Somalia

Communities

Please note that spellings may vary.  

Main languages:   Awer, Bajuni, Benadiri (multiple dialects including Af-Hamari and Af-Maasu-Donte), Bravanese, Chimini/Chimbalazi, Eyle, Gosha, Jiddo, Kizigua, Mahatiri, Maay, Tunni.   

Some occupational groups may speak additional languages – Af-Calowe and a language spoken by the Yibir people, but little is known about either of them. Somali sign language is also used. National languages are Mahatiri and Maay. 

Main religions: Islam, very small numbers of Christians.  Some animist or traditional religious practices may be carried out alongside Islam by some groups but only by keeping a very low profile, as the insurgent group al-Shabaab disapproves of such rituals. 

Minorities and/or indigenous peoples include Bantu (Gosha, Mushunguli, Shabelle, Shidle), traditionally (current or in living memory) hunting and gathering groups (Awer, Eyle, who are also sometimes counted among the Bantu) occupational groups (Gaboye, Tumal, Yibir, also referred to collectively as Mahdiban), coastal groups  (Benadiri,  Rer Hamar, Bravanese, Bajuni), and religious minorities (Ashraf, Shekhal, Christians). The degree to which these groups face exclusion varies.  

Somali society is intimately linked to clan.  There are four major clan groups, each of which is sub-divided into sub- and sub-sub-clans.  Reciprocal relationships of advantage and support operate within each clan with those in a close familial relationship having the most right to call on a person with shared clan heritage who has access to an opportunity or resource for support.  The four major clan groupings are: 

Somali political and to a large extent economic life runs according to a system known as the ‘4.5 formula’.  Parliamentary or upper house seats and other government posts are allocated in line with this formula, at least in theory.  All opportunities are divided into 9, two ninths of posts are allocated to each of the four major clan groups listed above (making eight ninths) with the remaining one ninth allocated to all remaining groups in the country.  This agreement was reached as a way to end the inter-clan conflict/civil war, but it is not well documented, seeming to exist largely as a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. In fact, the outcome documents of some of the conferences where peace deals were brokered and the system was discussed and verbally agreed make no reference to it. In fact, they call for the exclusion of clan dynamics from politics.  

It must be noted that Somalia has very limited demographic information, with the last published census having been completed in the 1950s. With the support of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Bank, the Bureau for National Statistics has initiated at least some demographic counts to document the situation of people across the country.  However, despite or perhaps because of the centrality of clan structures in political life, no data on the clan breakdown of the population currently exists.  The allocation of opportunities using the 4.5 formula is thus solely based on power, in particular the ability to mobilize an armed militia, and has no basis in population numbers. 

The fact that ethnic and occupational minority community members are in theory allocated half of the opportunities afforded to other groups is a source of grievance, as it appears to reflect an assumption that they are less worthy or valued than members of other groups. The words ‘in theory’ refer to allegations that even this half share may be allocated to others with minorities powerless to intervene or insist.  The unwritten nature of the agreement over the 4.5 formula adds to its complexity. It has been shown that groups with a close allegiance to one of the major clans are included in the 0.5 groups thereby eroding even further the opportunities and power of minorities and deepening their marginalization. 

Among other groups, Somalia’s ethnic minorities include the Awer, Bantu, Bajuni, Benadiri (or Reer Xamar), Bravanese and a small number of Christians.   

Somalia is linguistically diverse, and many languages are poorly documented or understood.  The nationally recognized languages of Somalia are Mahatiri (often simply referred to as Somali) and Maay. Mahatiri is spoken by Hawiye, Isaaq and Darood clans and sub-clans as well as some minorities.  Maay is spoken by Digil/Mirifle/Rahanweyn clans and sub-clans as well as some minorities.  Mahatiri and Maay are sometimes considered to be dialects, sometimes two languages. This is important. If Maay speakers (who have not learnt Mahatiri) are unable to understand materials or broadcasts in Mahatiri, this may result in exclusion; MRG research suggests that this is the case.  Maay was originally predominantly spoken in South West State and neighbouring regions like Gedo and Jubaland, with Mahatiri dominant in the rest of Somalia. The recent period has seen an intensification of the dominance of Mahatiri with its use in all government functions and in education in all areas including South West State and Jubaland.  The original concentration of Maay speakers in South West State and Jubaland has been blurred by large scale movements of internally displaced people in response to conflict, drought and flooding, so that, for example, there are now many speakers of Maay in the IDP camps surrounding Mogadishu.  As well as languages spoken by the ethnic minorities mentioned above (e.g. Bantu speakers of Kizigua, a Bantu language thought to have links with languages in Tanzania or even Mozambique), some of the major clan members also speak minority languages (e.g. Tunni, which is considered to be a dialect spoken in and around the rural areas near the coastal town of Brava and which is spoken by both some Bravans as well as Digil clan members in that area).  

The Ashraf and Shekhal minorities do not have significant religious or sect differences with the Islam as practised in the country and do not suffer from exclusion, but they have been included in the minority 0.5 group for the benefit of the major clans. Ashraf and Shekhal traditionally played important conflict resolution roles and were respected and protected by the clans with whom they lived. However, some were badly affected by the civil conflicts of the 1990s and lost this customary protection, becoming targets for human rights abuses by clan militias and warlords. Ashraf claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad and his daughter Fatima and believe they migrated to Somalia in the twelfth century. Ashraf in some areas are affiliated to and counted as Benadiri, while Ashraf living among Digil-Mirifle are affiliated with them as a sub-clan. Shekhal (also known as Sheikhal or Sheikasha, i.e. ‘the Shekhal people’) are a similarly dispersed religious community of claimed Arabian and early Islamic origin. As with the Ashraf, some sub-clans have affiliated with major clan groups and therefore benefit from access to at least some opportunities on that basis, while others have not and should be considered vulnerable. Both Ashraf and Shekhal historically achieved political influence and success in education and commerce with Arab countries, yet the gibil-cad (‘light-skinned’) Ashraf and gibil-cad (‘light-skinned’) Shekhal can still face discrimination and human rights abuses on account of their non-major-clan origins. The very small Christian minority in Somalia, comprising first- or second-generation converts from Islam, is under extreme threat, especially now with the presence of the armed insurgent group, al-Shabaab. 

The best current estimates of population numbers in Somalia were collected by UNFPA and the National Statistical Bureau in 2020 via a demographic and health survey.  Conditions did not allow for house-to-house census type information collection with full coverage, and the figures are derived from nationally representative samples combined with aerial or satellite photography-based estimates.  No data on the breakdown of the population by language, ethnicity or religion is available. In 2002, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that minorities comprised one third of the Somali population. Other sources cite 20 per cent of the total population as belonging to minorities. What is clear is that minorities are splintered within society and generally lack political and military organization compared to majority groups. The lack of comprehensive statistics extends to the disaggregation of data for different minorities; there is no clear, current breakdown in population figures for each community. It is generally assumed that Bantu are the largest minority in Somalia. According to OCHA’s 2002 study, they comprise roughly 15 per cent of the total population, though other sources estimate that they alone may amount to as much as a fifth of the country’s inhabitants. Minorities overall are not evenly distributed throughout the country; South-Central Somalia is believed to have a higher concentration of minorities than Somaliland and Puntland. The vulnerability of IDPs – 70 to 80 per cent of whom are women and children, according to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) – is especially pronounced among minority communities. While it is not uncommon to hear that Somalia is ethnically or linguistically homogenous, this is clearly not the case.  Numerous ethnic, religious and linguistic communities exist as well as occupational groups.

Current Issues  

For the past decade, Somalia has slowly been recovering from its status as a failed state, though significant instability persists. The country is in the early stages of implementing a fledgling federal system of six proposed regions – Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug, Jubaland, South West State, and Hir-Shabelle. However, political institutions established since 2012 remain weak. The resources of the Somali state are also insufficient to effectively realize the potential of the country’s political and constitutional aspirations. Against a backdrop of persistent instability inside Somalia, minority groups such as Bantu and Benadiri continue to face vulnerability and exclusion. Other vulnerable groups include occupational minorities or clans that are associated with specific trades, such as Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir, who work as blacksmiths, carpenters, tanners, barbers and in other trades.  

In particular, the country continues to suffer from the actions of the armed insurgent group al-Shabaab, which holds large swathes of territory in the country. Civilians face serious abuses, including targeted and indiscriminate killings, forced recruitment and evictions, and sexual violence. In addition to subjecting the population in areas under its control to a range of serious human rights abuses, the group has also launched a series of devastating and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including multiple bomb attacks in Mogadishu, most recently in August 2024. The majority of its bombing, shelling and gunfire attacks on politicians, other state officials, joint forces and civilians are in Mogadishu and the adjacent Lower Shabelle region, but also often take place in Jubaland, South West State and Hirshabelle.  A UN statement cited 1,289 civilian deaths resulting from conflict in the period January to October 2023 with two main causes: al-Shabaab actions and an outbreak of conflict in Somaliland between two clan factions centred on Las Canood.   

The failure of multiple rainy seasons in the period 2019-2023 led to the deaths of many herds, crop failures and the drying up of rivers, bore holes and other water sources. This in turn caused displacement due to lack of water for drinking/cooking and a lack of food.  It was estimated that 43,000 individuals died as a result of the 2022 drought (excess deaths), although no breakdown of this figure was made available concerning how many belonged to minorities. 

Many minorities have been forced to or have chosen to leave their traditional areas of residence and have relocated to IDP camps in the outskirts of major cities.  In the southern region and some parts of southwestern Somalia, the continued presence of al-Shabaab and government efforts to defeat the group militarily has resulted in displacement, but equally communities have been forced to relocate by drought as well as unfortunately flooding, when in 2023, an El Niño effect resulted in significant floods not only in riverine areas (such as the Shabelle and Juba river valleys) but also in areas thought to be less vulnerable to the risk of flooding, e.g. parts of normally dryer Hiraan and Puntland Provinces. 

MRG published research showing that aid and development interventions did not reach minorities equally or in proportionate to their needs in 2021 and an analysis of minority perceptions and experiences of using aid agency feedback mechanisms in 2022. 

Many members of minorities from Somalia, without protection from dominant clans or social networks, became refugees during the past several decades of conflict. A significant Somali refugee population made its way to Kenya and has been residing there in camps for the past two decades.  The situation for the 320,000 (UNHCR 2024) Somali refugees in Kenya remains precarious, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab, with Kenyan authorities previously announcing that it would close Dadaab camp by November 2016 – a move that would have gravely endangered the residents of the camp, including a sizeable population of Bantu. However, the decision was subsequently ruled unconstitutional, and the camp remains in operation, despite renewed threats by authorities to close it.    

Dominant clans in Somalia provide protection to clan members based on a complex system of customary law and use of armed force. Those from minority groups and minority clans fall outside this system of protection. Intermarriage with some minority clans is not permitted, and many other forms of interaction are frowned upon. Because of this long-standing differentiation in social status, minorities are significantly more vulnerable to human rights violations in Somalia and have few options for redress.  

Access to basic services such as education, health care and shelter, as well as access to justice for violations of human rights, are significant challenges for minorities. During Somalia’s conflicts many individuals belonging to minorities were displaced internally or became refugees in neighbouring countries. Minority women in Somalia suffered disproportionate violations of human rights, as a result of double discrimination and traditional Somali patriarchy.  

The majority religion in Somalia is Sunni Islam, although a small population of Asian Shi’a communities, comprising mainly Indians and Pakistanis, lived in the country before the 1991 civil war. Indeed, Islam is the national religion according to the law, and conversion from Islam is banned. Certain minority communities within the Muslim faith in Somalia, the gibil-cad (‘light-skinned’) Ashraf and the gibil-cad (‘light-skinned’) Shekhal, often experience discrimination on the basis of their assumedly non-Somali, Asian ethnic background. The Christian minority in Somalia experiences severe marginalization and – in the age of al-Shabaab – extreme danger.  

The goal to hold one-person, one-vote elections by September 2016 has, however, been repeatedly derailed by political conflicts between Somalia’s dominant clans and logistical challenges. Instead, elections began in October 2016 with 14,025 ‘electors’ (clan elders) divided into 51-member ‘colleges’, choosing 275 parliamentarians and 54 senators for the newly created upper house. Electors were chosen by clan chiefs to cast votes for members of parliament, who would then choose a new president. Concerns over the electoral process were manifold, including rampant corruption and intimidation. 

The process of indirect elections has continued. The elections due in spring 2021 were postponed on multiple occasions, with delays amounting to over one year.  After an intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which threatened to cancel a significant three-year aid package in May 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected President. He had previously served as President between 2012 and 2017. 

Somalia’s interim Constitution, adopted in 2012, establishes a federation with considerable autonomy granted to a number of member states.  These states have considerable control in their regions although they vary widely in terms of their level of capacity, access to resources and infrastructure.  The most established of the member states is Puntland, which held one-person, one-vote elections in spring 2023.  These were completed successfully and peacefully, although they were followed by an outbreak of conflict in Puntland which had largely been peaceful for more than one decade. The fighting was widely attributed to have been linked to the election process and results. Puntland’s occupational minorities had concerns about the degree to which these precedent-setting elections were inclusive of minorities, but full details are still being investigated. 

Somaliland has successfully completed multiple rounds of one-person, one-vote elections, most recently with parliamentary elections held in May 2021 and presidential elections concluded in November 2024 after having been delayed for one year.  In the period leading up to the 2021 election, efforts to increase the quota of seats reserved for both women and minorities were unsuccessful.  Somaliland has a quota of three places for minority MPs.  One minority MP was elected outside the quota system by a large majority of constituents in the Daami area of Hargeisa, known to include many IDP camp residents from minority communities. 

Background  

Environment 

The Federal Republic of Somalia is the eastern-most extension of the African continent, located in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. 

The southern region between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers is the main area of settled agriculture. However, as only 13 per cent of the land is arable, there is intense pressure on available pasture and water. 

History 

The history of Somalia has been shaped by its location, with its expansive coastline facing both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Thought to date back to approximately 3,000 BCE, ancient cave paintings in Laas Geel, Somaliland show that the region was settled by nomadic pastoralists several millennia ago. In a process of migration and settlement that then took centuries, Cushitic-speakers came from the west and north, and Bantu-speakers settled the lowlands. Ancient Somalia participated extensively in the vast trading networks linking Carthage and Rome to the west and India to the east. Arab merchants set up trading posts, with Mogadishu being established in the 8^th century. Arabs introduced Islam very early to the region, as reflected in the building of the Masjid (mosque) al-Qiblatayn in the significant port of Zeila in the 7^th century. From the 10^th century onwards, a number of Somali sultanates dominated the sea routes, with residents in Mogadishu and the Ajuran being particularly prominent and whose influence lasted for centuries. Other important sultanates included Warsangali, Ifat and Adal. Portuguese traders began to establish a presence in the 1500’s, although it took the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 to bring colonial competition over control of the region to a head.  

At the 1884 Berlin Conference, European powers carved Somali territory into four different territories: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (later Djibouti) and Kenya. In 1949, when Emperor Haile Selassie was reinstalled to the Ethiopian throne, Britain ceded the Ogaden region to Ethiopia. The question of reunification preoccupied successive Somali elites at the cost of addressing more concrete challenges. Economic and social issues received scant attention while the cultivation of clan and sub-clan interests accentuated the demise of kinship and the rise of clannism. When British Somaliland gained independence in 1960, it immediately joined with the formerly Italian-administered Somaliland. In 1969 a bloodless military coup displaced independent Somalia’s civilian government following the assassination of President Shermaarke by a rival clan member. Mohammed Siad Barre became President. 

Barre proved adept at exploiting nationalist jargon and Cold War politics for his personal gain. Initially a nominal proponent of Marxism, his regime received large-scale military and financial support from the Soviet Union. But following the 1974 military coup in Ethiopia that overthrew the US- backed Haile Selassie and brought to power the Communist Mengistu Haile Mariam, Moscow rapidly withdrew its support for Somalia’s claims on Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. When Somalia invaded the Ogaden in 1977, the Soviet Union airlifted Cuban troops to help Mengistu repel Barre’s advancing forces from the Ethiopian capital. Barre deftly switched allegiance to the United States, which, especially after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, provided lifeblood for his autocratic military regime until the Cold War’s end. 

Clan rivalries 

Traditional rivalries among various Somali clans were exacerbated by Barre’s divide-and-rule policies. The failing economy and political system reawakened long suppressed discontent over the regional neglect of the north, compounded by the fact that various clan groups in the north were not treated equally. The historically strong and wealthy Isaaq had been systematically undermined in military and civil service posts and through the unequal development of resources and the location of development projects. 

Barre constructed the inner core of his government from representatives of three clans belonging to the Darood clan family. By mid-1988, Somalia was embroiled in one of the most brutal civil wars in Africa, involving the government and five armed opposition groups. With dwindling US support to fight off encroaching clan militias, by 1990 Barre only controlled the capital, Mogadishu. However, in January 1991 Mogadishu fell to Hawiye clanspeople under the leadership of General Mohamed Farrah Aideed and his USC militia. Later that year, Barre fled to Kenya for exile before finally moving to Nigeria where he died in 1995. 

The downfall of Siad Barre: the effect on minorities 

By 1991 Somalia was a nation without a government or central security force, where a collection of armed clan militias fought over spoils, and in a combination of political and ethnic conflict, ravaged the land and systematically killed and displaced the civilian population. During Barre’s reign, as many as 500,000 Somalis are estimated to have died, and another 2 million had fled their homes to become displaced persons within their own country or unwelcome refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. By the time UN troops arrived in force two years after Barre’s fall, the crisis was far advanced. These two years allowed warlords to fragment the country in an attempt to consolidate shifting fiefdoms and alliances, and to deny resources to civilian communities as the source of this power. The arrival of UNOSOM with aid and resources provided them with a new source of strength. Indeed, several of the warlords who came to dominate later in the decade received their initial funding through UN contracts. 

Minorities were hard hit by the chaos during and following the fall of Siad Barre. Outside the clan system of protection, they faced expulsion from their land as well as looting by armed militias belonging to the more powerful groups. The victimization of women, particularly those who were displaced, was widespread. In the Shebelle region and the Hiran region north of Mogadishu, Gosha suffered displacement and starvation early on in the civil war. Scorched earth tactics were in operation against Bantu and other agricultural communities in the region between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in 1991-1992, removing their very means of survival. Communities were raided, stripped of their resources or expelled. Wells were destroyed, seeds, stocks and livestock looted, and agricultural land misappropriated. Meanwhile, the Gaboye/Gaalgale minority groups – accused of supporting Barre – faced brutal reprisals from Aideed’s militias. Many were murdered, others simply disappeared, their remains never discovered, while others fled the country. 

The outbreak of civil war had a disproportionate impact on Somali women, who suffered rape, displacement and limited access to essential services such as health and education in the years that followed. Another consequence of the conflict was a rise in the number of female-headed households, leaving women with the responsibility to support their families alone. 

Somaliland 

While southern Somalia was tearing itself apart, the northwestern strip of the country, Somaliland, was declaring independence. This region had already had a taste of statehood in the 1960s, when it was independent for a few days in 1960 between the end of British colonial rule and its union with the former Italian colony of Somalia. This area of the country is dominated by the Isaaq clan. They had long complained that the Darood and Hawiye had dominated power and privilege in the country at the expense of Isaaq since independence, and that southern Somalia, being both more developed and denser in population, had tended to dominate the northern region. In an attempt to crush the Isaaq Somali National Movement in the late 80s, Barre’s military unleashed terrible violence against civilians. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, and at one point around 90 per cent of Hargeisa – the main town in the area – was destroyed. Some 400,000 people fled into eastern Ethiopia. 

Since 1991, Somaliland has formed a breakaway region of Somalia, dominated by the Isaaq clan, though its independent status has yet to be recognized by either Mogadishu, a foreign government or the United Nations. Nevertheless, this northern area was relatively calm while the rest of the country remained immersed in chaotic inter-clan warfare. In October 2008, however, a series of bombings across Somaliland and Puntland killed nearly 30 people and led to fears about deteriorating security here too. 

Puntland 

Another region which has autonomy is Puntland. This area in central Somalia is dominated by the Majerteen sub-clan, allied with or falling within the Darod major clan group. Under Siad Barre’s regime, the area had suffered harsh treatment because of the presence of the rebel Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In May-June 1979, over 2,000 people died of thirst and the clan lost 50,000 head of cattle and 100,000 goats. In 1998 under Majerteen leadership, the region declared autonomy. Its stated goal was the establishment of a federated Somalia rather than the independence sought by neighbouring Somaliland.  

Attempts to restore central governance and the rise of al-Shabaab 

Up to 2004, there had been 14 attempts to restore a central government to Somalia. The 2004 effort resulted in lengthy peace negotiations in neighbouring Kenya, which were held under the supervision of several Horn of Africa states. This finally resulted in an agreement in August 2004 to create a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In October 2004, the Transitional Federation Assembly (TFA) elected Puntland’s President, Abdullahi Yusuf, a Darood, to serve as President of the TFG. The following month the President named Ali Mohammed Gedi, a Hawiye – but one lacking clan backing – as Prime Minister. The new Transitional Assembly – also elected in Kenya – had 30-odd seats reserved for minorities. It was a small but largely symbolic step forward as from the outset there were doubts about the TFG’s ability to take control of the country. The TFG inherited the clan-based power sharing system, known as the 4.5 formula. It allows half a seat to representatives from minority clans for every one seat held by members of majority clans. Although the number of minorities in Somalia remains difficult to count, it is likely to be much higher than the 4.5 formula suggests, and even within the given ratio, members of majority clans continue to disproportionally dominate in the 0.5 share allocated to the minorities. 

Islamic courts with backing from Hawiye businessmen seeking a more secure environment began to subdue the warlords in the capital. Amid the uncertainty of everyday Somali life in the south, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) gained popular support and were able to establish order through application of Shari’a law, although women and non-Muslims found themselves living under stricter conditions. 

In June and July 2006, the ICU defeated a coalition of militia leaders, taking control of the capital and other parts of the south. Mogadishu and its surroundings were calmer and safer than at any time since 1991. The ICU accused the TFG of receiving direct Ethiopian military assistance and called for holy war on Addis Ababa. This in turn fuelled Ethiopian concern about secessionist sentiment in its Somali Region. The United States also grew concerned about the ICU, accusing it of maintaining links to Al Qaeda. In November 2006, the Ethiopian government admitted to military engagement in Somalia, and with the backing of United States air support, routed the ICU from Mogadishu and southern Somalia in the following month. But Ethiopian forces, backed up by a small contingent of African Union (AU) peacekeepers from Uganda and later Burundi, struggled to impose their control in the face of a growing counterattack by factions including remnants of the ICU operating under the name al-Shabaab (‘youth’). 

Al-Shabaab started out as the youth wing of the ICU and developed into a hardline military force that opposes any UN- or AU-led peace process, which the more moderate ICU would support in the framework of a power-sharing agreement between the Islamists and the government. There was a renewal of bitter clan fighting, as largely Hawiye fighters have clashed with Ethiopian forces and their Darood allies. Heavy-handed tactics by Ethiopian troops increased popular opposition to the invasion. US air strikes on alleged terrorist targets in 2007 and 2008 also killed civilians and may have contributed to greater support for al-Shabaab militants. In October 2007, the struggling government entered into a power-sharing deal with a more moderate Islamist faction and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia, whose troops had been subject to fiercer counterattacks than anticipated, agreed. As the last of its forces withdrew in January 2009, the government remained only in control of the town of Baidoa and some neighbourhoods of Mogadishu. For its part, al-Shabaab announced that it would now turn its full attention to targeting AU peacekeepers in its effort to establish an Islamic state. 

In its fifteenth attempt to set up a government since 1991, the parliament elected a new moderate Islamist President from the Hawiye clan in early 2009. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed had headed the Shari’a courts movement that had brought some stability to Mogadishu and most of south Somalia in 2006, before the Ethiopian military ousted them. Ahmed chose a Darood, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as Prime Minister in a power-sharing government intended to end civil conflict, resettle the displaced and facilitate international aid. Prime Minister Sharmarke resigned from the TFG in September 2010 and was replaced by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed. In August 2010, the TFG drafted a new Constitution and launched a consultation process. 

Fighting between al-Shabaab and TFG forces, despite the presence of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), continued throughout 2009. Continuous fighting in Mogadishu then marked 2010 as the worst year for Somalian violence in over a decade. UN figures reported an average of more than 20 weapon-related casualties per day over the year. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam launched a new offensive against the TFG in May, which intensified during the months of Ramadan (August-September of that year). Al-Shabaab also claimed responsibility for the 11 July bombing in Kampala, Uganda, which they said was a response to Uganda contributing troops to AMISOM in Somalia. Al-Shabaab made significant territorial gains in 2011, winning control of most of South-Central Somalia from the Kenyan border to regions bordering Puntland, whilst the TFG controlled only a few blocks of Mogadishu around the Presidential Villa. In 2010, al-Shabaab enforced a version of Shari’a law which was severely in breach of international legal standards. This included a number of ‘morality laws’ such as the systematic closure of cinemas, and bans on the stimulant khat, smoking and music. Severe restrictions were also placed upon women, who were prohibited from leaving the house alone and forced to wear the abaya, a garment which covers the whole body and was supplied by al-Shabaab. 

Continued challenges despite post-conflict stabilization 

With the TFG’s mandate set to expire, in August 2012 the National Constituent Assembly, consisting of clan elders, local leaders, youth and women, overwhelmingly passed a new Constitution by a margin of 621 to 13, with 11 members abstaining. Subsequently, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud became President – the first to be elected from within Somalia since the start of the civil war more than two decades before, and a 275-member parliament was selected by clan elders. These milestones were deemed a significant step in the country’s transition toward democracy, and ushered in a new era of hope whereby Somalia could finally move from conflict and instability to peace and redevelopment. 

Somalia continues to struggle with humanitarian crises, attacks from a resurgent al-Shabaab and weak governance, with central authority control still fragmented by competing clan rivalries and vested interests. The situation has been aggravated by environmental pressures such as drought and floods, bringing with them famine and displacement. 

Governance 

In the absence of central governance, and with the exception of a brief rival administration by Islamists and an attempt to form an inter-clan government, a fractured Somalia has fallen under the shifting control of competing clan elites. Within a caste-like hierarchy, Somalis are divided into three to five major clan families; the number and definitions of these are contested. Most conventional descriptions of Somali society identify four major clan groups: Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Darood, who make up higher Samaal castes, and Digil-Mirifle/Rahanweyn (sometimes mentioned as two distinct clan groups), belonging to the low-caste Sab. Some consider the Isaaq part of the Dir clan. Each clan comprises numerous subfamilies and lineages.  

While ‘clan’ refers to the social organization, clannism is the politicization of the clan structure by elites, for personal gain. The clan is an important social organization in the Somali social structure. It affects politics, economics and social status. For minorities, the clan structure poses special difficulties; the Bantu, Gaboye, Benadari and others lie outside the system. They have little or no political power, and during upsurges of the conflict, have been especially exposed. Without militia protection, they are vulnerable to attack and having their properties seized. Thus, in a country where all residents face some degree of threat, minorities are at special risk. 

Clan relationship is regulated by the Somali customary law, xeer. This is particularly important in view of the absence of a well-functioning modern state structure and judiciary in Somalia. In most of the southern Somali regions, it is customary law that is utilized to regulate social relations. Besides determining one’s origin, social standing and economic status, clannism permeates nearly every aspect of decision making and power sharing in the country. In the best case, the clan may provide a social security welfare system for its members, but at its worst, it leads to conflict, bloodshed and xenophobia. Xeer also governs the relationship between minority and majority communities but does not always provide the same level of protection to minorities as majority clans. In fact, minority communities previously relied on majority clans for protection through sheegat or sheegasho, whereby minority groups would become closely associated with a majority clan through provision of some service or compensation in exchange for protection. Such protective (but often also exploitative) relationships mostly came to an end with the onset of the civil war, when majority clans targeted members of particular minority clans due to their limited numbers and lack of military organization. 

Despite efforts to reform and strengthen formal governance in Somalia, the government is currently able to provide only limited protection for minorities and offers few opportunities for participation for women. Nor have the authorities appeared to exploit the post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ to build more inclusive institutions for minorities and women – for example, by revising the controversial 4.5 system. 

This controversial power-sharing formula, providing equal political representation to the four major clans, while the country’s minorities receive an additional half-share as a collective, has attracted continued criticism since its inception in 2004. On the one hand, commentators saw it as a good temporary stepping stone toward a power-sharing mechanism that could eventually lead to a one-person, one-vote political system. However, while the system was designed to encourage power-sharing and prevent a particular group monopolizing decision making, it has been criticized for deepening social divisions and failing to reflect the true composition of the Somali population. Out of a total of 275 seats in parliament, the four major clans are each guaranteed 61 seats, while minority clans have only 31 seats, including sub-clans in the majority ethnic groups imposed into the minority quota on political grounds. Some commentators have suggested that the 4.5 ratio should be increased to 5 to provide minority clans with better representation (i.e. with minority clan representatives also being 61 individuals). Furthermore, the 4.5 arrangement fails to reflect the diversity of Somalia’s minorities, reducing all the various minority clans to a 0.5 sub-group and ignoring the range of societal customs that characterize each one. As the 0.5 sub-group is not based on the actual net population, it does not provide equal representation: on the contrary, it places limits on the space for political participation among minority groups and facilitates the domination of government and other political structures by majority clans. The argument that minorities should be given greater representation appears to have gained some acceptance: for example, it has been observed that cabinet selections under current President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud were made using the 5, rather than 4.5, distribution structure. Despite this headway, however, little progress has been made to adequately incorporate minority clans – and by extension minority women – into the political sphere.