including protests on their behalf by 71 prominent Hungarians, exiled to Hungary. As a riposte in autumn of 1982, anti-Hungarian leaflets in Romanian appeared in the Szekler region. Three Romanians were arrested and admitted having produced them. All three were released. However, three ethnic Hungarian intellectuals were subsequently arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment (suspended in the case of the woman Katalin Biro) for voicing the conviction that the leaflets had been produced by the authorities, and commenting indignantly on the official manifestations of solidarity with the authors of the leaflets.36

Such protest, however, was the exception rather than the norm. At the time of the transfer of Transylvania to Romania in 1958, the Hungarian minority had a complex and varied structure, from the aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie, through various middle strata, down to the numerically small working class, and varied strata of peasantry. By the late 1980s this structure had become greatly simplified. The middle strata of managers, technocrats, administrators, engineers, etc. had greatly diminished. The intelligentsia was still in existence but proportionately smaller and concentrated in fewer professions, mostly as literati. They had been progressively excluded from the remaining occupational categories, especially the middle and upper reaches of the party and state bureaucracies, the diplomatic service, the security and armed forces.

For most intellectual Hungarians in Romania the choice was internal emigration or leaving Romania, for Hungary if possible. The outcome was that morale of the ethnic Hungarian intelligentsia was largely broken. The lower strata, on the other hand, had been atomized and dislocated through the massive demographic shifts of urbanization and internal migration. Perhaps the most important aspect of Ceausescu’s policies towards the minority was to break the process of upward mobility within the minority. As a result of this decapitation of the minority community, low status ethnic Hungarians were less likely to seek promotion within the minority, but rather tended to accept that assimilation to the majority was the automatic price of personal promotion.
The final year of the decade however saw a growth, albeit a small one, in intellectual opposition, both ethnic Hungarians and Romanians. The authorities responded with the usual intimidation and attempted to prevent Hungarian dissidents from joining the handful of Romanian intellectuals who were publicly criticizing the regime in coordinated activity. Threatening letters were sent to 10 prominent Hungarians including Eva Gyimesi, university professor at Cluj, Andor Horvath, an editor and Lajos Demeny, an historian, both from Bucharest.37

The Csangos

Information on the Csangos, the Hungarians living in Moldavia and effectively cut off from their compatriots in Transylvania and the Banat, was extremely sparse but it appeared that their situation was worse than other Hungarians. While immediately after the communist take-over there had been a Hungarian-speaking organization with some 40 schools for the Csangos, these were closed in the 1950s. The Romanian authorities under Ceausescu attempted to imply that the Csangos were Romanians who had been forcibly Magyarized in Moldavia. Emigres allege that Hungarian was forbidden to be spoken in their Catholic Churches, and their villages suffered extreme control — even by Romanian standards.

The Systemization Policy

Hungarians also saw Ceausescu's avowed policy of 'systemization' whereby it was planned to destroy half of Romania's 13,000 or so villages by the year 2000 and re-house the inhabitants in 'agro-industrial towns' — as a measure aimed at eradicating Hungarian culture in Transylvania and elsewhere in Romania. This was the ultimate attempt by Ceausescu to eradicate all vestiges of pre-socialist, or pre-Ceausescu, national culture and help create the new 'socialist Romanian citizen' by destroying the bonds of solidarity that existed in the villages. It would also greatly ease the supervision and control of the entire population.

The 'systemization' campaign, was not specifically aimed at the Hungarian minority. In fact most of the villages which were destroyed before Ceausescu's fall and the abandonment of this grandiose scheme were ethnic Romanian ones. Nevertheless it would have inevitably adversely affected the Hungarian (as well as other) minority's cultural heritage. Traditional Hungarian values were surviving with difficulty in the villages; such an uprooting could well have proved fatal and certainly facilitated assimilation.

Emigration and refugees

Ethnic Germans and Jews

Throughout the 1980s, Romania was unusual among COMECOM East European states in allowing sizable numbers of its citizens to emigrate to the West. This emigration was permitted primarily for financial reasons. The US government granted Romania 'Most Favoured Nation Status' as a reward for her 'independence' from the USSR in some foreign policy matters but under the Jackson-Vanik amendment this was contingent on emigration policy. Although the Romanian authorities did not publish statistics on emigration, according to western sources 21,200 people officially emigrated in 1984. Many of these — 14,831 in 1984 for instance — were members of the ethnic German communities. An agreement was reached between Romania and the West German government in 1980 which allowed these ethnic Germans to emigrate to the FRG allegedly in exchange for an unofficial payment of 10,000DM per person by the FRG authorities. (An article in Der Spiegel of 21 October 1985 further stated that the rate was 6,000DM for a pensioner and up to 4,000DM for a child). Throughout the 1980s, an average of 12,000 ethnic Germans emigrated from Romania every year. In many cases would-be emigrants were also allegedly obliged to make similar unofficial payments to the Romanian authorities before being permitted to emigrate.38

In February 1983 the Romanian government began to implement a decree whereby governments had to repay the state in convertible currency (Romanian citizens were forbidden to possess such currency so the payments had to come from abroad) the costs of their education beyond the 10th grade level. However international pressure, especially from the USA and FRG emigrants, caused the abandonment of this measure in June 1983.39 Additionally leading members of the ethnic German minority who were seen by the authorities as a threat or as a potential focus for minority aspirations were pressured into emigration eg. members of the Banat Action Group and Adam Mueller Guttenbrun Literary Circle.

A similar unofficial arrangement for payment for emigres was reportedly undertaken by the Israeli authorities for members of the small Jewish minority, estimated to number between 25,000 and 35,000. Romanian Jews emigrated on a large scale between 1944 and 1948, and this large scale emigration continued until 1951 with 40,625 leaving in that year alone. Emigration continued on a smaller scale right through the 1980s, spurred on by a spate of officially inspired anti-semitism in the media and poetry collections of the early 1980s.40 The result was that by 1990 the Jewish community was in danger of vanishing.

Ethnic Hungarians

Ethnic Hungarians were less fortunate in that throughout most of the 1980s and before, the Hungarian authorities were loath to encourage emigration from Romania. Those who visited Hungary and declined to return, or those who fled over the border, were obliged to obtain temporary visas which had to be renewed monthly and were not encouraged to remain in Hungary. Exceptions were expelled intellectuals like those associated with Elenpentokó.

However in 1988/89, an unprecedented situation occurred with thousands of Hungarians from Romania fleeing to Hungary and applying for asylum there. In 1988, 13,400 refugees were legally accepted and granted temporary residence permits by the Hungarian authorities. Around
12,700 remained in Hungary, the rest having left for the West or returned (a very small number) to Romania. Of these refugees the overwhelming majority were Hungarians with only some 8% being ethnic Romanians. The number of Hungarian refugees from Romania in Hungary was over 25,000 by August 1989 with many more unregistered. In the summer of 1989 some 300 refugees were arriving each week from Romania to Hungary of whom approximately 27% were Romanian — a far higher proportion than previously, reflecting the general feeling of dissatisfaction with the deteriorating situation under the Ceausescu regime among the Romanian majority as well as the Hungarian minority population.

The status of these refugees remains a matter of debate (see the section on The International Aspect for the moves by the Hungarian government to introduce joint citizenship). It was not until March 1989 that Hungary signed the United Nations 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees — the first Eastern bloc country to do so. In 1988 1650 refugees were returned to Romania but the number for 1989 was much lower with only some 29 being sent back by July. About half the refugees were skilled workers with agricultural workers accounting for only 2% of the total which indicates that the systemization was not a major reason for the exodus. In an attempt to prevent this outflow, the Romanian authorities started to build a fence along the Hungarian/Romanian border in 1986 — by mid-June 1989 some 78 kilometres out of a projected 300 had been completed. However on 24 June, for reasons which are still not clear, part of the fence began to be dismantled and the fence was never completed.

However such protests increased somewhat in 1988/9 with individuals also joining the common East European — usually Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak — 'dissident' proclamations which were another feature of the period. In this repressive atmosphere, large scale protests appeared more likely to follow the model of previous Romanian manifestations of the type (eg the Bragov revolt of 1987). These tended to be spontaneous uprisings — little more than localized food-riots — of sections of the population goaded into action by the harshness of life, and with little or no political organization. With the Romanian population well informed by foreign radio stations of the events in Eastern Europe and the USSR the stage was set. All that was needed was a catalyst event, and it was perhaps fitting that this was provided by the eviction from his church of an ethnic Hungarian pastor in Timișoara — László Tokes.

László Tokes was pastor of the Reformed Church in Timișoara and had been an outspoken critic of both his church leadership, which was cravenly subservient to the authorities, and the government. Following an interview broadcast on 24 July 1989 by Hungarian television in which he drew attention to human rights violations in Romania and the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in particular, he was briefly detained on 6 August and placed under constant surveillance. He also signed an open letter calling on the Reformed Church leadership to initiate a dialogue with the authorities to stop the stigmatization campaign. This brought him into conflict with his bishop, László Papp, who, closely collaborating with the authorities, attempted to evict pastor Tokes from his Timișoara parsonage through the civil courts, after Tokes, supported by his congregation, refused to leave.

The authorities attempted to intimidate him. He received anonymous death threats and all visitors to his home were subjected to body searches and police questioning. On 2nd November four masked men smashed down the door of his apartment in the church and attacked him without hindrance from the ever present police surveillance. Despite all this Pastor Tokes refused to leave, and his congregation, helped by Romanian believers from nearby churches, continued to support him. At about 2am on the morning of 17 December the Securitate came to enforce the court's decision and physically evict him. His supporters surrounded the church as a defence but the security officials broke through. Mass demonstrations began immediately and by that afternoon a large crowd — by now predominantly ethnic Romanians — shouting anti-Ceausescu slogans moved into the town centre. What had initially been a local issue concerning the Hungarian minority and church affairs had become a widespread anti-government revolt. The Romanian Revolution had begun.

Troops and tanks were called in to quell the disturbances and Security Forces opened fire indiscriminately on the demonstrators but failed to stop them. The revolt quickly spread to other towns in the western area, Arad and Oradea. Ceausescu returned from a three day visit to Iran on 20 December and addressed the population on Romanian Television. He declared a State of Emergency in Timiș county and blamed 'traitors' and Hungarian agents whom he described as 'chauvinist fascist terrorists who wish to destroy
the territorial integrity and independence of our socialist Romania'. The inference was clear — the revolt was, he claimed, a revanchist Hungarian plot.

This final appeal to Romanian fears over Hungarian claims to Transylvania was an abject failure. Already demonstrations were occurring in non-Hungarian areas including Iași in eastern Romania. The following day the revolt spread to Bucharest and Ceaușescu and his wife Elena fled the city. The army joined demonstrators against the hated Securitate forces who mounted a brief but bloody counter-revolution. The Ceaușescus were caught and executed on Christmas Day. In the space of a week hundreds of people had died. The ensuing political vacuum was quickly filled by an organization calling itself the National Salvation Front (NSF) which was ostensibly composed of all sections of anti-Ceaușescu society.

**Ethnic Hungarian political groupings**

After the severe repression of the Ceaușescu regime the Hungarian community quickly began to assert itself, helped by the NSF recognition of the past assimilatory policies, and also the role ethnic Hungarian individuals had played in opposing the Ceaușescu regime. Almost immediately an organization known as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) was set up in Cluj and a statement of its aims was issued on 23 December 1989. Among its demands were:

- 'The immediate development of an educational system which guarantees the opportunity for minority language instruction at every level... The re-establishment of the independent Hungarian University in Kolozsvár [Cluj], the establishment of independent Hungarian schools of engineering, agriculture, medicine and pharmacology, teaching and fine arts, and the re-opening of the centuries-old Hungarian high schools.'

- 'The introduction of mandatory bilingualism in Transylvania, with administrative and judicial proceedings conducted in the Romanian and Hungarian languages.'

- 'The right of local government by democratically elected officials, and the restoration of the Hungarian autonomous towns, regions and counties where the majority of the population is Hungarian.'

- 'The establishment of a Ministry of Nationalities and the convening of a Hungarian Nationality Congress...'.

The DAHR also advocated 'guarantees for the national minority rights of the Germans, Serbs, Ukrainians, Russians, Turkish-Tatars, Jews and others.' The DAHR was officially registered and on 29 January it announced that the organization was operative in 17 Romanian counties with a membership of 300,000. During and after the immediate aftermath of the revolution there were reports of ethnic Hungarians from homogenous Hungarian villages in Transylvania attempting to Lynch the local police and Securitate officials who were invariably ethnic Romanians. The DAHR was quick to strongly criticize revenge killings, such as that of six militia men in Harghita county in late December and early January.

The DAHR initially saw itself as 'one of the grassroots branches of the NSF', and was 'subordinated to the NSF' and stated that it was not a political party but would field candidates in the forthcoming National Assembly elections. However after the NSF declared itself to be a political organization which would contest the elections, the DAHR also announced that it would stand as an independent political organization in the elections. In the future which group would receive the NSF announcement in January that it would contest the elections from the fledgling political parties who resigned NSF dominance, a compromise was reached whereby the legislative body, the NSF council, was renamed the Provisional Council for National Unity and expanded so that half its numbers would be made up of three members from each of the 30 or more political parties, including the NSF, and the others nominated from various walks of life including students, intellectuals, workers etc and including nine ethnic minorities who would also have three members each.

Other smaller ethnic Hungarian organizations also appeared. In Cluj, the Union of Magyar Democratic Youth which aimed at the 'realization of the rights of the young Magyar nationality in Romania and the achievements of equality of rights of all nationalities'. This organization saw itself as co-operating with DAHR and its basic goal was to be an information centre for young ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. Another organization called the Magyar Independent Party, under the leadership of János Vincze (later dismissed) announced its programme in early February. This organization saw itself as 'an active political force' apparently not in competition with the DAHR which it saw as a mass public organization. Other parties formed in February include the Magyar Smallholders Party and the Magyar Christian Democratic Party.

**The new authorities and education rights**

The NSF was comprised of a Council of 145 members, nominated ostensibly to represent all aspects of the anti-Ceaușescu opposition. As such the full NSF included 16 leading Hungarians including Károly Király, László Toke, Andor Horváth, and DAHR president Geza Domokos, and quickly issued its own declaration on minority rights which stated that the former policies against the Hungarians would not be continued. Hungarian-language radio broadcasts were allowed legally to be broadcast in Transylvania for the first time in five years after being allocated funds from the Romanian budget.

The authorities also promised to revive the Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj and to separate education according to the language of instruction. The NSF also appointed an ethnic Hungarian, Attila Palfalvi, as Deputy Education Minister, responsible for minority schools. On 15 January Palfalvi announced that the Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj would reopen in autumn 1990 where teaching would be carried out in Hungarian and German. The Bolyai University would incorporate all Hungarian and nationality institutions of higher education, including the medical universities of Tîrgu Mureş, the College of Dramatic Arts of Tîrgu Mureş, the Hungarian faculties of the Cluj Art College and Music Conservatory and every faculty of Cluj University. On 20 January it was announced that the minorities' right to mother tongue education would be reintroduced in the autumn of 1990 and that the Ministry of Education had began to reorganize primary schools, gymnasias and colleges. Along with the recreation of Bolyai University it was also announced that the German language higher education unit in Sibiu would be re-established.

However Palfalvi was dismissed on 27 January for 'taking decisions on his own in such a manner that contributed to creating tension between the Magyar population and the Romanian population in some Transylvanian settlements. Despite this the Education Minister, Mihai Sora, announced on 31 January that the agreements on the separation of Hungarian and Romanian language schools 'which came about in a spontaneous way in Transylvania' would stand. Where no agreement had been yet reached the problems would wait until the start of the new academic year. Palfalvi was replaced by another ethnic Hungarian, Lajos Demeny, a noted intellectual.
This somewhat uneasy relationship resulted in a series of mass demonstrations by Hungarians throughout Transylvania in late January and early February, some of which resulted in clashes with Romanians opposed to creating a bilingual education system. Several people were reportedly injured in Cluj after some Romanians denounced Hungarian demonstrators as chauvinists and were alleged to have threatened to Lynch them. On 10th February some 40,000, predominately young, Hungarians marched peacefully through the centre of Tîrgu Mureş demanding separate schools for ethnic Hungarians. The backlash quickly appeared in the form of a Romanian nationalist organization called Vatra Românească, Romanian Heath, which pointed to the apparent lack of interest in the situation of Transylvania's Romanian majority and hinted darkly at threats to territorial integrity. There were further reports of Romanian attacks on the Hungarian minority in Tîrgu Mureş in mid-March. Romanians and Hungarians staged a joint demonstration in Cluj to protest at the growing conflict.

These current tensions bear witness to the strength of feeling of both sides on this issue, so exacerbated under Ceausescu's rule. A declaration on behalf of 11 ethnic minorities including the Hungarian minority called once more for a Ministry of Minorities as a basis for minorities legislation. The Romanian delegate at the UN Commission on Human Rights, meeting in Geneva in February 1990, Dr Adrian Nastase, anticipated that these demands would become official policy.

Other minorities

The German minority also began to organize after the downfall of the Ceausescu regime. Representatives from Sibiu, Arad, Restita, Bucharest, Satu-Mare, Cluj, Braşov, Baia Mare, Medias, Focsani and Lugoj took part in a meeting in Târgu Mureş on 9 January which concentrated on education and cultural aspects. Again, the request for minority teachers, this time German, to be assigned to the town with the relevant minority was raised. Romanian TV resumed its German language broadcast on 12 January.

However the mass emigration and repression which had resulted in many of the ethnic German intellectuals leaving the country, combined with the economic lure of the FRG and general misgivings about the future in Romania, makes it highly likely that a substantial section, probably even the majority of the ethnic German population will take advantage of the relaxation in acquiring passports and join the general German emigration from Eastern Europe and the USSR to the FRG. An opinion poll in the German language daily Neuer Weg showed that out of the 2100 ethnic Germans of all ages sampled, 71% said that they were definitely leaving, 23% were undecided and only 6% said that they were definitely staying. The possibility that some may keep their homes in Romania as 'holiday homes' may well exacerbate possible future tensions between those who leave, those who stay behind, and the Romanian majority who will not have such privileged personal access to the FRG economy.

On 28 December 1989 the Ukrainians' Union of Free Romania was established. This organization, like its Hungarian counterparts, initially supported the NSF and aimed to protect the interests of Ukrainians in Romania. Among other things it planned to set up Ukrainian-language creches, kindergartens and schools in localities where Ukrainians live in Sighetul Marmatiei and Siret. It also called for Ukrainian publications and media programmes and declared its wish to maintain close relations with Ukrainians in the USSR and elsewhere. The small number of Bulgarians, 10,467 in the 1977 census, also organized themselves into the Bulgarian Association of the Babat. This organization brought out in Timişoara in January 1990 the first edition of the Bulgarian language newspaper 'Our Voice'. This organization, similar to the other small minority organizations, looked to the NSF for support.

On 22 February Rompres announced the establishment of the Democratic Union of Serbians operating in the counties of Timiş, Arad, Caraş-Severin and Mehedinti. In March Rompres announced the aims of the Muslim Turkish Democratic Union of Romania. There are over 20,000 Muslim Turks in Romania, most of whom live in Dobrogea.

Romania's large Roma (Gypsy) population, estimated to number over 750,000 and traditionally subject to everyday discrimination, also began moves to organize. They were recognized by the NSF as one of the nine minorities allowed to be represented in the new Council for National Unity under their leader Ion Ciobă. Ciobă alleges that under the Ceausescu regime Roma were detained and tortured and their property, including the gold jewelry of the women, was forcibly taken by government officials.

The international aspect

The Transylvanian question has been enormously complicated by its international ramifications. It is probably no exaggeration that the absence of good will, which has been so characteristic of the situation, derives above all from a persistent Romanian fear that the question has not been irrevocably settled and that using the existence of the minority as the pretext, the Hungarian state may once again claim the province. No amount of disclaimers from Budapest can dispel this sense of insecurity—Hungarian leaders, Kádár and Nemth included, have repeatedly insisted that the Hungarian state has no claims of Romanian territory—while concern from Budapest about the minority has been automatically interpreted in Romania as covert irredentism.

This fear has been exacerbated by the invisible role that Transylvania played in the triangular relationship among Romania, Hungary and the Soviet Union. Just as the Hungarian state argued that it had a certain locus standi vis-a-vis the Hungarians of Transylvania, so the Romanian state claimed a similar status vis-a-vis the Romanians of Bessarabia, the Moldavian SSR in the Soviet Union, to whom the status of Romanian nationality was, until the end of the 1980s, entirely denied by the Soviet authorities. The Kremlin thus used two latent irredentist issues to exert pressure on Romania and to ensure Hungary's loyalty. On a number of occasions in the past, the Soviet Union tacitly encouraged the Hungarian Communist Party to express criticism of the Romanian Party in international communist terms—criticism that was automatically translated by public opinion in both states as criticism in national terms, i.e. focused on Transylvania.
Relations with Hungary

The 1970s:

The Hungarian government secured a significant advance vis-a-vis Romania when in May 1977, presumably after Soviet pressure, the Romanian government agreed to hold bilateral discussions with Hungary on, among other matters, the problem of the minority. After what was privately reported as a fairly chilly meeting between Ceausescu and Kádár, the two sides issued a joint communique in which the Hungarian minority in Romania (c. 2 million) and the Romanian minority in Hungary (c. 25,000) were declared to be bridges between the two nations.

In political terms, this declaration was seen as giving Hungary its much coveted status vis-a-vis the Hungarians of Transylvania. The two sides agreed to promote cultural contacts, a Hungarian consulate would be re-opened in Cluj, while a Romanian consulate was to be set up in Debrecen. In the year that followed, no movement of any significance took place on either front and when Ceausescu's personal representative, Ştefan Andrei, visited Budapest in February 1978, he was told by his Hungarian hosts that matters had dragged on for long enough.⁶⁵

The entire question of cultural links between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian state was a highly sensitive one from the Romanian standpoint. It aroused precisely the strongest fears of Hungarian irredentism that the Hungarian authorities were so anxious to dispel. The results were absurd. Hungarians complained that it was virtually impossible to buy newspapers from Hungary in Transylvania, even while the Romanians put them on sale in the Regat, where, of course, no one bought them. Subscriptions by Transylvanians to journals from Hungary were discouraged and the Romanian authorities made difficulties with deliveries and payments. At one stage in the 1960s, it was reported that whenever the Romanian authorities screened films from Hungary, they either showed them dubbed into Romanian or with Romanian sub-titles and the Hungarian soundtrack was slightly desynchronized in order to make it unintelligible. Listening to Hungarian radio or Hungarian television stations was disliked by the Romanian authorities.

The communist regime in Hungary was incomparably more liberal than the one in Romania and the Romanian authorities were afraid of the comparisons with Hungary, where — quite apart from anything else — the standard of living was much higher. This problem extended to Romanian intellectuals, many of whom knew Hungarian and used Hungary as their window on the West; in this sense, publications from Hungary were seen as subversive.

A particularly irritating regulation was the one introduced by the Romanian authorities in 1974 on tourism (Decree Law 225/1974). Under this regulation, foreign tourists were no longer allowed to stay overnight in private houses, but had to either stay in hotels or on camping sites. This regulation was strictly enforced in Transylvania, though rather less so on the Black Sea. It was regarded by Hungarians, both from Hungary and from Transylvania, as being directed against them, because it prevented Hungarians from staying with relatives or friends, the only exception being relationship in the first degree (parent, sibling). The local authorities took great care to see that this regulation was enforced. The Hungarian writer Ferenc Kunszabó described how he missed his last bus back from the town where he was staying, was put up by the local people and how his host was subsequently fined 25,000 lei (the average monthly income in Romania was at the time around 2,000 lei).

Whether this decree was really introduced with the express purpose of cutting down on the number of Hungarians from Hungary travelling to Transylvania — there was very little traffic in the other direction — was difficult to say with any certainty. On the other hand, it clearly had an undesirable effect, both as far as contacts between Transylvania and Hungary were concerned and in the broader sense of extending state regulation over the lives of the individual. It is noteworthy that in 1976 a new decree (no. 372/1976) abolished visiting restrictions and currency exchange requirements for foreign citizens of Romanian origin, in other words, it expressly excluded Hungarians.

The raising of the Transylvanian issue in the West, particularly in the United States where, from the 1970s various bodies had been campaigning energetically on behalf of the Hungarian minority with the objective of revoking Romania's Most Favoured Nation Status in trade with the US, forced the Romanian leadership to make a response. This response varied from bland denials of discrimination to abuse of the Hungarian minority's case.

Ceausescu personally denounced 'traitors to the fatherland, weak elements or morally decadent persons who, for two gold or silver coins, for a bowl of lentils or goulash, sell their services to foreign circles'. This was interpreted as a reference to Király and 'foreign' in this context probably included Hungary. Other similar moves were the publication of pamphlets recounting the atrocities committed by Hungarian police during the Horhiyisht occupation of northern Transylvania against Romanians (events which had taken place over 30 years before) and a revival of polemics over the Daco-Roman continuity question. Particular offences were evidently caused by the two articles published by Gýula Illéssy, then Hungary's leading literary personality who accused Romania (not by name) of pursuing a policy of apartheid towards the minority.⁶⁶

Otherwise, Romanian officials in the West sought to give assurances that the minority had never been better treated in its entire existence and attempted to support this by quotations from official documents and by statistics. Letters were sent to Western publications which reported on the Transylvanian question and these denied the truthfulness of these reports. Mention should also be made of a campaign waged by sections of the Romanian emigration, which — despite its anti-communism — agreed fully with the official Romanian position on the minority issue and sought to discredit the Hungarian case. An illustration was the output of a Rome-based publishing house, which issued material claiming that the Hungarians were in Europe through conquest only and that they had no right of habitation anywhere except in Siberia.

The 1980s:

Hungarian-Romanian relations remained strained through the 1980s. While Hungary was evolving towards a mixed market economy and pluralist political system, Romania under Ceausescu became more isolationist and authoritarian. The Gábor Bethlen Foundation, named after a 17th century Transylvanian ruler, was formed in 1978/9 by Hungarian intellectuals in Hungary, ostensibly to sponsor scholarship on the different nations in the Carpathian basin, but specifically to offer succour to the Hungarians of Transylvania. However it was only given grudging recognition by the Kádár regime in May 1985.

The removal of János Kádár in 1988 as Hungarian leader meant the disappearance of a politician whose dislike of Hungarian nationalism and whose unwillingness to exploit it politically was genuine. Tension between Hungary and
Romania over the treatment of the Hungarian minority increased and became increasingly more open after Kadar's departure and progressive liberalization in Hungary, which in addition to giving Hungarian citizens far greater access to consumer outlets in marked contrast to the situation in Romania, allowed Hungarian public opinion to raise the issue of the minority ever more vocally. After May 1988, the Hungarian press was filled with Transylvanian "atrocities stories". Ceausescu's systemization project gave the added bonus of drawing unfavourable world opinion to the Romanian regime which came under increasing attack from the world press.

From the official Hungarian point of view public discontent within Hungary was better directed against Romania than against the increasingly difficult conditions within Hungary itself as the economic situation deteriorated. In June 1988 50,000 people demonstrated in Budapest against "systemisation" and on 1 July the Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution describing the programme as a violation of human rights. The Romanians responded with accusations of Hungarian irredentism and closed the Hungarian consulates in Bucharest and Cluj.

The Hungarian authorities had earlier begun to raise the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania at a number of international forums. At the Second Session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Vienna in early 1987 the Hungarian delegate joined six Western and two neutral countries in a proposal on the protection of national minorities. Although Hungary was the only Warsaw Pact member to sponsor this proposal it was believed that the Soviet Union had covertly tolerated the Hungarian move, and indeed Gorbachev became increasingly critical of the Ceausescu regime. Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Gyula Horn condemned Romanian policies on minorities and human rights in his speech of 27 February 1989 at the UN Commission of Human Rights in Geneva. The Commission adopted a resolution condemning human rights abuses in Romania and took the unusual step of appointing a Special Rapporteur to investigate the situation and report back to the Commission in due course.

By 1989 Romania had become more and more isolated within Europe. The US Congress voted to suspend Romania's Most Favoured Nation Status in July 1987, initially for six months, but in order to avoid further humiliation the Ceausescu government renounced its MPN status, with the subsequent loss of export earnings. In March 1989 the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning violations in Romania including "brutal suppression of minorities" and negotiations on a trade accord were frozen. A number of European governments recalled their ambassadors or closed their embassies in Bucharest.

1990 and beyond:

Relations between Hungary and Romania unsurprisingly improved immediately after Ceausescu's fall. The new Romanian authorities quickly announced the reopening of the Hungarian Consultate in Cluj, although its activities were restricted to consular matters, and the new authorities did not take up the option of opening a Romanian consulate in Debrecen in Eastern Hungary. However a Hungarian Romanian cultural agreement was signed on 5 February 1990 by the Hungarian Minister for Education and the Romanian Minister of Culture. This called for the setting up in 1990 of a Hungarian cultural centre in Bucharest and a similar Romanian one in Budapest, and the renewal of Romanian-Hungarian Friendship societies. However the demonstrations in Transylvania and the nationalist Romanian reaction gave rise to fears on the Hungarian side and this has exacerbated the problems of citizenship of the thousands of ethnic Hungarian refugees from Romania who had fled to Hungary.

Under the previous agreement with Romania Hungary had agreed to ban dual citizenship. However this agreement's second five year term was due to expire on 11 February 1990 and the Hungarians proposed to suspend this agreement until a new one was mutually agreed and asked the Romanians to reply by 8 February or otherwise the Hungarians would unilaterally abrogate the agreement. No reply was apparently received. Hungary then announced that this was not intended to overly influence the Hungarians in Romania by the concept of dual nationality, but rather was a humanitarian gesture to help the situation of refugees. It was announced at the meeting in Ottawa between the respective Foreign Ministers that 'it would be desirable to start talks within the week on a new agreement to replace the one on dual citizenship which the Hungarian side had repudiated', and for the Hungarian consultate in Cluj to reopen as soon as possible. The unease of the Romanian authorities was additionally shown by the protest by the Ministry of Education against the illegal distribution of textbooks printed in Hungary to schools in Transylvania.

The future

The situation of Hungarians in Romania centres on their position in Transylvania. Yet Transylvania as a whole should be considered. Transylvanian Romanians also suffered along with Transylvanian Hungarians and Germans under the Ceausescu regime which paid no attention to the specific character of the region. Thus the Romanians had also been at the receiving end of an unthinking mobilization policy, in which individual freedom was entirely discounted and the illusory interests of the ruling bureaucracy were held paramount. Transylvanian Romanians also had to go to any part of the country to which they were directed; they had to accept the presence of large numbers of Regatean incomers who lacked sensitivity towards local preferences and habits; and they were not all unsympathetic to Hungarian aspirations. In this there appears to be a genuine spirit of 'Transylvanianism', which essentially accepts that the Transylvanian way of life is a fusion of all three main national cultures and that all three owe a great deal to one another.

But Transylvanianism, however attractive it may have seemed and however workable it was at the grassroots level where relations between members of the nationalities were often very good, founded on the rock of Romanian state nationalism, for which Transylvanianism was a dangerous concept in that it questioned the unity and integrity of the Romanian nation. The distinction remained between loyalty to the nation (a cultural category in the first place) and loyalty to the state (a political imperative which Transylvanianism did not seriously undermine).

Yet, under Ceausescu, the position of the the Romanians of Transylvania could not really be compared to the Hungarians or other minorities, given that a Hungarian was by definition a second-class citizen in Romania and was exposed to discrimination in national terms. Whatever the
privations of Transylvanian Romanians, they were not subjected to attacks on their national culture and allegiance to language. A Transylvanian Romanian, however concerned he may have been about the treatment of the Hungarians, however sympathetic he may have been to Transylvanianism and however much he may have been humiliated by Regateans, was nonetheless a member of the national majority and enjoyed whatever benefits derived from it. He may have detested Ceausescu and the policies of the Romanian Communist Party, but he remained a Romanian, giving his loyalty to the Romanian nation and deriving his identity from it, something which no Hungarian could do as long as he wished to remain a Hungarian.

There could be no doubt that under Ceausescu the Romanian state – or at least many of its agents – treated the Hungarian minority as an alien body in society, considered it a potential danger to the integrity of the Romanian state's territory and therefore subjected the minority to greater pressure and discrimination than the Romanian majority had to accept. It is particularly ironic that the Hungarians of Transylvania have traditionally had a strong identity and consciousness of their own and do not automatically identify with the Hungarian state.

The political situation in Romania at the time of writing (mid-March 1990) is extremely volatile. The end of the Ceausescu regime has allowed the minorities, and the Hungarians in particular, to freely voice their aspirations. It remains to be seen whether these aspirations, especially in the vital field of education, can be met without the escalation of ethnic tensions seen recently in Cluj and elsewhere. It is likely that if they are not met then Romania's ethnic Hungarians will look increasingly to Hungary for support and aid with possible disastrous consequences for political stability in the area.

It is thus vital that the ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, along with other minorities, use the opportunity afforded by the overthrow of the totally discredited Ceausescu regime and its equally discredited minority policies, to create institutions which allow all the ethnic groups in this ethnically diverse region to develop without mutual antagonism.
Conclusion

One lesson of the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe and in Romania in particular, is that human rights are rightly a matter of international concern. The CSCE process has brought together 33 European states of different languages, cultures and political systems which have, after long and difficult negotiations, agreed on basic principles of military security, economic and scientific co-operation and humanitarian principles. (Albania is the only European nation not be a member and there are two non-European members - USA and Canada). Now that basic human rights standards have been agreed there is a need to implement them and to continue to monitor that they are observed.

The ending of the political divisions between Eastern and Western Europe, the whole or partial withdrawal of US and Soviet troops and the continuation of the CSCE process, open real possibilities whereby ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious minorities can assert a separate identity in various spheres of their lives without being seen as a threat to the integrity of the state or alliances.

The assertion of ‘minority rights’ by aggressive nations formed the background to European wars of the 20th Century; consequently some states still fear for their borders. The Minority Rights Group has never held the view that changing international borders is the natural solution to minority conflicts, although the attraction of this solution is an understandable response of minorities to years of centralized government repression. Yet in many areas this would only create new minorities and an increased danger of regional conflicts accompanied by an upsurge of nationalism and xenophobia. The issue is fundamentally one of democracy nationally and locally both in policies and their implementation. How the democratic rights of minorities and majorities can be protected and promoted harmoniously at all levels of society, is a complex question, even when there is goodwill on all sides.

The Hungarian government has been constructive and unambiguous in renouncing fully any contemporary claims to Transylvania or to areas in other states inhabited by Hungarians. However it has a legitimate right to remain interested in the situation of the Hungarian minorities in these states, and when necessary, to express its concern. Ideally under the CSCE process all member states should monitor the treatment of minorities, thus removing the charge of revanchist sentiments. Small, neutral states have a particularly important role to play in this process.

After a quarter of a century of Ceausescu’s regime, Romania was left an impoverished nation. The worst features have been swept aside - the destruction of historic art and architecture as well as humble villages under the ‘systemization’ plan, the forced birth programme, the rationing of food, fuel and medical supplies and other essential goods in order to pay off foreign debts, the ruthless actions of the Securitate forces to crush dissent, the constant surveillance of the whole population, the repression of minority cultures and languages. Yet many of the old suspicions, fears and prejudices, rooted in history but encouraged under Ceausescu, remain. The Revolution of December 1989 will not have succeeded in meeting its aims if it cannot overcome these barriers to create a society which is more open, more equitable and more pluralist.

Organizations and governments outside Romania can play an important role in this process. A large amount of humanitarian and economic aid will be needed - western nations must ensure that this aid is appropriate to the situation, will be allocated impartially and will not exacerbate tensions between communities. It is crucial that the international community responds to this human challenge first and foremost and does not exploit Romania at such a vulnerable stage, by treating it primarily as an opportunity to develop political and commercial domination by outside interests. UN and other international agencies will need to retain professionals and to direct resources into areas of greatest need such as female and child health schemes. Non-government organizations have relatively few resources but they are important as role models in a society where for too long all activity has been state-directed and individual and community initiative stifled. The Christian churches, of all denominations, must work responsibly together for greater tolerance and to promote reconciliation.

Ultimately however the responsibility for the building of a new society depends upon the people of Romania and upon the government they democratically elect to represent them. For minorities, democracy can be a two-edged sword for while it might promise representation for minority views, the reality of majority rule could mean the ignoring or suppression of minority aspirations. The definition of democracy is government by the people. It implies the involvement and participation of majorities and minorities and not the domination of a minority by a majority.

The National Salvation Front government has ruled out the establishment of an autonomous Hungarian province in Transylvania and it is difficult to see how it could be established without considerable resentment by the majority Romanian population. One way forward was suggested in the Statement of Intent by Dr. Adrian Nastase, the Romanian representative to the UN Commission for Human Rights in February 1990, when he described plans to establish Constitutional provisions for protection of minority rights, anticipated a Ministry of Minorities and new laws especially covering minority issues. He invited the UN Human Rights Commission to give assistance to the Romanian government in its efforts to implement these provisions. This is an exemplary statement of the new policies being developed in Romania towards minorities. It deserves much praise and support to ensure that the statements of principle lead to new policies, new legislation, new administrative structures and new resources for minority communities.

The next two years will be crucial for constructive change in Eastern Europe. In almost every country new reforming governments are taking power with a democratic mandate. By their positive treatment of minorities within their borders, they have the opportunity to resolve old grievances and contemporary tensions, and go forward to create a truly egalitarian, pluralist societies.
Footnotes


4. Self-identification is notoriously unreliable as an indicator of nationality, as it may be easily influenced by external pressures. The demographic aspect of Transylvania is explored in Paul Compton, Demographic Change in Transylvania since 1956, Conference Paper presented at the National Association of Soviet and East European Studies Annual Conference, 1972, and subsequently a statement under the name of G.D. Satamacu, The Changing Demographic Structure of the Population of Transylvania, East European Quarterly, 8:4 (January 1975), pp.425-439. See Trends in Ethnic Minorities in Romania under Socialism, East European Quarterly, 7:4 (January 1974), pp.435-458. Both these studies conclude that a measure of under-enumeration can be deduced on demographic grounds as far as the Hungarian and German minorities are concerned.

5. The Hungarian Text appeared in George Lazar, Jelentés Erdélyből, Irodalmi Újság (Paris) March-April 1977. Zoltan Divid, A magyarul beszélő szemén [The number of Hungarian speakers], Magyar Noked, Budapest, 94:4 (October-December 1977), pp.386-392. The booklet The Hungarian Nationality in Romania, Bucharest, 1976, was prepared by the Institute of Political Sciences and of Studying the National Question and published by Meridiane Publishing House; it can be taken as an expression of the official position of the then Romanian government.


8. The word 'Transylvania' means ['the land beyond the forest', that is beyond the Munții Apuseni; the Hungarian 'Erdey' has the same meaning derived from 'eréde', Ardeal is derived from the Hungarian: Siebenburgen refers to the seven towns founded by German settlers in the same period.


12. For further information on the Vlachs see Minorities in the Balkans, MRG Report no. 82, 1989.


15. Some examples of polemics are found in Contemporanul, 10 February 1978 and Saptimana, 17 February 1978, the Hungarian version is expressed in Magyar Hírlap, 25 December 1977 and 3 April 1978.


18. Beszé Magyar Hirado, ibid.

19. Much of the information in this section and the one following is taken from the Lazar memorandum and from the document in Beszé Magyar Hirado, 1 January and 1 February 1978.


22. The memorandum by Lajos Takacs was in samizdat and all references are from this text; Karoly Kiraly's three letters (to file Verdel, to Janos Faekas and to Janos Vincze) were issued with English translations by the Committee for Human Rights in Romania, 30 January 1978. There were veiled hints by Andras Sato, a leading writer from Transylvania and at the time one of the most original dramatists writing in Hungarian, to the same effect in Elet es Troidalom, 20 April 1978.

23. [No author] A living reality in Romania today; FulHarmony and Equality between the Romanian People and the Co-Existing Nationalities, [no publisher or printer, date or place of publication], distributed by Romanian Diplomatic Missions in the spring of 1978, in various languages.


25. This appeared in the official Hungarian language daily of the Romanian Communist Party, Elore, 31 March 1972.

26. 'Patriotic duty' is from Albert Szegeti, Invatamantul ilescl se tecnic profesional, November 1976, pp.4-5. The minutes of the joint plenum of the Hungarian and German Nationality Councils were printed in Romanian and published in Edunia Politica, Bucharest; the speaker referred to was Hermann Schmidt of the Ministry of Education, Plenarele Consiliului Oamenilor Muncit de Nationalitate Maghiara si Germana din Republica Socialistă Romania, pp.97-102.


28. Complaints about libraries appeared regularly in the Hungarian-language press in Romania, e.g. Elore, 19 March 1972, Igos Szó, No 9, 1971, p.345 and Konyvzsi Szemle; the dissatisfied farmers were at the village of Bodok (H. Bodok), Megyesi Tukor, 18 May 1972; Konyvzsi Szemle ['Bibliographical Review'] was a specialist journal for librarians; it ceased publication in 1974 at the time of the paper shortage.

29. Text of the law in Scinteia, 2 November 1974; details of its enforcement in Neuen Zürcher Zeitung, 1-2 February 1975 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 December 1977. The latter made it clear that the German religious communities were just as adversely affected as the Hungarian ones.


32. Viktor Meier of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, reported after a visit to a small Hungarian village near Chi that only 10 of the approximately 300 families were Hungarian and that they were almost all the families of police; in being asked whether they spoke Hungarian, the villagers told him that they might know some but that it was better to speak to them in Romanian, EAZ, 11 September 1976. Siksas's case was mentioned by Kiraly; the others were documented by the Committee for Human Rights in Romania; the peasant from the Calata was described by Ivan Volgyes, 'Zsebad - sirni a Karpatok alatt', Irodalmi Újság, March-April 1976.


35. 'Hungarians of Romania', in MRG (Ed), World Directory of Minorities, ibid, p.113.


Select Bibliography

There are few works of analysis on Romania, and in particular on Transylvania, that are accepted as objective and unbiased by all parties involved. The picture has to be put together from an assessment of the variety of partial and polemical writings available. In addition to the select bibliography below, the books and articles in the footnotes should be consulted.


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Other minority groups in Eastern Europe are covered in the following:


POULTON, Hugh and MINNESOTA INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, Minorities in the Balkans, Minority Rights Group Report no. 82, 1989.


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SWB = BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
The Reports already published by the Minority Rights Group are:

- No. 1 Religious minorities in the Soviet Union (Revised 1984 edition)
- No. 2 The two Ireland's: the double minority (New 1984 edition)
- No. 3 Japan's minorities: Burakumis, Koreans, Ainu and Okinawans (New 1984 edition)
- No. 4 The Asian minorities of East and Central Africa (to 1971)
- No. 5 Eritrea and Tigrai (New 1983 report)
- No. 7 The position of Blacks in Brazilian and Cuban society (New 1979 report)
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- No. 25 The Tamils of Sri Lanka (Revised 1988 edition)
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REVOLT AGAINST TYRANNY

In December 1989 László Toke, an ethnic Hungarian non-Conformist pastor in the Romanian city of Timișoara, defied the dreaded Securitate forces who came to evict him from his church. This action sparked the Romanian Revolution, resulting in the overthrow of Europe's most brutal leader, Nicolae Ceausescu.

The Hungarian minority and many others had reached their final breaking point and could endure no more. The dawn of democracy was breaking in Eastern Europe and yet in Ceausescu's Romania human rights violations continued - imprisonment and torture, minority groups denied public recognition of their language, culture, education and religion, communities threatened by mass eviction and demolition of villages.

Romania's Ethnic Hungarians, a newly revised and updated edition of MRG's authoritative report, provides a balanced, and scholarly analysis of the historic background and contemporary situation. Written by George Schöpflin and Hugh Poulton, it gives a detailed account of the Hungarian minority and information on the Germans, Romani Gypsies and other minorities. It also describes the changes since the revolution and prospects for the future.

Nationality issues and racism towards minorities pose two of the greatest threats to peace and security in Europe in the 1990s. This timely report aids understanding of the past while offering hope for the future.

An indispensable resource, sympathetic yet objective, which will prove of great value to students, academics, development agencies, governments and all those interested in minorities.